69-3671

PATTERSON, David Sands, 1937-
THE TRAVAIL OF THE AMERICAN PEACE
MOVEMENT, 1887-1914.

University of California, Berkeley, Ph.D., 1968
History, modern

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

© Copyright by
DAVID SANDS PATTERSON
1969

# The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887-1914

By

**David Sands Patterson**

**A.B. (Yale University) 1959**
**M.A. (University of California) 1963**

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

**History**

in the

GRADUATE DIVISION

of the

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Approved:

Armin Rappaport
Paul Seabury
Lawrence W. Levine

Committee in Charge

Degree conferred DEGREE CONFERRED JUNE 13, 1968
Date

# CONTENTS

I. The Late Nineteenth Century Setting. . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. Anglo-American Arbitration, 1887-1898. . . . . . . . . . 21

III. Reaction: War and Imperialism, 1898-1900 . . . . . . . 86

IV. Toward the Federation of the World, 1898-1909. . . . . 140

V. Organization, 1905-1914. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

VI. Profile, 1910-1914 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

VII. The Wilson Administration, 1913-1914 . . . . . . . . . . 312

VIII. Aftermath. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366

Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412

# I. THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY SETTING

## (1)

Historians of American diplomacy agree that in the post-Civil War era the United States began to be interested in expanding abroad, an interest that culminated in the war with Spain and in the acquisition of a colonial empire. Starting with the important events between 1898 to 1900, they have looked backward in an attempt to uncover the economic changes, the expansionist theories of intellectuals, and strategic factors which contributed to the growing interest in and the eventual establishment of a new American empire. Yet if the expansionists won the day in these years, it does not necessarily follow that they were the only individuals who were interested in influencing American foreign policy. Indeed, it was in these same years that several American peace workers were also trying to persuade the American government to adopt their proposals for American foreign policy. If they had no pronounced influence on the formulation of American foreign policy in these years, their perseverence and dedication to the cause of world peace did not go unnoticed by contemporary observers.

Since the influence of the American peace workers in the last decades of the nineteenth century was limited, it is not surprising that most historians have relegated them to comparative oblivion. Yet the American friends of peace who participated in the organized peace movement should not be overlooked for three reasons. First, they serve as a healthy antidote to the accepted view that the American people were almost totally uninterested in international affairs immediately following the Civil War and that when they did begin to take an interest in international problems in the 1890's, they became overwhelmingly jingoistic and began to experience a "psychic crisis," such as Richard Hofstadter has described, which finally swept the nation into war with Spain in 1898. Second, their numbers increased in the post-Civil War years, so that as early as 1887 a modest contingent of peace advocates was lobbying in behalf of an Anglo-American arbitration treaty. Finally, and perhaps most important, in these same years the American pacifists had already organized several peace societies which provided the foundation on which the peace movement was to build and expand in the decade-and-a-half after the Spanish-American war. The pre-1898 years, in short, were years of preparation for the American peace movement.

(2)

What, first of all, were the organizations that participated in the American peace movement in the closing decades of the nineteenth century? Of the peace societies, only a few received any notice from the nation's press or exerted much influence in the first two decades after the Civil War.

The oldest peace organization, the American Peace Society, was most influential. Organized in Boston in 1828, it quickly became and remained the best known of the American peace groups in the ante-bellum period, mainly because of its dedicated leaders who included William Ladd, William Jay, Elihu Burritt, and Charles Sumner, and the scholarly merits of its monthly journal, the Advocate of Peace. From its first days the Society championed international arbitration and worked closely with its more radical counterpart across the Atlantic, the London Peace Society, in organizing a series of peace congresses from 1843 to 1853. Although badly divided by the Civil War, the American Peace Society slowly recovered. In the 1870's and 1880's a new generation of dedicated intellectuals, reformers, and professional people replaced the aged or now deceased pre-war leaders. Among the new leaders were suffragette Julia Ward Howe, the New York jurist David Dudley Field, and Edward Everett Hale, the Boston clergyman who was perhaps best known for his authorship of The Man Without a Country.[1]

A second major peace society after the Civil War was the Universal Peace Union. Organized in Philadelphia in 1866 by the Quaker wool manufacturer, Alfred H. Love, a nonresistant who vigorously opposed and personally defied the military draft during the Civil War, the Universal Peace Union took an uncompromising antiwar position. Within a few years this radical peace group, benefitting from the reaction to the human slaughter of the Civil War, had formed branch societies in several states and had enrolled several thousand members. Though many, like Love, were Quakers, non-Quakers also embraced the Union's program and joined the new group. While supporting the principle of international arbitration treaties as one path to world peace, the Union placed major emphasis on the armament problem. Believing preparation for war meant eventual war itself, it championed immediate disarmament of all nations as the surest path to permament world peace. Similarly, it attacked military training in the schools and colleges. Love even advocated the abolition of the armed forces in the United States and proposed an amendment to the United States Constitution which would have taken the war-making power out of the hands of Congress and given it to the people through a war referendum.[2]

---

[1] Merle Curti, The American Peace Crusade, 1815-1860 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1929), 88-95, 122-23, 166-88, 194-200; Merle Curti, Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636-1936 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1936), 75-76, 143.

Though working on a scant budget averaging only $1500 a year, the Union managed to publish a monthly, the Peacemaker, which Love himself edited.[3] The Peacemaker helped to publicize the Union's program, but an even more important promotional technique was the use of eye-catching symbols such as peace bells, flashy banners, and the peace plow. The last-named dramatized the Biblical prophecy of Isaiah: "They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks. Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." At the centennial celebration of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, a blacksmith actually forged a sword into a peace plow and a spear into a pruning hook, and their exhibit of another peace plow at the Chicago World's Fair in 1893, depicting the same prophecy, won the grand prize.[4] Though many people criticized and ridiculed these propaganda tactics as tomfoolery, they at least attracted the public's attention to the Union.[5]

---

[2] Alfred H. Love, "Military Instruction in Schools, Colleges, and Churches," American Journal of Politics, V (August 1894), 205-11; Robert Welsey Doherty, "Alfred H. Love and the Universal Peace Union"(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: University of Pennsylvania, 1962), 96-98, 102-05.

[3] The journal began with the title Bond of Peace in 1868, changed its name to Voice of Peace in 1874, and finally to Peacemaker in 1882. To avoid confusion, I have used the last-named title throughout these pages.

Although Love remained the Union's guiding hand and main inspiration until his death in 1913, a few dedicated members helped him. Of the other Union members, Mrs. Belva A. Lockwood gave Love the most faithful support. An ardent woman suffragist, defender of the rights of labor, and in 1879 the first woman lawyer to argue a case before the Supreme Court of the United States, she was nominated for the Presidency of the United States by the National Equal Rights Party in 1884 and again in 1888.[6] In the previous decade Mrs. Lockwood, who was living in Washington, D.C., heard of the Universal Peace Union and, strongly supporting its opposition to militarism, quickly became the Union's main lobbyist in Congress. She also helped other Washington peace workers found the National Arbitration League in the nation's capital in 1882 to muster support for arbitration and anti-military resolutions in Congress.[7]

---

[4] Doherty, "Love," 78-83; Peacemaker, XI (May 1893), 201-02. For more details on the peace plow, see ibid., XII (November 1894), 81-90;and Advocate of Peace, LX (November 1893), 253-54.

[5] Curti, Peace or War, 79-80. As if these ostentatious displays did not give the Union publicity enough, a Vice-President of the Universal Peace Union sailed with Commodore Peary for the North Pole in 1897 bearing peace messages! Alfred H. Love, A Brief Synopsis of Work Proposed, Aided and Accomplished by the Universal Peace Union During the Last Forty-Five Years (From 1866 to 1911) (n.p.: n.p., n.d.), 17.

One other peace organization, the Peace Association of Friends, completed the list of the most influential peace societies in the two decades after the Civil War. Founded by the yearly meeting of Ohio Friends in 1866, the Peace Association of Friends established headquarters in New Vienna, Ohio, and a few years later moved them to Richmond, Indiana. Although it remained exclusively a Quaker organization, it spread its peace message to all faiths, especially to ministers of the gospel who hopefully would convey Christ's teachings of human brotherhood and non-violence to their congregations. Its journal, Christian Arbitrator and Messenger of Peace, had the widest circulation of any peace paper in the United States in the 1870's and early 1880's, and in one year, 1871, the circulation reached eleven to twelve thousand ministers.

---

[6] In the latter year, Love was nominated for the Vice-Presidency of the same party, and though declining the nomination, his name was not removed from all the ballots by election day. Doherty, "Love," 139-41.

[7] Curti, Peace or War, 116; Belva A. Lockwood, "How Shall the Columbian Exposition be Opened?" American Journal of Politics, I (July 1892), 44-47, is a good statement of her anti-militarism.

Since about one-half of this total subscribed to the journal, it is probable that these clergymen at least read the issues and made an honest effort to include the question of war and peace in some of their Sunday sermons. Finally, the Peace Association of Friends reinforced the efforts of the other pacifist agencies by frequently petitioning Congress against large armaments and in behalf of international arbitration.[8]

Other individuals abhorred war and preached peace, although they were not actively associated with peace societies. These included disillusioned Civil War veterans like William Tecumseh Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant, whose indictments of war the pacifists frequently quoted, ministers, and international lawyers. The lawyers were perhaps the most active non-pacifists who actively searched for methods to substitute law for war. In cooperation with their occupational counterparts in Europe, the American lawyers established two international law societies in 1873, the Institute of International Law and the International Law Association.[9]

---

[8] Official Report of the Fifth Universal Peace Congress Held at Chicago, United States of America, August 14 to 20, 1893 (Boston: American Peace Society, 1894?), 67-68; Amos Arnold Hovey, "A History of the Religious Phase of the American Movement for International Peace to the Year 1914" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: University of Chicago, 1930), 180, 181.

[9] Actually, the latter was called the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations until 1895 when it changed its name to the International Law Association. I have used the latter title throughout these pages. Irwin Abrams, "The Emergence of the International Law Societies," Review of Politics, XIX (July 1957), 361-80, is the best account of the formation and activities of these two societies.

The shock of the Franco-Prussian war and, more important, the enthusiasm generated by the Geneva arbitral award of 1872, which settled the thorny issue of American claims against Great Britain for the latter's building and outfitting of ships for the Confederacy during the Civil War, prompted lawyers to found these societies. Idealists but not dreamers, they diligently drew up codes of international law in the hope that the major powers would endorse their work at some future international conference. Many of the discussions at the annual sessions of these two societies centered around David Dudley Field's pioneer work, Draft Outlines for an International Code, first published in 1872.[10]

Although pacifists placed more faith in arbitration treaties whose provisions were loosely framed to give maximum flexibility to the contracting parties than in the precise legalism of an international code, many of them participated actively in the lawyers' conferences. Several members of the American Peace Society were international lawyers, including Field himself, and had played a major role in founding the International Law Association. Once the movement for international arbitration treaties revived in the late 1880's and 1890's, however, the American pacifists' interest in international law societies declined while their interest in and cooperation with peace societies, both at home and abroad, revived. As a result, the impact of the international lawyers on the peace movement, which was never very pronounced to begin with, slowly declined. Only after the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 did their legal expertise assume importance again.[11]

---

[10] Ibid., 363-64; Curti, Peace or War, 97-101.

(3)

Despite the untiring efforts of these peace advocates, as late as the mid-1880's the American peace societies had made almost no impact on public opinion. One sign of the weakness of the societies was their failure to gain Congress' support of international arbitration. Congressmen willingly introduced their petitions in behalf of international abritration in Congress, but almost all of them were immediately referred to the foreign relations committees where they died or were reported out unfavorably. The only exception occurred in 1874 when the lower chamber endorsed two such resolutions on the same day, and six days later the Senate endorsed a third.[12] So, too, the efforts of the Universal Peace Union and the American Peace Society to induce the Republican administrations between 1869 and 1885 to mediate conflicts or disputes between other nations found sympathy from the Presidents and Secretaries of State but brought no concerted diplomatic action which might have unnecessarily jeopardized America's traditional isolationism.[13]

---

[11] Ibid., also Abrams, "International Law Societies,"377-80.

[12] Congressional Record, 43rd Congress, 1st session, II (June 17, 1874), Appendix, 5114, 5124; (June 23, 1874), Appendix, 5407.

[13] Curti, Peace or War, 102-03, 174, 176.

Another indication of the ineffectiveness of the movement was its static character. New local societies, it is true, were formed in these years, but many of them failed within a few years for lack of financial support and public interest, and the few that survived had only a local following and influence. As a result, the total number of peace organizations fluctuated from twenty-five to thirty, including six to twelve state and regional groups,throughout the 1870's and 1880's. As for membership in peace societies, one observer estimated in 1887 that it totaled only four hundred.[14] Moreover, the societies lacked the financial resources to employ any full-time peace worker. Even the zealous Alfred Love continued to rely on his woolen business for his income. Peace work, in short, was not a profession.

The reasons for the societies' limited influence are not difficult to explain. For one thing, the inevitable reaction to the horrors of the Civil War was somewhat blunted by the general feeling that the war had been fought for high and noble ends, the preservation of the Union and the abolition of Negro slavery. The American peace movement had centered almost entirely in the Northeast before the war, and many pacifists from this section had renounced their pacifism when the prospect of a Civil War loomed on the horizon. Even those Northerners who believed that the Civil War was a repressible conflict assumed that only a stronger Southern willingness to free and resettle their slaves in return for some monetary compensation by Congress could have prevented the armed clash between the sections.[15] In the second place, the peace movement had previously grown most rapidly during the "Romantic" era of the 1830's and 1840's when anti-slavery, educational, temperance, prison, and woman's rights reforms were fashionable. By contrast, the post-Reconstruction era was hardly a reform generation. Most Americans, caught up in the "Great Barbecue" of the 1870's and 1880's, were interested in business concerns and other pecuniary interests. In an age of materialism, reform activity of the utopian variety was at a premium. Finally, the peace movement had even less hold on the public imagination because of the dearth of important international issues. Once the Anglo-American arbitration of 1872 settled American Civil War claims against Britain, no questions of vital importance appeared on the international scene. Although certain businessmen were beginning to look outward for new markets for their agricultural and industrial surpluses in these years, they did not stimulate feelings of international consciousness among the American public. With the exception of these businessmen, the few advocates of peace and arbitration, international lawyers, and some governmental officials, the eyes of almost all Americans were still turned on local and national issues or on the American West. Lands across the oceans still seemed remote. In terms of public interest in foreign affairs, these were truly the "nadir" or at best the "awkward" years of American diplomatic history.[16]

---

[14] Robert McMurdy, cited in Curti, Peace or War, 81.

---

[15] Merle Curti, American Peace Crusade, 218-23; also see George M. Fredrickson, The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 41-44, 56-57, 61-64. Fredrickson describes the declining pacifism of non-resistants like Gerrit Smith, William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, Ralph Waldo Emerson, all of whom participated in the peace movement before 1861, in the wake of Southern secession and the firing on Fort Sumter.

(4)

Although the American peace movement failed to show much strength in the first two decades following the Civil War, it began to show flickerings of new life in the late 1880's. Slowly but inexorably, new forces began to sow the seeds for a quickening of interest in the peace movement, and these seeds were to bear considerable fruit in the next two decades. The growing interest in peace was an inevitable by-product of a shrinking world. By the 1880's the continuing industrial revolution had led to the development and perfection of new inventions such as the steamship, the telegraph, and the trans-Atlantic cable, all of which increasingly facilitated contact and communication with foreign lands. These developments, in turn, gradually induced many Americans to expand their intellectual horizons beyond the United States. The increasing frequency of American attendance at international conferences over imperial claims, scientific, marine, and postal matters in the 1870's and 1880's was one index of a growing international consciousness among American governmental leaders.[17] Another index was the tendency among American industrialists and farmers to look outward. The more capitalists adapted new scientific and technological innovations to expand industrial and agricultural production, the more their search for new markets abroad increased. Since the American population nearly doubled between 1870 and 1900, the home market kept pace with production and throughout the period bought about nine-tenths of the agricultural and industrial output. The total dollar value of the other tenth continued to grow in these three decades, however, until it amounted to more than $1,000,000,000 in 1898. As the disposal of these surpluses abroad became an important monetary consideration, the businessmen's search for foreign markets increased. Gradually they came to see an interdependent economic world in which commercial isolation, however desirable, was no longer possible. And it was natural for producers to turn to the federal government to promote policies which would help to expand America's export trade. Their favorite remedies were lower tariff barriers and reciprocity treaties. The depressions of 1884 to 1886 and 1893 to 1897 only intensified their interest in and search for foreign markets, for with home consumers able to buy less in hard times while production figures remained relatively high, the businessmen's ability to dispose of the enlarged surplus abroad often meant the difference between their survival and bankruptcy.[18]

---

[16] Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 4th edition, 1955), ch. 26; David M. Pletcher, The Awkward Years: American Foreign Relations under Garfield and Arthur (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1963). Bailey has omitted the word "nadir" from the chapter titles of later editions of his textbook, but if public interest is a measure of a nation's diplomatic history the word is still an accurate one.

---

[17] See Paul S. Reinsch, *Public International Unions: Their Work and Organization* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1911), 23, 34, 56-57, 63, 69; also Curti, *Peace or War*, 176.

The assumption of the business community that extra-continental commercial expansion was a fact of life, it is true, contributed to the large navy sentiment which increasingly dominated the public mood in the decade of the 1890's. Many politicians and some businessmen accepted the argument so brilliantly elaborated by Alfred Thayer Mahan in the late 1880's and early 1890's that business interest in foreign markets necessitated a large, modernized navy to protect American trade on the high seas and to win commercial concessions from foreign nations which would respect, if not fear, America's naval might. It is also true that Brooks Adams, Josiah Strong, and John Fiske pointed out that America's increasing economic involvement in the world would inevitably lead to some kind of political involvement. However much these writers differed in their interpretations of America's future role in foreign affairs--and there were significant differences among them--they all agreed that the changes in commerce, industry, communications, and transportation had thrust the United States onto the international stage.

---

[18] Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963), 17-24, ch. 4.

The intellectuals who discussed America's future role in world affairs were important not so much because of any direct influence they had in shaping American foreign policy in the 1880's and 1890's, although in the case of Adams and Mahan their influence was more than marginal, but because they reflected certain common attitudes of many Americans who were beginning to think seriously about American involvement in world affairs and because they helped to define the intellectual limits within which the foreign policy issues were debated. The key words or phrases like "Social Darwinism," "Anglo-Saxonism," and "expansionism," which repeatedly appeared in their writings and speeches, also appeared in the public statements of almost all literate Americans who discussed the nation's present role and future promise in the world arena. It is therefore worthwhile to investigate, however briefly, what these intellectuals meant when they used these words and then to compare and contrast their interpretations with those of the American peace workers.

To begin with, when talking about these intellectuals as a group, it is difficult to go beyond the simple generalization that they all believed in American "expansion." Historians have erred in the past in emphasizing that all these writers laid the intellectual foundations for the outburst of manifest destiny sentiment of the 1890's that culminated in the war with Spain in 1898 and in the acquisition of a colonial empire.[19] That their writings contributed to the expansionist sentiment of the 1890's is indisputable, but that they all thought they were formulating a rationale for an American colonial empire is certainly mistaken. In fact, recent historical scholarship has shown that "expansion" before 1898 meant different things to different people.[20] While to some it came to mean the glorification of the American nation and the justification of the use of military power and physical conquest, if necessary, to forge a new empire, to many others it meant the extension of America's influence abroad through nonviolent means. To many American businessmen, for example, it meant commercial expansion without any drastic changes in America's traditional political or strategic position in world affairs. Confident in the superior marketability of their products, these businessmen assumed they could find foreign outlets for the distribution of their surpluses without the acquisition of foreign areas by conquest or purchase. All that was needed, they believed, was equal opportunity to trade with other nations.

---

[19] For one attempt to link all these writers to imperialism, see Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1959 revised edition), ch. 9.

[20] For some of the most penetrating scholarship, see Dorothea R. Muller, "Josiah Strong and American Nationalism," Journal of American History, LIII (December 1966), 487-502; Charles Hirschfeld, "Brooks Adams and American Nationalism," American Historical Review, LXIX (January 1964), 371-92; and Milton Berman, John Fiske: The Evolution of a Popularizer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 140-42, 251-52. LaFeber, New Empire, ch. 2, is the best summary. His essay is so good that he considerably diminishes, though not entirely discredits, the "intellectual formulation" for expansion which is the theme he propounds in the chapter.

Expansion also meant the extension and application of American ideals to other peoples without the acquisition of colonies or protectorates. It meant, in short, a reassertion or reinterpretation of the American mission. While Mahan and Adams hardly assumed that American expansion would occur without the strong possibility of serious conflict with other powers, Strong and Fiske began and ended their writings with this optimistic assumption. Though the latter two were silent on naval preparedness, they both strongly opposed the jingoism of the 1890's and had deep reservations concerning the war with Spain and the annexation of the Philippines. Fiske, and to a lesser extent Strong, were Social Darwinists and used evolutionary theory to explain the expansion of American influence throughout the world, but they repudiated the violent implications of such phrases as "the struggle for life" and "the race for life" that characterized the rhetoric of Mahan, Adams, and imperialistic-minded politicians. Much as Fiske assumed America's future physical power and commercial supremacy, he deprecated naked force and believed that America's industrial power was a force for good in the world. It would bring, he thought, a world of rising material plenty, harmony, and peace instead of international friction and combat.[21] Since other Social Darwinists like John W. Burgess, E.L. Godkin, and William Graham Sumner opposed or had misgivings over America's war with Spain and strongly condemned the acquisition of a colonial empire in the western Pacific, it is clear that Social Drawinism alone did not provide the intellectual foundations of imperialism. So, too, when Fiske and Strong talked of "Anglo-Saxonism," they used it more in a cultural than in a racial sense. The basis of Strong's philosophy on international affairs, for example, was not Darwinism but Christianity. Since he assumed that the Christian ideal had received its fullest expression in the United States and Great Britain, he argued that these nations were obviously in a more favorable position to spread Christian ideals to other lands. Not racial hostility but the Christian ideal of love, of world service, was the basis of his expansive Anglo-Saxonism. In fact, he often warned that the Anglo-Saxons were "as worldly, as gross, as selfish and beastly ... as ... any other people," and he supported proposals to protect the underdeveloped nations from self-righteous missionaries and others who consciously or unconsciously brought to these lands the vices along with the spiritual benefits of Anglo-Saxon civilization.[22]

---

[21] See Berman, Fiske, 138-40; and Muller, "Strong," 491-92, 498-99. Also LaFeber, New Empire, 99-100.

Strong and Fiske were not pacifists and did not assume positions of leadership in the American peace movement in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, their ideas on American expansion are important for revealing the similarity between their version of expansion and that of the American peace workers. The fact is that the leaders of the peace and anti-imperialist movements acknowledged and occasionally invoked the arguments of Strong and Fiske as part of their own ideological baggage.[23] Nor were they entirely mistaken in claiming them as their own. Both Strong and Fiske had optimistic visions of a peaceful, federative world order and thus were more in agreement with the American peace workers than with "realistic" nationalists like Brooks Adams and Alfred Thayer Mahan. If Strong and Fiske were not as certain as the idealistic pacifists in their hopeful vision, they shared the pacifists' faith in international arbitration as a desirable first step toward this goal.[24] As long as nations seemed interested in negotiating arbitration treaties for the peaceful settlement of international controversies, it was easy for all friends of peace to believe that they were making progress toward a peaceful world order. It was only when the harsh realities of imperial rivalries and the Spanish-American controversy over Cuba began to challenge their optimistic and rather innocent assumptions about international relations that the more moderate friends of peace began to suffer intellectual discomfort and to leave the fundamental question of war and peace to the pacifists who were determined to work for peace even as war threatened. Until then, however, international arbitration provided a consensus around which they could all unite.

---

[22] Berman, Fiske, 249-51; Muller, "Strong," 488-97.

---

[23] In a review of Strong's The New Era, or The Coming of the Kingdom, one anonymous peace worker criticized Strong's overstatements of Anglo-Saxon achievements and destiny but approved his call for the evangelization of the world. The review was generally favorable. Advocate of Peace, LV (December 1893), 284. Some of the Boston peace workers knew Fiske personally and admired his cosmic optimism.

[24] Strong actively cooperated with the peace workers in promoting arbitration treaties with Great Britain and other nations. For Fiske's support of Anglo-American arbitration, see his essay, "The Arbitration Treaty," in A Century of Science and Other Essays (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, and Company, 1899), 166-93.

# II. ANGLO-AMERICAN ARBITRATION, 1887-1898

## (1)

In the years 1887 to 1898, the interest of peace advocates centered almost entirely on Anglo-American arbitration. At first glance their promotion of an arbitration treaty between these two nations appears rather impractical, for past and present grievances between the United States and Great Britain had raised imposing obstacles in the way of any rapprochement. The two nations had been enemies in the War of Independence and the War of 1812 and had nearly resorted to hostilities during the American Civil War. Although they had successfully resolved the American Civil War claims, disputes between the United States and the Dominion of Canada over fishing rights off the Newfoundland coast and the Bering Sea seals continued to plague Anglo-American relations. Moreover, the Irish immigrants in the United States further embittered their relations. Intensely anti-English, many Irish joined an Irish-American organization, the Fenians, which in the 1870's and 1880's used the United States as a base for armed raids on Canada. Many other Irishmen returned to Ireland to inflame anti-English sentiment there. Yet since the Irish were an important political force in the United States, the state and federal authorities generally refrained from vigorous prosecution of these radical Irish. In fact, both political parties were so acutely aware of the concentration of Irish in the large urban centers of the populous Northeastern states that they carefully cultivated their votes. The close elections of the 1870's and 1880's made politicians' deference to the Irish doubly important. For an administration in Washington to endorse an Anglo-American arbitration treaty, therefore, would have aroused the strong opposition of the Irish and invited defeat at the polls. As late as 1900 many politicians recognized that twisting the lion's tail was still good politics.[1]

Yet the leaders of the arbitration movement found good reasons for believing that these obstacles to Anglo-American understanding were not insurmountable. In the first place, both nations had long led the way in the negotiation and ratification of arbitration treaties. One estimate showed, for example, that either the United States or Great Britain had been a party in eighty-six of the 124 arbitration agreements between 1815 and 1887. Even more significant, the United States had concluded nearly half of its arbitrations with Great Britain.[2] The Geneva award, they just claimed, was not only the most recent but perhaps also the most important Anglo-American arbitration treaty, and therefore was a promising omen for the negotiation of a more permanent treaty between the two nations. Furthermore, both spoke the same language and shared common traditions in religion, law, literature, and politics. In the jargon of that day, the shared "Christian institutions and principles." For these reasons alone, the peace workers could argue persuasively that if the United States was going to open negotiations for an arbitration treaty with any European nations, it should begin with Great Britain. In the late nineteenth century, however, a new intellectual development enhanced the idea of Anglo-American understanding. This was the impact of Darwinian thought which stimulated the notion of race patriotism. Especially popular among the intelligentsia and upper classes of both nations, "Anglo-Saxonism" increasingly became the rationale for closer trans-Atlantic ties.[3]

---

[1] See the able summary by Charles S. Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), 1-3; also R.G. Neale, Great Britain and the United States Expansion, 1898-1900 (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1966), 157-61, 214.

[2] W. Evans Darby, International Arbitration. International Tribunals. A Collection of the Various Schemes Which Have Been Propounded; and of Instances Since 1815 (3rd ed., London: J.M. Dent and Co., 1900), ix, 486-505. Slightly

---

different totals are given in John Bassett Moore, "Historical Notes on International Arbitration," in The American Conference on International Arbitration, Held in Washington, D.C., April 22 and 23, 1896 (New York: The Baker & Taylor Co., 1896), 195-99. Benjamin Trueblood, address, in Report of the Second Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1896 (Lake Mohonk, N.Y.: The Lake Mohonk Arbitration Conference, 1896), 32. (Hereafter reports of these conferences are cited as Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, with the year of the conference added). Compiling a list of arbitration treaties is rather arbitrary, for it depends on the definition given to arbitration. Most arbitration treaties have covered specific issues rather than established a permanent framework for the arbitration of future disputes. The Treaty of Washington of 1871, for example, established arbitral tribunals to handle only a few specific past grievances between Great Britain and the United States but in no way provided for the arbitration of future difficulties that might arise between the two nations.

## (2)

Not much came of the peace workers' first attempt to promote an Anglo-American arbitration treaty in the 1880's. The episode is worth relating, however, for it exemplifies the many barriers that lay in the path of Anglo-American understanding and the British and American peace workers' vigorous but unsuccessful attempts to remove them. The first move for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty came from Britain in 1887. Randal Cremer, a British labor leader, provided the catalyst which touched off a flurry of peace activity in both nations. For several years a promoter of arbitration in both industrial and international disputes, Cremer was elected to the House of Commons in 1885. In the spring of 1887 he began soliciting his colleagues in the House to sign a memorial addressed to the President of the United States in which they pledged their support for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty. Cremer gained the signatures of 234 members of the House of Commons, and though not asking for their endorsement, his scheme also received letters of support from thirty-eight members of the House of Lords.[4]

---

[3] Advocate of Peace, LV (April 1893), 82; and (December 1893), 276-77; Trueblood, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1896, 28-33. See also Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, 8-9.

[4] Arbitrator, No. 183 (May 1887), 1; and No. 184 (June 1887), 2. This journal was the organ of the British International Arbitration League; Cremer, the League's secretary, was the main leader.

Before bearing the memorial to the United States, Cremer secured the aid of an influential ally, the British-born Andrew Carnegie, whom he met in June 1887. Carnegie was an excellent choice. An outspoken advocate of an Anglo-American arbitration treaty as early as 1885, Carnegie perhaps best embodied the race patriotism which provided much of the intellectual cement for Anglo-American understanding. In his best seller of 1886, Triumphant Democracy, for example, he had attributed the greatness of the American people to their British descent. "Fortunately for the American people," he exulted, "they are essentially British. I trust they are evermore to remain grateful for this crowning mercy." He later expressed his twin loyalties more succinctly: his "Motherland" was Britain but his "Wifeland" was America.[5] Carnegie's annual summer sojourns in his native Scotland only deepend his love for and identity with both nations. Consequently, when Cremer approached him with the memorial, Carnegie was enthusiastic. He immediately agreed to promote the memorial and upon his return to the United States arranged an interview with President Cleveland at which a British delegation could present the memorial.[6]

---

[5] Andrew Carnegie, Triumphant Democracy, or Fifty Years' March of the Republic (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886), 23; Andrew Carnegie, address, in Proceedings of the Third American Peace Congress Held in Baltimore, Maryland, May 2 to 6, 1911, ed. Eugene A. Noble (Baltimore: The Waverly Press, 1911), 21. (Hereafter cited as Third American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1911). Carnegie also wrote: "For many years the United flag has floated from my summer home in my native land, the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack sewn together -- the first of that kind of flag ever seen. That flag will continue to fly there and the winds to blow the two from side to side in loving embrace." Andrew Carnegie, "Americanism Versus Imperialism," North American Review, CLXVIII (January 1899), 6.

For the White House interview, Cremer gathered a British delegation of nine members of the House of Commons and three representatives of the Trades Union Congress. When the delegates arrived in Washington, Cremer invited Lyon Playfair of the House of Lords to join them. Playfair accepted. Like Carnegie, Lord Playfair had married an American, spent part of each year in Britain and America, and preached the common racial ties of the two peoples. Moreover, he had already discussed the Cremer memorial in a speech as the British representative at the Philadelphia centennial celebration of the signing of the Constitution.[7] On October 31, 1887, Carnegie and the British delegation called on the President. After Carnegie had introduced the British visitors, Playfair and Cremer argued the merits of their memorial. Speaking in general terms, Playfair emphasized that the United States and the United Kingdom, "allied by blood and knit together by lore," were "the common inheritors of the traditions and glories of the Anglo-Saxon race from which we have obtained the spirit of conciliation." An Anglo-American arbitration treaty, he concluded, "would be a glorious example to other nations and might lead to the two great Anglo-Saxon nations being the peacemakers of the world." Cremer was more specific. Anticipating possible objections to the arbitration proposal, Cremer admitted that there were obstacles in the way of such a treaty, but he insisted that they were not insurmountable. Indeed, their memorial indicated that there was considerable support in Parliament for such a treaty. To the possible query, why, then, did not the signatories initiate such a proposal in their own legislature? Cremer argued that "the government of the United States, being free from the old world broils and complications, is of all governments most favourably circumstanced for taking the initiative."[8]

---

[6] For a full summary of the Cremer-Carnegie meeting, see Arbitrator, No. 184 (June 1887), 2-5. David Dudley Field who was in Britain at the time also encouraged Cremer in his plans. Peacemaker, VI (July and August 1887), 10-11.

[7] Wemyss Reid, Memoirs and Correspondence of Lyon Playfair, First Lord Playfair of St. Andrews (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1899), 239-47, 250-21, 359-66, 405-09.

Cleveland accepted the memorial and promised to give the proposal his "faithful and careful consideration." He made no definite commitment to the Cremer proposition, however, and in fact stated that practical difficulties would probably stand in the way of its adoption.[9] Though Cleveland did not state exactly what these difficulties were, they were fairly obvious. Senatorial opposition to a pending fisheries treaty with Great Britain and the strong Irish antipathy toward England undoubtedly induced Cleveland's caution. With a national election only a year away and Anglophobia rampant, the administration's formal endorsement of the Cremer proposal would have been politically inexpedient.

---

[8] Arbitrator, Nos. 189-192 (November, December [1887], January, February [1888]), 8-11, gives verbatim the addresses at this interview.

[9] Ibid., 11.

If the Cremer group had any illusions concerning the absence of virulent Anglophobia in the United States, the Irish soon dispelled them. Following the meeting with the President the British visitors appeared at public meetings in Philadelphia, Boston, New York, and Camden, New Jersey, which local peace societies and civic leaders sponsored. The avowed purpose of these meetings was to drum up public support for the memorial, but the Boston meetings alone were successful. At Philadelphia, New York, and Camden, Irish agitators infiltrated the meetings and frequently interrupted them with cries of "Remember the Alabama!" "Home Rule for Ireland!" "We Want no peace with England!" "Give us arbitration for Ireland!" "We won't listen to English assassins!" At Camden the Irish were so disorderly that they nearly broke up the meeting. Only the adoption of a resolution urging Britain's arbitration of its difficulties with Ireland pacified the Irish who then allowed the meeting to pass a resolution endorsing an Anglo-American treaty.[10]

---

[10] Proceedings of these meetings, along with full press reports from American newspapers, are reproduced in ibid., 11-30. Quotations are from pp. 27, 28, 29, 30. While obviously partial to the pacifist viewpoint, The Arbitrator much more frequently presented evidence of the shortcomings and failings of the arbitration movement than any of the peace journals in the United States.

Though considerably sobered by the Irish demonstrations, Cremer did not give up all hope. While most of the British delegation departed for England, Cremer and two others returned to Washington for the opening of Congress on December 6, 1887. As Cremer half-expected, Cleveland's annual message to Congress did not mention international arbitration. Nevertheless, several American congressmen told Cremer that they approved of his mission and would support an Anglo-American treaty. Perhaps, he now reasoned, Congress' endorsement of ~~the~~ the British proposal might help to influence the President at some later date to open treaty negotiations. Cremer found a powerful ally in Senator John Sherman of Ohio, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who gave the British visitors a hearing before his committee. Partly as a result of their testimony, several Anglophile congressmen introduced resolutions in both houses proposing an Anglo-American arbitration treaty.[11]

Nor did the American peace workers give up hope. Many of them in New York and Boston who had warmly received the Cremer delegation in their cities drew up petitions and memorials to Congress. In January 1888 a New York committee, consisting of Andrew Carnegie, David Dudley Field, Charles A. Peabody, Dorman B. Eaton, Morris K. Jessup, and Mayor Abram S. Hewitt persuaded a New York Representative to introduce in Congress their petition which requested the President to initiate formal negotiations for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty, and a month later Carnegie, Field, and Peabody testified in behalf of their petition before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.[12] In the same month, Edwin Mead, a member of the American Peace Society, presented a memorial to President Cleveland signed by the Governor of Massachusetts, the Mayor of Boston, several scholars and university presidents, and Boston peace, business, and civic leaders. It urged presidential action on the British memorial. Once again the President expressed sympathy for the British proposal but reiterated the practical difficulties that he faced.[13]

---

[11] Ibid., 12-13, 30-31; also Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 1st session, XIX (December 12, 1887), 17, 25; (April 9, 1888), 2796; (July 28, 1888), 6958.

The House failed to take any action on the resolutions, but in June 1888 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported a resolution endorsing the principle of international arbitration, and upon Senator Sherman's urging it passed. Framed in general terms, the Senate resolution "requested the President to invite from time to time, as fit occasions may arise, negotiations with any government with which the United States has or may have diplomatic relations, to the end that any differences or disputes arising between the two governments which cannot be adjusted by diplomatic agencies may be referred to arbitration, and adjusted by such means."[14] There the matter rested until January 1890 when Sherman introduced an identical concurrent resolution. This time it passed both houses unanimously.[15]

---

[12] Ibid., XIX (January 24, 1888), 687; David Dudley Field, Andrew Carnegie, Dorman B. Eaton, Morris K. Jessup and Abram S. Hewitt, Memorial to Congress, 1888 (pamphlet in Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College); Arbitrator, Nos. 189-192 (November, December [1887], January, February [1888]),2; and No. 193 (March 1888), 2.

[13] Ibid., 1-2.

The State Department dutifully communicated the resolution to foreign governments, but no response was forthcoming until 1893 when the House of Commons responded to the Congressional resolution.

While the peace leaders were taking an interest in Sherman's resolution, an arbitration scheme for the Americas also held their attention. This arbitration proposal evolved out of the movement for a Pan-American Congress. After several resolutions calling for a Pan-American Congress had failed in Congress between 1886 and 1888, Congress passed a law in May 1888 authorizing the President to call a Pan-American Congress to meet in Washington the following year.[16] President Cleveland issued the formal invitations to the conference, but by the time the Conference convened on October 2, 1889, the Harrison administration had assumed office.

---

[14] Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 1st session, XIX (June 14, 1888), 5239.

[15] Ibid., 51 st Congress, 1st session, XXI (January 15, 1890), 581; (February 14, 1890), 1325; and (April 3, 1890), 2986.

[16] A. Curtis Wilgus, "James G. Blaine and the Pan American Movement," Hispanic American Historical Review, V (November 1922), 687-91, cites the introduction of ten congressional resolutions for a Pan-American Congress in 1886, 1887, and 1888 before Congress finally endorsed the calling of a Conference.

In the new President's appointment of James G. Blaine to the Secretaryship of State, the arbitration proponents found a firm friend. Blaine had long favored more cordial relations with the American Republics and as Secretary of State in 1881 had issued invitations to a Pan-American conference. Blaine's plan had collapsed shortly after the assassination of President Garfield, however, when the new President, Chester Arthur, removed Blaine from the Cabinet, and, after prodding from his successor, Frederick L. Frelinghuysen, also withdrew the invitations. In 1889, however, Blaine had a second chance. When the First International American Conference, as it was called, convened in Washington, Blaine personally presided over the sessions. While interested in promoting American trade with the Central and South American nations, he also endorsed arbitration at the Conference. Indeed, as his oft-repeated remarks on Pan-Americanism testify, he believed the prerequisite for commercial prosperity throughout the hemisphere was peace and the means for stimulating the desired peace was an inter-American arbitration treaty.[17] Moreover, the appointment of Andrew Carnegie as an American delegate gave him an influential ally in his promotion of an arbitration treaty.[18] When a fight developed on the arbitration convention which a committee of the Conference had painstakingly formulated, Blaine left the dias, and, assuming the role of an American delegate, strongly defended the convention.[19] The Conference finally included an arbitration convention for disputes which diplomacy could not settle, except for questions of "independence," but it was not adopted. President Harrison praised the arbitration convention when he submitted it to Congress, but once referred to the foreign relations committees it was quickly forgotten. The home governments of several Latin American nations also helped to deliver the fatal blow to the arbitration scheme. Suspicious of its sweeping provisions which their northern "Big Sister" might invoke to demand commercial and diplomatic concessions from their countries, these Southern neighbors also failed to ratify the treaty.[20]

---

[17] James G. Blaine, Political Discussions: Legislative, Diplomatic, and Popular, 1856-1886 (Norwich, Conn.: The Henry Bill Publishing Co., 1887), 403-06, 411; and International American Conference, Reports of Committees and Discussion Thereon (4 vols., Washington, D.C., 1890), II, 1167.

[18] Ibid., II, 1110-11.

(3)

It is doubtful whether the American peace advocates had any marked influence on the American political leadership between 1887 and 1893. Despite their enthusiastic support of the Cremer mission, for example, President Cleveland had failed to endorse an Anglo-American treaty. And Blaine needed no prodding from peace workers to promote his arbitration scheme for the Americas. Moreover, except for Sherman's concurrent resolution of 1890 the peace advocates could point to no concrete accomplishments in the arbitration movement, and even Sherman's interest in peace and arbitration antedated the Cremer mission.[21] Yet these years 1887 to 1893 were important ones for the peace movement, for simultaneously with this interest in international arbitration on the governmental level came a rapid growth and expansion of the peace movement. In a few cases, in fact, the American government's interest in international arbitration contributed directly to the new signs of vitality in the peace movement. The number of peace societies did not increase appreciably in these years,[22] but a few reform organizations now included international peace among their aims. It was also in these same years that the existing peace societies added new and vigorous leaders and broadened their contacts to include other pacifist agencies both at home and abroad.

---

[19] *Ibid.*, II, 1145-46.

[20] *Congressional Record*, 51st Congress, 1st session, XXI (September 3, 1890), 9582, 9635. For the reactions of the Latin American states to the American plan, see Thomas F. McGann, *Argentina, the United States and the Inter-American System, 1880-1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 145-48; and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The International Conferences of American States, 1889-1928* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1931), 40-41, note 4. To comply with a vote of the Conference, the State Department transmitted the project to European governments, but that was the last heard of the matter.

One sign of an awakening of peace interest came from two women's organizations, the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union and the National Council of Women. In 1887 the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, founded more than a decade earlier, established a department of peace and arbitration. The Ohio WCTU had added the subject of peace to its list of departments in 1885 and at its state convention in 1887 voted to request the forthcoming WCTU national convention to add a peace department. Miss Frances E. Willard, president of the national WCTU, was present at this Ohio convention and warmly endorsed the resolution. Already a loyal supporter of Alfred Love's peace efforts in the Universal Peace Union, Miss Willard needed no prodding. In introducing the Ohio resolution at the WCTU national convention in Nashville in late November 1887, she linked together the peace and temperance movements. The creation of a peace department, she insisted, was "strictly germane to our work for nothing increases intemperance like war."[23] To bolster support for the Ohio proposal, she invited the English Quaker, William Jones, Secretary of the London Peace Society, to address the convention. Though not an official member of the Cremer delegation that called on President Cleveland, Jones had independently promoted Anglo-American arbitration in an interview with the President a month before Cremer's visit to the United States. He had also attended Cremer's interview with the President and had given moral support to the British memorial. On the strength of Miss Willard's and Jones' appeals, the WCTU convention quickly agreed to establish a department of peace and arbitration.[24]

---

[21] According to Alfred Love, John Sherman was a Vice President of the Universal Peace Union as early as 1880. Peacemaker, XIX (November 1900), 106.

[22] As late as 1893 there were only eleven state and regional peace societies, excluding branches, in the United States. Advocate of Peace, LV (January 1893), 23. Peacemaker, XII (October 1893), facing 61, lists thirty-five local, state, and regional societies, excluding branches.

---

[23] Quoted in Hovey, "Religious Phase of the Movement for International Peace," 187.

For superintendent of the new peace department, the WCTU appointed the Maine Quaker, Mrs. Hannah J. Bailey. Although Mrs. Bailey remained active in suffrage, temperance, and other reform movements, her major interest for the next twenty-seven years was the peace department of the WCTU.[25] She believed that the women of America, especially the mothers and school teachers among them, could most effectively educate the youth of America in moral and religious principles which lay at the heart of pacifism. Women, she stressed, could greatly stimulate the peace movement once they realized the full potential of their moral influence in the Sunday schools, public schools, and homes of America. In 1895, for example, she wrote:

> It is early training that exerts the greater influence. Mothers should not allow their children to have military toys, to practice warlike games, or anything that makes them familiar with taking life, as a pastime. They should be early taught the divine law as to the sacredness of human life, and also the golden rule. Show them that true

---

[24] Typescript copy of Union Signal, June 1, 1893, Hannah J. Bailey Papers (Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College), Box 1, contains the fullest account of the founding of the WCTU peace bureau. Also see Hannah J. Bailey, "Diary," November 4, 1889, ibid., Box 5; and Mary Earhart, Frances Willard: From Prayers to Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), 260-62. Peacemaker, VI (December 1887), 101, gives a full account of Jones' interview with President Cleveland.

[25] A good biographical sketch of Mrs. Bailey is contained in ibid., XVI (May 1898), 205-06.

> heroism consists of saving life and property and in self-denying labors for the good of mankind. Instil [sic] into the minds of the boys and girls the noble principles of forgiveness of injuries and of overcoming evil with good. Let us teach the children that true patriotism consists in doing good and not evil to our fellow countrymen, and teach them to love the flag of our country, to regard it only as an emblem or ensign of our nationality, and to hold it sacred as such. We wish every school-house in our land had this beautiful emblem floating over it.[26]

Operating out of her Maine residence, Mrs. Bailey advanced these ideas in two monthly peace publications, The Acorn, a children's magazine, and The Pacific Banner, for adults, both of which she edited. She also issued a stream of peace tracts. As early as 1888 her department distributed 4,500 Bible readings, 2,500 leaflets on peace, and 16,000 leaflets for children, and a year later it sent out 5,000 calendars depicting peace and war themes.[27] With the encouragement and loyal support of Miss Willard, she enlisted the services of ten women lecturers to spread the peace gospel throughout the United States and promoted peace bureaus on the state level. By 1889 the WCTU had established departments of peace and arbitration in seventeen states and by 1893 this number had grown to twenty-five states and the District of Columbia. On the basis of this phenomenal growth Alfred Love could declare without exaggeration: "The peace department of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union, though only one of the phases of the work carried on by this great organization of women, is really one of the strongest and most influential of our peace organizations."[28]

---

[26] Quoted in Advocate of Peace, LVII (April 1895), 80.

[27] Earhart, Willard, 263-265.

A year after the founding of the WCTU's peace department, a group of women reformers organized the National Council of Women. From the start Mrs. May Wright Sewall, a dedicated suffragist and pacifist from Indianapolis, Indiana, was the driving force in the new organization, though Mrs. Lockwood, Miss Willard, and Mrs. Bailey were also active members. The latter two even served, for a time, as officers. Women pacifists in the Universal Peace Union and the leadership of the WCTU and the National Council of Women cooperated so closely in their peace work that the three bodies seemed to act more as sister-organizations than as separate reform groups.[29]

While the womanhood of America was organizing two pacifist agencies, the older peace organizations began to show new signs of life. In 1889 the leaders of the American Peace Society and Universal Peace Union cooperated with

---

[28] Ibid.; Christian Arbitrator and Messenger of Peace, XXIII (November 1893), 175; Peacemaker, VIII (March 1889), 73.

[29] Earhart, Willard, 265-68; May Wright Sewall, letter, in Advocate of Peace, LXXII (March 1910), 65. Peacemaker, XIII (January 1895), 122-23; (March 1895), 176; (April 1895), 189-93; XV (February 1897), 158-59. May Wright Sewall, ed., Genesis of the International Council of Women and the Story of its Growth, 1888-1893 (Indianapolis: n.p., 1914?) contains an excellent documentary history of the activities of the National Council of Women in the United States and its cooperation with other women's reform groups in the United States and with the National Women's Councils in Europe.

European pacifists in holding a Universal Peace Congress in Paris. Pacifists had held international congresses from 1843 to 1853, and in 1867, 1878, and 1882, but these meetings had neither been widely attended nor generated much enthusiasm. More than 500 peace leaders, including delegates from the American Peace Society, Universal Peace Union, and WCTU peace bureau, attended the 1889 congress, however, which proved the first of these congresses to assemble annually in European and American cities from 1889 to 1913, excepting 1898 and 1899.[30] The first three congresses were so successful, in fact, that the pacifists decided to establish a permament organization at Berne, the International Peace Bureau, to handle the administrative work for future conferences and to serve as a world-wide clearing house for peace proposals.[31]

It was also in these same years, 1887 to 1893, that the American Peace Society was strengthened by two new leaders, Robert Treat Paine, a Boston philanthropist and great-grandson of the signer of the Declaration of Independence, who served as its president from 1891 until his death in 1910, and the Quaker pacifist, Benjamin F. Trueblood, who left a successful career as a midwestern college president to serve as its secretary from 1892 until shortly before his death in 1916. Although Paine's presence gave the peace society a prestigious name as well as a dedicated peace worker, Trueblood's influence in the society was more important. The new secretary brought a rare combination of administrative ability and missionary zeal to the Boston society. His careful editing of the Advocate of Peace, for instance, immeasurably improved the quality and enhanced the respectability of that journal without sacrificing the high moral tone of its pacifist message. Moreover, no other American peace worker rivaled his mastery of three foreign languages, his knowledge of the history of the peace movement, and his patient dedication to its daily tasks. Compared with Alfred Love whose strident personality and sensational publicity tactics annoyed many peace workers, Trueblood quickly gained the respect of all friends of peace.[32] Perhaps most important, Trueblood was the first full-time peace worker. As one of his colleagues, Edwin Mead, later remarked: "When Dr. Trueblood began his service as secretary of the American Peace Society in 1892, and for many years afterwards, it is right to say that he was the only professional peace worker in the United States, the only man who made service of the peace cause his vocation.... In

---

[30] Two of these congresses were held in the United States -- in Chicago in 1893, and in Boston in 1904.

[31] Merze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942), ch. 3, has a good summary of the Universal Peace Congresses from 1889 to 1897. A synopsis of the organization of the International Peace Bureau appears in Peacemaker, XXIII (September 1904), 205-07.

---

[32] A good summary of Trueblood's early life is Charles E. Beals, Benjamin Franklin Trueblood - Prophet of Peace (New York: Religious Society of Friends, 1916?), 1-9.

Dr. Trueblood's early days in Boston he stood alone; it may almost be said that he was the organized peace movement in America, so far as vocation was concerned."[33]

(4)

The additional pacifist agencies, individuals, and international contacts encouraged the belief among American workers for arbitration that the promotion of international arbitration which had previously resulted in frustration and failure might at last bring success. In 1893 they undertook a new campaign for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty -- a campaign which after many painful delays and temporary disappointments ultimately resulted in the negotiation of the Olney-Pauncefote treaty of 1897. Again the initiative came from Randal Cremer. Unlike his petition of 1887, however, which Cremer circulated in Parliament for support of an arbitration treaty with the United States, in 1893 he introduced a resolution in the House of Commons asking for the government's official endorsement of such a treaty. Also unlike his campaign in 1887 which he initiated without any previous evidence of support for arbitration from the United States government, in 1893 he was able to cite the Sherman resolution as a clear indication of American interest in international arbitration. It was now Britain's turn, he urged, to initiate negotiations on the basis of the Sherman resolution. On June 16, 1893, the House of

---

[33] Edwin D. Mead, introduction to Benjamin F. Trueblood, The Development of the Peace Idea, and Other Essays (Boston: Plimpton Press, 1932), xxii.

Commons debated his resolution which after a few changes in wording passed unanimously. While not specifically promising British initiation of negotiations for such a treaty, the resolution noted "with satisfaction" the Sherman resolution of 1890 and expressed the hope that both the British and American governments would use the Sherman resolution as the basis for cooperation in negotiating an arbitration agreement.[34]

The British resolution fell on fertile ground in the United States. Shortly after the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Julian Pauncefote, communicated the British resolution to Walter Q. Gresham, Secretary of State in the second Cleveland administration, Robert Treat Paine of the American Peace Society called on the Secretary and urged him to secure some favorable mention of the British proposal in the President's annual message to Congress.[35] Paine's efforts may have had some effect, for on December 4, 1893, Gresham wrote Pauncefote that the House of Commons' endorsement of the Sherman resolution "afforded a most gratifying proof of the sentiment of the two nations in favor of the settlement of international agreements by honorable resort to impartial arbitration, a mode of adjustment of which the United States and Great Britain have, by mutual accord, given to the world conspicuous illustration on several recent occasions." He added that President

---

[34] Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, XIII (June 16, 1893), cols. 1240-73.

[35] Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1893 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894), 346. (Hereafter cited as F.R., with the year added.) Paine, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1895, 35.

Cleveland's annual message on the same day would lay the parliamentary resolution before Congress for its consideration. Cleveland did, in fact, inform Congress of the British resolution and praised the growing expressions of sentiment in both nations for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty. At last the President had expressed his mind on a subject which he had long favored privately.[36]

Yet the President did not specifically promise to open negotiations for a treaty. He probably hoped his message would induce Congress to pass a joint resolution or bill authorizing the President to take formal steps in negotiating a treaty with Britain. He soon discovered, however, that Congress was not very interested in the matter. Only one resolution proposing an arbitration treaty between the United States and Great Britain was introduced in each house, and both were immediately buried in committee.[37] When Congress reconvened in December 1894, Benjamin Trueblood and Robert Treat Paine of the American Peace Society interviewed members of the foreign relations committees of both houses in an attempt to discover the reasons for Congress' disinterest and to urge congressional action in the present session. The congressmen gave them little encouragement. They pointed out that a congressional resolution would probably have little effect because the constitutional power for negotiating treaties rested solely in the hands of the chief executive. Since Cleveland intimated no action beyond his endorsement of the British resolution a year earlier, the prospects for an arbitration treaty did not appear very hopeful.[38]

---

[36] F.R., 1893, 352; James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (20 vols., New York: Bureau of National Literature, Inc., 1897-1917), XIII, 5874. (Hereafter cited as Richardson, Messages and Papers.)

[37] Congressional Record, 53rd Congress, 2nd session, XXVI (June 2, 1894), 5693; and (June 20, 1894), 6551.

While the movement was coming to an apparent standstill in the United States, Cremer again seized the initiative. During the summer months of 1894 he circulated a petition among the members of the House of Commons endorsing a treaty of arbitration with the United States. Cremer was rewarded for his efforts, for he received the signatures of 354 members of the House of Commons, 120 more than signed the memorial of 1887. Bearing the memorial, Cremer sailed for the United States in early January 1895 in what was in many ways a repeat performance of his mission in 1887.[39] On his second visit, however, he came alone and stayed only long enough to interview the Secretary of State and the President, and to give moral support to the friends of arbitration in Congress. As far as Cremer was concerned, his American visit was a complete success. Of his interview with Secretary Gresham, for example, Cremer wrote: "My first conference with Mr. Gresham lasted nearly an hour, and, although I am not at liberty to repeat what transpired, I can say that no more earnest, enthusiastic supporter of our cause could be found on either side of the

---

[38] Paine, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1895, 35-36; Advocate of Peace, LVII (April 1895), 84.

[39] The most complete account of Cremer's visit is in Arbitrator, Nos. 276-277 (February and March 1895), 16-20.

Atlantic, and the impression I then formed was fully confirmed at two subsequent meetings with the hon. gentleman."[40] Cremer's optimism was not unjustified, for Gresham was deeply interested in negotiating an Anglo-American treaty. He had even indicated in a letter of December 31, 1894, two weeks before Cremer's arrival in the United States, that he soon expected to begin negotiations with the British government and have a treaty signed within six months.[41] Cremer believed his interview with President Cleveland was "equally gratifying." In presenting the memorial to the President, Cremer stressed the strong support for such a treaty in Parliament. When Cleveland intimated his continued interest in an arbitration agreement, Cremer volunteered his advice on "the best way of getting a treaty drafted and agreed to."[42]

On the same day of his interview with the President, Cremer forwarded a copy of the British memorial to every member of Congress, and a day later, on January 19, 1895, Congressman William J. Coombs of New York introduced a resolution, based specifically on the Cremer memorial, calling for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty.[43] In the next few weeks, more than twenty Representatives and Senators introduced resolutions endorsing an Anglo-American arbitration treaty. Cremer himself helped to stimulate this activity when he made personal appearances on the floor of the House and Senate and then testified before the committees on foreign relations of both houses. Although he realized that Congress, which would adjourn in February and not reassemble until December, would probably not find time to act on the resolutions in 1895, he returned to England with the distinct impression that almost all congressmen, especially the Senators who would have to ratify such a treaty, approved of an Anglo-American arbitration treaty. On the basis of all these encouraging signs of support, Cremer boldly concluded: "If the present Government is in office when the treaty is prepared there will probably be little difficulty in the way of its being ratified."[44]

---

[40] Ibid., 16.

[41] Letter, cited in The Nation, LXVII (February 13, 1896), 133.

[42] Arbitrator, Nos. 276-277 (February and March 1895), 17.

[43] Congressional Record, 53rd Congress, 3rd session, XXVII (January 19, 1895), 1154-55.

It is doubtful whether Gresham and Pauncefote had more than the most informal discussions on an Anglo-American arbitration treaty during the first months of 1895,[45] for at the same time Cremer was exuding optimism, a boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guinea was complicating and gradually worsening Anglo-American relations. The dispute had existed since the 1820's and had worsened in the late 1880's, but in 1894 and the first months of 1895 it flared to the point where British military intervention in defense of its territorial claim seemed imminent. Believing intervention would provoke a serious crisis in Anglo-American relations, Gresham tried throughout 1894 to persuade Great Britain and Venezuela to arbitrate the dispute. His efforts were unsuccessful, for Venezuela had already broken off diplomatic relations with Great Britain and refused Gresham's entreaties to resume them. But if Gresham was annoyed by Venezuela's intransigence, he believed the threat of British incursions on American commercial and strategic interests in the New World was much more serious. Indeed, Britain actually extended its boundary claim westward in the first months of 1895. In the face of Britain's obstinancy, the suspicion increasingly grew in American governmental circles that Britain's professed interest in negotiating an Anglo-American arbitration treaty was really a clever design to hoodwink the United States into the acceptance of a position from which Britain could challenge and ultimately emasculate the authority of the Monroe Doctrine whenever it became involved in disputes with Latin American states. Opponents of arbitration delighted in presenting this view to the Cleveland administration.[46] Yet Gresham also realized that this dispute as well as other unresolved issues between Britain and the United States only made some kind of permanent system of arbitration between the two nations more desirable as an additional safeguard against war. He probably hoped to promote an amicable settlement of the Venezuelan controversy and then proceed apace with discussions on a permanent arbitration agreement; arbitration of the former would verify Britain's good will toward the United States and would stimulate interest in the latter. Whether Gresham could have successfully steered a moderate course of patience and persuasion until the British government came to accept his position will not be known, for Gresham suddenly fell ill and died on May 28, 1895. It is clear, however, that Gresham became increasingly annoyed at Britain's intransigence in his last few months in office, although his wife later wrote that even in his last note to the British Foreign Office (which was never sent), "there was to be no ultimatum as my husband prepared it."[47]

---

[44] Arbitrator, Nos. 276-277 (February and March 1895), 17; for the numerous resolutions on arbitration in early 1895, see Congressional Record, 53rd Congress, 3rd session, XXVII, "Index," (December 3, 1894 to March 4, 1895), 104.

[45] None of the Gresham-Pauncefote correspondence on an Anglo-American arbitration treaty was ever published, but Lord Salisbury referred to it a year later when negotiations for such a treaty were resumed. See F.R., 1896, 222.

---

[46] One American citizen, William Lindsay Scruggs, who served as lobbyist for the Venezuelan government in the United States, conducted a one-man propaganda campaign to focus the attention of Cleveland, Gresham, Congress, and the newspaper press on the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute. One example of his influence involved the Cremer mission. Realizing Cleveland's sympathy for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty, Scruggs hastened to arrange an interview with the President three days before Cremer's interview on January 18, 1895. Scruggs probably told the

---

President that an Anglo-American arbitration treaty would endanger the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine and bind the hands of the administration in any dispute between Britain and a Latin American nation. A day after the interview, Scruggs wrote that "The President seemed deeply interested" in his arguments. Although Scruggs did not sabotage Cremer's mission, it is safe to say that he helped to dampen temporarily the President's enthusiasm for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty. For new light on this and other aspects of the Venezuelan crisis, see John A.S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), chs. 5 and 6, especially 133-48.

[47] Matilda Gresham, The Life of Walter Quintin Gresham, 1832-1895 (2 vols., Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1919), II, 795.

Gresham's death brought only a momentary pause to the hopes of the arbitration workers. Only a week following his demise, thirty-five prominent supporters of the arbitration movement responded to the invitation of the Quaker humanitarian, Albert K. Smiley, to meet at his hotel-resort on Lake Mohonk in the Catskill Mountains of New York for a three-day conference on international arbitration. Isolated from the outside world, surrounded by beautiful, almost idyllic scenery, and with no liquor permitted on the premises, Lake Mohonk was a suitable location for high-minded discussions on important reform proposals -- and Smiley had long dedicated his life to benevolent causes. In 1883 he had started annual conferences at Lake Mohonk on the Indian problem and seven years later had begun similar meetings on Negro affairs, and though he did not abandon his conferences on these matters, his conference on international arbitration indicated his conversion to a new cause.[48] Though a member of the Society of Friends, Smiley was not a non-resistant; and without altogether prohibiting discussion on the armament question, he wanted to limit the scope of the conferences as much as possible to the subject of international arbitration.[49] The 1895 conference had far-reaching effects in the peace movement, for it proved the first of twenty-two annual spring meetings on peace and arbitration. These regular conferences represented the first departure from the ad hoc meetings which had previously characterized the peace movement in the United States. Moreover, as a common meeting ground for all peace workers in the Northeast and Middle West, the Mohonk sessions were to serve in succeeding years as a spawning ground for organizational schemes that would broaden and strengthen the American peace movement.

---

[48] Frederick E. Partington, The Story of Mohonk (Fulton, N.Y.: The Morrill Press, 1911) describes the founding and development of Smiley's hotel and his many philanthropic interests.

[49] Smiley best stated his position in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1896, 50-51.

Following the practice of his previous conferences on Indian and Negro affairs, Smiley invited the leaders in the peace movement as well as other high-minded individuals to his first conference on international arbitration. Among the participants at this conference were the prominent peace workers -- Hannah J. Bailey of the WCTU peace department, Reverend Edward Everett Hale, Robert Treat Paine, and Benjamin Trueblood of the American Peace Society, and William G. Hubbard of the Peace Association of Friends in America.

During the three-day conference the peace advocates delivered lofty speeches on the merits and advantages of international arbitration in general and an Anglo-American arbitration treaty in particular. All of these speeches obscured the harsh realities of world politics and America's growing involvement with them. Indeed, not one speaker mentioned the growing tension between the United States and Great Britain over the Venezuelan situation. With both President Cleveland and the British Parliament on record in favor of international arbitration, they trusted implicitly the good faith of the American and British statesmen to solve what seemed to them only a minor irritant on the way to a more positive relationship between the two nations. The platform of the Conference embodied this optimistic outlook:

> In taking the next great step forward, the United States should lead. Our country is free from foreign entanglements, is strong and prosperous in the result of its peaceful policy, and the world knows that we are not moved to it by fear. It is for those nations whose peaceful position is strongest, and whose strength is most conspicuous, to take the initiative; and it is time for Great Britain and the United States to act.
>
> Expressing, as we believe, the judgment of the American people we urge the government of the United States to negotiate a treaty of arbitration with Great Britain.[50]

The myopic optimism of the peace leaders was revealed only a month later when Gresham's successor as Secretary of State, Richard Olney, with President Cleveland's full approval, sent a bombshell message to England which claimed that the alleged British incursions upon Venezuelan territory were a violation of the non-colonization principle of the Monroe Doctrine and demanded arbitration of the Venezuelan boundary. In effect, Olney's note asserted America's paramount interest in the Western Hemisphere and demanded Britain's recognition of American supremacy there. When the Salisbury government at first ignored and finally brusquely rejected Olney's sweeping contention that the Guinea-Venezuela dispute required any deference to the Monroe Doctrine, Cleveland reiterated America's uncompromising position in a special message to Congress on December 17, 1895, which he concluded with the hint of impending war: "there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-interest and honor, beneath which are shielded and defended a people's safety and greatness."[51]

---

[50] Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1895, 81-82.

The Cleveland administration's motives in taking this jingoistic position are still a matter of debate among historians and need not concern us here. What is significant for the arbitration movement is the immediate reactions of the two governments and the peace workers. While both Cleveland and Olney wanted to force a "showdown" with Britain on the Venezuelan situation and were pleased with the strong public support for their policy, they did not want Anglo-American relations to deteriorate to the point of possible war. So alarmed were they by the outpouring of jingoistic support in the nation for their extremely broad -- and questionable -- interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that they immediately refrained from acting upon the inflammatory implications of their earlier messages. Instead, they stalled for time with the hope that public passions would soon cool.

Their hopes were at least partially fulfilled, though not without severe castigation of their blustering diplomacy. Within a week several editors, businessmen, educators, literary intellectuals, and churchmen denounced Cleveland's message and deplored the possibility of war between the two English-speaking peoples. Many of them went so far as to deny the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to the Venezuelan situation.[52]

---

[51] Richardson, Messages and Papers, XIV, 6090.

[52] Advocate of Peace, LVIII (January 1896), 7, 11-12, 14-17, 20-22; (February 1896), 39-45; (March 1896), 59-63, contains the fullest account of the editorials, petitions, speeches, and meetings in opposition to Cleveland's message to Congress.

The American workers for arbitration were also active. Totally unprepared for a crisis in Anglo-American relations, they were at first shocked and dazed by Cleveland's December message. Within a few days, however, they began to recover and to organize the opposition to Cleveland's message. While the WCTU, Universal Peace Union, and Quaker bodies petitioned Congress to delay precipitate action and heed the growing expressions of sentiment in the nation for a permanent system of arbitration to settle this and future disputes with Britain, Trueblood and Paine of the American Peace Society petitioned the President and Senate leaders to exercise restraint in the crisis and to search actively for arbitration of the Venezuelan dispute with Britain.[53] The Universal Peace Union also tried personal diplomacy. Shortly after Cleveland's message, it sent one of its Vice Presidents to Caracas to induce the Venezuelan government to arbitrate the boundary dispute with Great Britain. Despite Alfred Love's claim to the contrary, this peace mission did not change Venezuela's official position toward Britain, but the Venezuelan President was sufficiently impressed with the Union representative's extension of the olive branch that he bestowed upon him the decoration of the Order of the Bust of the Liberator and the title of Minister of Peace.[54] Of the American peace advocates, Andrew Carnegie seemed the least disturbed by

---

[53] Congressional Record, 54th Congress, 1st session, XXVIII (January 7, 1896), 482; (January 11, 1896), 600; and (March 5, 1896), 2517. Also Advocate of Peace, LVIII (January 1896), 5-11; (February 1896), 34,36; and Peacemaker, XV (April 1897), 217.

[54] Ibid., 217-218.

Cleveland's position. Though he believed war was possible, he optimistically assumed that the "day has gone by when English-speaking men can kill each other in battle." Indeed, he thought Cleveland's firm stand would help to vindicate two of his pet ideas: British withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere so as to avoid future friction with the growing power and influence of the United States in the area and the sudden realization by both sides that an arbitration treaty between the two powers was essential for future peace.[55]

Meanwhile, the Salisbury government in Britain also had no intention of going to war over the issue. Although Lord Salisbury at first seemed intent on maintaining his earlier rigid position and, in line with his insouciant approach to diplomacy, content to remain silent until the crisis atmosphere subsided or until the American government took specific action on Cleveland's message, the English press, members of Parliament, and leading Britons in professional and intellectual circles reacted with remarkable restraint to Cleveland's message. Even with this relatively mild reaction of British opinion, however, Salisbury might have remained firm in his earlier refutation of the American position but for another diplomatic crisis which followed closely on the heels of Cleveland's message. On January 3, 1896, the German Emperor, William II, sent a congratulatory telegram to Paul Kruger, the President of the Transvaal Republic, after the latter's forces had successfully repulsed the raid on his territory by a group of British filibusterers led by Dr. Leander Jameson. News of the Kruger telegram brought an outburst of anti-German sentiment throughout Britain and immediately diverted the attention of British leaders from Washington to Berlin. The new crisis with Germany over South Africa, which was much closer to Britain's main interests than British Guinea in South America, frightened members of Salisbury's cabinet and induced the Prime Minister to adopt a more flexible position on the Venezuelan question. Whatever they had thought earlier, the possibility of a war with the United States now seemed the height of folly. On January 12, 1896, only a day after the Salisbury Cabinet reviewed the crises in South America and South Africa, Lord Playfair, at the request of the British Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, began informal talks with Thomas F. Bayard, the American ambassador in Britain, to find an amicable solution to the Venezuelan dispute, and a few days later British private citizens in Washington arranged similar discussions with Secretary Olney. Though these talks did not accomplish anything concretely, they helped to delay any further drastic moves by the two governments. Gradually, and grudgingly, Salisbury accepted Olney's position of American interest in the boundary dispute and also agreed to conduct further discussions on the issue in Washington where the pliant Pauncefote could work personally with Olney. By April 1896 the two nations had agreed on the principles for arbitration of the Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dispute, and after strong British and American pressure on Venezuela, which had heretofore been callously ignored in the Anglo-American negotiations, an Anglo-Venezuelan treaty was signed in February 1897, and ratifications exchanged three months later, binding the parties to arbitration.[56]

---

[55] Advocate of Peace, LVIII (January 1896), 15; Carnegie, "The Venezuelan Question," North American Review, CLXII (February 1896), 129-45. Privately, Carnegie recognized another reason for believing that the war scare was not altogether harmful: it served as a boon to his steel company in gaining additional armor plate contracts from the United States Navy! As long as Carnegie owned his steel company, the Advocate of Peace continually questioned the contradiction between his professed love of peace and his willingness to accept the American Navy's orders for armor plate. Since Carnegie did not claim to be a peace-at-any-price man, he could have defended his acceptance of naval preparedness with the realistic argument that world peace could only be maintained through American naval strength. But Carnegie's position was particularly uncomfortable because he publicly advocated a small navy for the United States! Carnegie to John G.A. Leishman, President of the Carnegie Steel Company [no date, but after Cleveland's special message to Congress], December 1895, Andrew Carnegie Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Vol. 33, expresses his hope for larger armor plate orders. For Carnegie's small-navy views, see his An American Four-in-Hand in Britain (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883), 14-16, and Triumphant Democracy, 6. For pacifists' criticisms of Carnegie's position, see Advocate of Peace, LVIII (March 1896), 58; and LXIII (January 1901), 7.

Indeed, the longer the two nations' peace leaders reflected on Cleveland's speech and the longer neither the United States nor Great Britain seemed anxious to press its viewpoint to the point of war, the more they came to appraise Cleveland's message, though a colossal diplomatic blunder in the short run, as a distinct benefit to Anglo-American understanding in the long run. In expounding the points of agreement as well as disagreement between the two nations, Cleveland's message had cleared the air for an Anglo-American rapprochement and thus was really a "blessing in disguise."[57] As early as late January 1896, with the frigid diplomatic climate between the two nations just beginning to thaw, Randal Cremer described the effect of Cleveland's policy:

---

[56] The foregoing summary of the Venezuelan crisis is based largely on the extended analysis in Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), 152-205, 217-24; also A.E. Campbell, Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1960), ch. 2; Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), 39-59; and Grenville and Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, ch. 6. Campbell and May are particularly good on British public opinion. For Playfair's role, see Reid, Memoirs and Correspondence of Lyon Playfair, 416-26. The part of private individuals is fully traced in Joseph J. Mathews, "Informal Diplomacy in the Venezuelan Crisis of 1896," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, L (September 1963), 195-212.

> It would require a great stretch of the imagination to believe that President Cleveland issued his [December] message with a view of expediting the conclusion of a Treaty of Arbitration between this country and the United States, but, whatever may have been his motive, the effect has undoubtedly been to revive, quicken, and crystallize the movement in which we have laboured for so many years.[58]

Though Cremer had so solid reasons beyond his own compulsive optimism for making such a statement, his analysis was correct, for while Olney and Pauncefote were exchanging notes on the arbitration of the Venezuelan boundary in January 1896, they were simultaneously discussing the possibility of establishing a permanent Anglo-American arbitration treaty. Olney, who only recently had nearly brought on war with Britain, now seemed anxious to renew Gresham's idea of negotiating such an agreement.

---

[57] Arbitrator, Nos. 288-289 (February and March 1896), 21, 22; also Trueblood, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1896, 28; and Belva A. Lockwood, "International Arbitration, Venezuela, Cuba, and the National Conference at Washington," American Magazine of Civics, IX (July 1896), 15.

[58] Arbitrator, No. 287 (January 1896), 3.

The Olney-Pauncefote negotiations were secret and very tentative until early March, but in the meantime the friends of arbitration, fearing the prospect of the Venezuelan or some future Anglo-American dispute plunging the two nations into war, had already taken the first steps toward the promotion of a general arbitration treaty. Thirty-seven prominent Chicago citizens, none of whom was an active participant in the organized peace movement, initiated the campaign on February 5, 1896, when they issued a circular, addressed to the press and people of the United States, calling for the cities and towns throughout the nation to hold meetings to inaugurate "a movement for cementing all the English-speaking people of the world in peace and fraternal unity." It particularly urged public discussion on the question: "how to establish arbitration as the method of concluding all differences, which may fail of settlement by diplomacy between the two powers." In reply to the Chicago circular, favorable responses were received from thirty-six states, including the faculties and students of seventeen schools and colleges, twenty meetings of private citizens, thirty-two private associations, clubs, and peace societies, twelve branches of the WCTU, and 132 churches. The Chicago appeal also prompted leading citizens in Philadelphia, New York, Washington, D.C., St. Paul, San Francisco, Baltimore, St. Louis, and other cities to hold public meetings in

February, March, and early April, at which they endorsed an arbitration treaty between the United States and Great Britain.[59]

The result of these municipal meetings was the calling of a two-day National Arbitration Conference in Washington, D.C., in late April. Nearly three hundred influential men, including ex-Secretary of State John W. Foster, the distinguished international lawyer John Bassett Moore, the noted reformer Carl Schurz, the free trade economist Edward Atkinson, university presidents such as James B. Angell of Michigan, Charles W. Eliot of Harvard, the retired president of Cornell, Andrew D. White, and the leading peace workers, Alfred H. Love, Edward Everett Hale, Edwin Mead, Robert Treat Paine, and Benjamin Trueblood, attended the Conference. And though Andrew Carnegie could not attend, he sent the conference a check for $1000 toward the expenses of the arbitration campaign.[60] After many lofty speeches on the advantages of peace and arbitration with Great Britain, the delegates approved strong resolutions for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty. The important resolution "recommended to the United States Government, so soon as it is assured of corresponding disposition on the part of the British Government, to negotiate a treaty providing for the widest application of the method of arbitration to international controversies." The Conference also appointed a delegation to present the resolutions to President Cleveland and established a Permanent Executive Committee to continue the awakening and education of public opinion in favor of a permanent system of arbitration between the United States and Great Britain.[61]

---

[59] The fullest account of the revival of the movement for an Anglo-American treaty is Nelson M. Blake, "The Olney-Pauncefote Treaty of 1897," American Historical Review, L (January 1945), 228-43. A good summary of the Chicago circular and municipal meetings is in American Conference on International Arbitration... 1896, 1-17, 226-33.

[60] Ibid., v, ix-xiv, 24.

When a delegation of the Conference took the resolutions to the White House in May, both President Cleveland and Secretary of State Olney received them cordially, expressed deep sympathy for the spirit and aims of their resolutions, and praised their resolve to promote throughout the United States any Anglo-American arbitration treaty that might be signed in the near future.[62] Such public support for arbitration did not convert Olney to international arbitration since he had begun formal negotiations with Pauncefote on the subject two months earlier, and it may not have even hardened his determination to press on with the negotiations; but it probably strengthened his belief that an Anglo-American arbitration treaty was popular among an influential group of professional people and public figures in the United States and would receive their strong backing. Throughout the remaining months of 1896, Olney conducted formal negotiations with the British ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, who persuaded Lord Salisbury to accept a system of permanent arbitration with the United States covering all types of disputes and providing a final decision in most cases. The treaty was to remain in force for five years but would be automatically renewed thereafter until one of the parties gave a one year advanced notice of its termination. On January 11, 1897, the final draft of the Olney-Pauncefote treaty was signed and on the same day Cleveland submitted it to the Senate.[63]

---

[61] Ibid., 88-89, 91, passim. Lockwood, "International Arbitration, Venezuela, Cuba, and the National Conference at Washington," 19-30, supplies additional color on the Conference. Mrs. Lockwood was rather miffed because women delegates were excluded from the Conference.

[62] American Conference on International Arbitration... 1896, 149.

The arbitration proponents immediately unleashed an intensive propaganda campaign in behalf of the treaty. In the first week of February 1897, the Permanent Executive Committee of the National Arbitration Conference sent out 50,000 circular letters to ministers, endorsed by the heads of their denominations, as well as some 3,000 letters to leading people in other professions, many editors, and every United States Senator, asking them to support the treaty and to state publicly their opinions on the treaty. During the next two months the Committee received more than 2,000 replies of which ninety-three percent were favorable to ratification without amendment. In a separate survey the New York World found that the bishops and archbishops of every denomination and more than 400 presidents of colleges and universities endorsed the treaty without qualification, while the mayors of fifty-four large cities, 361 of 400 daily newspapers, and the presidents of the boards of trade and chambers of commerce of more than fifty cities also supported the treaty.[64] Perhaps awakened by this circular as well as by previous organizational efforts, many business, law, church, and women's organizations, college students, professors, and other interested citizens swamped Senators with letters and petitions urging early ratification of the treaty.[65] With this evidence of support for the treaty, it is probable that had a public opinion poll of Americans been taken a majority of Americans would have favored its ratification without amendments.

---

[63] Blake, "Olney-Pauncefote Treaty," 233-34. Richardson, Message and Papers, XIV, 6178-79.

Even with all these visible signs of support for the treaty, however, it was apparent from the first that the campaign for the treaty lacked real fuel and fire. The leaders of the movement concentrated almost exclusively on winning the "better classes" -- educators, businessmen, ministers, and lawyers -- to the cause but failed to mobilize a larger cross-section of the populace. While the prestige of these elites certainly influenced mass opinion in support of the treaty, it evoked only a few tangible expressions of support from the lower classes who seemed uninterested in the treaty. Even many of those groups which passed resolutions supporting the treaty undertook no concerted campaign to mobilize opinion behind it. Underneath, it was evident that besides the handful of peace workers only a few zealous individuals actively campaigned for the treaty. In many cases their own influence and prestige in various private associations were usually strong enough to carry resolutions in favor of the treaty.[66] Perhaps most important, the Olney-Pauncefote treaty evoked a small but vocal opposition which neutralized the boasts of the arbitration proponents that the treaty was very popular in the United States. These opponents of the treaty sent several petitions to the Senate denouncing the treaty or promising their endorsement only after restrictive amendments had been added. Predictably, many of these petitions came from Irish-American organizations, but others came from patriotic Americans who were not so much interested in staring John Bull in the eye on all international issues as they were concerned about the possible implications of the treaty for American foreign policy. One organization with some following in

---

[64] William E. Dodge to Cleveland, February 10, 1897, cited in Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1932), 720-21, describes the circular letter campaign. The results are summarized in Second American Conference on International Arbitration, Held in Washington, D.C., January 12, 1904 (Washington D.C.,: Gibson Bros., 1904), 7-8. 55th Congress, 1st session, Senate Documents, No. 63, 1-2, gives the figures of the New York World.

[65] See Congressional Record, 54th Congress, 2nd session, XXIX (January 18, 1897), 872; (January 21, 1897), 1003; (January 22, 1897), 1044, 1045; (January 23, 1897), 1088; (January 26, 1897), 1148; (January 28, 1897), 1238, 1239; (January 29, 1897), 1289: (February 1, 1897), 1376, 1377, 1419; (February 4, 1897), 1509; (February 5, 1897), 1556; (February 8, 1897), 1556; (February 8, 1897), 1639; (February 9, 1897), 1670; (February 10, 1897), 1690; (February 12, 1897), 1758; (February 13, 1897), 1788; (February 15, 1897), 1824; (February 16, 1897), 1963; (February 20, 1897), 2022; (February 25, 1897), 2225; (February 27, 1897), 2395, 2398; (February 28, 1897), 2523; also 55th Congress, 1st session, XXX (March 16, 1897), 34, 35-36, 45; (March 19, 1897), 64; (March 22, 1897), 116; (March 23, 1897), 154; (March 24, 1897), 212; (March 25, 1897), 262, (April 1, 1897), 559; (April 5, 1897), 571, 572; (April 13, 1897), 679, 680, 681; (April 19, 1897), 749; (April 20, 1897), 758, 845.

---

[66] May, Imperial Democracy, 61-65, has a good discussion of the weaknesses of the arbitration campaign.

Eastern cities, the Monroe Doctrine Club, was especially active in pointing out that in future disputes Great Britain might use the treaty machinery to undermine and perhaps eventually abrogate the traditionally sacred concepts of Monroe's 1823 message.[67]

Aware of the lack of any irresistible public demand for the treaty, many Senators immediately began to raise specific objections to the treaty. Fears that it would tie the hands of future executives in securing concessions from Great Britain on the construction and fortification of an Isthmian canal, the lingering anti-English bias among the Irish, and a new anti-English issue, the irritation of the silverites in the Senate who, perhaps frustrated by their defeat at the polls in 1896, found revenge in attacking the treaty with Britain, the symbol of the hated gold standard, dampened the enthusiasm of many Senators on the treaty issue. Even without these issues, however, an underlying Senatorial jealousy of the executive's control of foreign policy would have threatened the treaty. For the Senate to hand over all authority to the President and an arbitration tribunal seemed to many Senators to smack of an unnecessary and unwarranted abdication of their traditionally important position in the conduct of American foreign policy. Later developments in the arbitration movement were to confirm that the Senate's desire to maintain some control over foreign policy was the most imposing obstacle to the successful negotiation of any general arbitration treaty.

---

[67] For resolutions opposing an unamended treaty, see Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 1st session, XXX (March 16, 1897), 34; (March 25, 1897), 347; (April 8, 1897), 654; (April 14, 1897), 702; (April 20, 1897), 758; (April 21, 1897), 774; (May 3, 1897), 848; (May 5, 1897), 902; also Advocate of Peace, LIX (April 1897), 83.

When Cleveland and Olney left office on March 4, 1897, the Senate had still not voted on the matter. The two were disappointed and feared the new administration would let the matter die. But the new President, William McKinley, strongly urged the Senate to approve the arbitration treaty in his inaugural address, "not merely as a matter of policy, but as a duty to mankind. The importance and moral influence of the ratification of such a treaty can hardly be overestimated in the cause of advancing civilization. It may well engage the best thought of the statesmen and people of every country, and I cannot but consider it fortunate that it was reserved to the United States to have the leadership in so grand a work."[68] McKinley's public endorsement of the treaty failed, however, to prevent the Senate from adding restrictive amendments to the treaty until it was emasculated beyond all recognition. Even then a die-hard group of Senators opposed the weakened treaty and helped to defeat it by three votes.[69]

---

[68] Richardson, Messages and Papers, XIV, 6242.

[69] W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate: A Study of the Struggle between President and Senate over the Conduct of Foreign Relations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), 154-62, contains an excellent discussion of the Senators' arguments against the treaty. Professor Holt cites a letter from Richard Olney to Henry White, dated May 14, 1897, as an accurate assessment of the arguments which were advanced to defeat the treaty. In their own analysis of the Senate's action, the peace workers gave the identical arguments and virtually the

## (5)

The defeat of the Olney-Pauncefote treaty was a bitter blow to the peace advocates who had labored so long and so faithfully in the arbitration vineyard. Yet as in their previous setbacks, they managed to remain somewhat sanguine even in defeat. Minimizing the importance of the drastic Senate amendments to the treaty before the final vote, they pointed out that the treaty had won the support of a majority of Senators and had fallen only three votes short of the two-thirds vote necessary for consent of the treaty. They found other encouraging signs. Had not their campaign demonstrated that the public was strongly in favor of such a treaty? And might not this public sentiment induce the Senate to reconsider its action? Moreover, did not McKinley seem interested in the matter? And, almost as important, would not his appointment of the leading proponent of international arbitration, John Sherman, as Secretary of State facilitate the negotiation of a new treaty?

On the basis of these optimistic assumptions, the friends of arbitration decided to resume their campaign for a treaty.[70] Only a month after the Senate rejected the Olney-Pauncefote treaty, the Lake Mohonk Conference passed resolutions expressing the belief that the defeat of the treaty was only temporary.[71]

---

same importance to each. See Advocate of Peace, LIX (June 1897), 125-26; and Arbitrator, Nos. 302-304 (April, May, June 1897), 20-21; and No. 310 (July 1898), 48-49.

[70] Advocate of Peace, LIX (June 1897), 126, 130-31, 132, 137-38, 140, used this line as reasoning in proposing a new treaty.

The Conference also appointed a committee of five, consisting of ex-Senator George F. Edmunds of Vermont, Philip C. Garrett of Philadelphia, the Boston municipal reformer and businessman Samuel B. Capen, Paine, and Trueblood, to visit the President to urge the reopening of negotiations with Britain on the Cleveland treaty. On November 18, 1897, the committee called on President McKinley who received them, according to the report of one of the delegates, "not only with the greatest courtesy but with expressions of the deepest interest in the whole subject of arbitration." He listened, the report continued, "with sympathetic attention to the reading of the Mohonk platform" and to their personal "observations and suggestions." Believing the Senate was tired of the subject, McKinley promised no definite action, but he consented to mention international arbitration in his first annual message to Congress and even wrote out the substance of his remarks on the subject in the presence of the delegation. If the President meant to dampen the committee's enthusiasm for a new treaty, he did not succeed, for the report concluded that the "committee left the President assured that whatever lies in his power will be done not only to revive the matter of an Anglo-American treaty, but also to promote permanent arbitration with other nations as fast as it may be found practicable to do so." The delegates also called on Secretary Sherman who did not go into detail on the efforts of the State

---

[71] Platform, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1897, 130; also see Trueblood, address, in ibid., 14-16, 18; Love, address, in ibid., 69; and Paine, address, in ibid., 94-95.

Department in this direction, but he assured them that the Department had taken preliminary steps toward the reopening of negotiations with Britain on an arbitration treaty. Since none of the published diplomatic correspondence of Sherman's secretaryship mentions Anglo-American arbitration, it is doubtful whether Sherman had more than the most informal, if any, discussions with Pauncefote on the matter. Nonetheless, on the basis of McKinley's and Sherman's statements the Mohonk delegation felt satisfied that the new administration was very interested in pushing forward the arbitration movement.[72]

At this point the American workers for arbitration once again received further encouragement from a familiar source. Five days before the Mohonk deputation's interview with the President, the indefatigable Randal Cremer arrived in New York on his third visit to the United States in ten years in behalf of Anglo-American arbitration. Cremer, who had been narrowly defeated for re-election to the House of Commons in July 1895, did not bring another memorial signed by members of Parliament. Instead, he brought a memorial urging an Anglo-American treaty signed by 7,432 trade union officials of England, who, Cremer claimed, represented some 2,750,000 workingmen. Cremer's object in circulating this memorial was to dispel the belief in some American circles that the movement in Britain for an Anglo-

---

[72] Advocate of Peace, LIX (December 1897), 254-55, contains a summary of the Mohonk deputation's interviews. Though unsigned, it was probably written by Trueblood. Also see Washington Post, November 19, 1897, 4:3; and Philip C. Garrett, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1900, 50.

American arbitration treaty was strongly supported only by the aristocratic and ruling classes.[73] As a second part of his plan, Cremer had originally intended to persuade an influential representative from the Congregational, Baptist, Wesleyan, and Presbyterian churches to accompany him to the United States, but unable to secure a prominent spokesman from the latter three bodies, Cremer accepted the support of the English Congregationalist minister, the Reverend Charles Albert Berry, who had promoted the Olney-Pauncefote treaty in the United States and was still visiting there. Upon his arrival in New York, Cremer immediately went to Washington where he secured pulpits and a public meeting for Dr. Berry on the Sunday before the opening of the 55th Congress. The announcement that Berry would speak on Anglo-American arbitration drew a large audience including many members of Congress and others in high official circles,and a friendly newspaperman reported that "it was at once apparent the views expressed by the English clergyman reflected in a very marked degree the sentiment of his American auditors."[74] Berry delievered three sermons in all that day and on the following day gave the invocation at the opening of Congress. Cremer also attended and listened to the reading of McKinley's first annual message in which the President stated: "Events have only served to strengthen the general views on this question [of arbitration treaties] expressed in my inaugural address.... Treaties embodying these humane principles on broad lines, without in any way imperiling our interest or our honor, shall have my constant encouragement.[75]

---

[73] New York Times, November 14, 1897, 5:4. Arbitrator, No. 310 (July 1898), 48-50, contains Cremer's detailed account of his visit. Earlier, in June 1896, Cremer had gained the signatures of 5,357 labor officials for an Anglo-American treaty and as part of a deputation of the International Arbitration League presented it to Lord Salisbury. The 1897 memorial was newly drawn up but probably had most of the same as well as some additional signatures.

[74] Ibid., Nos. 305-309 (July-November 1897), 31; and No. 310 (July 1898), 46, 48. Also Advocate of Peace, LIX (December 1897), 261; LX (January 1898), 13-14; and Washington Post, December 6, 1897, 2:4.

Unlike the Advocate of Peace which thought that these few lines in McKinley's address might be a prelude to a later special message to the Senate proposing a new Anglo-American treaty, Cremer realized that McKinley's statement on arbitration was both too general and too cautious to be taken seriously. Nevertheless, he arranged an interview with the President to present his views and to see whether McKinley had any intention of negotiating a new treaty. On February 2, 1898, Cremer called on the President. McKinley told Cremer that he was friendly to arbitration but did not think the moment opportune for legislative action. When Cremer showed him a copy of his memorial, McKinley also asked him to defer its presentation until the administration decided to promote a treaty.[76]

Though Cremer was favorably impressed with McKinley's sincerity, he was forced to conclude that the administration would not take action on a new treaty at the earliest until after the mid-term elections and the opening of a new Congress in March 1899. After all, he reasoned, the present Senate had defeated the Olney-Pauncefote treaty, and there was little reason to believe that it would change its mind. After seeing John Sherman, Cremer also realized that the Secretary, now old, feeble, "and with a very defective memory for names and dates," was without any influence on either the President or the Senate. Indeed, Cremer reported a common opinion in Washington circles that Sherman's indecision in Senate debate in the last months of the Cleveland administration had contributed to the delay in bringing the Olney-Pauncefote treaty to a vote.[77] Sherman was indeed too senile to manage even much of the routine business of the State Department, and McKinley finally managed to persuade him to resign the post in late April 1898.[78]

---

[75] Richardson, Messages and Papers, XIV, 6267.

[76] Advocate of Peace, LX (January 1898), 8; Arbitrator, No. 310 (July 1898), 49.

The McKinley administration's rather evasive posture on international arbitration was prompted not only by the President's phlegmatic personality or the Secretary's senility; it was even more the result of their nearly total preoccupation with the controversy with Spain over the revolutionary turmoil in Cuba. Much as McKinley professed to believe in arbitration treaties, from the first days of his administration he was much too deeply involved in the Cuban imbroglio to promote them. With jingoistic politicians in Congress clamoring for American military intervention on the island, he found no alternative policy than to appease their wrath temporarily as much as possible while attempting to negotiate far-reaching consessions from Spain.

---

[77] Ibid.

[78] Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 100-02, 151-55, vividly portrays Sherman's general incompetence as Secretary of State.

The Spanish-American controversy over Cuba had waxed and waned since February 1895, so the danger of a war with Spain was present even before the advent of the McKinley administration, but as late as 1897 most peace advocates had been so interested in avoiding a war with Great Britain over the Venezuelan boundary and in promoting an Anglo-American arbitration treaty that they showed scarcely any interest in the Cuban situation. Their inattention continued into 1898 when two events intensified the crisis in Spanish-American relations. The first occurred on February 9, when the New York Journal published an intercepted letter written by the Spanish minister in Washington, Enrique Dupuy de Lome, in which he described President McKinley as "weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd, besides being a would-be politician who tries to leave a door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party." De Lome admitted writing the letter, immediately resigned, and the Spanish government apologized for the indiscretion, so that the McKinley administration considered the incident closed. But the outrage expressed by warmongering politicians, the yellow press, and the great mass of the populace indicated that the American public mood, previously very edgy and on the verge of unrestrained anger toward Spain, now bordered on hysteria. McKinley had placed his hopes for peace on gaining sufficient time to negotiate concessions from Spain, but after the De Lome letter, he found that time was beginning to run out. The second incident occurred six days later when the American battleship "Maine" exploded in Havana harbor resulting in the loss of some 260 American officers and men. The feeling in favor of intervention to stop the inhumanities in Cuba and to obtain revenge for the alleged Spanish challenge to American honor was now blown to a white-heat. Cries of "Cuba Libre" and "Remember the Maine" filled the streets and public demonstrations.[79]

In the nine weeks between the "Maine" disaster and the American declaration of war on Spain, the paralysis of the peace forces became strikingly evident. To be sure, strong efforts were made to persuade the McKinley administration to avert war in these trying days, but significantly almost all of them came from individuals who had no official connection with peace societies, and in direct response to McKinley himself who openly solicited influential individuals for imaginative yet feasible plans to prevent a war with Spain. Of the known peace advocates, however, only Oscar Straus who had played a small part in organizing the 1896 National Arbitration Conference gained the ear of the President in the final crisis.[80] A former minister to Turkey, Straus told McKinley that the United States should ask Spain to deal with Cuba as Turkey had earlier dealt with Egypt; this would give self-government to Cuba in domestic affairs while remaining nominally under Spanish sovereignty in foreign matters. In a word, it proposed dominion status to meet the special demands of Cuba, Spain, and the United States. In his diary Straus noted that McKinley praised his ingeneous plan as "the most practical of any that have been brought to his attention, but intimated, not in so many words, but by the general drift of the conversation, such a plan would not stop the jingoes."[81] When McKinley submitted an outline of the plan to the Cuban junta, however, the Cubans, sensing the popular clamor for war -- a war which more than likely would result in their full independence -- immediately rejected any such complex arrangement for the future political system of their homeland.

---

[79] For background on the Cuban crisis, I have relied here and in the following pages mainly on Leech, In the Days of McKinley, ch. 7; and May, Imperial Democracy, chs. 11, 12.

[80] Straus to McKinley, March 12, 1898, Oscar Straus Papers (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress), Box 2.

Other peace workers made very little effort to counteract the inflamed public temper. Andrew Carnegie, for example, was vacationing and attending business conferences in Cannes, France, during these critical weeks and offered no suggestions for preserving peace with Spain. Instead, he resigned himself to a war he considered inevitable and not entirely an unmixed evil since he was certain it would result in a quick American victory and end Spanish colonialism in the New World.[82] Carnegie's silence was more typical than exceptional among peace advocates. The petitions of peace societies in Congress pleading for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban situation, for instance, were conspicuous only in their absence. Various groups of the Society of Friends alone felt moved to petition Congress against the impending war.[83]

---

[81] Straus Diary, March 19, 1898, Straus Papers.

[82] Carnegie to H.C. Frick, April 23, 1898, Carnegie Papers, Vol. 41. In his autobiography, Carnegie leaves the impression that he was in New York during the final weeks of the crisis and was in close touch with the anti-war forces in Congress (Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie, 361-62), but his personal correspondence clearly indicates that Carnegie was in Europe until after the war began.

The American Peace Society well reflected the prevailing feeling of hopelessness among the peace forces. From the beginning of the hysterical aftermath to the "Maine" tragedy, the Advocate of Peace expressed deep concern over the volatile state of public opinion but relied entirely on the personal diplomacy, restraint, and patience of the President to avert war. They failed, however, to give the President much encouragement in resisting the interventionist temper of Congress which the peace advocates accurately described as "violent" and as "explosive as torpedoes."[84] The most the Society offered was a resolution dispatched to the President praising his patient diplomacy and reaffirming its hopes for peace.[85] For the rest, the Society's journal merely denounced the "crime" of cheap, vulgar, and sensational journalism and defended its inaction with the assertion that the chief aim of the Society was not to demonstrate against war in times of excitement when the people were carried away with emotion but to conduct a long-range educational program which would eventually "bring about such a change in public sentiment in reference to the whole subject of war and the methods of administering international justice as will ultimately render all war impossible."[86] Believing self-control and a dignified bearing were the proper antidotes to the war spirit, the American Peace Society held no mass rallies or otherwise demonstrated against the interventionists. Considering the small number of peace societies and the difficulty in stirring up opposition to a war which was championed as a crusade, a holy war to liberate the Cubans from their Spanish oppressors, such meetings undoubtedly would have failed to prevent war and more than likely would have been denounced as unpatriotic. Yet their silence in the final crisis revealed even more clearly than during their campaign for the Olney-Pauncefote treaty the wide gap between their own peaceful intentions and the masses who now were not just disinterested in peace but were determined to go to war.

---

[83] Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2nd session, XXXI (March 31, 1898), 3408, 3447; (April 1, 1898), 3451-52.

[84] Advocate of Peace, LX (April 1898), 81; Isabel Barrows, A Sunny Life: The Biography of Samuel June Barrows, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1913), 151-55.

[85] Advocate of Peace, LX, (April 1898), 83-84. Beals, Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, 11, says Trueblood "had [a] private conference with President McKinley, concerning the Spanish-American War," but no other evidence indicates such a meeting ever took place, nor does Beals say whether this conference took place before or after war was declared.

While most of the peace and arbitration societies refrained from direct action tactics to stir up opposition to the warmakers, one notable exception was the Universal Peace Union. Radical pacifists to the core, Alfred Love, Belva Lockwood, and a few of their co-workers in the Union labored incessantly for

---

[86] Advocate of Peace, LX (April 1898), 77-80, 81-82. Shortly after the war began, the minutes of the annual meeting of the Society gave a similar judgment: "Mr. Paine admirably summed up the nature of the work of the Society, as not so much consisting in efforts by petition and otherwise to prevent war in times of excitement and passion, as in constant education of the public sentiment and conscience of the nation. Only along this line was there any real hope of success." Ibid., LX (June 1898), 134.

for peace from the first days of the Cuban crisis. Until February 1898 their proposals paralleled Cleveland's and McKinley's policies for avoiding a showdown with Spain on the Cuban situation: diplomatic moves to secure the withdrawal of General Valeriano ("the Butcher") Weyler, end of the reconcentration orders, political reforms granting the Cuban landholders and taxpayers greater authority in administering and governing the island, and the retention of the American Consul General in Havana to maintain open contact with both the Spanish and Cuban authorities there and to receive clothing, food, medicine, and other necessities of life for the relief of suffering among the Cubans.[87] So anxious were they to prevent war that they grasped at any policy of the President which seemed to dampen the public's enthusiasm for intervention. Thus, the Peacemaker at first applauded McKinley's decision to send the "Maine" to Havana and encouraged a continuation of these "pacific visits" in the belief that they emphasized "the power of touch," though after the sinking of the battleship, it immediately realized its mistake and reverted to its traditional anti-militarism. However peaceful the administration's motives, it now charged that the battleship was "armed to the teeth" and, if necessary, was "prepared to sink other vessels or bombard a city, to destroy, maim or kill."[88]

In the final few weeks before the American war declaration, Alfred Love and Belva Lockwood intensified their peace efforts.

---

[87] Curti, Peace or War, 170; Peacemaker, XV (February 1897), 167-69; (May 1897), 233.

[88] Ibid., XVI (February 1898), 156-57; (March 1898), 174.

Only a week after the "Maine" disaster, the Universal Peace Union held a meeting in Philadelphia on Washington's birthday and passed resolutions which praised "the calmness, moderation and wise firmness of President McKinley, and would strengthen his hands by encouraging him to persevere in his exalted statesmanship respecting the disturbing issues that surround us." Love and Mrs. Lockwood also sent several letters to President McKinley and friends of his peace efforts in Congress which commended their restraint and attempted to bolster their sagging spirits in the face of growing demands for war.[89]

Fearing the rising demands in Congress for military intervention in Cuba, however, these same Union leaders also tried to avert war by persuading the Spanish government to make further concessions and by encouraging the European powers to offer their "good offices" for mediating the Spanish-American difficulties. In March, they sent an appeal to Pope Leo XIII to mediate the Spanish-American controversy and urged Cardinal James Gibbons to serve as a mediator between the Pontiff and the President for any papal mediation offer which might save the Spanish nation from a war with the United States. They also used the International Peace Bureau at Berne to channel their proposals for mediation to the major European powers. Believing these efforts might not suffice, both Mrs. Lockwood and Love dispatched letters to the Spanish Premier, Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, urging further concessions to the Cubans. They also appealed to their friend, Don Arturo de Marcoartu, a member of the Spanish Cortes as well as of the Universal Peace Union, in March 1898, as they had already done once before in November 1897, requesting him to use his influence among Spanish leaders to grant Cuba autonomy as a step toward its eventual full independence. Since this would be a major Spanish concession, Love also wrote the Cuban leaders asking them to accept the same proposal as a test of the Spanish good faith.[90]

---

[89] Ibid., 165-69, 170-72; (April 1898), 190, 191-92, 193.

None of these efforts had any tangible results. Senator de Marcoartu either did not fully grasp the rapid deterioration in Spanish-American relations, as Mrs. Lockwood believed, or had no influence in Spanish ruling circles, for he did not affect Spanish policy. Similarly, when the Holy See made a mediation offer, it came to President McKinley through Archbishop John Ireland, not Cardinal Gibbons, and the European powers advanced awkward and hesitant mediation proposals but not because of any urgent entreaties from the International Peace Bureau. Indeed, as Mrs. Lockwood pointed out, the Berne Bureau was operating on a very meagre budget and had insufficient funds to run a well-oiled propaganda machine for promoting and coordinating the mediation proposals of the European nations.[91]

---

[90] Ibid., XVI (March 1898), 169, 170-72; (April 1898), 190-91, 192; and XVII (July 1898), 13.

[91] Curti, Peace or War, 169-70; Peacemaker, XVI (April 1898), 189. For additional information on the finances of the Berne Bureau, see Advocate of Peace, LX (December 1898), 252.

The Union's most persistent efforts for averting war, however, rested with Stewart L. Woodford, the American Minister in Madrid. Woodford's laborious efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban difficulties are well-known; less well-known is his earlier interest in peace and arbitration. Before accepting the appointment as American Minister to Spain in 1897, Woodford had served as a general in the Union Army during the American Civil War and in succeeding years had divided his time between Republican politics and his profession as a lawyer. After serving as Lieutenant Governor of New York State and as unsuccessful gubernatorial nominee in 1870, he was elected to the House of Representatives in 1872. Though he resigned from the chamber in July 1874, in early June of that year he met a representative of the Universal Peace Union in Washington and agreed to promote one of the Union's arbitration petitions in Congress. It was Woodford who on June 17, 1874, introduced the Union's arbitration resolution in the House of Representatives which passed unanimously.[92] Consequently, when Woodford went to Madrid, Love thought that Woodford would not be unreceptive to his peace appeals. In the last two months before the outbreak of the war, Love wrote Minister Woodford on several occasions, and each time Woodford, probably remembering his earlier relationship with Love's peace society, replied promptly and courteously and encouraged him to continue his letter-writing campaign to the President of the United States, members of

---

[92] Voice of Peace, I (August 1874), 73-74.

Congress, and Spanish authorities for the peaceful settlement of the Cuban tangle.[93] In a letter of late March, Woodford well expressed his hopes for peace: "I have done, am doing and shall to the last try to do all that I can to keep peace between Spain and the United States, with justice to Cuba and with protection to American interests. President McKinley is so wise, so brave and so strong that under his great leadership I shall have faith that these good and necessary ends may be secured."[94]

Love's appeals to Woodford did not influence the latter's diplomatic efforts, but it is worth noting that Love saw eye to eye with Woodford on the Cuban situation. At one point or another in the last two months before the outbreak of hostilities, both suggested virtually all the policies McKinley considered to avert war. A striking illustration of the similarity of their views existed on the question of a military armistice in Cuba. Love cabled Woodford on April 9: "Urge Queen concede unconditional armistice." But Woodford, who had already been working for this Spanish concession, learned only hours before the arrival of Love's message that the Spanish government had granted a temporary cease-fire. Woodford was elated and on April 11 wrote back to Love that this Spanish action, "I sincerely trust, may be the beginning of permanent peace in Cuba."[95]

---

[93] Peacemaker, XVI, (March 1898), 170, 172.

[94] Quoted in ibid., XVI (April 1898), 192.

[95] Quoted in ibid., XVI (April 1898), 194; and (May 1898),206.

Yet Woodford's joy was premature, for in spite of this Spanish concession, as well as others promising to grant Cuba a greater measure of self-government and to revoke the reconcentrado order, McKinley believed that only an immediate Spanish guarantee of full Cuban independence could prevent American intervention. Time had finally run out. Yielding to the overwhelming pressures for intervention, on April 11 McKinley sent his message to Congress asking for broad but vaguely stated powers "to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba."

Even after this ultimatum, Love still refused to concede defeat and made three last ditch efforts to prevent what most observers now believed was an inevitable war. First, Love tried to persuade Luis Polo de Barnabe, De Lome's replacement in Washington, to grant independence to Cuba, the American _sine qua non_ for preventing war. But Polo's reply to Love on April 13 reaffirmed what he had told officials in the McKinley administration three days earlier. Spanish concessions, he said, had already "reached the limit of what a nation can give without detriment to her honor and self-respect." Besides, to grant independence to the island would "deliver the wealth, the interests and the destinies of Cuba into the hands of desperadoes. The better class of Cubans, the true patriots who yearn to see their country happy and prosperous as it had been in former years, desire a broad system of self-government under the sovereignty of Spain. These are in the great majority, and to them Spain has made and is willing to make all reasonable concessions."[96] While the minister spoke for himself, he accurately reflected the attitude of his government. Clearly, the Sagasta ministry, so divided over many of the previous concessions demanded by the United States, was unwilling to make the one final concession of full independence which might have appeased the jingoes in Congress.

Love made his second last plea on April 19, the eve of the final vote on the Congressional joint resolution authorizing American military intervention in Cuba. Hearing rumors of further mediation overtures of the European powers, he wrote Sir Julian Pauncefote, *doyen* of the diplomatic corps in Washington, urging him to request his government to offer mediation. Though the reply from an assistant in the British Embassy two days later stated that Pauncefote "would gladly urge her Majesty's Government to suggest arbitration if he thought the proposal would be favorably received," the clear intimation was that it would have no hope of success. The peace workers' arbitration campaign had worked too well. Having promoted Anglo-American friendship over the previous decade, they now found that Great Britain was averse to any policy that might contribute to ill feeling between the two governments. Realizing that the United States was determined to go to war in any case, the British government showed no more enthusiasm than the other European powers for exerting strong moral pressure on the United States to draw back from the brink of war. The irony of Britain's acquiesence in an American war of conquest in 1898, just as it had supported the peaceful policy of the Olney-Pauncefote treaty a year earlier, was not lost to the American peace workers.[97]

---

[96] Quoted in *ibid*., XVI (May 1898), 207-08.

Finally, on April 21, the day after McKinley signed the Congressional declaration authorizing military intervention in Cuba but before war had been formally declared or hostilities had actually commenced, Love sent a letter to the Queen Regent of Spain begging her to abandon Cuba so as to avoid war, but the letter, which in the face of Spain's determination to fight would have failed in its purpose anyway, was intercepted by the postal authorities in New York, held for three weeks, and then returned unopened with the words: "Dispatch to Spain or colonies prohibited on account of war." Although the course of hostilities indicated that the defeat of Spain was already virtually certain, on May 17 Love sent the letter to John W. Hoyt, ex-governor of Wyoming and a Union representative in Washington, asking him to obtain permission from the State Department to forward the letter to Spain. Unwilling to flout the government's war effort, Love nevertheless still hoped that if his appeal could reach the Queen, it might persuade her to abandon a lost cause and perhaps hasten the end of the conflict. Though still denied the use of the mails, the State Department allowed the Union to send the letter to the International Peace Bureau at Berne where it was then relayed to Madrid, but this effort, like all the Union's previous ones, failed to alter the course of events between Spain and the United States.[98]

---

[97] Ibid., 208-09; Advocate of Peace, LX (May 1898), 107-08. Neale, Great Britain and United States Expansion, ch. 1, is the most careful analysis of the historiographical debate surrounding the mediation moves of the European powers.

The total frustration of the peace proposals of Love and his co-workers in the Universal Peace Union would have had all the makings of an opera bouffe, if the onset of the war did not have its tragic aspects. As it was, their failure, as well as the even greater failure of the other peace societies, indicated that the American peace movement had much work to perform if it was to have any influence in averting future wars which might threaten the Republic.

---

[98] Peacemaker, XVI (March 1898), 209; (June 1898), 244.

# III. Reaction: War and Imperialism, 1898-1900

## (1)

The Spanish-American War proved an unpleasant experience for all friends of peace who remained loyal to their colors, for with the upsurge in American patriotism and the martial spirit throughout the course of the hostilities any further criticism of the administration's foreign policy might easily be labeled treason. Aware of the dangers of their position, most advocates of peace prefaced their remarks in opposition to the war with expressions of their patriotism and loyalty to their country during the war or remained silent on the entire Spanish-American controversy. Alfred Smiley, for example, chose the latter course when he prohibited any criticism of the past policies or present actions of either the United States or Spain at the Mohonk Conference in early June 1898. Instead, he advised the members of the Conference to limit their discussions to the subject of international arbitration which had always been the primary purpose of the Conferences.[1] A few, however, turned to conscientious objection rather than support the war. Benjamin Trueblood, for example, continued to defend his opposition to the war in the Advocate of Peace and used the columns of that journal to rebuke those friends of peace who had deplored the onset of the war but closed ranks behind the administration once hostilities had commenced. "To proceed as these men have proceeded," Trueblood wrote, "is to proceed on the theory that the government is infallible, that its behests are always to be obeyed and its policies followed, that it is above conscience and God." Such an attitude, Trueblood claimed, amounted to "a slavish patriotism" which helped to encourage the very same evils these so-called peace advocates had deplored in opposing the rising crescendo of jingoism before the war:

---

[1] Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1898, 5.

> the decline of the religious spirit, the lowering of the standard of morals, the perversion of the public taste, the derangement of literature, the arrest of educational and philanthropic work, the derangement of business, the re-creation of warlike instincts and love of war and its glamour, the increase in violence and disrespect for law and order, the distraction of the people from their true and abiding interests, the development of a spirit of speculation and corruption in business circles, the advancement of the military classes over civilians, the strengthening of the already dangerous jingo elements in the nation, the sharpening of the restless desire to enter upon a policy of territorial conquest and meddlesomeness in international affairs, the increase of national pride and boastfulness, and of dislike and distrust of foreigners who may happen in any way to disagree with us, the temporary blocking of the movement for larger international friendship and cooperation -- these evils, in part or in whole, in greater or in less degree, are sure to come, nay, are already upon us in a way to awaken the deepest concern of all truly good patriotic citizens.[2]

Despite this statement, and others of a similar nature,[3] Trueblood and his associates in the American Peace Society escaped vituperative abuse or intimidation partly because they confined their remarks to the Advocate of Peace, which was read only by the most faithful peace workers and partly because so many other influential Bostonians who had no direct connection with the peace movement were nonetheless lukewarm at best toward the Spanish-American conflict and had no intention of stifling criticism of it.

---

[2] Advocate of Peace, LX (June 1898), 137-38.

[3] Ibid., LX (May 1898), 101-02; (June 1898), 125-26, 127-28; (June 1898), 151, 152; (August and September 1898), 174-76.

Though Alfred Love also continued to defend his opposition to the war on similar grounds, his fate was not so pleasant. One newspaper story made his plight during the war far more unhappy than any of the other peace workers. On May 25, 1898, a reporter from the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, seeking a good story, visited the rooms of the Universal Peace Union. One room contained an exhibit of the flags of several nations, each of which was about twelve inches in length and bordered in white. When someone in the room, perhaps the reporter himself, noticed the display of the Spanish flag, a few onlookers protested its presence. The secretary of the Universal Peace Union immediately removed it so as to avoid public criticism, although he pointed out that the display of the Spanish flag had been part of the society's exhibit for years and was not intended as an unpatriotic symbol. By itself a story describing this incident might have proved innocuous, but to worsen matters someone told the reporter during his visit that Alfred Love had written the Queen Regent of Spain. Love was not then present, so before writing his story the reporter returned to the Union offices on the following day and asked Love for an interview on his letter to the Queen. After the newspaperman promised to report faithfully the facts that were given him, Love told him the story of his final peace effort in its entirety and even furnished him with a copy of his letter. But the reporter deceived him. When the story appeared on the same afternoon, it revealed all the half-truths and distortions of facts that characterized the sensational journalism of that day. Concerning the innocent flag exhibition, for example, the story reported that the Spanish flag "flaunted defiantly" in the Union's rooms until the objections of visitors prompted the secretary to take it down. In an obvious attempt to enliven this part of the story, the reporter added a rumor which was probably untrue but appealed to super-patriotic minds: "It is said it was unceremoniously thrown upon the floor and trampled upon by several men who were in the sales-room at the time." More damaging, however, was the newspaper's account of Love's letter to the Queen Regent. Omitting the crucial portions of the letter, which requested the Queen to grant Cuba full independence and affirmed Love's professions of loyalty and patriotism to his nation, the story presented the false impression that Love had sent only a "letter of sympathy" to the Queen after the two nations had decided on war and therefore was an obvious attempt to undermine the established policy of the American government. The story went on to state that the State Department had positively declined to sanction the use of the mails for Love's letter to the Queen, which was true, but erroneously reported that it had also prohibited the sending of the letter to the Queen by way of the International Peace Bureau. As a result, the story gave the impression that Love had deliberately defied the State Department.[4]

Even before the appearance of this story in the Evening Bulletin, Love had received abusive and threatening letters, but after its publication the cries of "treason" and "disloyalty" against him increased. Threats on his life were made, and a mob numbering some six hundred persons in nearby Chester, Pennsylvania, burned him in effigy after which the "corpse" was riddled with bullets and dragged through the streets while the marchers sang patriotic songs and yelled "Down with Love and his brand of traitors." As a final insult, the newspaper press aroused the ire of the Chief Bureau of City Property, who, acting under authority of a city ordinance, gave the Universal Peace Union three days over the Memorial Day week-end to evacuate its offices in Independence Hall which the city had leased to the Union rent-free in 1895. Though no reason was given for this expulsion order at the time, the failure of the city official to wait several days until the next meeting of the Ordinance Council for deliberative action on the matter, which would have been the normal procedure for an eviction notice, and the demand for removal only a day after another story in the Evening Bulletin had charged that the presence of pacifists having offices in the "Cradle of Liberty" was an intolerable anomaly during a patriotic war, indicate that he acted in response to the inflamed public outcry against Love which the newspaper story had incited. Though badly discouraged by this turn of events, the Union members manged to move their personal effects from Independence Hall and to relocate in the same offices they had occupied a few years earlier.[5]

---

[4] Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, May 26, 1898, 2:4; Peacemaker, XVI (May 1898), 209; (June 1898), 244: XVII (July 1898), 33-34. Love's account of his letter to the Queen is to be trusted, for it appeared in full in the May and June issues, both of which went to press before the reporter's interview. As for defying the State Department, Love's account was also correct, for his letter of May 17, 1898, to John W. Hoyt, reproduced in the June issue, stated in part: "I could send it [the letter to the Queen] by way of our Berne Peace Bureau at Switzerland, Elie Ducommun [secretary of the Bureau], but I don't want to do anything that would deceive or go round our government in its plans. As an American citizen I shall be true and loyal, and will not circumvent our country or our endeared President."

The experience of the Universal Peace Union in these early months of the war furnishes additional evidence that the newspaper press, so often irresponsible in its reporting before the war, continued to provide the sensational news that a large segment of the American public wanted. Such news stories undoubtedly helped to sustain the war fever during the course of hostilities and helped to drown out what little dissent against the administration's war policy still existed. Interestingly enough, however, even before the war had ended, the peace movement began to recover and in the following decade was to experience a rapid growth. At first glance, the accelerating momentum of the peace movement following the war seems somewhat paradoxical, but the quickening of interest in the peace movement stemmed in part from the same inevitable reaction which had followed all American wars. Thus, just as the War of 1812 had helped to stimulate efforts leading to the founding of various peace societies in the Northeast, the Mexican war to a momentary revival of peace activity in the same section, and the American Civil War to the formation of the Universal Peace Union and the Peace Association of Friends, so did the Spanish-American War contribute to the growth of peace activity. The Spanish-American war had a more far-reaching importance, however, for it brought the United States four-square into the international arena. The awesome display of American naval prowess at Manila Bay and Santiago and the equally successful land campaign in Cuba made a marked impression on the European powers which now fully realized, if they had not earlier, that the United States possessed the military power to assume considerable potential importance in international affairs. With the annexation of Hawaii during the war, and, after the ratification of the treaty formally ending the war, the Spanish cession of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States, by 1900 it was clear that the United States had become an imperial power, not only in name but in terms of its actual responsibilities far away from the shores of continental America. No matter how much Americans might still prefer the advantages of political isolation, after 1900 the existence of American possessions thousands of miles away from the shores of continental America no longer allowed the American government the luxury of ignoring the military strength, diplomatic maneuvers, and political posture of other powers in the western Pacific.

---

[5] Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, May 27, 1898, 2:1; May 28, 1898, 1:1; Peacemaker, XVII (July 1898), 1-2, 3, 8-9. Love later defended his position in the New York Times, August 26, 1898, 5:1.

Given the new fact of insular imperialsim, moreover, the demands for an even larger, modernized American navy to defend these possessions from possible aggressive actions of foreign powers became irresistible.

The reactions of the peace advocates to America's emergence as a great power were deeply ambivalent. Still wedded to their traditional principles of arbitration and anti-militarism, they responded adversely to the harsh realities of world politics which faced the United States after 1898. Their opposition to the war with Spain and their vehement denunciations of imperialism and navalism that followed revealed a profound pessimism toward the dominant thrust of world politics at the turn of the century. Nor were they a lonely minority in this attitude, for much as many Americans, probably a majority, either actively championed or quietly acquiesced in America's new role as a world power, with all the responsibilities and possible dangers of conflict with foreign powers that accompanied that role, many others found it difficult to adjust to the far-reaching implications of America's new position in international affairs. A few of these individuals reacted so strongly to the Spanish-American war, imperialism,and navalism, that they became active participants in the American peace movement.

At the same time, however, much as these new individuals shared the veteran peace workers' dismay at the imperialistic tensions and militaristic proclivities in the international arena, their rhetoric did not always sound the note of Cassandra, for other developments on the international scene helped to counterbalance their gloomy prophecies. Most encouraging among these developments were the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the phenomenal growth in the number of arbitration treaties. If the continuing armament race, the dangers of a conflict with Japan or some other power in the Philippines, and the gradual tightening of the rival alliance systems in Europe all seemed to presage an immediate future of international anarchy, they looked forward to the day when the Hague Conferences and an ever expanding network of arbitration treaties would establish a more rational, stable world order -- what they rather vaguely called the Federation of the World. A few individuals even developed bold blueprints for a Congress of Nations with legislative and enforcement powers. Since the United States was now recognized as a world power, the American peace workers believed they had a special responsibility to encourage their government to assume the world's moral leadership in promoting the international machinery that would facilitate the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The longer some semblance of peace among the major powers existed in the decade after 1898 (the Russo-Japanese War was a grim exception) and the more these same powers, however gingerly, seemed to accept the Hague Peace Conferences and arbitration treaties as a permanent part of international diplomacy, the greater the tendency of peace workers to overlook the harsh realities of international affairs and to magnify the crude beginnings and extol the future promises of a new international order. Indeed, at times their rhetoric sounded like Pollyanna herself. Until about 1909, however, the ominous forebodings of Cassandra and the exuberant optimism of Pollyanna appeared almost alternately in their writings and speeches.

(2)

Although the Spanish-American War discouraged the peace workers, it also had a marked influence on several individuals who had not actively participated in the movement before 1898. Among those who became dedicated peace workers largely because of the war experience were two of the nation's intelligentsia, David Starr Jordan, president of Leland Stanford Junior University, and Edwin Doak Mead, a Boston literary figure and civic reformer. The war itself was not such a shock to them since they recognized that the grossest inhumanities existed in Cuba which Americans could not tolerate indefinitely, but the jingoistic pressures that resulted in President McKinley's capitulation to the pro-war camp alarmed them. They were particularly disturbed by the growing indications that a peaceful settlement of the issues with Spain over Cuba was possible and in fact on the verge of success when McKinley broke off negotiations and Congress overwhelmingly approved the joint resolution for American military intervention on the island. David Starr Jordan at first was willing to admit the possibility of justice in America's desire to free the Cubans from their Spanish yoke, but the longer he thought about it, the more he believed that certain selfish "commercial and political interests," particularly the armament manufacturers and, to a lesser extent, the yellow press, the Cuban Junta, and certain capitalists who already had or foresaw investment opportunities on the island, had deliberately inflamed public opinion and thereby foisted war upon the nation.[6] Jordan received first-hand confirmation of his belief that the Spanish-American War was a repressible conflict from Minister Woodford, whom Jordan had long known from their mutual service as trustees of Cornell University. Shortly after Minister Woodford's return from Spain in May 1898, Jordan, who was then in the East, visited Woodford at a Washington hotel and discussed with him the diplomacy leading to hostilities. Several years later Jordan wrote that during this meeting Woodford upheld his own impressions that a Spanish-American war was not inevitable and on the contrary could have been averted if McKinley had allowed Woodford a little more time to negotiate the necessary concessions from the Spanish leaders. Jordan recalled, in fact, that the ex-Minister was "extremely distressed and humiliated" because he believed his delicate negotiations had verged on success only to be undercut by the domestic pressures that precipitated McKinley's surrender to the jingoes. Although Woodford was undoubtedly upset over the war he had labored so strenuously to prevent, it is debatable whether he really felt he had been so deeply wronged as Jordan stated, for he never commented publicly on his diplomacy with Spain, and the ensuing debate which developed over Jordan's disclosure of Woodford's attitude came after Woodford had died and then revealed nothing to confirm Jordan's recollections of Woodford's true feelings. Whatever Woodford told him, however, his words undoubtedly helped Jordan to believe what he already wanted to believe -- that the war was a terrible aberration in the history of American diplomacy.[7]

---

[6] David Starr Jordan, The Days of a Man, Being Memories of a Naturalist, Teacher and Minor Prophet of Democracy (2 vols., Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book Company, 1922), I, 613-16, gives Jordan's later reflections on the causes of the war. For a contemporary account, see his addresses of 1898 and 1899, reprinted in David Starr Jordan, Imperial Democracy: A Study of the Relation of Government by the People, Equality before the Law and Other Tenets of Democracy, to the Demands of a Vigorous Foreign Policy and Other Demands of Imperial Dominion. (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1899), especially 14, 91.

Edwin Mead came to a similar conclusion. Writing on the eve of the war declaration, Mead declared that a year earlier, when the atrocities in Cuba were at their height, a war would have been justified but that under the "President's masterly course" of gaining concessions from Spain, since then "the need had passed away." Yet the American people, so docile and slow to anger earlier, now demanded war. Like Jordan, Mead believed that only a few people were responsible for manufacturing the public outcry for war. A coterie of "busy-bodies and mischief-makers," he charged, "with their bluster and bravado and melodrama, have eagerly seized the opportunity afforded by the

---

[7] Jordan, Days of a Man, I, 613-16, retells the entire story. He first publicly disclosed the story of his interview with Woodford in a letter to the New York Times, April 1, 1915, 14:8, which touched off a short but spirited debate from others who tried to recall Woodford's attitude immediately after his return from Spain. See letters in ibid., April 13, 1915, 10:7; April 15, 1915, 12:1; and April 17, 1915, 10:7. The last letter cited a speech Woodford gave in early September 1898 to bolster Jordan's contention that Woodford believed the war could have been avoided; but a verbatim account of that speech indicates he made no such statement. See The Critic, XXXIII (new series, XXX) (October 1898), 287.

Cuban situation, have thriftily turned to account the genuine sympathies and manly instincts of the people, have magnified everything which should be minimized and minimized everything which should be magnified, and left nothing undone to make more difficult a situation which at best was difficult enough," and he singled out the irresponsible reporting of a large segment of the press for special censure. He concluded that though "the primary and determining motive of the war was noble -- sympathy with the oppressed and suffering" Cubans -- it was still "an unnecessary war."[8]

The distaste of Jordan and Mead for the Spanish-American War did not suddenly arouse their interest in the peace movement, for previous to 1898 both had given some attention to the issues of war and peace. Mead, it will be recalled, was the representative of the American Peace Society who presented the Society's resolution in behalf of Anglo-American arbitration to President Cleveland in January 1888. After assuming the editorship of the New England Magazine in 1890 from his friend Edward Everett Hale, who helped to nourish his interest in international peace, Mead had written a few editorials attacking the growing jingoism in the nation. Concerning the war scare with Chile resulting from the death of two American sailors in a Valparaiso riot, Mead had claimed that the issues involved were really "petty" but had nonetheless revealed "an insane itching to get out our new navy and spank this little South American republic, [and] kill a few thousand Chilians [sic] to avenge our ruffled 'honor;'" and four years later during the Venezuelan boundary controversy he had lashed out at "the reckless appeal to the war spirit" in the nation and "the bluster and brag and swagger" of certain politicians. He had written short studies of previous prophets of international organization, Dante, Henry of Navarre, William Penn, and Immanuel Kant and had attended the 1896 National Arbitration Conference and the Lake Mohonk Conferences of 1896 and 1897.[9]

---

[8] "Editor's Table," New England Magazine, XVIII, new series (May 1898), 385-87; "Editor's Table," ibid., XIX, new series (September 1898), 134; also see Edwin D. Mead to John D. Long (Secretary of the Navy), March 31, 1898, in Papers of John Davis Long, 1897-1904, ed. Gardner Weld Allen (Norwood: The Massachusetts Historical Society, 1939), 79-80.

Nevertheless, until the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Mead's name was rarely mentioned in the Advocate of Peace or other peace journals, for he still devoted almost all of his time to his literary interests and various civic reform causes in his native Boston.[10] Almost all of his writings on international peace and his speeches to peace conferences were more scholarly exercises than calls to action. Born in New Hampshire, Mead had studied at Cambridge and Leipzig Universities and upon his return to the United States in 1879 settled in Boston whose cultural advantages and literary heritage seemed inevitably to attract young men of learning and intellect. Mead devoted most of his time in the following decade to his literary and historical interests. In the 1880's he wrote a biography of Martin Luther, a study of the philosophy of Thomas Carlyle, and various articles on his heroes in American history: the Puritans, New England leaders in the struggle for independence, and the writers of Boston's Golden Age, especially Ralph Waldo Emerson and James Russell Lowell. His veneration of the American past -- at times it approached glorification -- stimulated his interest in saving the Old South Meeting House, a revered symbol of Boston history, from destruction and making it a center for the teaching of American history and the principles of good citizenship. Beginning in 1883 he received financial support to sponsor annual Old South summer lectures for young people and annual winter lectures for school teachers on famous personages and events in early American history, which Mead (and almost all Boston literary figures) interpreted to mean preeminently the history of Puritanism, or at least of Massachusetts. Among the lecturers who spoke at these Old South meetings were two of his closest literary friends, John Fiske and Edward Everett Hale. Mead supplemented these lectures in this period with two hundred numbers of "Old South Leaflets" which were mainly reprints of important historical papers in American history.[11] In the 1890's, in addition to his editorial responsibilities, Mead directed his energies into Boston political and social reform organizations whose avowed purpose ranged from simple moral uplift to the reform of city government to slum clearance and other beautification programs. He helped to found and direct two reform groups, the Boston Municipal League in 1893 and the Twentieth Century Club in 1894, and at various intervals played prominent roles in the Free Religious Association, the Men's League for Woman's Suffrage, and two organizations founded by Edward Everett Hale in the 1880's, the Lend a Hand Book Mission and the Massachusetts Society for the Promotion of Good Citizenship. Having committed himself so fully to these reform groups, the wonder is that Mead was still able to devote some of his time to the peace movement.[12]

---

[9] Edwin D. Mead, "Boston Memories of Fifty Years," in Fifty Years of Boston: A Memorial Volume, ed. Elisabeth M. Herlihy (Boston: Goodspeed's Bookstore, 1932), 31, 32, 38; "Editor's Table," New England Magazine, VI, new series (March 1892), 134-36; "Editor's Table," ibid., XIII, new series (February 1896), 801; "Editor's Table," ibid., XV, new series (November 1896), 380-84.

[10] It may be that Mead allowed his membership in the American Peace Society to lapse in the 1890's, for the Advocate of Peace, LXI (May 1899), 103, lists Mead as one of those who had "recently become members, though their names have not heretofore been published in these columns."

---

[11] For Mead's reminiscences on these matters, see his "Boston Memories of Fifty Years," 8, 10, 31-32. Mead's reverence for the Puritan can be found in almost any one of his editorials in the 1890's, but see especially his article, "The Message of Puritanism for This Time," New England Magazine, IV, new series (June 1891), 462-69. Edwin D. Mead, The Old South Work (Boston: Old South Meeting House, 1899) summarizes Mead's involvement in that area.

[12] Mead, "Boston Memories of Fifty Years," 35-37, is Mead's own summary of his domestic reform activities. On Mead's efforts for municipal reform, see "Editor's Table," New England Magazine, IX, new series (January 1894), 666-69; Mead to Robert Treat Paine, November 21, 1896, Robert Treat Paine Papers (Massachusetts Historical Society); Chauncy J. Hawkins, Samuel Billings Capen: His Life and Work (Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1914), 84; and Arthur Mann, Yankee Reformers in the Urban Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 159-63. [No author but probably by Mead], The Twentieth Century Club of Boston, 1894-1904 (Boston: The Davis Press, 1904?), 3, 9, 22, describes Mead's activities in that organization; Edward Everett Hale to Helen Kimball, December 31, 1895, Edward Everett Hale Papers (The New

Beginning with the war, however, Mead began to take a much more active part in the daily operations of the peace movement. In reinforcing Mead's interest in world peace, no individual was to have more influence on him than Lucia True Ames, a Boston school teacher and social reformer, whom he married in September 1898. Before her marriage to Mead, Miss Ames, had participated in the woman's suffrage and municipal reform movements and had joined the Twentieth Century Club in 1895. She had also written a utopian novel, Memoirs of a Millionaire, in 1889, which was probably inspired by Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward published two years earlier, and several essays depicting the growing ugliness and squalor in Boston and proposing remedial programs such as urban renewal projects and a fuller development and recognition of the importance of the nascent settlement house movement. An idealist pure and simple, her civic and literary interests paralleled Mead's, even to the point of revering Emerson as her main inspiration. Her commitment to the peace movement was no exception, although she took no part in peace work until 1897 when she attended the conference on international arbitration at

---

York State Library), Box 11, summarizes Hale's association with Mead in the Good Citizenship League; Lend a Hand: A Record of Progress, XVIII (January 1897), 71, lists Mead as treasurer of Hale's Lend a Hand Book Mission, which collected second-hand books and distributed them in the South, Southwest, and generally to rural areas throughout the nation.

Lake Mohonk.[13] Her marriage to Mead symbolized an emotional union not alone to each other, nor to their common intellectual interests, but also their mutual pledge to devote the rest of their lives together as activists in the quest for international peace. Shortly after their marriage they both began to write magazine articles and pamphlets and to lecture to private gatherings and peace societies on the question of world organization; almost immediately the two were recognized as among the most prolific writers and most forceful and inspirational speakers in the peace movement.

Although David Starr Jordan as president of Stanford was far away from the center of peace organizations on the eastern seaboard, he too was not entirely unfamiliar with the peace movement before 1898. In 1874, two years following his graduation from Cornell, Jordan has taught for a year at Indianapolis High School, where he first met Mrs. May Wright Thompson who had recently married one of Jordan's friends and after the early death of her husband was to marry another of Jordan's friends, Theodore L. Sewall. After his year at Indianapolis, Jordan became a leading ichthyologist and taught natural science subjects at Butler University and Indiana University and served as president of the latter institution from 1885 to 1891. It was in these same years that Mrs. Sewall began to champion international peace in the newly organized National Council of Women, and since Jordan and his wife kept in touch with the Sewalls whenever they visited Indianapolis, it is not unlikely that Mrs. Sewall told Jordan about her recent commitment to the peace movement.[14] Whatever impression Mrs. Sewall's interests in the peace movement might have made on him, however, was not immediately apparent, for after he went to Stanford in 1891 he was much too busy organizing and administering the new university to participate in outside causes which were far removed from the West coast. Jordan's first direct contact with the problem of international peace did not come until 1896 when President Cleveland, hearing of his wide-ranging research on marine life, appointed him to serve as an American delegate on the Joint High Commission with Great Britain to investigate the fur seal problem in the Bering Sea. Though the American and British commissioners failed to reach a final settlement of the problem at that time, the experience started Jordan thinking seriously about international arbitration and made him an enthusiastic advocate of the Joint High Commission and arbitration treaties for the pacific settlement of international disputes. The nearly simultaneous developments leading to the signing of the Olney-Pauncefote treaty, which Jordan endorsed, helped to sustain and nourish this interest. Early in

---

[13] Lucia True Ames, Memoirs of a Millionaire (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1889); Lucia True Ames, "The Home in the Tenement-House," New England Magazine, VII, new series (January 1893), 394-99; Lucia True Ames, "Saints and Sinners," Lend a Hand: A Record of Progress, XI (September 1893), 213-16; Lucia T. Ames, "City Homes for the Poor," ibid., XII (March 1894), 163-70; and Lucia True Ames, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1897, 95-99.

---

[14] Jordan, Days of a Man, I, 130; "Sewall House Visitors' Register, 1885-1908," May Wright Sewall Papers.(Indianapolis Public Library) discloses that Dr. and Mrs. Jordan were house guests of Mrs. Sewall on March 26, 1891.

1898, on the day following the last session of the Commission's work, John W. Foster, head of the American Commission, convened a public meeting in behalf of international arbitration and without any advance warning called on Jordan as the first speaker. Though taken completely by surprise, Jordan managed to make a few appropriate remarks on the need for an international arbitral tribunal with clearly defined procedures for hearing and deciding disputes between nations. Jordan later recalled that this was "the first of the many addresses I have given in behalf of arbitration, a society of nations, and the abolition of military force as an argument in economics or politics."[15] Already disposed to champion the peaceful settlement of international disputes, it is not surprising that Woodford's remarks to Jordan on the eleventh hour breakdown in diplomatic negotiations preceding the Spanish-American War only deepened his resolve to do whatever he could in the future to prevent the nation from plunging into unnecessary wars.

(3)

In a larger sense, the Spanish-American War was only a prelude to a much more far-reaching problem for the American Republic, for once Admiral Dewey's fleet had demolished the Spanish squadron in Manila Bay the prospect immediately loomed of American acquisition of the Philippines. In fact, Dewey's exploits were just as important as the onset of the war itself in pushing Jordan more deeply into active cooperation with the peace forces. As soon as he read newspaper reports of a naval battle in the Philippines, he sensed that the administration might allow a war undertaken ostensibly to free Cuba to develop into an imperialistic adventure, so on May 2, 1898, only a day after the battle of Manila Bay but several days before the official confirmation of Dewey's victory, Jordan discarded the prepared text of a speech on "Anglomania" he was supposed to deliver to a women's congress in San Francisco and instead lectured to the ladies on the baneful consequences of imperialism. His address, entitled "Lest We Forget" after Kipling's poem of the same name, was only a minor event in the peace movement, but to Jordan it "marked a turning point in my life." In succeeding weeks he frequently reiterated and elaborated these remarks, and in early 1899 he became a Vice President of the Anti-Imperialist League which Boston men had formally established in the autumn of 1898.[16]

---

[15] David Starr Jordan, letter, in American Conference on International Arbitration...1896, 160; New York World, March 30, 1897, 4:5; Jordan, Days of a Man, I, chs. 22, 23, especially 605-06.

With the exception of Edward Everett Hale, who naively believed that on the question of expansion the McKinley administration "knew the facts better than we and was to be trusted,"[17] all the peace workers were unanimous in their opposition to imperialism. Although only Jordan and Carnegie became officers of the Anti-Imperialist League, Alfred Love, Belva Lockwood, Hannah Bailey, Edwin and Lucia Mead, Robert Treat Paine, and Benjamin Trueblood fully endorsed its program, helped to organize its meetings, and often appeared on the same platform with its leaders.[18]

---

[16] Peacemaker, XVII (August 1898), 22, gives the account of an eyewitness to Jordan's San Francisco speech. Jordan, Days of a Man, I, 616, 695-99, recounts the story, the latter pages containing excerpts of Jordan's speech. Apparently Jordan repeated the exact same speech to the graduating class of Stanford on May 24, 1898, which is reprinted in its entirety in his Imperial Democracy, ch. 1.

[17] Quoted in Edwin D. Mead, "Everett Everett Hale," New England Magazine, XL, new series (July 1909), 525.

The ideological affinity of the peace workers and anti-imperialists is striking. Although the individuals in the two groups were not all of one mind on the questions of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, they all agreed on the question of the Philippines, and their rhetoric on this issue during the debate over the peace treaty with Spain, and even afterwards, shows a remarkable consensus.[19]

---

[18] For evidence of their opposition to imperialism and their cooperation with the Anti-Imperialist League, see Advocate of Peace, LXI (January 1899), 7-8; (February 1899), 32-33; (May 1899), 105; (June 1899), 131; (November 1899), 235. Also Belva Lockwood, in Peacemaker, XVII (December 1898), 113; and the Universal Peace Union's resolution promoted by Alfred Love, in ibid., (February 1899), 154, which George F. Hoar introduced in the Senate and William F. Aldrich introduced in the House. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3rd session, XXXII (February 3, 1899), 1414, 1442. The names of Mead, Jordan, Mrs. Bailey, Philip C. Garrett, and Samuel Capen appeared on anti-imperialist petitions to Congress. Ibid., 55th Congress, 3rd session, XXXII (December 15, 1898), 205; (December 20, 1898), 322; (January 5, 1899), 401; 56th Congress, 1st session, XXXIII (December 11, 1899), 175. Richard Harlan Thomas, "Jenkin Lloyd Jones: Lincoln's Soldier of Civic Righteousness" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: Rutgers - The State University, 1967), 101-02, notes Mead's close cooperation with Chicago anti-imperialists.

[19] The following analysis treats only the reactions of the peace workers to imperialism, but my conclusions do not differ greatly from those given by the historians of anti-imperialism. The most rewarding studies of anti-imperialism for my purposes are cited in many of the following footnotes.

The key word for understanding the position of the peace workers, as well as the anti-imperialists, in the debate over the future disposition of the Philippines is "tradition." Whatever arguments the peace advocates used against imperialism, they invariably invoked this word or its equivalent to express their satisfaction with America's relatively stable and secure position in world affairs before 1898 and their profound dissatisfaction with the administration's foreign policy between 1898 and 1900 which seemed suddenly and sharply to undermine, indeed repudiate entirely, the basic principles on which the Republic had been founded and prospered for more than a century. Most obviously, they all strongly opposed American imperial expansion because it signified a drastic departure from America's traditional isolationism. Again and again, they repeated the solemn warning of George Washington's Farewell Address against permanent entangling alliances or other foreign commitments far away from the Western Hemisphere, yet they believed that the planting of the American flag in the Philippines would do just that. Jordan proclaimed that Americans "have followed the spirit of Washington's address for a hundred years, until the movement has brought us to the parting of the ways," and he feared that the quest for empire would bring the United States all the complexities, complications, and perils that had befallen the European powers in previous decades in their scramble for colonies.[20] The Advocate of Peace agreed.

---

[20] Imperial Democracy, 19.

The rising demands for an American colonial empire, it complained, meant that the

> wisdom of the fathers is thrown to the winds. Washington is suddenly dethroned.... We are asked to break with our whole past, to tear out the roots of the great tree of our national life, to plant a new tree of foreign origin. Just at the moment when the American ideal is becoming overmasteringly potent, we are urged to abandon it. The European models are held before us -- the great powers, the armor-clad powers, the meddling, mischief-working, entangled powers. We must go in and do as they do. We must say "Hands off!" or "Hands on!" as suits our purpose.

The lessons of the situation, it concluded, should be clear: "three thousand years of history teach, beyond almost all other national lessons, that the temptations of great power, even when the attempt is made to use it to promote good ends, are particularly irresistible. Every government that has ever been, under no matter what pretext, led away by the lust of power and physical greatness, has sooner or later gone to wreck."[21]

The premonitions of the peace workers were not entirely unfounded. Since the islands were strategically surrounded by the territorial possessions of Japan and several European powers, it was inconceivable that the United States could govern the Philippines without becoming embroiled in Far Eastern problems. If the United States decided to retain the Philippines, it could no longer ignore the diplomatic intrigue, suspicion, and the recurring dangers, rumors, and threats of war that pervaded the area. Since the United States still did not have sufficient military strength to resist with any assurance of success the aggression of another major power or combination of powers in the area, the decision to remain in the Philippines would require the building of a large navy and the expansion of the army or the reliance on the support of Great Britain, the most friendly, trustworthy of the so-called civilized powers, in maintaining American influence there. Even with a formal or informal rapprochment with Britain, however, it was probable that the United States would have to increase substantially its military establishment to counteract the military strength of the other powers in the area.

---

[21] Advocate of Peace, LX (July 1898), 150.

The peace workers did not like any of these options. Increases in the army and navy they immediately rejected as antithetic to their anti-military prejudices, but the idea of an Anglo-American alliance also repelled them. While they admired the British traditions of liberty and their achievements in literature, commerce, and industry, they had no sympathy with British imperialism nor any desire to play Britain's game in world politics. Carnegie, Mead, Jordan, and Trueblood all wrote extensively on England between 1898 and 1900, but they distinguished carefully between its "false" imperialistic tradition of Benjamin Disraeli, Joseph Chamberlain, and Cecil Rhodes and the "true" England of Richard Cobden, John Bright, John Morley, and and the later years of William Gladstone, all "little Englanders."[22] In the same way, the American peace workers were

---

[22] Ernest R. May has recently argued that the proto-imperialist writings of Europeans, especially those in England, were well known and probably read in the 1880's and 1890's by

"little Americans" who desired to preserve a comparatively small, compact, continental America with a minimum of binding foreign commitments. Since Britain was experiencing increasing difficulties in extending its colonial possessions in China and Africa, while simultaneously defending its far-flung holdings, the peace workers believed that Britain would use an Anglo-American alliance covering Far Eastern matters to its own selfish advantage and might even draw the United States into any war Great Britain might fight there; at the same time, however, the United States would run the risk of being deserted by its ally whenever it needed diplomatic or military support in the area. Overlooking or minimizing the possibility of defining carefully the mutual obligations of any agreement between the two powers,

---

several of the "opinion leaders" in the United States, and the force of their writings, together with the accelerating pace of European imperialistic rivalry in the 1890's, helped to make imperialism understandable, if never entirely respectable, to a broad spectrum of the American opinion elite. With the "anti-colonial consensus" thus weakened, once the logic of events of 1898 raised the question of the annexation of the Philippines, it was easier for Americans to justify the annexation of the Philippines than it would have been earlier, say, in the 1870's. By the same token, it can be argued, as I do here and in the following pages, that the anti-imperialist "opinion leaders" in the United States used the arguments of their English and European counterparts to demonstrate the fallacies and dangers of following the example of European imperialism. Though May believes that by 1898 the ideas of the European imperialists had gained considerable ground at the expense of the European anti-imperialists in the United States, he recognizes the persistence of the latter's influence on American anti-imperialists and the reassertion of their importance after 1899 in helping to restore the "anti-colonial consensus" in the United States. See his essay, "American Imperialism: A Reinterpretation," in Perspectives in American History, I (1967), 123-286, especially 194-95, 200-01, 204-06, 207-63, 268-74. The peace workers adhered to the British liberal tradition in foreign affairs described in F.R. Flournoy, "British Liberal Theories of International Relations (1848-1898)," Journal of the History of Ideas, VII (April 1946), 195-217.

they assumed that Britain was only slightly less perfidious than the other colonial powers and therefore was a poor bargain for the future security of America's territories in the western Pacific. It would be safer and no more difficult for the United States to withdraw entirely from the Philippines and thereby avoid all of these unpleasant alternatives.[23] Jordan stated this feeling most graphically when, after listing all the perils that annexation of the Philippine archipelago would bring to the nation, he remarked quite seriously: "The only sensible thing to do would be to pull out on some dark night and escape from the great problem of the Orient as suddenly and as dramatically as we got into it."[24]

When the peace workers did not call up the memory of George Washington and the self-contained Republic that his and later generations of Americans had helped to develop, they still looked to past traditions for their arguments. In the area of political economy, for example, they upheld the free trade theories of Cobden, Bright, and the Manchester School which had greatly influenced American economic thought in the nineteenth century. These British economists had opposed colonialism in part because they thought it was economically unsound and ultimately ruinous to the financial health of the mother country. The American peace workers, especially the Boston economist Edward Atkinson whose speeches against imperialism were prominently reported in the Advocate of Peace,[25] frequently cited their arguments that colonial expansion would erode the age-old laissez faire liberalism, notably the "natural" law of free trade, which in their view had stimulated business initiative, promoted commerce, and brought an ever-ascending level of material plenty to the American people. If the United States annexed the Philippines, they predicted ominously, the enlargement of the bureaucracy and the increases in administrative expenses of the federal government would inevitably follow, to say nothing of the skyrocketing costs which the necessity for an enlarged army and navy would require. The tendency, if not the immediate result, would be a governmental paternalism leading to the enslavement of the masses in taxes and debt. They rejected out of hand the large policy advocates' contention that American financial and commercial interests would exploit the economic potential of the new colony and bring increased trade and other monetary rewards which would more than compensate for the administrative expenses of the government. As Jordan asserted dogmatically: "No dependent colony, honestly administered, ever repaid its cost to the government, and this holds out not the slightest promise of such a result."[26] As for the opportunities for private investment, Edwin Mead could not understand how the sober business community could seriously consider them: "No man of common sense, "he wrote bluntly, "can believe that a hundred million dollars put into the Philippines would yield half the returns of the same millions put into Oregon or Texas."[27]

---

[23] See, for example, Mead, "Editor's Table," New England Magazine, XVIII, new series (July 1898), 631-36; "Editor's Table," ibid., XIX, new series (December 1898), 519; and "Editor's Table," ibid., XXI, new series (December 1899), 250-56. Also Carnegie, "Americanism Versus Imperialism," 1-10; Carnegie, letter, in New York Times, December 12, 1898, 6:5; Jordan, Imperial Democracy, 17-19, 26-27, 29-30, 32-36, 50-58, passim; Advocate of Peace, LX (June 1898), 128-29, 130; (July 1898), 155-56; and LXI (May 1899), 104.

[24] Imperial Democracy, 52.

---

[25] Advocate of Peace, LX (June 1898), 133; (November 1898), 227; LXI (May 1899), 107.

Most frequently, however, the annexationists cited the old imperial maxin that trade followed the flag and that therefore the United States should remain in the Philippines not just for the trade of those islands but for their potential as a stepping stone to larger trading opportunities in the Orient. The peace workers vehemently disagreed. Andrew Carnegie said that the trade-follows-the-flag argument was "obviously false. Trade scents the lowest price current, and does not care a copper about the flag," he rebutted, and to illustrate his point cited Canada which he claimed bought its union jacks in New York rather than from the mother country simply because they were cheaper in New York.[28] Edwin Mead and David Starr Jordan also used free trade language in their attempts to drive nails into the annexationists' coffin. As Mead put it:

> No fallacy is more fallacious nor more pestilent than the fallacy that in order to trade with a people you have got to govern them -- the fallacy that trade

---

[26] Imperial Democracy, 53.

[27] "Editor's Table," New England Magazine, XX, new series (July 1899), 636.

[28] Letter in New York Times, October 24, 1898, 6:6.

> follows the flag.... If trade with China and the Philippines is what we want, all that we have to do is to send to their markets what their people need. If this be done at lower prices than what England, France and Germany do it for, then we shall get the trade.[29]

From such statements it would appear that the peace workers were rigidly opposed to any extension of American political or economic influence outside the Western Hemisphere, yet they were not inflexible isolationists. None of them protested commercial expansion, for example, as long as it could be attained honestly and peaceably. The free trade theories of the Manchester School, after all, were not only a negative economic argument against imperialism but also a positive argument for the free flow of goods in international trade. Just as important to the peace workers were the political implications of free trade, for they assumed that unfettered international trade would stimulate the growth of commerce itself, and this growth, by multiplying contacts between nations and creating mutual, dependent interests, would help to improve the possibilities for international understanding and world peace. In effect, in the realm of economic theory they envisaged the same liberal internationalism which Woodrow Wilson later was to make a cornerstone of his post-war formula for international amity. Edwin Mead believed that foreign trade was a positive good -- "the great civilizer, the great sapper and miner for progress, the great stimulator and minister of men," he called it -- and he minimized the possibilities of international conflict resulting from legitimate business interests of various nations competing for foreign markets. He objected only to tariff barriers and other discriminatory economic measures which certain business groups tried to foist on the government. Such measures not only disrupted the "natural" laws of economics and thereby brought confusion if not chaos to the world economy, but increased the suspicions between competing interest groups. If unchecked, these suspicions could have dangerous international repercussions and foster the war spirit.[30] Similarly, David Starr Jordan and Andrew Carnegie accepted commercial expansion and were even willing to modify the doctrinaire aspects of free trade to adjust to the changing commercial realities stemming from America's victories in the recent Spanish war. Thus, on one occasion Carnegie stated that he had no objection to the retention of a coaling station in the Philippines for the benefit of American business and shipping interests in the Far East, and David Starr Jordan believed that it was possible and not undesirable for the United States to secure coaling stations on the way to the Orient "to meet our commercial needs without entering on colonial expansion." They drew back only from this larger policy of colonial expansion. To limit America's territorial acquisitions to these coaling stations would enable the nation to fulfill its commercial needs without assuming all the additional financial, administrative, and diplomatic burdens that the annexationists wanted the nation to accept.[31]

---

[29] Jordan, Imperial Democracy, 52, 142-43; Mead, "Editor's Table," New England Magazine, XX, new series (July 1899), 636.

---

[30] "Editor's Table," New England Magazine, XX, new series (July 1899), 643, 638.

The peace workers, in truth, fit well into the same interpretive framework of recent historians who have emphasized that the so-called Great Debate over imperialism from 1898 to 1900 was not fought out between two diametrically polar groups of expansionists and anti-expansionists, since both groups agreed on some measure of American expansionism as inevitable and even desirable, but between annexationists and anti-annexationists on the narrow, but crucial question of the Philippine archipelago.[32] What disturbed the peace workers and other anti-annexationists was not so much the extension of the nation's economic and political influence into the western Pacific but the administration's methods in advancing them. The one crucial issue which most clearly divided the annexationists and anti-annexationists centered around the thorny question of the future status of the Filipino people. Conceivably, if the Philippines had been uninhabited, the peace advocates would not have protested so strongly against the annexation of the islands, much as annexation would still have enlarged and complicated the nation's foreign commitments. Carnegie believed that in such a hypothetical case he would still have opposed the annexation of the islands, but since had had no objection to the settlement of Americans and Britons in relatively uninhabited lands, as had already occurred in their settlement of the North American and Australian continents, he himself recognized that his objections would have been muted.[33]

---

[31] Carnegie, letter in New York Times, October 24, 1898, 6:6. Carnegie's position was well stated even before the debate over imperialism. Erving Winslow to Carnegie, April 12, 1898, Carnegie Papers, Vol.50, mentions a leaflet Carnegie wrote entitled "Commercial vs. Colonial Expansion," which extolled the former and condemned the latter. Carnegie's article, "The Manchester School and To-day," The Nineteenth Century, XLIII (February 1898), 272-83, is a panegyric of the continuing industrial revolution and commercial expansion. For Jordan's views, see Imperial Democracy, 57-58.

[32] LaFeber, New Empire, 416. Also see the commentary by Thomas J. McCormick, in Studies on the Left, III, No. 1(1962), 28-33, especially 28-29, 31-32.

The question of annexing islands inhabited by thousands of Filipino natives, however, complicated the matter by introducing a human factor, which the peace workers consistently defined in moral terms. To be sure, they argued that the American and Filipino people had such different religious, political, and linguistic traditions that even America's best intentions in bringing the Filipinos the benefits of American civilization would in the end breed confusion, sullen resentment, and perhaps even rebellion, and they also accepted the pseudo-Darwinian argument against annexation, most emphatically expounded by Andrew Carnegie, that "the influence of a superior race upon an inferior in the tropics is not elevating but demoralizing" to both races.[34] More often, however, they subordinated these cultural and racial considerations to the fundamental question of political morality. Again and again they pointed out that imperialism above all else involved the subjugation of foreign peoples without their consent and at its heart was immoral. They were usually careful, for example, to explain that their economic arguments against imperialism were secondary to the moral issue. Thus, although Carnegie advanced economic arguments against imperialism, he emphasized that compared with the moral issue they were "least important." And while Edwin Mead often used economic arguments, perhaps in an attempt to convince businessmen and other practical-minded people of the logic of the anti-annexationist position, he still placed the commercial argument against annexation "second, and not first," which he reserved to the deeper moral question. As far as he was concerned, imperialism was simply immoral. With burning indignation he described it as nothing more or less than "the devil's gospel," "conscienceless brigandage," "stealing."[35]

---

[33] "Distant Possessions -- The Parting of the Ways," North American Review, CLXVII (August 1898), 341-42.

---

[34] Mead, "Editor's Table," New England Magazine, XIX, new series (September 1898), 132-33, best summarizes the cultural argument against expansion. For the strongest statements of racial degeneration, see Jordan, Imperial Democracy, 93-95; and the many Carnegie letters reproduced in Burton J. Hendrick, The Life of Andrew Carnegie (2 vols., Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1932), I, 414 ff. The quotation is from Carnegie, "Americanism Versus Imperialism, -- II," North American Review, CLXVIII (March 1899), 367.

[35] Carnegie, letter in New York Times, October 24, 1898, 6:6; Mead, "Editor's Table," New England Magazine, XX, new series (July 1899), 643; and "Editor's Table," ibid., XIX, new series (September 1898), 131, 133.

In the same way, much as they praised the "little Englanders" -- Cobden, Bright, Morley, and Gladstone -- for their opposition to foreign entanglements and for their free trade theories, they revered them more fundamentally because they were moralists who preached the brotherhood of man and the peaceful mission of the Anglo-Saxon race. And they condemned the British imperialists not so much for their expansionist beliefs, pernicious though they were, as for their deviously clever rationalizations of their colonial policies which more often than not had brought on the "brutal" and "rapacious" subjugation and exploitation of foreign peoples. Over the years the rationalizations of the imperialists had blurred the central moral question and had seriously eroded the Christian humanistic strain in the British tradition. It was small wonder, therefore, that they found the British heart "hardened" and the British blood "poisoned" from its many imperialistic adventures.[36]

The American peace workers often cited the example of the British moral decline to predict that the American annexation of the Philippines would prove but the first false step on the way to a similar moral decline in their own nation. They pointed out that if imperialism had led the British people almost past the point of redemption, the American people, whose hands had previously been so pure on the question of colonialism, now faced the possibility of prostituting its past anti-colonial record and perhaps repudiating entirely the very foundations of its political morality. They believed that the Spanish-American War was one sign of this tendency, but the imperialistic aftermath seemed an even more drastic departure from America's cherished ethical heritage, a deplorable shift from self-denying morality to national self-glory, from idealism to vulgarity, from high principle to opportunism. It reminded them of the American struggle for independence more than a century earlier. How could Americans stand on the principles of the Declaration of Independence, they asked, yet prevent the Filipinos from attaining the same freedom that the Seventy-Sixers had fought for? Imperialism, they argued, was clearly un-American since it denied the basic democratic principle of the consent of the governed. Long before the Filipinos rose in revolt against the American rule, a strong independence movement had existed in the islands, and the peace workers assumed that the islanders were freedom-loving people who were asking for the same self-government that had long been a cardinal principle of the American political philosophy. In defining the issues as "Americanism" versus "Imperialism," Carnegie spoke for all the peace advocates: the former stood for the nation's historic principles of freedom, the latter for the present temptation to dominate alien peoples.[37] In no case did they believe there could be any compromise between the two concepts. When they did not cite America's revolutionary experience, they invoked the ethical precepts of the anti-slavery movement. They often referred to Abraham Lincoln's "half-slave" "half-free" speech and made the analogy that in the present age the nation could not long endure half-Republic half-Empire.[38] Several months before the outbreak of fighting between Filipino rebels and the American troops who were rapidly occupying the islands, Carnegie warned President McKinley that the Filipinos wanted their full independence and would be willing to fight for it if necessary. "Our young men volunteered to fight the oppressor," he warned; "I shall be surprised if they relish the work of shooting down the oppressed." Yet McKinley foresaw no danger of a Filipino rebellion. "Mr. Carnegie doesn't understand the situation at all.... We shall be welcomed as their dearest friends," he replied confidently.[39]

---

[36] See especially Mead, "Editor's Table," *ibid.*, XXI, new series (October 1899), 256; and "Editor's Table," *ibid.*, XVIII, new series (July 1898), 632-36. Mead's frequent references to England derived in large measure from his early experiences as a student there. As his wife later wrote: "He was studying in England during Gladstone's campaign against the Bulgarian atrocities, and on his return home he lectured many times on Gladstone, contrasting his broad humanity with the nationalistic and selfish policies of Disraeli." Lucia Ames Mead, "Apostles of World Unity, X -- Edwin D. Mead," *World Unity*, II (August 1928), 337.

---

[37] "Americanism Versus Imperialism," especially 13.

[38] Carnegie, "Americanism Versus Imperialism -- II," 371-72; Mead, "Editor's Table," New England Magazine, XX, new series (July 1899), 645-46; Jordan, Imperial Democracy, 100-01.

[39] Carnegie quoted this conversation with McKinley in his "The Opportunity of the United States," North American Review, CLXXIV (May 1902), 607. His recollection was probably accurate, for McKinley admitted shortly after the outbreak of the Filipino unsurrection that he "never dreamed" the Filipinos would "return our mercy with a Mauser." New York Times, October 24, 1898, 6:6; Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley: From March 1, 1897 to May 30, 1900 (New York: Doubleday and McClure,1900), 216.

Once the Filipinos led by Emilio Aguinaldo clashed with American occupation troops, the moral argument pushed all others even more deeply into the background. The news of hostilities resulting in the loss of some American lives reached Washington only a day before the final vote on the treaty in the Senate and probably influenced a few anti-annexationist Senators, angered at this affront to the nation's honor, to change their minds and vote for the treaty which gained the necessary two-thirds approval with only one vote to spare. After the treaty was ratified, the peace workers, like the anti-imperialists, did not immediately abandon the fight against imperialism which they hoped would become the paramount issue of the election of 1900. While awaiting that campaign, they unleashed verbal barrages against the McKinley administration for its resolute determination to crush the Filipino insurgents. They recognized that McKinley had unpleasant alternatives in dealing with the rebellious Filipinos, especially after the ratification of the treaty legalized American sovereignty over the islands, yet they still believed that even his best of intentions revealed a remarkable insensitivity to the human costs. Andrew Carnegie admitted that both the imperialists and anti-imperialists sincerely had "as their aim what they believe to be the good of the poor backward races, and neither pecuniary gain nor military glory for their own country," yet as far as he was concerned, the thrust of the administration's Filipino policy, if resolutely pursued to its logical conclusion, would be to "kill off half the inhabitants in order to civilize the rest."[40] David Starr Jordan thought that the outbreak of guerilla warfare in the Philippines submerged the expansionist issue entirely to the question of peace. "Good intentions lie at the bottom of the greatest crimes of history," he stated bluntly, and concluded angrily:

> Do what you will with the Philippines, if you do it
> in peace -- but stop this war.
> It is our fault and ours alone that this war began.
> It is our crime that it continues.[41]

Likewise, Edwin Mead looked with dismay at the seeming unconcern of the American people for the plight of the Filipinos:

> how has it become possible that the spectacle of such a passion and such a struggle should fail to stir any American heart? How is it possible that this democracy, a century after Washington, should prostitute itself to the mouldy and poisonous doctrine that "sovereignty" -- sovereignty over unconsulted, unconsenting, and protesting millions of men -- is something to be bought and sold?[42]

While the warfare between the Filipino rebels and American troops continued in the islands, the news of the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and the Boers in South Africa in October 1899 further confirmed their beliefs in the moral degeneracy of the so-called civilized nations at the end of the century. The American war of conquest was a degrading experience, but the Boer War seemed to presage the final capitulation of Great Britain to the most selfish and brutal aspects of imperialism. The peace workers frequently cited the

---

[40] "Americanism Versus Imperialism -- II," 367.

[41] Imperial Democracy, 268, 274.

[42] "Editor's Table," New England Magazine, XX, new series (July 1899), 645.

British vigorous prosecution of the Boer War as a parallel to the logical consequences of America's conquest of the Philippines. If the United States and Great Britain, both of which they assumed to be in the vanguard of civilization, could trample on the rights and liberties of others, then the future course of world history would be very grim indeed.[43] Andrew Carnegie assailed the promoters of the Boer War for their sordid motives. "It was brought on by Great Britain in her desire for the gold fields and for race supremacy in South Africa," he exclaimed, and he specifically linked this "infamous and unjust" war to the American attack on "the poor Filipinos. These two attacks are a disgrace to both branches of our race."[44] Edwin Mead who was already prepared to attribute the worst motives to British imperial policies believed that Britain had reached its nadir after reading John A. Hobson's savage exposure of the financial bonds between the English press of South Africa and the mine-owners and speculators there. He was so alarmed that he called the British subjugation of the Boers "one of the grossest crimes in history." Yet although he believed "that every lover of freedom and fair play in America and in the world should be on his feet to denounce it," the general indifference of the American people to events in South Africa, just as they had already shown their indifference to the warfare in the Philippines, made the deepest impression on him.

---

[43] See, for example, Advocate of Peace, LXI (September 1899), 179-80; and (November 1899), 232-33.

[44] New York Times, November 10, 1899, 2:3.

He recognized this most fully when a delegation of Boer leaders visited Boston in the spring of 1900 to dramatize their unhappy plight at the hands of Great Britain. "It is a measure of our degredation and of the irony of our own political situation," he grumbled, "that the uprising in New England to greet these men was so unlike the uprising to great Louis Kossuth," the Hungarian freedom-fighter who had received an enthusiastic reception during his visit to Boston fifty years earlier. And although Mead described the Boston meeting for these Boer spokesmen in Faneuil Hall as "magnificent," he thought it was "pitiful and tragical" that the "best of the newspaper reports gave no conception to it." The Boston Transcript, he wrote acidly, "could not give a column to this momentous meeting in our New England capital, the boasted cradle of Liberty, to consider this momentous question in this world at this moment!"[45]

(4)

For all the ideological similarities between the anti-imperialists and the peace workers, however, the fact remains that the two movements began to diverge even before the election of 1900. Most of the anti-imperialists who had not shown any deep interest in the peace movement before 1898 continued to express little concern for it after about 1900, although the peace movement was to grow rapidly after that date and become respectable in the eyes of many Americans. Nor did the peace workers participate more than marginally in the anti-imperialist movement after 1900, although the Anti-Imperialist League continued to exist and to agitate for the independence of the Philippines as late as 1920.

---

[45] "Editor's Table," New England Magazine, XXII, new series (May 1900), 369-80, is Mead's laudatory review of Hobson's The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Cures. The quotations are from Mead to Edward A. Atkinson, June 2, 1900, Edward A. Atkinson Papers (Massachusetts Historical Society).

Several factors contributed to the divergence of the two movements. In the first place, some of the leaders of the Anti-Imperialist League had strong obligations to that organization and found time only to direct their organizational and propaganda efforts to the single issue of independence of the Philippines. Erving Winslow, David Greene Haskins, and Moorfield Storey, the League's three most energetic officers in the first decade of the twentieth century, were all members of the American Peace Society but were so committed to their anti-imperialist work that they took only passing interest in the activities of the peace society. On the other hand, members of the Anti-Imperialist League who held no official positions in that organization felt freer to join other idealistic movements. A more important reason for the divergence of the two movements was the fundamental differences in the temperaments of their personnel. A profile of the League's fifty-two officers from 1898 to 1900 reveals a hodgepodge of political loyalties, but with the exception of a few moderate social reformers the overwhelming majority were profoundly conservative on economic and social questions, and they remained conservatives into the twentieth century.[46] Whether nominal Republicans, independent Republicans (Mugwumps), or conservative Democrats, these anti-imperialist leaders viewed with distinct caution any attempts to use the state and national governments to legislate far-reaching reforms in American social, political, and economic life. They carried their cautious views into the area of international reform. They were pessimistic or at best mildly hopeful concerning the future course of the nation both in domestic and world politics. Even their moral indignation against imperialism sounded rather tired, bland, and uninspired, and lacked the radical cutting edge which might have been channeled into other idealistic causes such as the peace movement once the anti-imperialist agitation had abated. In effect, they retained the same skittish attitude toward American foreign policy after 1900 that had first prompted their participation in the anti-imperialist movement.[47] When they did support idealistic causes, they involved local, domestic issues and had a direct relationship to previous causes for which they worked, but in no case did they have more than the most indirect relationship to international reform. Moorfield Storey's active role in the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in 1909, for example, represented a continuation of his long-standing interest in racial justice which he had derived from his anti-slavery parents and his service in his early manhood as secretary to the Radical Republican Senator Charles Sumner. In a very real sense, his interest in the Philippines after 1898 merely added an international dimension to his life-long concern for colored peoples.

---

[46] E. Berkeley Tompkins, "The Great Debate: Anti-Imperialism in the United States, 1890-1920"(Ph.D. dissertation: University of Pennsylvania, 1963), 277-81, 298, has a careful analysis of the official leadership which corrects many errors of previous scholarship on the actual number of officers in the Anti-Imperialist League.

[47] *Ibid.*, 297-315. A similar conclusion for the Boston anti-imperialists is given in Geoffrey Blodgett, *The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 265-68. The pessimism of the anti-imperialists is further documented in Robert L. Beisner, "Gloom, Gloom, Gloom, and Scarce One Ray of Light: Ruminations of E.L. Godkin and Charles Eliot Norton," *American Heritage*, XVIII (August 1967), 65-71, which is a selection from his forthcoming book on the anti-imperialists.

The more idealistic and optimistic of the anti-imperialists, by contrast, found the anti-imperialist movement only a way station on the way to other reform movements. It is true that in attacking the administration's expansionist policies they too sounded like gloomy prophets of the Last Judgment, but they felt rather uncomfortable in their narrow, crabbed, and essentially negative posture during the debate over imperialism. However pessimistic they appeared in the present crisis, they still managed to believe that a brighter future lay ahead. David Starr Jordan could say shortly after the clash of arms between the Filipinos and American troops that "there are occasions when optimism is treason. Only an accomplice is cheerful in presence of a crime."[48] But Jordan's pessimism was limited to time and place, for his deeper convictions were at once more affirmative, optimistic, even utopian. As he was to say a few years later:

---

[48] Imperial Democracy, 81.

> "Unless your soul dwells in Utopia, life is not worth the keeping. Your windows should look toward heaven, not into the gutter."[49]

Similarly, although Edwin Mead wrote some of the most scathing prose against imperialism, he did not allow himself to despair. Indeed, he pointed out that a major weakness of the anti-imperialist movement was its underlying pessimism. "If there is any language more offensive to the honest democrat than the language of the imperialist, it is the language of the American pessimist and unbeliever who answers that the proposed [imperialistic] policy would be well enough for some other nation, because others have the capacity, the training and machinery and political capacity but that we have not the capacity and would simply open new flood gates of corruption." Mead did not doubt the American capacity to rule the Filipinos as honestly and fairly as circumstances allowed until they were given self-government; he opposed American rule there simply because he thought it was stupid, unnecessary, and in the final analysis a travesty to the highest, noblest ideals of the American Republic.[50]

The different temperaments between the two movements can be clearly seen in their differing reactions to William Jennings

---

[49] Quoted in Edward McNall Burns, David Starr Jordan: Prophet of Freedom (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953), 35.

[50] "Editor's Table," New England Magazine, XX, new series (July 1899), 641.

Bryan, the Democratic presidential candidate in the election of 1900. Almost without exception the officers of the Anti-Imperialist League had deep reservations about supporting Bryan, for they did not care for his flamboyant political style and did not understand his behavior in asking Democratic Senators to consent to the peace treaty with Spain. Even the older confirmed pacifists, especially Alfred Love, wondered whether Bryan's apparent inconsistencies would make him a more reliable president than McKinley.[51] To make matters worse, the leaders of the Anti-Imperialist League strongly disliked his "radical" domestic program, especially his desire to revive the free silver issue as equal in importance to the question of imperialism. Although the Democratic platform of 1900 declared that imperialism was the "paramount issue" in the campaign, Bryan consistently refused to abandon the money question and the rest of his domestic reform program and at times seemed to place greater emphasis on them than on imperialism.[52]

By contrast, many of those who actively cooperated with the Anti-Imperialist League but later were to direct their energies into the peace movement either actively championed Bryan's candidacy or later regretted their reluctant choice of McKinley. From the beginning of the campaign, Mead placed himself clearly in the Bryan camp. In his wide friendships among Boston Mugwumps, his distrust of the "spirit of party," his belief in honest and efficient government ruled by men of social position and intellect, his commitment to tariff reform, and his vehement opposition to the free silver agitation in the early 1890's, Mead seemed to share the Mugwump political philosophy.[53] But he had never joined their ranks and never sympathized with their underlying conservatism. As early as 1884, for example, he had supported the Republican presidential candidate, James G. Blaine, whom the Mugwumps deserted *en masse* because of his alleged public indiscretions, and he even wrote a campaign pamphlet strongly defending Blaine against the wide-spread charges of his past corruption. He also believed Blaine was a more forceful individual, would be willing to try new domestic programs as President, and had a better grasp of foreign problems than the Democratic candidate, Grover Cleveland.[54] In the 1890's his persistent campaign for many political, social, and economic reforms in Boston contrasted vividly with the Boston Mugwumps who offered no remedy for the problem of poverty in an industrial society and viewed with horror any attempts at the redistribution of wealth.[55] Mead was, in sum, a progressive reformer long before progressivism began to make headway on the national scene, while his growing commitment to the peace movement after 1898 essentially represented an extension of his crusading zeal into the area of international reform. By 1900 he was no longer worried about Bryan's silver views and supported his presidential candidacy both because of his anti-imperialism and his domestic reform program. The local Democratic organization even asked Mead to run for the United States House of Representatives, and he refused only because the Republican candidate from his district, the incumbent Samuel W. McCall, was also a pronounced anti-imperialist.[56]

---

[51] Peacemaker, XIX (November 1900), 105. The Advocate of Peace, LXII (November 1900), 205, endorsed no presidential candidate, although its unqualified opposition to imperialism implied its support of Bryan. Also see its praise of Bryan's acceptance speech at Indianapolis, and its discouraging post-mortum on the election. Ibid. (September 1900), 169; and (December 1900), 228-29.

[52] E. Berkeley Tompkins, "Scylla and Charybdis: The Anti-Imperialist Dilemma in the Election of 1900," Pacific Historical Review, XXXVI (May 1967), 143-61, is a good summary of the anti-imperialist predicament.

---

[53] Mead's views on these subjects can be found in "Our Silver Experiment," *American Journal of Politcs*, V (October 1894), 399-407; "Editor's Table," *New England Magazine*, XIII, new series (February 1896), 801; and New York *Times*, January 10, 1898, 7:4.

[54] *The Case of Mr. Blaine: An Open Letter to the Boston Advertiser. By an Independent* (Boston: J.S. Cushing & Co., 1884), *passim*.

David Starr Jordan was less certain of Bryan's fitness for the presidency. He had been a Mugwump in the 1880's and still held on to its ideological baggage in 1900, for he deplored Bryan's refusal to abandon the silver issue.[57] Significantly, however, Jordan had second thoughts about his reluctant choice of McKinley in the election of 1900 and later wrote that it was "not impossible that Bryan would have been the safer [candidate], as the rise of senatorial domination was more of a menace than any financial heresy originating with the people."[58] In effect, Jordan was one of the few Mugwumps who was adjustable enough to become a progressive reformer when he saw, as did many other Americans after about 1900, that certain reform legislation was necessary.

---

[55] For a good survey of the Boston Mugwump viewpoint, see Blodgett, Gentle Reformers, especially ch. 2.

[56] Mead, "Boston Memories of Fifty Years," 34.

[57] Jordan to Bryan, February 7, 1900, William Jennings Bryan Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Box 27, is a passionate plea to Bryan to abandon the money question and make imperialism the "sole issue" or else "to stand aside for someone else who can."

All of these explanations for the divergence of the two movements suggest a more inclusive reason -- that the individuals whose participation in the anti-imperialist effort represented their first commitment to an organized movement in the area of international reform but whose loyalties ultimately shifted to the peace movement were much younger individuals than the hard-core leadership of the Anti-Imperialist League and were able to adjust more readily to America's new role as a world power. While they no more liked the imperialist adventure at the turn of the century than their older associates in the anti-imperialist movement, they turned enthusiastically to the peace movement as a proper vehicle to prevent similar colonial ventures in the future and to influence American foreign policy in more positive, constructive directions. The average age of the fifty-two officers of the Anti-Imperialist League was just over sixty in 1900,[59] while the anti-imperialists who first began to participate actively in the peace movement at about that time were much younger. Of the League's official leadership, for example, David Starr Jordan, forty-nine, was the fourth youngest in years, and the third youngest was the forty-seven year old Henry Wade Rogers, president of Northwestern University, who like Jordan had expressed virtually no interest in the peace movement before 1898 but moved effortlessly into its ranks after 1900. Among the other opponents of imperialism, either as members (though not officers) or non-member supporters of the Anti-Imperialist League, who indicated a growing commitment to the organized peace movement in the first years of the new century were the Unitarian minister Jenkin Lloyd Jones, fifty-seven years old in 1900, Edwin and Lucia Mead, fifty-one and forty-four respectively, and Jane Addams and William Jennings Bryan, both forty. The average age of these seven new recruits to the peace movement was just under forty-seven, far younger than the average age of the officers of the Anti-Imperialist League.[60] The only other officers of the League to indicate any lasting concern for the aims of the programs of the peace movement were five of its vice presidents: Andrew Carnegie, John Sherman, Edward Atkinson, George Mercer, and Carl Schurz. Since they had all shown some interest in the peace movement before the Spanish-American War, their interest in the peace movement after 1900 did not indicate a conversion to the cause but a continuation in it. Moreover, with the exception of Andrew Carnegie they were too aged to participate actively in or to exert any real influence on the American peace movement and by 1906 they were all dead.

---

[58] Days of a Man, I, 135.

[59] Tompkins, "Great Debate," 323, gives this figure; my own computation agrees exactly. The Advocate of Peace, LX (November 1898), 225, noted very early this tendency: "It is significant that the older statesmen of the nation are almost without exception opposed to the colonial imperialistic policy now so much talked of."

---

[60] This listing includes only those individuals who were well known in the anti-imperialist movement and after about 1900 assumed positions of leadership in the American peace movement. If lesser-known figures who first participated in the anti-imperialist movement and later played minor roles in the peace movement before 1914 -- the twenty-eight year old Oswald Garrison Villard, Herbert Bigelow, aged thirty, and Adolph A. Berle, thirty-four, for example -- are added, the average age would drop to the lower forties.

Carnegie was indeed the only exception among the older officers of the League but a most striking one. Though sixty-five in 1900, he still retained all the vitality and youthful optimism that had first helped to arouse his interest in this idealistic cause. His idealism was not entirely obvious at the turn of the century, however, for he was still too fully engrossed in the practical tasks of his steel business. Although he wanted to appear as the friend and benefactor of idealistic causes, he was entirely willing to compromise his higher principles if they conflicted with the profitable operations of his steel business. In the first stages of the debate on imperialism he apparently saw no conflict of interest between his opposition to imperialism and his business concerns, for he wrote William Jennings Bryan on several occasions urging him to unite the Democratic party around him against the annexation of the Philippines.[61] When Bryan refused to oppose the ratification of the treaty, Carnegie was sorely disappointed and concluded that Bryan was a political opportunist.[62] Nevertheless, Carnegie continued to oppose the administration's imperial policy, financed the activities of the Anti-Imperialist League, and in January 1900 was one of the most prominent anti-imperialists who took the first steps toward the formation of a third party to dramatize the issue of imperialism in the forthcoming national election. The ironmaster even promised to give as much money, dollar for dollar, as other party organizers could raise and to indicate his sincerity pledged $25,000 on the spot. Yet after giving $15,000 of this sum, Carnegie suddenly refused to contribute any more to the third party movement and soon abandoned the idea entirely.

---

[61] Carnegie to Bryan, December 15, 18, 26, 1898, January 10, 1899, all in the Bryan Papers, Box 27.

The reasons for Carnegie's turnabout remain something of a mystery, but it is probable that his decision was related to complicated developments in the steel industry. Senator Richard Pettigrew, a leading anti-imperialist and close associate of Carnegie in the original plans for a third party, later described the reasons for Carnegie's reversal:

> No sooner was it noised abroad that Carnegie was actively engaged in organizing a third political party which would oppose McKinley and his imperialist policy, than he was waited on by a committee [of businessmen and bankers] with the ultimatum that they would go no further with the organization of the steel trust unless he abandoned his third party activities and stopped his contributions towards the movement. The members of the committee told him that it was absolutely necessary that they should have a protective tariff in order to justify the organization of the steel trust; that in order to have a tariff satisfactory to them, McKinley must be elected; that the organization of a third party would jeopardize his

---

[62] *Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie*, 364.

> election, and, consequently, the tariff, and as they were going to capitalize the tariff by the issue of stock for which they paid nothing, they would have nothing further to do with the steel trust if Carnegie insisted upon pursuing the political course he had outlined.[63]

Although the details of Pettigrew's story were not entirely accurate, it is clear that Carnegie was deeply worried about the threat of a rival steel combination at this time, and it is probable that his financial worries took precedence over his devotion to anti-imperialism. Carnegie himself never discussed his activities in the third party movement, but he did give very flimsy reasons for supporting McKinley over Bryan in the 1900 election. Although he approved of the Democratic party's statement on imperialism and did not even think Bryan's silver views were that dangerous, he came to oppose Bryan for his party's criticism of the Supreme Court. "President McKinley at present stands for war and violence abroad, but Mr. Bryan stands for these scourges at home," he reasoned. "It is not possible to support a party whose platform contains such an attack on the Supreme Court; better far better, to continue for a time the wrongful effort to force our government upon the Filipinos, in total disregard of Republican ideas, than fail to repel this covert attack upon the reign of law at home."[64] In raising the spectre of anarchy and violence, Carnegie was grasping for straws, for the Democratic party platform had no specific plank attacking the Court but only reaffirmed the general principles of its platform of 1896, one of which had denounced recent decisions of federal judges, and Bryan never made the judiciary a major issue during the 1900 campaign.[65]

---

[63] This story is told in R.F. Pettigrew, Imperial Washington: The Story of American Public Life from 1870 to 1920 (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1922), 321-25.

[64] "The Presidential Election -- Our Duty," North American Review, CLXXI (October 1900), 502.

If Carnegie decided to mend his fences with the Republican party in this election in order to maintain good relations with the conservative magnates who were organizing the steel "trust," after his withdrawal from the steel industry in 1901 business considerations no longer stood in his way for promoting various liberal causes in which he had long believed. In succeeding years he demonstrated a remarkable capacity to work closely with all the peace workers regardless of age or temperament. It might almost be said that the older he grew, the younger became his spirit. Certainly he became more idealistic, and in the following decade was to channel this idealism into even more active cooperation with the peace forces.

---

[65] Cf. Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, eds. National Party Platforms, 1840-1964 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), 99, 114.

# IV. TOWARD THE FEDERATION OF THE WORLD, 1898-1909

## (1)

By far the most important reason for the divergence between the anti-imperialist and peace movements, however, was the rescript of August 24, 1898, of the young Russian Czar Nicholas II, which invited the nations of the world to attend an international disarmament conference. Much as the supporters of the anti-imperialist movement differed in political allegiance, temperament, and ages, it is very likely that without the Czar's proposal almost all of them would have continued to work together against the annexation of the Philippines in the months following the ratification of the peace treaty and perhaps even after the election of 1900. But the Czar's resescript which came only a few weeks after the armistice terminating the Spanish-American War aroused the interest of the younger, more idealistic of the anti-imperialists as well as the old faithful pacifists in the American Peace Society and the Universal Peace Union. These individuals continued to cooperate with the anti-imperialists after the first news of the Czar's rescript, but the prospect of a disarmament conference gradually diverted their attention from the expansionist to the armament issue. By the spring of 1899, with the Spanish treaty ratified and the covocation of the international conference imminent, it became relatively easy for the peace workers to channel their energies into the latter cause.

The American peace societies reacted enthusiastically to the Czar's rescript, yet at first they expressed no interest in organizing a campaign to rally public support behind a disarmament conference such as they had earlier undertaken to mobilize opinion behind the Olney-Pauncefote arbitration treaty. Immediately following the announcement of the rescript, the journals of the American Peace Society and Universal Peace Union published the Czar's rescript in full, and the latter society dispatched a message to the Russian Emperor praising his rescript and imploring him to persevere in his efforts for a disarmament conference.[1] In general, however, the friends of peace in the United States seemed reluctant to suggest any specific mode of action for the peace forces until they received tangible indications of interest from the national governments. A month later, with all the major powers expressing their cordial sympathies for the principles expressed in the Czar's rescript, the Advocate of Peace was encouraged and emphasized that the young Russian's proposal had "tremendous significance" for the future. Yet it recognized that the reaction of the American government to the rescript was only lukewarm. Despite McKinley's promises of American support for the Czar's proposal, he indicated that the armament problem was basically a European question and had only a marginal relationship to the United States government which during the hostilities with Spain had announced its intention to enlarge the nation's armed forces. He explained that these armament increases were justified because the level of American armaments would still remain far below that of the major European powers. The Boston society was not very happy with the American position and at the Board of Directors meeting in late September voted to send a petition to President McKinley opposing increases in armaments "except for police purposes." It also voted, however, to send a resolution to the Russian ambassador in Washington, Count Arthur Cassini, praising the Czar for his rescript and petitioned McKinley congratulating him on his prompt approval of the Czar's proposal and asking him to instruct the American delegation to promote discussions on other peacekeeping measures at the conference, especially the framing of a model arbitration treaty and the creation of an international tribunal.[2]

---

[1] Peacemaker, XVII (October 1898), 74-76; Advocate of Peace, LX (August and September 1898), 176, 191.

There were a few other signs of activity behind the conference. In late October, 1898, a general convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church, meeting in Washington, D.C., agreed overwhelmingly to send the Czar a letter "hailing with joy the great peace manifesto." In addition to its support for the reduction of armaments, the letter also expressed the hope that the upcoming conference would result "in the establishment of some method of judicial arbitration for the settlement of international difficulties." The latter resolve, if not the former, might have come at the urging of Robert Treat Paine, president of the American Peace Society, who attended the conference as a delegate.[3] A delegation of the Episcopal Church convention communicated these resolutions personally to the President in late December, but McKinley, though sympathetic to their endorsement of a disarmament conference, made clear that he had not wavered in his position that the tangled question of armaments did not apply to the United States.[4] At about the same time as the Episcopal Church convention, Mrs. Lucia Mead sent out an appeal she had written herself to several wealthy people asking them to contribute money to the organization of a fund of some $300,000 which she hoped to use to finance a nation-wide propaganda campaign behind the Czar's proposal for a disarmament conference. She intended to set aside $50,000 as a prize for the best essay on the subject of gradual disarmament.[5] When her proposal received no encouraging response (even the pacifist journals failed to mention it), she dropped the idea almost as quickly as she had first raised it. In retrospect, her suggestion was interesting chiefly as the first indication that the peace workers were perhaps not content with their limited influence and meagre resources and were beginning to see the importance of enlisting the financial support of wealthy capitalists and philanthropists if they hoped to pursue more ambitious programs in the future.

---

[2] Ibid., LX (October 1898), 197-98, 202.

---

[3] New York Times, October 21, 1898, 7:3; Advocate of Peace, LX (November 1898), 225.

[4] Belva A. Lockwood, Peace and the Outlook (Washington, D.C.: Thos. W. Cadick, 1899), 18; Peacemaker, XVII (January 1899), 139-40.

[5] New York Times, October 30, 1898, 1:2.

Despite these few gestures of support for the Czar's proposal, the peace societies and individual friends of peace made almost no attempts to educate public opinion on the potential importance of a peace conference in the four months following the publication of the Czar's rescript. It is not easy to explain their gingerly approach to the Czar's proposal, but it is probable that the peace societies, still trying to regroup their forces and to recover their lost prestige after the debacle of the Spanish-American War, realized that they were still too small in number and too insolvent financially to have much influence on public opinion. The comparative indifference of the Universal Peace Union to the disarmament suggestion in these months, for example, stemmed not from lack of interest in the subject since its leaders had always believed that disarmament was the only sure path to world peace, but from the Union's defensive position after its recent attenpts to avert the Spanish war. The Union's journal was so obsessed with detailed explanations of its unpopular actions before and during the recent war that other subjects received comparatively little attention.

The expansionist issue further weakened the pacifists' initial interest in full-scale organizational efforts behind the Czar's proposal. Much as they wanted to support international disarmament, most of the leading peace workers saw the imperialist issue as the most vital question of the moment. Imperialism was a real issue which would be decided in the near future, and the final result would, without question, have a far-reaching effect on the future course of American and world history; the Czar's rescript, on the other hand, was only an invitation to a disarmament conference and still required the cooperation of the major powers before the conference could actually convene. Even if they succeeded in persuading the American government to champion the disarmament conference and perhaps modify its position on the armament question, there was no absolute guarantee that the other nations would agree to a conference.

One other matter helped to divert their attention from disarmament. When they were not promoting the anti-imperialist movement, they showed considerable interest in reviving the movement for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty. British friendship for the United States had been clearly evident during the Spanish-American War, and most peace workers believed that the prospects for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty had improved since the defeat of the Olney-Pauncefote treaty. Certainly if precedent was considered as a factor in the future direction of the peace movement, then an Anglo-American arbitration treaty seemed the most obvious choice for an easy, immediate victory. The American Peace Society and the Episcopal Church convention recognized the Anglo-American amity and in their petitions to the President had included requests for the negotiation of an Anglo-American arbitration treaty. When

Robert Treat Paine was in Washington in October 1898, perhaps on the same occasion as his attendance at the Episcopal Church convention, he called on the new Secretary of State, John Hay, who had recently returned from a successful stint as the American ambassador to the Court of St. James. One might have expected that Paine would have raised the question of the Czar's rescript, but when Paine later described this interview, he never mentioned that they talked at all about the subject. Instead, he urged Secretary Hay to renew or bring forward in some better form the abortive arbitration treaty between Great Britain and the United States. Anglophile though he was, Secretary Hay managed to convince even the zealous Paine that it was unwise at present to renegotiate the treaty and risk another rejection so soon after the failure of the Olney-Pauncefote treaty.[6] But Hay and McKinley did not entirely shut the door on an Anglo-American arbitration treaty and continued to show some interest in the subject. It is not surprising therefore that the peace leaders thought this issue was just as important as a disarmament conference.

Finally, so much talk existed of the alleged cynical motives behind the Czar's circular that the peace advocates were at first cautious not to champion the conference until they received some confirmation of the Czar's sincerity. Had not the Russian government always been noted for its duplicity in diplomacy, its insatiable land hunger, and its intolerance of minority groups and dissenting opinions? Was not Nicholas the ruler of one of the most ruthless autocracies in the world? How could such a despot pose as the mouthpiece of the world's most enlightened ideals?[7] Even the peace workers admitted on occasion that these questions come to mind, though they refused to believe the Czar was an insincere and villanous as others pictured him.[8] Whatever the peace workers thought, by December 1898 a rumor was circulating that the leading powers were so suspicious of the Russian motives that the conference would never get off the ground and might amount to nothing more than a meeting of the foreign ministers accredited to St. Petersburg.[9]

---

[6] Paine, address, Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1900, 59.

Such suspicions of the Czar were not groundless, for the underlying purposes of the rescript were much more cynical than altruistic. Although Nicholas was a kindly person who hoped his rescript would inscribe his name alongside the humanitarian achievements of his royal ancestors, such as the Holy Alliance of Alexander I or the Emancipation Proclamation of Alexander II, idealistic motives played at best a small role in the decision to draw up the document. The idea for the rescript originally came not from the Czar but from his most intimate advisors, war minister General Alexei N. Kuropatkin, foreign minister Count Michael Muraviev, and finance minister Sergius Witte. These ~~three~~ individuals informed the young autocrat that unless the European powers concluded some kind of international disarmament agreement in the immediate future, Russia would have to allocate enormous sums of money to make up for its deficiencies in military technology. They told Nicholas that Germany and France had already adopted a rapid-fire field gun which could fire six rounds a minute as opposed to the best Russian gun which could fire only one round a minute, and that Austria-Hungary, its long-standing enemy in the Balkans, would soon adopt a similar weapon. If Austria-Hungary went ahead with its plans, the Czar's counselors warned, Russia would have to follow suit, yet this would constitute a serious financial drain on the Russian treasury which was already nearly empty. Once Nicholas saw the Russian predicament, he endorsed his ministerial council's suggestion for calling a disarmament conference as one possible way out of his nation's dilemma. He and his ministers hoped that a conference would reach a satisfactory agreement on armaments which would give Russia a breathing spell to recover from its financial and military difficulties. Even if such a conference failed to devise a satisfactory formula for arms limitation, it might distract attention away from Russia's Far Eastern ambitions.[10] It might also draw closer to Russia many of the smaller nations of the world as well as Germany and France, all of whom were already concerned with the unpleasant realities of America's emergence as the seventh major world power and the growing signs of a rapprochement between this rising star on the world scene and Great Britain, the unquestioned mistress of the seas. Although the Russian ministers had initially formulated the plans for a disarmament conference before the outbreak of the Spanish-American conflict and at that time had totally ignored the United States as a variable in the international equation, it is possible that the Russian decision to release the rescript only a few weeks after the armistice ending the Spanish-American War was partly influenced by America's dramatic military victory and the prospects of America's much more active cooperation with Great Britain in European and Far Eastern affairs. Some of the Russian ministers thought that a disarmament agreement on land forces would enable the continental powers to spend a larger portion of their military appropriations on developing larger navies to meet the challenge of any formal or informal Anglo-American combination.[11] Given such sober, "realistic," even cynical reasoning, the Czar's rescript was far from an altruistic document. As the careful historian of the conference has well said: "The truth was that the peace rescript had been conceived in fear, brought forth in deceit, and swaddled in humanitarian ideals."[12]

---

[7] Tate, Disarmament Illusion, ch. 12, is a detailed summary of non-pacifist European and American public opinion to the Czar's rescript. Opinion was nearly unanimous that the Russian proposal was insincere and hid some darker motives.

[8] Advocate of Peace, LX (August and September 1898), 176; (October 1898), 198.

[9] Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 50. (Hereafter cited as Davis, First Hague Peace Conference.)

---

[10] Ibid., 43-48, is a careful analysis of these factors.

---

[11] Ernest R. May, after analyzing the Russian documents of the period, concluded cautiously: "It does seem clear that the disarmament appeal was not considered as a reaction to the United States as a power. It may be, however, that its actual issuance was influenced by this consideration. It is equally possible that the Russian ministers merely believed others to be concerned and thought mention of the American peril might promote acceptance of the Czar's proposal." Imperial Democracy, 236.

Although the peace workers of course did not know the scheming that lay behind the Czar's note, they were well aware of the strongly negative reactions of a large segment of the American and foreign newspaper press and of official diplomatic circles to it. But while widespread suspicion contributed to the peace workers' initial caution, they naturally hoped for the best and were tempermentally inclined to accept the Czar at his word. Gradually they came to overlook the possibilities of Russian duplicity and to champion the Czar's rescript as a supreme opportunity to negotiate a disarmament agreement and perhaps agreements on other international matters as well.

The favorable reactions of the European peace workers to the Czar's rescript helped to bolster their American cohorts' hopes for the actual convocation and possible achievements of such a conference. Shortly after the publication of the rescript, the more militant and radical pacifists on the European continent heralded the Czar's disarmament suggestion as a supreme opportunity to check the armament craze which had assumed an ever-increasing financial burden on the European powers and helped to foster the growing feeling of insecurity throughout Europe.[13] Even more encouraging were the favorable newspaper reports of their interviews with Russian leaders. The Austrian pacifist, Baroness von Suttner, whose moving indictment of war in her novel Die Waffen Nieder ("Lay Down Your Arms") has been justly called the Uncle Tom's Cabin of the peace movement, had an interview with Count Muraviev during his visit to Vienna in November 1898, and he convinced her that the Czar's intentions were wholly idealistic. In addition, the Czar met two months later with Count Leo Tolstoi whose uncompromising opposition to armaments and his disdain for Russian despotism were already well known, and the youthful ruler convinced the Count of his sincere belief in and genuine enthusiasm for a disarmament agreement. The Advocate of Peace was reassured by the reports of these interviews. Of Tolstoi's favorable impressions of the Czar, for example, it remarked: "It is needless to say, that this interview, if it occurred as the dispatches declare, is of much significance in showing that the Czar is not only in earnest, but also determined to enlist every influence possible in support of its purpose."[14]

---

[12] Davis, First Hague Peace Conference, 43.

[13] Advocate of Peace, LX (November 1898), 226-27; (December 1898), 254, 255, 257.

Even more encouraging was the resurgence of peace interest which the Czar's rescript generated in Great Britain. A few days after the announcement of the rescript, Randal Cremer sent a circular to 218 members of Parliament asking them to sign a telegram to the Czar expressing their approval of his proposal for a disarmament conference. Although Parliament was not in session and its members scattered for the summer holidays, Cremer received 126 replies, of which 104 were favorable. At the same time his peace group, the International Arbitration League, cooperated closely with the London Peace Society and other British peace groups, and together planned public meetings throughout Britain to mobilize public support behind the conference. Between October and December 1898, these peace organizations, with the strong support of many industrial, trade union, and religious bodies, held more than one hundred meetings throughout the British Isles in support of the conference.[15] These meetings were not publicized in the United States,but the peace workers read the reports of these meetings in the British newspapers and peace journals and thus were well informed of the feverish activities of their Anglo-Saxon brethren.[16]

---

[14] Ibid., LX (December 1898), 251; LXI (February 1899), 34. Tolstoi was probably misquoted, for a month after this interview he saw no hope for success in a disarmament conference and reasserted his belief that universal peace would come only from mass "disobedience to the Government that exacts military service from individuals for violence and organized murder." New York Times, February 12, 1899, 12:1.

While these developments encouraged the American peace workers, the reports of the actions of William T. Stead, the dynamic but erratic editor of the British Review of Reviews, impressed them the most and ultimately were to convince even the most sceptical among them. No pacifist, Stead had previously promoted a curious amalgam of causes: a large British navy, defense of the British empire, various urban reforms, and spiritualism. He had also desired more friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States, and in the aftermath of the Venezuelan boundary dispute of December 1895 had published a penny pamphlet, Always Arbitrate before you Fight: An Appeal to All English-speaking Folk, which contained as lively an argument for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty as its title implied.[17]

---

[15] Arbitrator, No. 311, (December 1898), 64-67, 73-74.

[16] Advocate of Peace, LX (December 1898), 259-61; LXI (January 1898), 10.

Most important, he had long favored closer ties with Russia and during a moment of Anglo-Russian tension in 1888 had visited Russia to interview Czar Alexander III. Realizing Stead's value in publicizing the views of the Russian government in the British press, Alexander had invited Stead to return to Russia whenever British-Russian tensions developed. With relations between the two nations beginning to deteriorate in the summer months of 1898, Stead made plans to visit Russia and interview Alexander's son and successor to the throne, Nicholas II. When he heard of Nicholas' rescript, he immediately believed it might prove one of the most important documents in world history and decided to investigate thoroughly the Czar's proposal. He broadened his itinerary to include interviews with European statesmen and learn their reactions to the Czar's rescript and after his arrival in Russia to find out from the Russian leaders themselves their true motives in promoting a disarmament conference.[18] On his way to Russia Stead hoped to talk with King Leopold II of Belgium, French leaders, and Emperor William II of Germany, but all his requests for interviews were refused. He learned from the distinctly cool replies to his letters requesting interviews as well as from secondhand sources that these European statesmen obviously had little sympathy for the Czar's rescript and did not want to give Stead any encouragement on his mission. Soundly rebuffed in his first endeavors, Stead arrived in St. Petersubrg a very disappointed man.[19] His hopes revived, however, after talking to the Russian leaders. Concealing the real motives that prompted the rescript, all the Russian officials who saw him, including Muraviev, Witte, Constantine Pobedonostsev (the procurator of the Holy Synod), and the Czar himself, received Stead courteously and convinced him completely of the sincerity and conviction that stood behind the document. Fully rejuvenated by these interviews, Stead returned to England with nothing but enthusiasm for a disarmament conference. In an article in the London *Daily News* of December 11, 1898, Stead summarized his impressions of his Russian visit:

---

[17] Frederic Whyte, The Life of W.T. Stead (2 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925), II, 10, 27, 35-53, 78-87.

> I know now, as a matter of absolute certainty, no longer to be disputed even by the most cynical and sceptical, that the Peace Rescript summoning the Governments to the Parliament of Peace is no mere flash in the pan, no sudden outburst of an

---

[18] W.T. Stead, *The United States of Europe on the Eve of the Parliament of Peace* (New York: Doubleday & McClure Co., 1899), 351-55, 115-44.

[19] Whyte, *Stead*, II, 129-34.

> enthusiastic youth. Neither is it a mask covering any deep-laid Macchiavellian [sic] design. It is the carefully weighed and long considered expression of a reasoned conviction on the part of the ruler of the greatest military empire in the world, a conviction which is held and expressed by the Czar with intense, almost passionate, earnestness, but which is adhered to the full by his most experienced and powerful Ministers.[20]

Since Stead had seen the Russian leaders face to face, it is small wonder that the American pacifists were willing to take him at his word when he hailed the Russians' devotion to the Czar's rescript. The Advocate of Peace accepted Stead's conclusion without any reservations. Stead's account of his Russian visit, the journal stated optimistically, "has been able to remove from the mind of the civilized world all doubt as to the real and earnest wish of the young Emperor to accomplish what he has proposed in his rescript. He has published also the reassuring fact that three of the ablest of the Russian ministers who are closest to the Czar are heart and soul with him."[21]

Stead realized that his own words alone would not induce the major world powers to unite behind the Russian appeal for disarmament and frame an acceptable but far-reaching disarmament agreement. If these ends were to be attained, he believed that tangible manifestations of public support would be necessary. He surmised that the actual convocation and ultimate success of a disarmament conference depended in large part on the strong support which the governments of the United States and Great Britain gave to the Czar's rescript. More than anything else, he was convinced that a great public demonstration in these two nations would reveal the ground swell of public support for disarmament, focus more clearly the attention of their leaders on the subject, and induce them to work long and hard for the success of the conference. For these purposes he announced shortly after his return to Britain at a peace meeting in London the formation of an International Peace Crusade to arouse Americans and Britons in support of the conference. He proposed the organization of mass meetings in every town and city in the two nations in behalf of disarmament. As an integral part of this grassroots approach, he planned a pilgrimmage starting with a deputation in San Francisco who would give speeches at carefully arranged meetings in the many towns and cities on their way to the nation's capital where they would receive the blessing of President McKinley. Thereupon they would depart for England, join up with British crusaders and journey to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, and Rome where they would enlist still more recruits. Everywhere the pilgrimmage went, Stead envisaged receptions and public demonstrations which would affirm the strong public support for an international disarmament conference. By the time the pilgrims arrived in St. Petersburg, they could relate personally to the Czar "how passionately the people desire peace, how enthusiastically they have responded to his [the

---

[20] Quoted in Arbitrator, No. 311 (December 1898) 70. Stead gave a similar, much more detailed verdict of the Czar's idealistic motives in issuing the peace rescript in his United States of Europe, 369-94, 443-47.

[21] Advocate of Peace, LXI (January 1899), 6.

Czar's] initiative, and how emphatically they bid him stand firm in the name of 'God and the people' and achieve this great good for humanity." With any kind of success, he believed that his International Peace Crusade would compel the nations of the world to convene the conference and to take a large step forward in negotiating a disarmament agreement.[22]

Although Stead's peace crusade aroused the interest, if not the respect, of the British public, it failed to get off the ground in the United States. The American peace workers approved of Stead's grandiose plan but made no attempt to organize a peace pilgrimmage in the United States. Andrew Carnegie praised Stead's proposal but contributed neither his time nor his money to its promotion in the United States.[23] Nor did the American Peace Society and Universal Peace Union pay more than lip service to his project. They obviously felt that Stead's peace crusade was too ambitious, the nation too vast, the peace societies' financial resources and influence too limited, and the time too short to promote, let alone organize, a peace march from San Francisco to Washington. Besides, they questioned Stead's motives. When Stead first announced his peace crusade, he made the mistake of relating the Czar's disarmament proposal to his own prejudices for a dominant British navy. Stead believed that a disarmament conference was in Britain's best interest since any disarmament agreement would more than likely freeze the armaments of the contracting parties at their present levels and thereby recognize the status quo in the armament situation. As Stead bluntly remarked, the Czar's rescript "is equivalent to a proposal that for a term of five or ten years the naval supremacy of England should be recognized as a fundamental principle of the world's balance of power."[24] When Trueblood learned of Stead's erratic reasoning, he sharply rebuked him and wondered how Stead could believe that the conference would have the remotest chance of success if the British delegation at the conference would approve only those disarmament proposals which would perpetuate British naval supremacy.[25]

---

[22] Stead, *United States of Europe*, 461-68.

[23] New York *Times*, January 6, 1899, 6:7.

Stead did not worry about these suspicions or the generally muted response of the American peace leaders, for he hoped to appeal directly to the American people. Yet even his many letters to government officials and to prominent Americans who were not members of peace societies but had worked for the Olney-Pauncefote treaty fell on deaf ears. The recipients of his letters soon became annoyed at his persistence and suspected that

---

[24] Quoted in Arbitrator, No. 311 (December 1898), 70.

[25] Advocate of Peace, LXI (January 1899), 6-7. Even before Stead began his crusade, the Advocate of Peace suspected him. It quoted long portions of an article by Stead in the American Monthly Review of Reviews which clearly showed his inconsistencies and then went on to mock his program: "The navy first, the army next, British imperialism, British supremacy on the sea, British commercial supremacy everywhere, holding all you have, resting and digesting before proceeding to take more, and all this spiced up somewhat with improvement of the people at home and with common sense and the Ten Commandments abroad, that is the great editor's picturesque worldly-moral program for his country." Ibid., LX (March 1898), 61-62.

Stead was as much interested in gaining headlines for his zealous endeavors as he was in the conference itself.[26]

Lacking the necessary American support, Stead reluctantly abandoned his plans for a peace pilgrimmage in the United States. The muted response to Stead's pleas did not mean, however, that the American peace advocates were not interested in promoting a disarmament conference, for at about the same time Stead decided to give up the American portion of his crusade, they began to respond more positively to the Czar's rescript. The catalyst that fully awakened them from their earlier lethargic attitude and finally moved them to action was the news that the Russian Emperor had released a second circular on January 11, 1899, which reiterated his earlier disarmament proposal but also urged discussions on other international matters at the conference. It was now entirely obvious, as it had not been earlier, that the Russian government was determined to promote the conference. As the Advocate of Peace remarked of the second circular: "It is clear that the Czar means serious business."[27] The Czar did indeed mean serious business, for within a few weeks after the Czar's second note the Russian government arranged with The Netherlands to hold the conference at The Hague. With the location agreed upon, the Dutch Foreign Office immediately sent out formal invitations to all nations having diplomatic representatives in St. Petersburg as well as to three other states,

---

[26] Davis, First Hague Peace Conference, 59-60.

[27] Advocate of Peace, LXI (February 1899), 33.

Luxembourg, Montenegro, and Siam. All these governments except Brazil, a total of twenty-six, accepted the invitation, and the Dutch government set May 18, 1899, as the date of the opening session of the conference.[28]

Among the new topics added to the second circular were specific proposals on the prohibition of new military weapons, restrictions on the use of certain ones already developed, revision of the laws and customs of war, and the improvement of mediation and arbitration procedures. The latter proposal particularly appealed to the American peace workers. Realizing that the hopes for a disarmament agreement seemed slim, they still hoped that the conference could agree to improve and add to the existing conventions for the arbitration of international controversies. By concentrating their efforts in this direction, they also realized that they would avoid working at cross purposes with their own government and perhaps influence its position at the conference. However lukewarm the American government's position on disarmament, they remembered President McKinley's endorsement of the Olney-Pauncefote treaty two years earlier. Moreover, since they believed the United States was the "mother of arbitration" and had an exemplary record in that area, they were eager to have the American delegation assume leadership on that question.[29]

---

[28] Davis, First Hague Peace Conference, 51-53.

[29] Advocate of Peace, LXI (March 1899), 51.

Many American peace leaders wanted the United States to take one important step beyond arbitration and promote the establishment of a permanent international court at the conference. As we have seen, some of the petitions to President McKinley immediately following the Czar's initial rescript of August 24, 1898, had urged the American government to promote an international tribunal at the forthcoming conference; after the Czar's second circular, however, their interest centered almost wholly on this subject. Indeed, if one had read only their petitions and their peace journals in the four months between the Czar's second circular and the opening of the First Hague Peace Conference, he would have assumed that an international court was the primary subject for discussion at the Conference, although the Czar had never included a court as part of his program.[30]

In part, the pacifists' growing preoccupation with a permanent court of arbitration seemed to represent another desperate attempt to save the conference from the inevitable stalement and failure that would result if it discussed only the armament problem. There was some truth in this, although the pacifists never admitted this interpretation. Instead, they sincerely believed, and with considerable justification, that they were acting in the mainstream of the peace movement which had always promoted the establishment of an international tribunal as one of its central objectives. The dream of an international court was nothing new in 1899 nor even wholly a creature of the nineteenth century. A French official had proposed an international court of arbitration for European states as far back as the fourteenth century, and in succeeding centuries it had appeared in the peace plans of several European severeigns and philosophers.[31] In the United States the American Peace Society had occasionally advanced plans for an international court almost from the date of its founding. One of the early leaders of the Boston peace society, for example, was William Ladd whose lengthy treatise An Essay on a Congress of Nations, published in 1840, contained a detailed account of the importance of an international court as a prerequisite for world federation.[32] The Treaty of Washington of 1871 which established the special tribunals to adjudicate the Alabama claims and other Anglo-American differences had further stimulated the interest in an international court. David Dudley Field's draft code published in the following year, for instance, had provided for an international tribunal to try cases between nations which diplomacy and joint high commissions could not settle.[33]

---

[30] See Peacemaker, XVII (February 1899), 154, and other examples cited in many of the following notes.

---

[31] A good summary of these proposals is given in Sylvester John Hemleben, Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1943), 1-3, 16-17, 86-87, 105-06, 109-11, 113-14, 122.

[32] Curti, American Peace Crusade, 10, 55, 58-60.

[33] The important articles of Field's plan are reproduced in Darby, International Arbitration, 122-23.

In the 1880's the American peace workers' growing interest in a permanent tribunal had paralleled their government's hesitant endorsement of the principle of international arbitration with European and Latin American states. As early as 1882, in the aftermath of the stillborn conference of American states, the Universal Peace Union had petitioned Congress to promote an international arbitration court, and in the next decade resolutions from other peace organizations, religious bodies, and interested private citizens were occasionally introduced in Congress as a supplementary aim of the arbitration movement. Some of these petitions had specified a tribunal of arbitration between the United States and Great Britain, while others had envisaged a more general tribunal composed of several of the leading powers.[34] With the revival of the Universal Peace Congress in 1889, American and European pacifists had occasionally discussed the advantages of an international court, and the 1893 Congress in Chicago had advanced several plans for such an institution.[35]

---

[34] Lockwood, Peace and the Outlook, 19, describes the Universal Peace Union's first petition for a high tribunal. American Arbitration League, Annual Report, 1884/85, 14-15, gives the background to that group's interest in an international tribunal. Also see, Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st session, XVII (December 10, 1885), 154; (January 6, 1886), 475; (January 18, 1886), 732; (January 21, 1886), 806; (February 5, 1886), 1424; (February 23, 1886), 1808; (March 9, 1886), 2204; (March 11, 1886), 2286; (March 12, 1886), 2321; (March 16, 1886), 2381; (March 19, 1886), 2519; (March 22, 1886), 2608; (March 25, 1886), 2734; (April 1, 1886), 2982; 49th Congress, 2nd session, XVIII (January 31, 1887), 1175; (February 10, 1887), 1601; (February 15, 1887), 1801; 50th Congress, 1st session, XIX (December 12, 1887), 25; (March 26, 1888), 2409; (April 9, 1888), 2796; (July 2, 1888), 5828; 52nd Congress, 2nd session, XXIV (December 8, 1893), 44.

[35] Universal Peace Congress, Report, 1893, 159-85, 292, 295.

The most influential organization to promote an international court was the Interparliamentary Union. Founded in Paris by ~~Randal Cremer and~~ a few other British and European legislators on June 29, 1889, only two days after the conclusion of the Universal Peace Congress in that city, the Interparliamentary Union was a quasi-official body which met annually in different European cities to discuss and formulate proposals for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Composed entirely of lawmakers and ex-lawmakers from every European nation (except Russia which participated after the creation of the Duma in 1905), most of whom were responsible to their constituents at home and whose practical programs carried more weight with their governments than the agitation of idealistic pacifists, the Interparliamentary Conferences discussed many measures which were designed to stimulate more cordial diplomatic relations between all the European nations. At first these conferences passed resolutions endorsing the extension of arbitration treaties and revisions of some established principles of international law, but the Interparliamentary Conference at Rome in 1891 voted to discuss the subject of an international tribunal at its sessions the following year. After three years of serious debate, the 1895 Conference at Brussels passed a resolution which formally endorsed the draft of an international court.[36]

---

[36] Hans Wehburg, "The Interparliamentary Union and the Development of International Organization," in The Interparliamentary Union from 1889 to 1939, [no editors] (Lausanne, Switzerland: Payot & Cie., 1939), 39, 41-43, 45-46; and Christian L. Lange, "The Interparliamentary Union," International Conciliation, Pamphlet No. 65 (April 1913), 6-7, summarize the efforts

These European developments occurred at the same time the movement for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty was gathering momentum. When the Venezuelan crisis of December 1895 temporarily disrupted the movement, many friends of peace emphasized that it was not sufficient in such times of excitement to trust the good will of the contesting powers to resolve their differences amicably through the establishment of a temporary tribunal or through normal diplomatic channels. By the same token they pointed out that if a permanent court had existed, it was highly probable that the two nations would have submitted the dispute to the court and thereby prevented it from reaching the critical stage.[37] In the aftermath of the Venezuelan debate most American friends of peace followed closely the Olney-Pauncefote negotiations for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty, but a few began to envisage bolder ideas for the settlement of future controversies between the two nations and between others as well. Only a month after Cleveland's inflammatory message to Great Britain had precipitated the Venezuelan crisis, the New York Bar Association established a committee to formulate a plan for an international tribunal representing nine nations -- the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, The

---

of this organization in promoting an international tribunal. The Union's resolution of 1895 is reproduced in French and English in Darby, International Arbitration, 290-95.

[37] See, for example, Advocate of Peace, LVIII (March 1896), 54-55; (April 1896), 77-78.

Netherlands, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.[38] On April 21, 1896, a delegation of the Bar Association presented the plan personally to President Cleveland who discussed it with them for about an hour. Cleveland was his usual friendly but non-committal self, though he reportedly conceded, "There is one fact about this matter: you have a plan; nobody else has given us a plan."[39] Subsequently, one of the New York lawyers discussed the plan with the British ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, and still later with President McKinley. About the time the Czar issued his second circular of January 1899, the Bar Association adopted a resolution praising the Czar's proposal for a disarmament conference and appointed a committee to draft an address to the Czar and President McKinley in commendation of the movement to limit armaments. The committee eventually sent this address and their 1896 proposal for an international court to the delegates of every nation at the Hague Peace Conference.[40] Though the New Yorkers' plan apparently had no influence on the proceedings of the Hague Conference, it represented another sign of the growing awareness among international reformers of the possibility of transforming the idea of a world court into a living reality.

---

[38] The background is given in Walter S. Logan, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1896, 60-61;the entire plan is printed in National Arbitration Conference ... 1896, 222-26.

[39] Quoted in W. Martin Jones, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1897, 69.

[40] W. Martin Jones, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1899, 44-45.

By the mid-1890's many peace workers were advancing these arguments for a court, but the most persistent and influential promoters of that institution came from one individual, the Reverend Edward Everett Hale. As early as March 1885 Hale had preached a sermon in Washington, D.C. on the Sunday before Grover Cleveland's inauguration in which he predicted the establishment of an international court for the twentieth century, and in 1889 he had reiterated this view in another sermon at the centennial celebration of the inauguration of President George Washington.[41] When the Pan-American Conference convened in Washington in the latter year, Hale had seen an opportunity to promote a tribunal for the Americas and published his first article on the subject. If his own testimony can be believed, he even managed to persuade James G. Blaine to sound out informally the opinions of the Latin American delegates on the feasibility of raising the question of a high court at the Conference. Although a few delegates expressed interest in the subject, Blaine decided that the time was not ripe for fruitful consideration of the proposal and did not raise it in the sessions of the Conference.[42] Hale was not discouraged and throughout the 1890's continued to conduct a virtual one-man crusade for a tribunal composed of the American and European nations. At the Chicago meeting of the Universal Peace Congress in 1893 he submitted an outline for an international tribunal, and a year later he pointed out that the deterioration in the Pan-American spirit resulting from America's unpleasant experience with Chile and Brazil made some kind of permanent tribunal all the more mandatory.[43] At the first three Lake Mohonk Conferences, Hale made clear his overriding interest in an international court and good-naturedly attempted to persuade his colleagues there that they should subordinate the more limited aim of international arbitration to the more far-reaching goal of an international court. He endorsed the New York Bar Association plan, popularized it at the Lake Mohonk Conference, and played a leading role in cajoling the 1896 and 1897 Conferences to adopt resolutions endorsing the general principle of an international tribunal for the settlement of international disputes.[44]

---

[41] Edward Everett Hale, Memories of a Hundred Years (two vols. in one, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1904), II, 282, recalls the 1885 sermon. His sermon of 1889 is published in The Works of Edward Everett Hale (Library Edition, 10 vols., New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1898-1900), VI, 399-400.

[42] Hale, "The High Court of America," Lend a Hand: A Record of Progress, IV (December, 1889), 845-48; also Hale, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference Report, 1896, 22-23.

Hale derived his ideas for an international court from his fundamental faith in American institutions. He believed that the genius of American political life could be traced back directly to the framers of the United States Constitution who had wisely provided for a Supreme Court in the final document. He admired the ability of this Court to settle peaceably the many boundary disputes and other controversies between the separate states and between individuals of different states. He even implied that the Supreme Court could have successfully resolved the slavery issue and thereby averted the Civil War if the institution had not been so thoroughly enmeshed in the Constitution. Hamstrung on the issue, the Court could not prevent that war, but with the exception of this one failure, which Hale minimized, he marveled that the Supreme Court had settled amicably the many controversies which had threatened to interfere with the peaceful development of the American nation.[45] Hale's faith in this institution was so strong that he almost totally ignored cultural and intellectual factors in his interpretation of American history. In the same way he minimized the national, religious, and geopolitical differences between nation states that had long stood as obstacles to the establishment of any permanent institutional machinery for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. By the 1890's Hale believed that the European states were so commercially and culturally interdependent that a closer political union was desirable and entirely feasible. He compared the present situation in Europe with the condition of the thirteen states of America on the eve of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Just as the American states had earlier submerged their particularisms and agreed to form a more perfect union, so would an agreement among the European states to establish an international court provide the first major step in the development of a united Europe.[46] As early as 1871, Hale had prophesised a "United States of Europe,"[47] and though he did not then discuss the institutional arrangements that would foster and perpetuate this unity, in the 1890's his writings and addresses emphasized that an international tribunal was the proper starting point for the confederation of European states. By this time, too, he was convinced that once the European states could make some progress toward the establishment of a court, then it would be a relatively easy task to broaden its membership and include the several American nations. He implied in fact that the European nations would not respond positively to any kind of institutional plan which would lead to a fuller integration of the Western world until the United States assumed the world's leadership on the subject. It was the mission of America to champion this integration of the civilized nations, and the world court was the most obvious first step in that direction.

---

[43] Universal Peace Congress, Report, 1893, 166-68; Advocate of Peace, LXI (March 1894), 59.

[44] Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1896, 19; platform, in ibid., 130; Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1897, 12, 44, 65; platform, in ibid., 130-31.

---

[45] Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1895, 22; Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1896, 19-20.

Hale's single-minded efforts in behalf of an international tribunal help to explain his comparative silence during the agitation for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty, the _idee fixee_ of almost all the other American peace workers in the 1890's. He had attended the American Conference on International Arbitration in Washington in April 1896 which inaugurated the campaign for the Olney-Pauncefote treaty, but he did not address its sessions and had little faith in the lasting benefits of such conferences which, in his view, amounted to much talk but little action.[48] Nor did he have much faith in international arbitration as a panacea for world peace. Calling himself an "edge-of-the-wedge-man," he worked for the Olney-Pauncefote treaty mainly because he believed that the ratification of the treaty would bolster the confidence of the peace forces and quicken public interest in his own dream of a world court. In the same way he viewed the defeat of the treaty less as a setback to the arbitration movement than a blow to his own hopes for the creation of a permanent international tribunal.[49]

---

[46] _Ibid._, 19.

[47] "The United States of Europe," _Old and New_, III (March 1871), 260-67.

More than peace, Hale believed in international justice. Consequently, in the absence of an international court and a comprehensive system of rules and procedures of international conduct, he saw no compelling reason to oppose the Spanish-American War and acquiesced in America's imperialistic experience. But he continued to champion the international tribunal as the proper agency to prevent future conflicts. When the Czar issued his first rescript, Hale, like the other American peace workers, at first watched for indications of the Czar's sincerity. By December 1898, however, he was fully convinced that the Czar was in earnest and immediately emerged as the foremost American supporter of the conference. Even before the Czar's second circular added the subject of arbitration to his list of proposals for discussion, Hale began to champion the conference for the work it could accomplish in creating an international tribunal:

---

[48] Hale to Emily P. Hale (his wife), April 24, 1896, Hale Papers, Box 11.

[49] Hale to Mr. Clayden, May 6, 1897, ibid., Box 11; Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1897, 11-12.

> The Conference must be held. Let us hope it will lead to some partial disarmament.... Whatever the conference may do about present armaments, it can certainly determine on a tribunal whose dignity and prestige and power shall make such armaments unnecessary.[50]

Though seventy-six in 1899, Hale, with the energy of one more than a generation younger, began a promotional campaign for the conference which originally had no direct relationship to Stead's plans for an Internatioal Peace Crusade but soon became the closest approximation to any trans-Atlantic cooperation in behalf of the conference. Early in 1899 he addressed meetings in thirteen states in the East, Middle West, and South in support of the conference and during his visit to Philadelphia prevailed upon the Universal Peace Union and other citizens to organize a citizen's committee to publicize the Czar's proposal in that city.[51] In late March he arrived in the nation's capital and had interviews with Secretary of State John Hay, Assistant Secretary of State David Jayne Hill, and the Russian ambassador Count Cassini. Hale was fully satisfied that these individuals were eager to do all they could to assure the success of the conference.[52]

---

[50] "Out of the Mouth of Czars," New England Magazine, XIX, new series (January 1899), 583.

[51] Hale, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1899, 8; George G. Mercer, address, in ibid., 39-40.

[52] Hale to Jack [Hale?], March 23, 1899, Hale Papers, Box 12.

Meanwhile, Hale had not neglected his home city. Shortly before embarking on his speaking tour, he called a meeting in Boston to initiate a peace crusade. He was ably assisted by his friend Edwin Mead who agreed with Hale that the upcoming Hague Peace Conference was the most promising development thus far in the history of international relations to organize the world into a peaceful confederation. Acting under the auspices of the Massachusetts Good Citizenship Society, Mead, its president, organized a series of Monday noon meetings in March and April to promote the conference. In addition to the leading Boston peace workers, Hale, Edwin and Lucia Mead, Robert Treat Paine, and Benjamin Trueblood, other public-spirited citizens including Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor, Frances E. Clark of the United Society of Christian Endeavor, Lyman Abbott, Julia Ward Howe, and the Reverend Adloph A. Berle also praised the lofty purposes of the proposed conference. With Mead's assistance, Hale also started a fortnightly journal, The Peace Crusade, which served as a mouthpiece for his own ideas on an international court and included articles on local movements in the United States and in foreign nations in support of the conference. From the first issue in March until the final issue in August when the Hague Peace Conference adjourned, in all Hale published twelve issues of The Peace Crusade.

Hale's prodigious efforts did not seem to have much lasting effect except perhaps in the Boston area where a talented and dedicated group of peace workers were more than willing to help

help him. It is doubtful whether they could have done much more to arouse the public's interest, for even after the Spanish-American War a deep isolationist spirit persisted in the nation and made their task of interesting Americans in a disarmament conference far away in Europe almost insuperable. Americans' interest in foreign developments was limited almost entirely to stories of American heroism in the recent Spanish War or the more recent Filipino insurrection. The newspapers sensed this lack of public concern in the disarmament conference and gave very little attention to it until its actual convocation; even then their coverage was spotty. Hale had published The Peace Crusade to remedy this defect, but it is doubtful whether his journal had more than a very limited circulation of subscribers outside the immediate Boston area.[53] For all of Hale's abiding faith in public opinion, he himself recognized that only a few Americans really cared about the Hague Conference or knew what it would discuss. Two weeks after the opening of the Hague Peace Conference, he attended the Lake Mohonk Conference and immediately realized that because of poor press coverage most of the participants at the Mohonk sessions had only a superficial understanding of the proposals before the Hague Conference, although presumably these people were the most interested and best informed private citizens in the United States on the

---

[53] The evidence for the circulation of The Peace Crusade is inconclusive since no figures of its circulation are available, but the number of extant issues is very small. So far as I could tell, only the State Historical Society of Wisconsin and the New York Public Library have fairly complete sets.

Conference. "The general run of the people here," he sadly reported, "are as ignorant of the subject as average school boys would be."[54]

(2)

If the peace advocates failed to arouse the interest of the American public to the proceedings at The Hague, they had little reason to worry, for two of the American delegates at the Conference, Andrew D. White and Frederic Holls, fully sympathized with their crusade for a permanent international court and quietly but persistently worked for this goal. There is little evidence that the American and European pacifists influenced any of the national delegations at the Conference. Although some delegates occasionally mentioned the many resolutions and letters they received from individual peace workers and peace organizations, they continued their deliberations without giving any credit to these appeals. Benjamin Trueblood and May Wright Sewall were the only leading American peace workers who witnessed the proceedings at The Hague, and Trueblood was so impressed with the difficulties of the delegates in reconciling the many different propositions and in overcoming the aura of suspicion there that he was content to leave the delegates alone so that they could work out these difficulties with a minimum of outside interference.[55]

---

[54] Hale to Edward Hale (his son), June 1, 1899, Hale Papers, Box 12.

The First Hague Peace Conference accomplished little. The delegates from the twenty-six participating nations spent much time talking in general terms about world problems but took no action on serious questions like disarmament. As a result, diplomatic historians have treated the 1899 Conference as a minor footnote in world history.

Yet the Hague Conference approved one proposal which encouraged the pacifists to believe that the first step in their movement for the federation of the world had been achieved. The major achievement of the First Hague Peace Conference was the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, the first international court in history. Actually, the Hague Court was hardly permanent or a court at all, for it had neither permanent judges nor compulsory arbitration features, but only a panel of judges from which nations could voluntarily select their adjudicators. Nevertheless, the peace workers hailed the founding of the Court as "the beginning of the Parliament of Man," the "Magna Charta of international law," "the most wonderful court the world ever dreamed of," "one of the greatest events in the history of human society," and certainly "the great event" or "the crowning glory" of the nineteenth century. At last, they believed, the peace movement had entered its "practical" or "political" phase. Henceforth, the nations of the world would not have to rely entirely upon haphazard and involved diplomatic negotiations but could turn to this tangible institution to settle their international differences.[56]

---

[55] Several other American pacifists, chiefly Quakers and representatives of the Universal Peace Union, attended the sessions of the Conference, but none were leading lights in the peace movement. Davis, First Hague Peace Conference, 100-02; Trueblood; "The International Peace Conference at The Hague," New England Magazine, XX, new series (August 1899), 667-68.

While the peace workers assumed that the nations of the world would feel a strong moral obligation to submit their international disputes to the new Court, they realized that it was an embryo which could develop into full maturity only through the actual adjudication of international controversies. Foreign as well as American pacifists thus urged their governments to submit their controversies with other nations to the Hague Court. They particularly wanted the United States to assume the world's leadership in making the new Court a living institution by offering to submit the Alaska boundary question, which a joint high commission had failed to resolve, or some other dispute to the new Tribunal.[57] Although Trueblood and other pacifists could not persuade President McKinley to submit an outstanding dispute to the Court,[58] they continued their efforts in this direction with his successor, Theodore Roosevelt.[59] The leading French peace worker, Baron D'Estournelles de Constant, was particularly active in trying to win the interest and support of the new President. In the first months of 1902 he wrote several letters to and had an interview with Roosevelt in which he urged the President to promote the Court. D'Estournelles' efforts were successful, for Roosevelt, who sympathized with the general purposes of the Hague Court, realized that unless the major powers agreed to submit some disputes to the Tribunal, it would become a paper institution. He therefore asked Secretary of State John Hay to propose the settlement of the Pious Fund controversy, a long-standing dispute between the United States and Mexico over the latter's obligations to Franciscan Missions in California, at the Hague Court. Since Mexico had already agreed to arbitration, the Hague Court received and decided its first case in 1902.[60] Shortly thereafter, other nations also turned to the Court for the settlement of their international differences. Most significant of the dozen cases settled by the Court before the First World War was the second one, the Venezuelan debt controversy. After considerable pressure from President Roosevelt, the creditor nations of Great Britain, Germany, and Italy (and eventually eight other nations) on the one side, and the defaulting Venezuela on the other, agreed in 1903 to arbitrate the dispute before the Court.[61] This arbitration was particularly gratifying to the peace workers, because Roosevelt, though asked by both sides to mediate the dispute himself, refused and instead convinced them to submit it to arbitration at the new Court.[62]

---

[56] Advocate of Peace, LXI (September 1899), 176; and LXVI (December 1904), 225; Oscar S. Straus, address, in Official Report of the Thirteenth Universal Peace Congress Held at Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A., October Third to Eighth, 1904, ed. Benjamin F. Trueblood (Boston: The Peace Congress Committee, 1904), 62, 63. (Hereafter cited as Universal Peace Report, 1904.) Paine, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference Report, 1900, 59; declaration, in The American Friends' Peace Conference Held at Philadelphia, Twelfth Month 12th, 13th and 14th (Philadelphia: Ferris & Leach, 1902), 208-09.

[57] Robert Treat Paine, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1901, 59; Trueblood, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1901, 13; and discussion, in ibid., 24; Advocate of Peace, LXIII (January 1901), 11; (March 1901), 49; (July 1901), 138; and LXIV (December 1902), 219.

---

[58] Platform, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1900, 105; platform, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1901, 91; Advocate of Peace, LXIII (January 1901), 11, and (March 1901), 49.

[59] Edward Everett Hale to Theodore Roosevelt, November 14, 1901, in Edward Everett Hale, Jr., The Life and Letters of Edward Everett Hale (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1917), 385-86.

[60] Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1913), 581; and Paul H.B. D'Estournelles de Constant, America and Her Problems (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915), 307-08. Also see Advocate of Peace, LXIV (August 1902), 152; and LXV (September 1903), 164-68. Francis J. Weber, "The Pious Fund of the Californias," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIII (February 1963), 78-94, gives a full discussion of this arbitration.

Among the Americans who joined the peace movement out of enthusiasm for the First Hague Conference in general and the Hague Court in particular was Richard Bartholdt. A German by birth and a popular representative from a German-American district in St. Louis from 1893 to 1915, Bartholdt had shown no interest in the peace movement in the 1890's. He had, in fact, strongly endorsed the war with Spain and defended America's annexation of the Philippines as "the law of nature ... the invisible momentum of progress and civilization."[63] Yet he responded enthusiastically to the peace movement after the First Hague Peace Conference. Echoing the pacifists' exhiliration at the accomplishment of that conference, he claimed that the creation of the Hague Court was "by far the greatest achievement of the nineteenth century."[64]

---

[61] Advocate of Peace, LXIV (December 1902), 213-14; LXV (November 1903), 192; LXVI (March 1904), 41-42; and (August 1904), 141.

[62] Ibid., LXV (February 1903), 26; and LXVI (January 1904), 1-2; Peacemaker, XXIII (March 1904), 58-59; John W. Foster, Arbitration and the Hague Court (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1904), 70-71. De Constant in New York Times, September 18, 1904, 4:4, believed that Roosevelt's promotion of the Court in these years had saved it from extinction.

Although Bartholdt became so dedicated to the peace movement that he eventually was known as "the peace apostle" in the House of Representatives, he was no full-blown pacifist.[65] Rather, his pacifism was a curious mixture of Germanophilism and American idealism. A close observer of international events, he saw that the real danger to world peace existed in Europe where his native Germany, encircled by the Franco-Russian alliance, had increased its armaments and assumed a suspicious attitude toward the other major powers. Europe, he repeatedly argued, was at the crossroad, one leading its people "in the future, as in the past, in [to] the fires of hell and war, ... the other leading them through the open portals of the Hague to heavenly peace."[66] He feared the former unless the United States, an unaligned and disinterested power, pursued an active and friendly policy toward the European nations. In the long run, he hoped that American benevolence would warm the chilly diplomatic climate in Europe. His ultimate goal was the abolition of German militarism. Once more amicable European relations existed, then, and only then, could Germany throw off its military harness.[67]

---

[63] Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2nd session, XXXI (March 25, 1898), 3225; and 56th Congress, 1st session, XXXIII (February 23, 1900), Appendix, 44.

[64] Address of Hon. Richard Bartholdt, President of the American Group, at the XIII Conference of the Interparliamentary Union at Brussels, August 29, 1905, 4, printed speech in the Richard Bartholdt Papers (Missouri Historical Society).

[65] New York Times, November 8, 1913, 2:3.

[66] Bartholdt, address at Brussels, August 29, 1905, 2, printed speech in the Bartholdt Papers. Richard Bartholdt, From Steerage to Congress: Reminiscences and Reflections (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Co., 1930), 172-73.

In pursuit of his dream of a European detente, Bartholdt argued that the American government could most immediately improve the chances for European amity by calling a second international conference at The Hague. Confident in the good will of the Kaiser and his advisors, he thought Germany would prove receptive to the proposal. Even if a second conference did not immediately dampen the suspicions between the European power blocs, he believed that the resevoir of American good will, if persistently and patiently applied, would stimulate European amity.

Bartholdt attempted to implement his proposal for a Second Hague Conference through the Interparliamentary Union. Before Bartholdt's participation in the Interparliamentary Union, most American congressmen had never heard of it. True, one American Representative had attended the 1889 meeting of the Union and another the one in 1897, but neither had popularized the Union's aims and programs among his fellow congressmen.[68] Even in American peace circles the Union was known before 1900 only to those pacifists who had regularly attended the Lake Mohonk and international peace congresses. Bartholdt, in fact, discovered the Union by chance. During one of his regular trips abroad, Bartholdt attended the First Hague Peace Conference and then journeyed to Berlin where a German friend invited him to attend the forthcoming meeting of the Interparliamentary Union at Christiania, Norway. Although Bartholdt had never heard of the Union, he accepted the invitation. The dedication and the practical emphasis of the European legislators in thrashing out the many complex details of world organization at the Christiania meeting immediately impressed him.[69] Realizing the Union's potential influence in ameliorating the nationalistic rivalries in Europe, he believed that active American participation in its deliberations would greatly improve the chances for world peace.

---

[67] Bartholdt, address, August 29, 1905, printed speech in the Bartholdt Papers; Bartholdt, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference Report, 1906, 50-51; and Bartholdt, From Steerage to Congress, 216-23.

Bartholdt soon formulated a bold plan to popularize the activities of the Union in the United States. At the 1903 meeting of the Interparliamentary Union in Vienna, Bartholdt, acting without any previous approval from the American government, persuaded the delegates to hold the 1904 congress in St. Louis. Returning to the United States, he called on President Roosevelt, who to Bartholdt's relief agreed to ask Congress to extend the customary invitation to the Union. Roosevelt also agreed to ask Congress to appropriate $50,000 to defray the expenses of the foreign visitors. Heartened by this support, in January 1904 Bartholdt called a meeting of Senators and Representatives who were interested in forming an American group of the Interparliamentary Union. Trueblood, who had only recently met Bartholdt, delivered an address to the forty-odd members of Congress who attended the meeting.[70] In the next decade this group was to grow in size until it comprised over two hundred Senators and Representatives. Although almost all of these legislators never took any active interest in the Interparliamentary Union, a handful regularly attended its later meetings in various European cities. Two congressmen in particular, Theodore Burton of Ohio and James L. Slayden of Texas, both of whom strongly opposed Roosevelt's large-navy programs, actively participated in the Union. Burton had already attended a meeting of the Union in Paris in 1900. These two gradually drew closer to the inner circle of pacifists. Elected officers of the American group of the Interparliamentary Union, they soon became active in the American Peace Society, Burton serving as its president from 1911 to 1915 and Slayden as a director from 1913 to 1917 and as president from 1917 to 1921.[71]

---

[68] Justin R. Whiting, of Michigan, attended the 1889 meeting and Samuel J. Barrows, of Massachusetts, the ones in 1897 and 1899. See Hayne Davis ed., Among the World's Peacemakers: An Epitome of the Interparliamentary Union (New York: The Progressive Publishing Co., 1907), 16; and Samuel J. Barrows, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1900, 17-20. A few Representatives and Senators attempted to form an American group of the Interparliamentary Union in 1894, but nothing came of the effort. Advocate of Peace, LXI (March 1894), 62-63.

[69] Bartholdt, From Steerage to Congress, 171-178

---

[70] Ibid., 213-16; New York Times, January 14, 1904, 7:2. Bartholdt, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1904, 120-21, said forty-three members of Congress attended the meeting, but a newspaper reporter counted thirty-eight. Arabella Carter, of the Universal Peace Union, who along with Belva Lockwood were the only women to witness the meeting, also gave the latter total. See Washington Post, January 13, 1904, 2:7; and Peacemaker, XXIII (February 1904), 42-43.

Meanwhile, Bartholdt's peace efforts did not go unnoticed outside pacifist and Congressional circles. A New York lawyer and free-lance newspaperman, Hayne Davis, responding to United States' participation in the First Hague Peace Conference, began as early as 1901 to write articles on the future development of international organization, and in 1904 he was to attempt to supplement Bartholdt's program for the Interparliamentary Union with a proposal of his own. Davis derived his program for world organization from his faith in American institutions. Like Edward Everett Hale, he believed that the early formative period of the American nation should serve as the model in the evolution of an authoritative world organization. "The idea of a Union of Nations," he said, "must go through substantially the same development as the idea of a Union of our States." Stretching the analogy between the development of national and international institutions, Davis claimed that the First Hague Conference was "really the first Constitution of the United Nations, as the Articles of Confederation was the first constitution of our Union." But while the establishment of the Hague Court at this Conference was a significant accomplishment, it represented only a "feeble" beginning and by itself was "hopelessly inadequate to the needs of the people of the world" just as the union of the American states under the Articles of Confederation had proven inadequate to the needs of the American people in the 1780's. Although he wanted to strengthen the Hague Court and was hopeful for its success, he believed that in the final analysis it "was manifestly incapable of preserving the peace" since it had no powers of enforcement.

---

[71] Forrest Crissey, Theodore E. Burton: American Statesman (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1956), 238, 239. Ellen M. Slayden, Washington Wife: Journal of Ellen Maury Slayden from 1897-1919 (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 55, 62, 71-79, 86, 89, 95, 124, 153, 160, 216, 351, 365, contains a full account of her husband's participation in the Interparliamentary Union and American Peace Society.

To remedy this defect, Davis urged the establishment of an international legislature. Such an assembly might not immediately prevent armed outbreaks, but it would further bind the nations of the world closer together and would strengthen the idea of the nations' collective responsibilities in working together toward a peaceful world order. This international parliament would have authority to develop rules of international law for the jurisdiction of the Hague Court and generally serve as the proper forum for the discussion of all important international questions. Davis was vague on the enforcement powers of this international congress but apparently thought that the nations of the world would adhere to the principles of international law declared by the international congress and applied by the Hague Court without the necessity of establishing any international police-keeping agency. But these were not matters of immediate importance to Davis. He was almost solely interested in elaborating the logic of an international legislature as the next step in the movement toward world organization, and he was an important addition to the peace forces mainly because he was the first individual after 1900 to rekindle interest in the concept of a congress of nations, which a few European and American philosophers and statesmen had discussed in previous centuries, but had been almost totally neglected since about 1840.[72]

Davis originally presented his ideas in a series of articles in The Independent, but in 1904 he found an opportunity to introduce them directly into the peace movement. In June of that year he attended his first Lake Mohonk Conference where he met Richard Bartholdt.[73] Bartholdt had previously shown no interest in an international congress, and his address to the Mohonk delegates did not mention a congress as part of his own program. He predicted in fact that the discussions at the forthcoming meeting of the Interparlaimentary Union in St. Louis would focus on arbitration and disarmament.[74] Nevertheless, Davis was impressed by Bartholdt's address on the potential importance of the Interparliamentary Union for discussing and disseminating proposals for world organization. Believing that the Union could provide a forum for his own proposal of an international legislature, in the intervening three months between the Lake Mohonk Conference and the St. Louis meeting he conferred with Bartholdt on a few occasions in an attempt to persuade him to add an international legislature to his own program for the Interparliamentary Union.[75] Apparently he won over the congressman to the merits of an international legislature, for at the St. Louis meeting Bartholdt included it on his list of proposals for discussion.

---

[72] Davis' ideas are most fully presented in his three articles: "The Final Outcome of the Declaration of Independence," The Independent, LV (July 2, 1903), 1543-47; "The Development of the Union," ibid., LVI (May 12, 1904), 1072-76; and "A World Congress," ibid., LVII (July 7, 1904), 11-19. On earlier proposals for a congress or council of nations, see Hemleben, Plans for World Peace, 3, 14, 16-17, 25-27, 37-38, 44, 45-46, 49-53, 55, 59-65, 75-78, 96-97, 105-09, 111-12, 116-17, 120-22.

[73] Davis later said that he first met Bartholdt at the 1903 Mohonk Conference (Among the World's Peacemakers, 22), but neither Davis nor Bartholdt attended in that year. Davis obviously mean 1904, when both attended the Mohonk Conference for the first time.

[74] Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1904, 119-22; a month earlier, on April 29, 1904, Bartholdt also failed to include an international congress when he reported the recommendations of the Interparliamentary Union. Peacemaker, XXIII (May 1904), 117-18.

The St. Louis meeting of the Interparliamentary Union, now attended for the first time by several American congressmen, provided clear evidence of the growing importance of American participation in the movement for world organization, for the delegates unanimously passed a resolution endorsing Bartholdt's entire program. This resolution requested the President of the United States to call a Second Hague Conference. Furthermore, it declared that this Conference should formulate international arbitration treaties for the jurisdiction of the Hague Court and consider the establishment of an international legislature which would convene periodically to discuss international questions.[76] Following the St. Louis meeting the delegates journeyed to the nation's capital and attended a reception at the White House at which President Roosevelt accepted the resolution and promised to call the Second Hague Peace Conference.[77] Roosevelt kept his word. Less than a month later he ordered the State Department to send out a circular note to the American diplomatic representatives accredited to the governments signatory to the final acts of the First Hague Peace Conference asking them to communicate to these governments the American interest in a second conference and to ascertain their receptivity to an American invitation for a second conference. Formal invitations for a second conference were delayed until the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War and still further after the war by a question of protocol. The Russian government assumed that since Czar Nicholas II was the acknowledged initiator of the First Hague Conference, he should have the honor of calling the second one. When Roosevelt learned of Nicholas' interest in a second conference, he immediately deferred to the Russian Emperor who finally in 1906 summoned it for the following year.[78]

---

[75] Davis, Among the World's Peacemakers, 22-23, 25, 27-30.

---

[76] The St. Louis resolution is contained in Union Interparliamentaire pour L'Arbitrage International, Session de 1904, Compte Rendu de la XII$^{e}$ Conference Tenue a Saint Louis, Missouri du 12 au 14 Septembre 1904, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905), 60.

[77] Roosevelt's speech to the delegates is given in ibid., 61; also see New York Times, September 25, 1904, 1:1. The most interesting and colorful account of the St. Louis meeting and of the delegates' visit to President Roosevelt is Ellen Slayden, Washington Wife, 56-61.

As the Second Hague Peace Conference approached, more and more individuals began to express interest in the peace movement. Jane Addams, Jenkin Lloyd Jones, William Jennings Bryan, Edwin Ginn, Samuel Train Dutton, Nicholas Murray Butler, George W. Kirchwey, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Rabbi Emil G. Hirsch, and the Reverend Frederick Lynch were only a few of the most prominent individuals who became enthusiastic supporters of the peace movement. At a gigantic four day meeting of the National Arbitration and Peace Congress in New York City on the eve of the Second Conference, all these individuals attended and frankly acknowledged their growing commitment to the cause of peace and justice in international relations.

Perhaps the most important new recruit to the peace movement before 1907, however, was Hamilton Holt, managing editor of The Independent, which had already published several of Hayne Davis' articles on world organization. Before Davis approached Holt in 1903 with his ideas on world organization, Holt had expressed no personal interest in the movement, although his father had urged him to study its potential importance for the future.[79] But Davis soon convinced him that the recent thinking of

---

[78] Roosevelt to Trueblood, October 20, 1904, in Morison, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, IV, 987. The official State Department circular was sent out on October 21, 1904 (F.R. 1904, 10-13).

[79] Theodore Marburg, "Apostles of World Unity, VI--Hamilton Holt," World Unity, I (March 1928), 412.

Bartholdt and other American peace workers on the subject of international organization was the most promising and important reform movement in the United States, even more important than the various domestic reforms Holt had previously championed. Once converted, Holt encouraged Davis, Bartholdt, and other peace advocates in the United States and Europe to contribute articles to The Independent which quickly became the leading weekly in support of the peace movement. The youthful and energetic Holt, who was only thirty-two in 1904, began attending the Lake Mohonk Conferences and wrote several articles on international aspects of the peace movement. The pacifists found him a valuable ally, both in the favorable publicity he gave to their movement and in his active participation in its daily operation.[80]

Foreshadowing his later campaign for a League of Nations, Holt's first interest in the peace movement was the machinery of international organization. Like Davis, whose ideas on international organization initially influenced him, Holt used the American Constitution as the model for the future federation of the world. Also like Davis, he believed that the Hague Court alone could not bring about permanent peace which would become a reality only after the elaboration of international peacekeeping machinery, and he strongly endorsed Davis' plan for an international legislature as the next logical step in the international peace movement. In one respect, however, Holt went further than Davis. Realizing Davis' conception of an international legislature stopped short of a truly authoritative body, Holt argued that if a world congress was to have any lasting influence, it would require an executive agent to enforce its acts whenever necessary. As he put it in an editorial commenting on one of Davis' articles for a world congress, "without an executive agent and organization, the acts and resolves of a world legislature would have a merely advisory force."[81] In another editorial published on the eve of the National Arbitration and Peace Congress, Holt presented a ten point plan for "A Constitution of the World." This editorial elaborated Holt's basic ideas on world organization. It proposed that the Hague Conferences -- what he called a General Assembly of Nations -- should meet a third time in 1915 and thereafter every fifth year. This General Assembly would apply the principles of international law framed by an executive council of the Interparliamentary Union which would be called the International House of Representatives. The most important section of Holt's "Constitution" involved the enforcement of the General Assembly's decisions. While it recognized the right of nations to maintain and use their armed forces whenever not specifically prohibited by treaties, it added that "the armed forces of all the nations represented in the Assembly shall be at the service of the Assembly for the enforcement of decrees rendered by the International Court at

---

[80] Warren F. Kuehl, Hamilton Holt: Journalist, Internationalist, Educator (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), 66-74, summarizes Holt's conversion to the peace movement. Holt later credited Davis for first arousing his interest in the peace movement. The Independent, CV (April 21, 1921), 336.

---

[81] Ibid., LVII (July 7, 1904), 46-47.

The Hague according to recognized principles of law and under the provisions of treaties of arbitration."[82]

While the movement for the Second Hague Peace Conference was evoking considerable enthusiasm in the United States, Bartholdt was hard at work attempting to persuade his European colleagues in the Interparliamentary Union to endorse his specific proposals as the Union's official recommendations for the forthcoming international conference at The Hague. Supported by a small nucleus of American congressmen, Bartholdt promoted his advanced program at the Interparliamentary Union Conferences in Brussels in 1905 and London in 1906. Of his many proposals he particularly urged a model arbitration treaty and an international legislature on the Union delegates. Acceptance of the first would facilitate the negotiation of more arbitration treaties which would strengthen the authority and jurisdiction of the Hague Court.[83] Acceptance of the second would stimulate the movement toward world organization. After some deletions, amendments, and refinement of language, the Interparliamentary Union completed its recommendations for the forthcoming conference. These called for periodic and automatic meetings of the Hague Conference, a universal arbitration treaty which automatically referred certain classes of cases to the Hague Court, a commission of mediation or an international commission of inquiry of one or more powers to undertake an investigation of all other disputes before the nations resorted to war, and the establishment of a permanent advisory body to codify international law for later meetings at The Hague. Thus the Interparliamentary Union endorsed Bartholdt's proposal for a model arbitration treaty but for his dream of an international legislature assembly substituted an advisory body. The Union members were perfectly willing to discuss an authoritative international organization but offered many objections as soon as specific proposals were brought forward. Nor did the Union make any specific proposal on the tangled question of armaments, although it urged full and serious discussion of the issue at the Hague Conference. Finally, it advocated measures designed to "humanize" warfare by imposing technical restrictions on belligerents: prohibitions on the use of new types of weapons and the bombardment of unfortified ports and towns, the immunity of private property, and broad definitions on the rights of neutrals.[84]

---

[82] Ibid., LXII (April 11, 1907), 826.

[83] Bartholdt, address, August 29, 1905, printed speech, and Bartholdt, typescript of supporting speech to the Interparliamentary Union at Brussels in 1905, both in the Bartholdt Papers; New York Times, May 1, 1905, 4:4.

By the time the Second Hague Peace Conference convened, the American peace workers had high hopes that their strenuous efforts would induce the delegates to adopt many of their proposals. But the Conference failed to live up to its expectations. It did not agree to any concrete measures which improved the machinery of international organization. And while it discussed all the recommendations of the Interparliamentary Union, in the end it made only minor improvements in the wording of the existing conventions relating to the Hague Court and mediation procedures. All of the ten new conventions governed the rules and techniques of warfare. Since the delegates could not agree on the limitation of armaments, the selection of judges for a newly designed Judicial Arbitration Court, or compulsory mediation or arbitration of any cases, it simply recognized them as desirable principles or wishes (voeux) but deferred positive action on them to a future conference.[85] In light of these meagre accomplishments, therefore, even the "practical" peace proposals of the Interparliamentary Union were too optimistic. After the Second Conference, in fact, the rival alliance systems in Europe hardened so rapidly that the Interparliamentary Union became more a debating society than a constructive sounding board for international reform proposals.[86]

---

[84] Bartholdt gave a good summary of the Interparliamentary Union's program for the Second Hague Peace Congress in Congressional Record, 59th Congress, 2nd session, XLI (March 4, 1907), Appendix, 49-51. The Union's resolutions at the London conference in 1906 are reprinted in ibid., 50-51. Also see From Steerage to Congress, 277-80.

The immediate reaction of many pacifists to the Second Hague Conference ranged from mild discouragement to outright scorn of its results. Trueblood scolded the nations for allowing their delegations to make only half-hearted and dilatory proposals on the central issues of armament limitation and obligatory arbitration treaties while dissipating their energies on the war conventions. The excessive talk on the latter matters, he frankly stated, was "a disgrace to our civilization."[87] Belva Lockwood and Alfred Love of the Universal Peace Union were just as disillusioned with the delegates' preoccupation with the rules of war rather than the reduction of armaments and the elaboration of peace machinery.[88]

---

[85] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, The Final Acts of the First and Second Hague Peace Conference, Together with the Draft Convention on a Judicial Arbitration Court, Pamphlet no. 10 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1915), 25-40.

[86] Bartholdt, From Steerage to Congress, 352-53.

But the pacifists' pessimism was only skin deep. The longer they reflected on the Second Hague Conference, the more they began to appraise it as distinctly beneficial. Since they could claim very little in the way of concrete achievements at the Second Conference, they pointed out the indirect benefits of the Conference. Just as they had argued after the First Conference, though at that time with more justification, the fact that the Second Conference had actually met and at least wrestled with the complex problems of world organization was to them a significant accomplishment. They also found consolation in taking the long view. Living in a generation which accepted the idea of "progress" as an article of faith, they confidently pointed out that great movements often had very small beginnings.[89] Compared with the First Peace Conference, for example, forty-four nations attended the 1907 Conference, an increase of eighteen. Edwin Mead claimed that on the basis of this increased representation alone the Second Hague Conference "was the most pregnant and significant gathering in human history." And Trueblood, hailing it as "the first general representative assembly of the world," agreed.[90] Even more significant from the same long-range perspective, the Second Peace Conference, unlike the vague, almost casual declaration of its predecessor, definitely provided for a third meeting after a time lapse analagous to the one between the first two, or about 1915. It also recommended the appointment of an international preparatory committee two years before the third conference to draw up a program and a system of organization and procedure for that conference. Susceptible to words and gestures which provided more than a glimmer of hope for the future, the pacifists looked forward to the day when their programs which had won the formal approval of most nations in 1907 would be achieved. On the American proposal for a general treaty of obligatory arbitration, excepting questions of vital interests, independence, and national honor, for example, only nine of the forty-four nations failed to approve the proposal. Surely, they reasoned, unanimity was possible and even probable on such a measure at a future conference. Similarly, only a few small powers had reservations on the proposed International Court of Arbitral Justice. Once the major powers could devise a suitable formula for the selection of judges to the Court, it would be established and gradually win the respect and support of all nations.[91]

---

[87] Advocate of Peace, LXIX (August and September 1907), 178-79.

[88] Belva A. Lockwood, The Central American Peace Congress and an International Arbitration Court for the Five Central American Republics (Washington, D.C., n.p., 1908), 3, 12-13; Peacemaker, XXVI (July 1907), 154-55; (September 1907), 196-97.

---

[89] Advocate of Peace, LXIX (November 1907), 229-30; (December 1907), 249; and LXX (February 1908), 32-34; Peacemaker, XXVI (November 1907), 241-42.

[90] Mead, address, in Proceedings of the Second National Congress, Chicago, May 2 to 5, 1909, ed. Charles E. Beals (Chicago: Peterson Linotype Company, 1909), 38. (Hereafter cited as National Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1909.) Also William P. Rogers, address, in ibid., 112; Frederick Lynch, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1908, 34; Advocate of Peace, LXIX (October 1907), 211; LXX (February 1908), 32; and Peacemaker, XXVI (December 1907), 267.

It is impossible to measure exactly the importance of the two Hague Peace Conferences in forwarding the American peace movement, but the outpouring of speeches, articles, and books on the Conference by peace advocates, many of whom had taken little or no interest in the peace movement before 1899, indicates a pervasive influence. In their analysis of the two Hague Conferences, they particularly cited historical parallels to illustrate the growing importance of the peace movement in world politics. The prophets of peace had had their day; now, at last, the peace movement had passed "from talking to achieving, from preaching to practice." Above all, their rhetoric emphasized that the Hague Conferences signalled the beginning of the "new" or "practical" peace movement, the major historical force of the twentieth century.[92] The Reverend Frederick Lynch, the leading American clergyman in the pre-war peace movement, later summarized the attitude of most peace advocates concerning the Hague Conferences: "We felt that with the assembling of the Hague Conferences a new era had dawned upon the world and that the peace problem was being brought down out of the world of idealism, where all movements are born, and was becoming a practical, political question."[93]

---

[91] Trueblood, address, in Report of the Proceedings of the New England Arbitration and Peace Congress, Hartford and New Britain, May 8 to 11, 1910, ed. James L. Tryon (Boston: American Peace Society, 1910), 24. (Hereafter cited as New England Arbitration and Peace Congress, Report, 1910.) William I. Hull, address, in National Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1909, 217, 219-20.

The peace workers' frequent comparisons between the "idealistic" proposals of the nineteenth century peace advocates and the "practical" proposals of their twentieth century counterparts were very misleading and even nonsensical. Professor Henry May has emphasized that the Americans of this generation delighted in using the vague phrase "practical idealism" to describe their faith in high ideals while still considering themselves practical.[94] But although the problem of peace had become a more important consideration among the major powers, the peace workers themselves were still idealists. Despite a growing concern for the procedures for arbitration and mediation and other details of world organization, their emphasis on the "practical" nature of their efforts was more an affirmation of their own hopes than an accurate description of world affairs after 1907.

---

[92] Frederick Lynch, "The Leaders of the New Peace Movement in America," The Independent, LXIX (September 22, 1910), 629; also see William I. Hull's collection of essays, The New Peace Movement, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1912), v-ix, 1, *passim*.

[93] Frederick Lynch, Personal Recollections of Andrew Carnegie (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1920), 24.

[94] Henry F. May, The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Own Time, 1912-1917 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), Part I, ch. 2.

In their more honest moments they unwittingly admitted that they were more idealistic than realistic, but even when they did not affirm their idealism, their own statements betrayed a utopian outlook. Shortly after his return from the Second Hague Peace Conference, Hamilton Holt prepared a stereoptican lecture entitled "The Federation of the World," which he delivered to university, school, and public gatherings. The major part of his lecture was an enthusiastic peroration of the achievements of the two Hague Conferences. The two meetings at The Hague, he emphasized, had created

> the germ of the Supreme Court of the World and [of] the International Legislature. As we perfect these, it will be possible to add an International Executive .... when that golden period is at hand -- and it cannot be very far distant -- we shall have in very truth Tennyson's dream of the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World, and for the first time since the Prince of Peace died on Calvary, we shall have Peace on Earth and Good Will to Men.[95]

Another new recruit to the peace movement, William I. Hull, a Quaker and professor of history at Swarthmore College, was just as bold in projecting the two Hague Conferences into a visionary future:

> So far-reaching through the realm of international relations is the scope of the conferences' work that to attempt to estimate the advance registered by them is like an attempt to estimate the results of the

---

[95] "The Federation of the World," undated Holt MS. in the Hamilton Holt Papers (Mills Memorial Library, Rollins College), Box 91. A printed summary of Holt's lecture, including many quoted excerpts, is in National Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1909, 333-35.

> application of steam to industry or of democracy to government. For already it is clear that the Hague Conferences are to international law what the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth century [sic] was to human industry or what the rise of the American Republic was to human government.[96]

Edwin Mead just as emphatically hailed the cumulative achievements of the two conferences:

> The two Hague Conferences failures! [he exclaimed sarcastically in 1910]. One is appalled at the depth of ignorance and Philistinism that venture the wild and mischievous assertion. I confess that, with such knowledge as I have of history and the general course of political action, I can never survey the prodigious achievements of the two Hague Conferences, with all that is pregnant in them, without being lost in amazement. If the most optimistic of us here had been told in 1898 that these advances would be made in the interval between then and now, none of us would have believed it.[97]

### (3)

Although the two Hague Conferences greatly stimulated interest in world organization, the pacifists did not abandon their traditional emphasis on arbitration treaties. Indeed, the two meetings at The Hague helped to promote international arbitration as no previous efforts of the peace workers had done. The establishment of The Hague Court in particular acted as a tonic to the arbitration movement which despite the active efforts of peace workers and diplomats had just begun to fluorish before the First Hague Peace Conference. Between 1901 and 1910, however, the nations of the world ratified more than 130 arbitration treaties, double the number of the previous decade. Furthermore, most of these arbitration treaties specifically provided for the automatic referral of certain classes of cases to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Two treaties in fact specified that all controversies were to be referred to arbitration for settlement, one of them explicitly naming the Hague Court as the tribunal.[98] Although the general search for friendly relationships, however tenuous, in an insecure world order was a major cause of these treaties, the pacifists nonetheless hailed them as another tangible manifestation of the growing progress toward the federation of the world.

---

[96] *Ibid.*, 204.

[97] "The Results of the Two Hague Conferences and the Demands upon the Third Conference," *World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series* (April 1911), No. 1, Part I, 6.

American peace workers wanted the United States to assume leadership of the arbitration movement. The rapid rapprochement between the United States and Great Britain from 1898 to 1903 helped to advance the arbitration movement in the United States by reviving enthusiasm for an arbitration treaty between the two nations.[99] Most of the same proponents of the abortive Olney-Pauncefote treaty of 1897 decided in 1903 that the time was ripe for renewed activity in support of an Anglo-American arbi arbitration treaty. The promoters of the 1896 Conference on International Arbitration called a second conference in Washington, D.C. in January 1904 to initiate another campaign for such a treaty. In addition to the "Old Guard" arbitration proponents -- Andrew Carnegie, Edward Everett Hale, Benjamin Trueblood, Robert Treat Paine, Edwin Mead, Samuel Capen, and John W. Foster -- recent recruits, Richard Bartholdt, David Starr Jordan, Hamilton Holt, and Theodore Marburg, also attended. Recognizing the growth of the arbitration principle throughout the civilized world, the Conference passed resolutions urging the United States government to conclude an Anglo-American treaty covering all disputes as well as similar treaties "to the same effect, as soon as practicable, with the other powers."[100] Partly in response to these appeals and partly because of his own and President Roosevelt's sympathetic support for arbitration, Secretary of State John Hay negotiated arbitration treaties with several powers in late 1904 and early 1905. Since his treaties excepted questions of "vital interest," "independence," and national "honor" and had to be renegotiated every five years, they did not go nearly as far as most peace advocates would have liked, but they still approved them as a step in the right direction.[101] When the Senate, fearing the loss of its constitutional prerogatives over foreign affairs, still further emasculated the treaties by adding an amendment that required Senate approval of an additional treaty specifying the issues in each dispute before arbitration could commence, Roosevelt pigeon-holed them.[102] Hay's successor, Elihu Root, persuaded Roosevelt to accept this stringent Senate reservation, however, and then negotiated twenty-five arbitration treaties in 1908 and 1909, twenty-two of which were ratified. The arbitration proponents took some comfort in the belief that these limited treaties marked the beginning of real American leadership in the arbitration movement whose efforts previously had lagged behind the other western nations.[103]

---

[98] Denys B. Myers, ed., "Arbitration Engagements Now Existing in Treaties, Treaty Provisions and National Constitutions," World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, V, No. 5, Part III (October 1915), 9-27, 30. Slightly higher totals are given in Denys B. Myers, ed., "List of Arbitration Treaties: Pacts to Which Pairs of Nations are Parties with Statistics and Notes," World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, No. 2, Part I (July 1911), 3-16; and Lucia Ames Mead, Swords and Ploughshares, facing 246, Trueblood cited sixty-three cases of international arbitration between 1890 and 1899. New York Times, February 17, 1903, 8:7.

[99] The fullest account of the Anglo-American rapprochment is contained in Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903.

---

[100] Second American Conference on International Arbitration, 12, 13-16.

[101] Advocate of Peace, LXVII (January 1905), 1; and (February 1905), 25; Oscar Straus, Under Four Administrations: From Cleveland to Taft (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1922), 329-30.

The peace workers were not unjustified in their hopes for more aggressive action on the part of the American government, for William Howard Taft's election to the Presidency in 1908 signalled an even greater awakening of the movement. A firm friend of international arbitration, he soon advanced the most far-reaching arbitration scheme yet proposed by any American president. During his administration the workers for international arbitration came to believe that in a few swift years a network of arbitration treaties would span the globe and bind the nation states more closely together. Once he announced his arbitration proposal, the peace workers could truly believe that their dream of the federation of the world was closer to fulfillment than ever before.

---

[102] Roosevelt's position is fully stated in several of his letters of the period. See, for example, Roosevelt to Carnegie, February 10, 1905, in Morison, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, IV, 1117.

[103] Advocate of Peace, LXX (March 1908), 50; platform, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1908, 7; Lockwood, Central American Peace Congress, 14.

## V. ORGANIZATION, 1905-1914

Fortified, on the one hand, by the reaction to the Spanish-American War, imperialism, and navalism, and, on the other, by the hopeful promises of the Hague Conferences, arbitration treaties, and progressive reform, the peace workers had good reason to believe in the first years of the twentieth century that their efforts had aroused the sympathy of many more influential Americans for their movement. In terms of numbers of new recruits, they could point to the growing momentum of the peace movement. The attendance figures at the Lake Mohonk Conferences on International Arbitration, for example, reflected the growing interest in peace and arbitration among professional people and independent businessmen. As previously noted, only thirty-five workers for peace and arbitration had attended the first of these annual conferences in 1895. By 1900, however, this number had grown to about one hundred and by 1904, 169 friends of peace, including fifteen diplomats and other government officials, ten judges, three members of the Hague Court, eighteen lawyers, twenty educators (many of them presidents of colleges or universities), thirty clergymen, twenty-five editors and journalists, and forty-five businessmen participated. The meetings of the Interparliamentary Union in St. Louis and the Universal Peace Conference in Boston a few months later, both of which initiated the movement for the Second Hague Peace Conference further stimulated this interest in peace and arbitration and helped to swell this number at the 1905, 1906, and 1907 Mohonk Conferences to 190, the most Smiley's hotel could accommodate.[1] The National Arbitration and Peace Conference in 1907 illustrates even more strikingly the growing enthusiasm for the movement. Organized by the Boston and New York peace leaders, this impressive four-day Congress was attended by a former Presidential candidate (William Jennings Bryan), two Cabinet officers (Oscar Straus and Elihu Root), four justices of the United States Supreme Court, one governor, ten mayors, twenty-seven millionaires, thirty labor leaders, forty bishops, and sixty newspaper editors.[2] Many of these individuals had shown no interest in the movement earlier but were now willing to share its popularity by making a public appearance on the platform. Of course the Congress was also well attended by almost all the leading international reformers in the United States. The Congress, one reporter claimed with only slight exaggeration, was "the greatest gathering ever held in advocacy of the abolition of war as a means of settling international disputes, and the most important non-political gathering ever held in this country for any purpose."[3] Indeed, the peace advocates were so encouraged by the public's warm response to this congress that they held similar congresses biennially until 1915 in other American cities.

---

[1] See Albert Smiley's remarks and the membership lists in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1904, 5, 162-65; Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1905, 9-10, 171-75; Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1906, 167-71; and Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1907, 192-97.

[2] National Arbitration and Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1907, 8-9, passim.

[3] Quoted in ibid., 7.

Although the Lake Mohonk conferences and the national peace congresses generated considerable enthusiasm among the peace workers, many of them came to feel that their influence was more temporary than lasting, more superficial than real. Since they met for only a few days every year or every other year, it was obvious that they could not do much more than stimulate public interest in and perhaps convert a few individuals to their cause, bolster the spirits of the faithful, and provide a forum for discussions on the present problems and future programs of the peace movement. While these achievements were not insignificant, many peace leaders had bolder ideas. What was now needed, these individuals urged, was a broad-scaled organizational and money-raising campaign that would commit the many new friends of peace to the movement on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. Once the peace organizations became more numerous, better organized, and affluent, they could then undertake a massive educational campaign for peace throughout the nation. Specifically, they could publish and disseminate peace tracts, hold public meetings, and send out lecturers to private gatherings on an unprecedented scale. A sufficient quantity and skillful mixture of these ingredients, they believed, would capture the public imagination and ultimately convert a major segment of the American populace to their cause.

Though a few new peace groups were formed in the first few years of the new century, the period of greatest development, expansion, and coordination of peace organizations occurred between 1905 and 1914. Before the advances of that decade, only a few pacifist agencies, especially the American Peace Society in Boston and the Universal Peace Union in Philadelphia, had exerted any influence beyond their immediate locales, while the Lake Mohonk Conferences represented the only departure from the ad hoc meetings of peace advocates for promoting their views on specific issues. With the advances of that decade, however, the peace movement increasingly became a vital and important factor in the molding of American public opinion on foreign affairs.

(2)

Pacifists had always stressed the importance of educating the masses on the goals, tactics, and achievements of the international peace movement, and in the first years of the twentieth century many educators increasingly agreed with them. Unashamed at the use of "propaganda"--the word in those days had more respectable and honest implications that it was to have later--many educators not only joined old peace groups like the American Peace Society but formed new ones. These new organizations stressed the publication and distribution of literature on the peace movement to schools, colleges, and the general public.

In the foreground of this educational campaign was the Boston millionaire textbook publisher Edwin Ginn. Though not a professional educator, Ginn believed that school books strongly influenced the moral outlook of young people. He particularly disliked the glorification of patriotism and the military spirit in history texts,[4] one major sign of the increasing international tensions which had contributed to the growth of armaments and "the war power." Long a reformer in Boston, Ginn assumed, as did many other progressives, that most people were rational and peaceloving while only the "interests," especially the military establishment, corrupted social life and perverted the peaceful life which all but the selfish few desired.[5] His antidote to this unhealthy militarism was a new emphasis in education on the basic unselfishness, idealism, and nobility of all peoples. He particularly wanted the schools to stress the peaceful aspirations of all peoples. "We need a body of educators," he insisted, "whose sole duty should be to go among teachers, awakening and developing an intelligent and adequate interest in this great subject" of peace. These educators should continue their efforts, moreover, "until every teacher in the land should be an Apostle of Peace." He also advocated international exchange programs for teachers and professors. The teachers, in turn, would commence the work of peace education with the school children, for it was "with them that our greatest hope lies."[6] He was convinced that if children were taught the horrors of war and the blessings of peace, as adults they would promote a more amicable international climate. This new amity would eventually enable nations to transfer the major portion of their armed might to an international police force that would enforce the peace against recalcitrant nations.[7]

---

[4] For an early expression of his interest in the content of textbooks, see Edwin Ginn, Are Our Schools in Danger? (n.p.: n.p., 1895), 1-3; and National Arbitration and Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1907, 155.

---

[5] Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1901, 21; National Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1909, 154.

[6] Ibid., 20-21; Universal Peace Congress, Report, 1904, 218; National Arbitration and Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1907, 154-55.

In July 1910, Ginn established the International School of Peace. This, the first peace endowment, immediately brought Ginn into the forefront of the peace movement in which he had long been active. He had attended Lake Mohonk Conferences since 1897 and gave his first address on international peace there in 1901. A year later he established an International Library in Boston, which published and distributed at cost the best peace literature to interested individuals, schools, and private associations.[8] Ginn continued to promote his educational ideas at various peace congresses but increasingly felt that despite the growing popular enthusiasm for the peace movement little was accomplished in organizing peace sentiment. He was especially critical of the peace societies. In his view they were reaching many more people but had failed to enlist them as active participants in the pacifist crusade. What was needed, he argued, was a centralized and heavily-endowed organization which would coordinate the peace work and conduct an intensive educational campaign on a national scale.[9]

---

[7] Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1901, 102-04; National Arbitration and Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1907, 152-56.

[8] Edwin Mead gave a good summary of the origins of Ginn's involvement in the peace movement in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1910, 188-92.

[9] National Arbitration and Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1907, 153-55; Universal Peace Congress, 1904, 217-18. Also Edwin Ginn to Samuel T. Dutton, January 22, 1908, New York Peace Society Papers (Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College), Box 4. (Hereafter cited as NYPS Papers.)

At first Ginn appealed to Carnegie and other philanthropists to create a peace endowment.[10] When he received no encouraging response, he took the initiative himself by giving $50,000 yearly to his School with the promise of an additional million dollars upon his death. Even this generous contribution, he believed, was only "the nucleus and beginning of a great endowment created by others and perhaps by governments themselves to forward this great cause."[11] He often mused that an endowment of ten million dollars would be needed before the peace movement would achieve real success, and he continued to hope other millionaires would donate large sums to his school. Deliberately publicizing his bequest of a million dollars, he hoped to encourage affluent individuals to contribute their own money to an endowment which upon his death would receive even greater financial support.[12]

The structure of Ginn's School, reincorporated as the World Peace Foundation in December 1910, was that of a college. Although it enrolled no students, it had a board of trustees who served without pay and were responsible for general policy, and salaried directors, technically a faculty, who wrote the peace propaganda and delivered lectures to teachers, school gatherings, private associations, and peace societies. The composition of the board of trustees and the directors illustrates the pedagogical emphasis of the Foundation. Five of the ten trustees and two of the seven directors, for instance, were leading educators in American colleges and universities. The other trustees and directors were progressive businessmen, editors, and clergymen.[13] Almost all of these latter trustees and directors were first exposed to the peace movement and in some instances to each other at the Lake Mohonk Conferences.[14]

---

[10] Ginn, letter, in The Nation, LXXXIX (September 23, 1909), 275-76.

[11] National Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1909, 322.

[12] National Arbitration and Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1907, 156. Ginn to Jordan, March 1, 25, 1910, Jordan Papers, Supplementary Correspondence.

Ginn's main collaborator in the World Peace Foundation and its chief director after 1913 was Edwin Mead. Though the scholarly Mead, like Ginn, was not a professional educator, he had long believed that a sound education was the key to good citizenship.[15] Accordingly, from his first days in the peace movement he urged the pacifist leaders to place their major emphasis on the education of young people. As early as 1902, for example, Mead and Ginn agreed that they should channel their pacifist energies into the neglected area of education. Ginn immediately established the International Library with Mead as its head. Mead's crusading zeal brought him closer to the professional educators as well as to the interested individuals from other vocations who eventually became trustees or directors of the World Peace Foundation.[16]

---

[13] The ten trustees were Edwin Ginn, president; Samuel Train Dutton; W. H. P. Faunce, President of Brown University; Sarah L. Arnold, dean of Simmons College; Joseph Swain, president of Swarthmore College; A. Lawrence Lowell, president of Harvard University; Samuel W. McCall, U.S. Representative from Massachusetts; Edward Cummings, a Unitarian minister in Boston; George A. Plimpton, an executive in Ginn and Co.; and George W. Anderson, a Boston lawyer. The seven directors were David Starr Jordan; Edwin Mead; Hamilton Holt; James A. MacDonald, editor of the Toronto Globe; James Brown Scott, international lawyer and Solicitor of the State Department; Charles R. Brown, dean of the Yale Divinity School; and John R. Mott, secretary-general of the Christian Students Federation. Others had served as trustees in 1910 but had resigned by the end of the year. Those listed here were the trustees and directors elected at the third meeting of the Endowment on December 22, 1910. Albert E. Pillsbury and Samuel B. Capen were added to the board of trustees in 1911. Two directors, Mott and Scott, were soon replaced by George W. Nasmyth and William I. Hull, since the former two could not devote much time to the Foundation. Meetings of July 12, November 29, December 22, 1910, November 28, 1911, and November 26, 1912, 12-13,15-16, 17, 28, 31-34, 40-42, in "Minutes of the Meetings of the Board of Trustees, 1910-1926," World Peace Foundation Files (World Peace Foundation, Boston, Massachusetts).

[14] Ginn, address, in Proceedings of International Conference, Under the Auspices of American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, December 15-17, 1910, Washington, D.C. (Baltimore: The Waverly Press, 1911?), 313-15, summarizes the plan of organization of the Foundation. (Hereafter cited as American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, Proceedings, 1910.) I am indebted here and elsewhere to the stimulating article by Peter Filene, "The World Peace Foundation and Progressivism, 1910-1918," New England Quarterly, XXXVI (December 1963), 478-501. The best contemporary summary of its activities

The Foundation immediately organized and financed the peace movement in the schools and colleges. In addition to its own propaganda campaign, it furthered the activities of two pacifist organizations which were already active on the college and secondary levels: the Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs and the American

---

is Edwin D. Mead, "The World Peace Foundation: Its Present Activities," *World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series*, No. 6, Part I (July 1912), 5-30.

[15] See Mead's two essays, *The Roman Catholic Church and the School Question* (Boston: C.H. Ellis, 1888); and *The Two Sides of the School Question* (Boston: Arnold Publishing Co., 1890). Also see Mead's article, "Adjustment of Education to Contemporary Needs," *Educational Review*, XIX (May 1900), 472-80, in which he urged: "Make your boys good citizens, and make them international men, citizens of the world." *Ibid.*, 480.

[16] Mead, address, in *Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1902*, 44-45; and Mead, "Peace Teaching in American Schools and Colleges," *The Outlook*, LXXXIII (June 16, 1906), 376-82.

School Peace League.[17] The Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs was organized in 1907 by federating international clubs in eight universities and colleges. In promoting closer contacts between the growing number of foreign students and their American counterparts, the Association attempted to break down national prejudices and promote international understanding.[18] Though not avowedly a pacifist organization, it expressed the same idealistic internationalism of the leading pacifists. One of the student leaders summarized this idealism:

> As a factor in international conciliation the cosmopolitan movement ranks equal with anything yet evolved. Our pacifism, though the very nature of our organization will perhaps prevent our ever identifying ourselves with any particular peace society, is nevertheless of a positive character; where many organizations aim at the prevention of war, our endeavor is first and foremost the promotion and upbuilding of friendship. When our members from so many different countries--and be it remembered that our foreign students are for the most part picked men, men coming from the best and most influential families, men in many cases sent by their governments and designed to become leaders of public opinion--when, I say, these are young

---

[17] Advocate of Peace, LXXIV (January 1912), 22. The Foundation also had an indirect connection with a third peace group, The Intercollegiate Peace Association, which comprised nearly fifty colleges and universities, mainly in the Middle West. This Association specialized in oratorical contests. The Foundation published the prize orations. See Stephen F. Weston, ed., Prize Orations of the Intercollegiate Peace Association (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1912).

[18] Louis P. Lochner, Always the Unexpected: A Book of Reminiscences (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1956), 33-35; Bjarne H. Graff, "A Resume of the Cosmopolitan Movement in the United States," in The Cosmopolitan Annual: Official Organ of the Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs, II (Ithaca, N. Y.: Andrus & Church, 1908), 59-61.

> men at the most impressionable and formative periods of their lives learn by close contact to know each other's characteristics, idiosyncrasies, and viewpoints, they cannot help but return to their native countries apostles of international goodwill, of world brotherhood.[19]

The motto of the Association--"Above all Nations is Humanity"--proudly expressed its idealism even more succinctly.

When the Foundation began its support of the Cosmopolitan Clubs in 1910, the movement was already a thriving venture. Although the Association had only two thousand members in twenty-two American colleges and universities in that year, many university presidents strongly endorsed its activities. David Starr Jordan of Stanford, Charles R. Van Hise of Wisconsin, Jacob Gould Schurman of Cornell, and Charles F. Thwing of Western Reserve, for instance, attended its annual conventions and praised its idealistic internationalism. The first president of Cornell and the chairman of the American delegation to the First Hague Peace Conference, octogenarian Andrew D. White, was especially enthusiastic concerning the Association's internationalism.[20]

---

[19] Louis P. Lochner, "The Cosmopolitan Club Movement," International Conciliation, Pamphlet No. 61 (December 1912), 14.

[20] Lochner, Always the Unexpected, 35-36. In a diary entry of November 11, 1911, White wrote: "I spoke to a large audience at Cosmopolitan Club [at Cornell] on the Hague Conferences and their work. Was wonderfully well listened to throughout the whole and H[elen, his wife] pronounced it a real success." Robert Morris Ogden, ed., The Diaries of Andrew D. White (Ithaca: Cornell University Library, 1959), 441. "Some Hints as to the Future Work of the Hague Conference," in The Cornell Cosmopolitan Annual, I, 1906-1907 (Ithaca, New York: Andrus & Church, 1907), 47-49, in White's earlier address to the Cornell Cosmopolitan Club.

More directly related to the peace movement was the encouragement Trueblood and Edwin and Lucia Mead gave to these clubs. They promoted pacifist thinking in them by giving lectures to their gatherings and publicizing their activities in the Advocate of Peace, and they soon persuaded the Association to enroll as an auxiliary of the American Peace Society.[21] When Mead joined the International School in 1910, he continued to endorse the activities of the Association. The dedication and youthful idealism of its two student leaders, Louis Lochner of the University of Wisconsin and George W. Nasmyth of Cornell, particularly impressed him. He quickly realized that with proper guidance from the School these two could make the Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs a major force in the peace movement. When the Association needed funds to establish a permanent office at Madison, Wisconsin, and publish a monthly magazine, for instance, it turned to Ginn's newly-established endowment. With Mead's strong endorsement, the School and its immediate successor, the World Peace Foundation, provided a yearly subvention to the Association and paid Lochner's salary so he could devote full-time to the Association as its permanent general secretary.[22]

---

[21] Advocate of Peace, LXXI (February 1909), 43; LXXI (January 1910), 15. Edwin Mead later wrote of Trueblood: "When the Cosmopolitan Clubs sprang up in our colleges and universities twenty-five years ago, nobody welcomed the movement more warmly than he or was more quickly taken into confidence and conference by the young men; he was invited as the chief speaker to two or three of the early national conventions." Development of the Peace Idea, xxi. One of Trueblood's addresses is reproduced in The Cosmopolitan Annual: Official Organ of the Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs (Madison, Wisc.: The Post, 1909), 74-80.

[22] Advocate of Peace, LXXII (April 1910), 88; LXXIV (May 1912), 119; (December 1912), 269-70; Mead to Carnegie, January 13, 1910, Mead Papers, Box 1.

Encouraged by the financial support and close cooperation of the World Peace Foundation, Lochner and Nasmyth expanded their horizons to Europe. Missionary in outlook, they believed that only American leadership could achieve the "world wide union of students in the cause of international peace and the human brotherhood of man."[23] Accordingly, they began a concerted campaign to establish similar clubs in European universities. Already loosely affiliated with the "Corda Fratres" (Latin for "hearts are brothers"), an organization of European students with similar goals, the Association strengthened its ties with this European organization and organized peace clubs among European students.[24]

Although Lochner attended the biennial international student conventions in Europe, the spearhead of this European activity was Nasmyth. While Lochner directed the Association's activities in the United States, Nasmyth went to Europe in 1910 for the dual purpose of graduate study in mathematics and physics and expanding the international student movement.[25] From 1912 to 1914 he visited over two hundred universities in twenty-two countries in behalf of the movement. The trustees of the World Peace Foundation, who had financed his European work, were so impressed by his zeal that in 1913 they promoted him to the position of full-time director of the International Students Bureau of the Foundation. Nasmyth looked forward to his new job. He was ready, he believed, to complete the great task of "weaving the peace ideal into the warp and woof of the world's new generation."[26]

---

[23] Nasmyth, "The Peace Movement in the Colleges," The Independent, LXVIII (February 17, 1910), 363.

[24] Advocate of Peace, LXXII (January 1910), 15; LXXIII (June 1911), 139.

[25] "Biographical Sketch of George William Nasmyth," in George W. Nasmyth Papers (Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College), Box 1; Advocate of Peace, LXXIV (September and October 1912), 209; Lochner, Always the Unexpected, 34-38.

Meanwhile, the National Arbitration and Peace Congress in New York City in 1907 had led directly to the founding of another pacifist propaganda agency, the American School Peace League. Encouraged by the enthusiastic reception of school teachers at a peace meeting for school children during the New York Congress, Edwin and Lucia Mead and others formed a committee to work out a plan to interest teachers in the international peace movement. The final result of the committee's work was the establishment a year later of the American School Peace League with headquarters in Boston. The League's general goal, its constitution stated, was "to promote, through the schools and the educational public of America, the interests of international justice and fraternity." Specifically, it distributed literature to teachers on the facts and principles of the international peace movement, promoted peace days, sponsored essay contests, and prepared materials on international good will which the teacher could use in the classroom.[27] The dominant motif of all these educational activities was the training of school children in the ideals of good citizenship and international understanding. One of its most interesting proposals was "A Course of Study in Good Will" for elementary school children. This syllabus revealed the genteel nature of the League's program and its intimate relationship to domestic moral reform.

---

[26] Nasmyth to Mead, April 24, 1913, Nasmyth Papers, Box 1.

[27] First Annual Report of the American School Peace League (Boston: n.p., 1909), 26; Fannie Fern Andrews, address, in Book of the Fourth American Peace Congress, St. Louis, May 1,2,3, 1913, ed. Walter B. Stevens (St. Louis: n.p. 1913), 211-13.

> If we can arouse the spirit of good will in children through all the years of school [the syllabus stated], we shall the more readily and forcefully bring about peace among nations. Good will in little children expresses itself through kindness and helpfulness at home and in school. Peace among nations has as yet no meaning to children. We must begin where they see our meaning.
> Throw a pebble into the stream. From a small center the ever-widening circles radiate till they reach the most distant shore. So loyalty to the simplest, most native ties can spread circle by circle in the rapid stream of the child's growth till it reaches the goal of good will among all men. Our theme is therefore that of good will in ever-widening circles....The time has come when we can advance on a new crusade. Let all the teachers of our land unite to spur their pupils on to drive back evil, disease, and sin. Let them form with one another the unbreakable bonds of a common loyalty embodied in service to the nation and good will to men.[28]

For executive secretary of the American School Peace League, the organization committee secured a former school teacher and Boston pacifist, Mrs. Fannie Fern Andrews.[29] A dedicated and extremely energetic worker, Mrs. Andrews immediately became the driving force in the new organization. Not only did she deliver lectures and disseminate the League's propaganda throughout the United States; she also visited Europe a few times for the same purposes. She was especially successful in winning over many college presidents and school administrators to her program. Largely through her personal efforts, by 1913 the League had gained the loyal financial backing of the World Peace Foundation and a few wealthy patrons, formed thirty-seven state branches, held annual conventions, and received the unanimous endorsement of the National Education Association and the National School of Superintendents.[30] Perhaps its most significant accomplishment, however, was the strong support which the United States Commissioner of Education, Philander P. Claxton, gave to the League's peace days in the schools.[31]

---

[28] Third Annual Report of the American School Peace League, 1911 (Boston: n.p., 1911), 44-45. A synopsis of this educational program is given in Fannie Fern Andrews, "A Course of Study in Good Will," Religious Education, VI (January 1912), 570-73.

[29] Mrs. Andrews was a member of the American Peace Society as early as 1906 when she collaborated with two others on a report on the teaching of history in the public schools. Advocate of Peace, LXVIII (May 1906), 100-07. She continued to give lectures for the Society even after she became executive secretary of the League.

(3)

While Ginn and Mead were formulating plans in Boston for the International School of Peace, prominent educators in New York

---

[30] Mead to the Finance Committee of the Board of Trustees of the World Peace Foundation, February 9, 1911, Mead to Ginn, February 15, 1911, Mead to Fannie Fern Andrews, March 15, 1911, all in the WPF Papers, Box 2. Edwin Mead, "The World Peace Foundation: Work in 1913," World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, III, No. 12 (December 1913), 14. Carnegie gave $1000 annually to the League until 1911 when the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace continued the same contribution. A wealthy Boston pacifist, Mrs. J. Malcolm Forbes, gave at least $5000 annually to the League. The World Peace Foundation contributed $1250 in 1911 and $2500 in the succeeding pre-war years. This data is gathered from the treasurer;s reports in the Annual Reports of the American School Peace League, 1909-1911, and the Yearbooks of the American School Peace League, 1911/1912-1914/1915.

[31] See, for example, New York Times, May 12, 1912, V., 5:1-8, and Fannie Fern Andrews, address, in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 78-80. Also see the peace literature Mrs. Andrews compiled and Claxton's office distributed: United States Bureau of Education," The Promotion of Peace," Bulletin (1913: No. 12); and "Peace Day (May 18)," Bulletin (1912: No. 8).

City were also expressing interest in the educational aspects of the international peace movement. Many New Yorkers were first drawn into the peace movement through their attendance at the Lake Mohonk Conferences which increasingly discussed the task of carrying the peace movement to the people. Encouraged by the accomplishments of the First Hague Peace Conference and the growing enthusiasm for the Second Conference, a group of educators and a few other prominent New Yorkers founded the New York Peace Society in February 1906.[32] As might be expected, professors and professional educators dominated the new Society. Especially prominent were faculty members from Columbia University: Samuel Train Dutton (head of Teachers College), John Bates Clark (professor in political science), Ernst Richard (lecturer in history), George W. Kirchwey (dean of the Law School), and John Bassett Moore (professor in international law) were among the twenty-three original members who remained active in the Society. The other founders were prominent New York lawyers, clergymen, editors, and philanthropists. Especially active in cooperating with the Columbia educators in the formation of the new society were Hamilton Holt, Oscar S. Straus, Reverend Charles E. Jefferson, and Reverend Frederick Lynch. As a group these leading citizens comprised a miniature "Who's Who" of New York City.[33]

---

[32] The original name was actually the Peace Society of the City of New York, which was changed to the New York Peace Society in 1910. For convenience, I have used the latter title throughout these pages.

[33] Levermore, Dutton, 80-83; Advocate of Peace, LXVIII (February 1906), 33; (March 1906), 65; (June 1906), 120.

For officers of the new society the members elected Straus as president and Dutton as secretary, but as the society grew in size and embarked on more ambitious programs, its leaders decided that it needed a full-time executive secretary. In October 1908 it appointed the Reverend William H. Short to the new position. Born and raised on an Iowa frontier farm, Short had graduated from Beloit College and had then studied for the ministry at Yale Divinity School where he came to know Frederick Lynch. After his graduation from Yale in the same year as Lynch, Short had accepted pastorates in Wisconsin and Minnesota where he displayed considerable organizational and promotional ability. When the New York Peace Society decided to hire an executive secretary, Lynch persuaded the executive committee to offer the position to his old classmate.[34] Short accepted and quickly demonstrated his competence in the new post as well as his whole-hearted interest in the peace movement. No visionary pacifist, Short was most deeply interested in elaborating the machinery of international organization which his close friend in the Society, Hamilton Holt, had promoted, and during the First World War he was to work closely with Holt in promoting a League of Nations. Until the outbreak of the war, however, Short, like Holt, showed a marked tendency to support all the pacifist programs.[35]

---

[34] Short's son, Frederick W. Short, of Geneseo, New York, has kindly supplied me with much biographical information on Short. Frederick W. Short to author, September 17, 1967. Also see "New York Peace Society Minutes," Meetings of October 7, 12, 1908, NYPS Papers, Box 1.

[35] Kuehl, Holt, 90, 119, 125 ff.

The wisdom of appointing a permanent secretary soon became evident, for the growth of the New York Peace Society was phenomenal. At the end of the Society's first year, for example, the membership had already grown to 600 and by 1912 it was to soar to more than one thousand.[36] Its influence rapidly spread far beyond the limits of the city. What began as an intensive effort to sponsor lectures and distribute literature to private associations in New York City expanded to include active cooperation with the American Peace Society in promoting the 1907 National Arbitration and Peace Congress and the organization of a New York branch of the American School Peace League. It also took advantage of the cosmopolitan nature of New York City by cooperating with friendship societies like the local Cosmopolitan Club and the German-American Peace Society and helped to organize the Japan Society, Mexican Society, and American Scandanavian Society.[37] Furthermore, many members of the society formed a special committee, the World-Federation League, which lobbied successfully in Congress in 1910 for a resolution providing for the establishment of a peace commission of five members, appointed by the President, to consider ways to cooperate with other nations in limiting armaments and combining the navies of the world into an international force. Although nothing came of the resolution, it indicated most strikingly the expanded activities of the New York Peace Society.[38] By 1910 it was the second largest peace group in the country, even rivaling the larger and older American Peace Society in financial backing and influence.[39]

---

[36] The Peace Society of the City of New York, Annual Reports, Constitution, List of Meetings and List of Members for the Year 1906-1907 (New York: The Irving Press, 1907), 9; and New York Peace Society, Yearbook 1912 (n.p: n.p., 1913), 21.

[37] Ibid., 13, 17-21; "New York Peace Society Minutes," Meeting of January 21, 1910, NYPS Papers, Box 1. Levermore, Dutton, 89-91; William H. Short, address, in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1911, 221.

The public's enthusiastic response to the peace society in New York City encouraged many of its members to broaden their horizons. If New Yorkers received the Society's activities so warmly, its leaders reasoned, why not champion the peace movement on a national and international scale? Although they believed the existing peace societies and national peace congresses were important gatherings in furthering the aims of the peace movement, they concluded, as Ginn had earlier, that without a large endowment the peace workers would only scratch the surface in the long-range goal of world peace.

Hamilton Holt, one of the most active members of the New York Peace Society, first suggested that the peace workers should enlist Carnegie's aid for a peace endowment. Late in 1908, in a conversation with Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia

---

[38] Kuehl, Holt, 77-88, has an excellent discussion of this lobbying campaign.

[39] As early as 1909, for instance, Trueblood called the New York Peace Society "the strongest and most important of the local peace societies of the country." American Peace Society, Annual Report, 1909, 5. In 1912 the New York Peace Society had an income of $13,484.52, the American Peace Society $31,876.66; but $21,500.00 of the total for the American Peace Society came from a subvention by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for the years 1911 and 1912. The private income of the New York Peace Society was actually higher. American Peace Society, Annual Report, 1912, 13, 24; New York Peace Society, Yearbook 1912, 21-23.

University and a recent convert to the peace movement, Holt pointed out that Carnegie had already endowed the Carnegie Institute in Pittsburgh and the Carnegie Institution in Washington. Holt asked Butler, who had cooperated with Carnegie in formulating the plans for the latter institution, to approach Carnegie with a proposal for a peace endowment. Butler immediately agreed. He asked Holt to consult Mead, Smiley, and Dutton and together draw up a statement of purpose signed by them and endorsed by other peace advocates who were known to have Carnegie's confidence.[40] Butler offered to take this statement to Carnegie and support it with his own personal appeal. Holt, Mead, Smiley, and Dutton drafted a letter which Holt took to Washington where he received the written endorsements of Andrew D. White, Edward Everett Hale (now Chaplain of the Senate), and two ex-secretaries of State, John W. Foster and Elihu Root. In explaining the need for "something larger and broader" for the peace movement, the letter specifically requested a permanent fund for a full-scale educational campaign:

> By persistent public demonstrations, by the promotion of international visits and other courtesies, by the spread of literature, by the enlightenment of the people through the press, pulpit, and the platform, and by the aiding of existing agencies, this fund could be made potent in developing a public opinion not only in America, but in Europe and Asia, that would in time reduce the martial and jingo elements of the several populations to comparative impotence.[41]

---

[40] Butler memorandum to Holt, December 6, 1908, Nicholas Murray Butler Papers (Butler Library, Columbia University). Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years: Recollections and Reflections (2 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939 edition), I, 314-16; Levermore, Dutton, 91-92.

[41] Ibid., 92-94; Smiley, Hale, Mead, Dutton, Holt to Butler, December 21, 1908, Butler Papers.

When Butler submitted the letter to Carnegie, however, Carnegie said the proposal was too vague.[42] And although Butler, Holt, Mead, and Dutton continued to elaborate the details of the endowment, Carnegie remained unconvinced until December 1910 when he finally donated $10,000,000 to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.[43]

Carnegie's gift represented the culmination of his growing interest in the peace movement. Although he had long sympathized with the idealistic pacifists, he had been very adverse to spending large sums of his money for utopian schemes--and the peace movement was still too utopian for him at the turn of the century. Thus, he had at first refused the many appeals for a heavily endowed peace institution. When William T. Stead asked him to create a peace and arbitration society in 1900, for example, Carnegie replied, "I do not see that it is wise to devote our efforts to creating another organization. Of course I may be wrong in believing that, but I am certainly not wrong that if it were dependent on any millionaire's money it would begin as an object of pity and end as one of derision. I wonder that you do not see this. There is nothing that robs a righteous cause of its strength more than a millionaire's money. Its life is tainted thereby.[44] And when Edwin Mead approached him in 1902 with another scheme, Carnegie responded in a similar vein: "I do not see how any combination of the rich to use money for this end [of peace] could be other than harmful."[45]

---

[42] Butler to Carnegie, January 8, 1909, and Carnegie to Butler, January 11, 1909, both in the Carnegie Papers, Vol. 175.

[43] Levermore, Dutton, 95-110. Scattered correspondence indicates the efforts of these men to coordinate their appeals to Carnegie for a peace endowment. Mead to Butler, December 21, 1909, Butler to Mead, December 22, 1909, Butler to Carnegie, February 4, March 7, 1910, all in the Butler Papers; Mead to Carnegie, January 13, 1910, Carnegie to Ginn, January 19, 1910, Mead to Dutton, February 14, 1910, all in the Mead Papers, Box 1.

Yet in the first decade of the twentieth century Carnegie, now freed from his steel business which he sold in 1901, increasingly devoted himself to progressive and humanitarian causes. Acting out his philosophy of the "Gospel of Wealth," he spent much of his time in this decade developing schemes for endowments, colleges, and libraries. Carnegie derived great personal satisfaction from giving his money away in these years which were his happiest in a long and happy life. It is not surprising, therefore, that Carnegie became even more optimistic and hopeful for the future. He himself put it quite humbly: "I...find with every successive year of my life that I take higher and higher views, that I think more and more of humanity, that I have brighter and brighter visions of the future."[46]

Given this loftier idealism, it was quite natural for Carnegie to commit himself more wholeheartedly to the peace movement. His larger and more frequent financial contributions were one measure of his growing interest in the movement. In 1903, for example, Carnegie gave $1,500,000 for a "Temple of Peace" at The Hague. He also donated $750,000 for a building to house the Pan

---

[45] Carnegie to Mead, April 9, 1902, Mead Papers, Box 2.

[46] _National Peace and Arbitration Congress, Proceedings, 1907_, 381.

American Union in 1906 and $100,000 for a Central American Court of Justice in 1908.[47] Furthermore, he contributed more liberally than ever before to peace societies and peace congresses.[48] In part, too, he became more personally involved in the peace movement. Shortly after the formation of the New York Peace Society Oscar S. Straus resigned from the presidency to accept the position of Secretary of Commerce and Labor in the Roosevelt administration. The executive committee immediately selected Carnegie as the new president, but Carnegie at first demurred. Only a second personal appeal by a delegation of the Society persuaded Carnegie, who had had second thoughts about his earlier refusal, to accept the position.[49] Once directly involved in the activities of the New York Peace Society, however, Carnegie served as president of the National Arbitration and Peace Congress in New York. Thereafter he was a consistent participant at peace congresses.

---

[47] New York Times, November 21, 1915, IV, 10:1, summarized these larger gifts.

[48] Beginning in 1903 Carnegie gave $1000 annually for five years to the American Peace Society, and in late 1907 or early 1908 he promised to give an additional $5000, or a total of $6000, for three more years. He also donated $5000 to finance the Universal Peace Congress in Boston in 1904, and after 1906 $1000 yearly to the Intercollegiate Peace Association and the American School Peace League. Carnegie to Trueblood, December 21, 1906 and February 5, 1908, both in the Benjamin Trueblood Correspondence in the American Peace Society Papers (Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College), Box 6; Peacemaker, XXIII (September 1904), 198; and Advocate of Peace, LXVIII (October 1906), 214. See also note 30 of this chapter.

[49] "New York Peace Society Minutes," Meetings of November 20, 1906, and January 21, 1907, NYPS Papers, Box 1. Also see Lynch, Personal Recollections, 26-28; and Carnegie, Autobiography 285-86.

As Carnegie's personal and financial commitments to the peace movement grew, he became more receptive to the idea of a peace endowment. Like his other gifts, however, he first had to be assured that an endowment would be ably and efficiently administered. "If we could only get the effective Organization," he wrote Mead in 1905, "the funds would be forthcoming. So far the path does not seem clear to me but it may be revealed. It is the greatest of all causes."[50] Although Mead proposed an elaborate scheme for a literary bureau that would publish and distribute pacifist tracts, Carnegie, who undoubtedly thought that Mead's educational emphasis was too narrow, refused to commit himself.[51] A year before his final approval of the Butler proposal, Carnegie opposed Ginn's decision to establish a peace endowment because it seemed to duplicate the educational propaganda methods of the peace societies. At the same time, however, he believed that even with Ginn's annual gift of $50,000 the peace movement needed additional funds, and he implied that an endowment along the lines of the Butler proposal might prove the most effective way to finance the peace movement without duplicating the efforts of the peace societies.[52]

---

[50] Carnegie to Mead, April 2, 1905, Mead Papers, Box 1.

[51] See the Mead-Carnegie correspondence for 1905 and 1906, Mead Papers, Box 1. Some of the undated correspondence probably falls in that period. Almost every peace leader urged Carnegie to finance various peace schemes. Alfred Love of the Universal Peace Union, for example, urged Carnegie to give the total of $30,000,000 for the establishment of Carnegie Institutes, similar to the one in Washington, in Paris, London, and Berlin. These Institutes, the proposal stated, would appeal to the intellectual elite of the three nations and help to promote an "alliance" of the United States, France, Great Britain and Germany in the interests of peace. New York Times, June 20, 1905, 1:5. The full text of Love's letter Carnegie is quoted in Peacemaker, XXIV (July 1905), 156-57.

Ginn's gift undoubtedly intensified Carnegie's interest in a peace endowment. If nothing else, it must have wounded his pride. Having pioneered in so many other fields of philanthropy, Carnegie suddenly found another philanthropist preempting what in recent years had become his major interest. Was he going to allow a text book publisher to become the great philanthropist for peace? For Carnegie to ask the question was to answer it.

Although the establishment of the World Peace Foundation had a powerful effect in converting Carnegie to a peace endowment, three new developments in 1910 made his conversion virtually inevitable. The first was the failure of Carnegie's personal diplomacy. Since he was personally acquainted with Theodore Roosevelt as well as many European leaders, he believed he could induce the leading statesmen to cooperate more closely in relieving the diplomatic tension in Europe. Carnegie's plan, most fully expounded in his Rectorial Address at the University of St. Andrews in October 1905, called for a League of Peace composed of the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany. If these powers, "the five greatest in the world," could agree to refer international disputes in the civilized world to the Hague Court or other arbitral machinery, war could be averted. Although he sympathized with the pacifist abhorrence of force, he was never entirely a convert to non-resistance. He proposed that the League use economic sanctions and, as a last resort, military force against recalcitrant powers. He cited the combined force of the five powers (Japan, the sixth, was not considered "civilized") which restored order during the Boxer Rebellion in China as a good precedent for such military cooperation. He hoped, however, that other nations would eventually join the League and that military force would be unnecessary.[53]

---

[52] Carnegie to Trueblood; December 20, 1919, Benjamin Trueblood Correspondence in the American Peace Society Papers, Box 6; also Carnegie to Ginn, December 8, 1909, Butler Papers.

The more Carnegie watched Europe between 1905 and 1910, the more he believed that Kaiser William II of Germany was the key individual for the future peace of Europe. Britain, France, and Russia had already drawn closer together by alliances, ententes, and arbitration treaties, and he now hoped William would call for a League of Peace. It was in his hands, Carnegie said,

> alone of all men, that the power to abolish war seems to rest. His invitation to form a union of nations for this specific purpose of restoring the peace would result in more than six nations gladly responding to his call. And, as in the temporary league of nations in China, so in this grander league, a German General would again rightly command the allied forces. Much has been written and said of the Emperor as a menace to the peace of Europe, but I think, unjustly. Let me remind you, he has been nearly twenty years on the throne and, so far, is guiltless of the shedding of blood. No international war can be charged to him. His sin hereafter may be one of omission, since having been entrusted with power to abolish war, he failed to rise to his transcendent duty. Let us watch this possible man of destiny, however, and hope that a vision of his true mission may be revealed to him.[54]

---

[53] A League of Peace: A Rectorial Address Delivered to the Students in the University of St. Andrews, 17th October, 1905 (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906), 32-34.

[54] National Arbitration and Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1907, 54.

Carnegie remained hopeful for the Kaiser's conversion to a League of Peace even after Germany's intransigent attitude at the Second Hague Peace Conference. In 1910 he pursued his personal diplomacy more directly. Early in that year, Carnegie and Elihu Root persuaded ex-President Roosevelt, who was hunting big game in Africa, to visit the Kaiser in Germany after his later visit to Norway where he was to accept the Nobel Peace Prize. Carnegie insisted that more than any other statesman, Roosevelt, whom William II greatly admired, could freely discuss the international situation with the Kaiser, and perhaps receive some expression of the latter's willingness to relieve the diplomatic tension in Europe. Roosevelt accepted the proposal; and though making his usual reservations that the discussions would have to be "practical" and not influenced by the pacifist "cranks" whom Carnegie knew, he was unquestionably sincere in hoping for real progress toward a friendlier climate among all the civilized powers. Shortly before his meeting with the Kaiser, Roosevelt wrote Carnegie:

> I will do all I can to bring about such a league of, or understanding among, the great powers as will forbid one of them, or any small power, to engage in unrighteous, foolish or needless war; to secure an effective tribunal, with power to enforce at least certain of its decrees; to secure an agreement to check the waste of money on growing and excessive armaments.

But even Roosevelt's cautious approach to these problems failed. The German Foreign Office, informed of Roosevelt's intentions, immediately curbed any thoughts of discussions with the Kaiser on these matters.[55]

---

[55] The entire story is told in Hendrick, Carnegie, II, 325-31. Also see Roosevelt's letters to Carnegie in 1910 in Morison, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, VII, 36-37, 42, 47-49, 55, 75-76, 83, 377-79, 398. The quotation is in ibid., 49.

Had Roosevelt's German visit resulted in partial success, Carnegie might have further pursued his personal diplomacy. In fact, he never lost faith in the Kaiser's essential good will and hoped until 1914 that he would undertake a peace initiative.[56] With the failure of the Roosevelt mission, however, Carnegie, seeing little hope for immediate high level discussions, became more receptive to other proposals to improve international understanding.

Another development may have had some influence in Carnegie's decision to create an endowment. Realizing Carnegie's aversion to extravagant proposals and his fetish for organization, the proponents of the Butler scheme undertook the organization and coordination of the peace forces. They especially intensified their efforts to draw the Boston and New York peace leaders closer together, for they reasoned that a united front of the leading peace advocates would demonstrate to Carnegie their dedication to the organization and further expansion of the peace movement. Nominal cooperation between the New York and Boston leadership had existed since 1907 when the New York Peace Society had helped the American Peace Society sponsor the National Arbitration and Peace Congress, and they held an informal meeting to discuss further efforts in this direction in 1908.[57] The first formal proposal for the coordination of the peace societies, however, occurred in 1909 at the Lake Mohonk Conference, the common meeting ground of the Boston and New York leaders. This Conference adopted a resolution, introduced by Samuel Dutton, authorizing Nicholas Murray Butler, the president of the Conference, to appoint a "Committee of Ten" to consider the advisability of a National Council for Arbitration and Peace. In addition to the leading peace advocates from Boston and New York, Butler wisely included Carnegie as well as their highly esteemed mutual friend, Elihu Root, and James Brown Scott. Both of the latter, two of the foremost international lawyers in the United States, later became respectively President and Director of the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.[58]

---

[56] New York Times, August 30, 1913, 4:4. Hendrick, Carnegie, II, 344.

[57] "New York Peace Society Minutes," Meetings of November 20, 1906, December 21, 1907, February 1, 1908, NYPS Papers, Box 1.

The evidence for a close relationship between the appointment of this committee and Carnegie's action in creating the endowment is not conclusive, but two letters from Butler to Carnegie indicate a close connection.[59] In fact, since Carnegie was interested in coordinating the activities of the peace societies, he may have first suggested some such committee as a condition for his continued interest in the Butler proposal. Besides the appointment of Carnegie, Root, and Scott, it is possible to infer other links between this committee and the proposed endowment.

---

[58] Dutton, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1909, 26; also ibid., 185-86. For an earlier, more general statement of this same idea, see Dutton, "Missing Factor in the Peace Movement," The Independent, LXIV (April 9, 1908), 786-88. The original ten members (actually eleven since Butler added Dutton as secretary) were Nicholas Murray Butler, Elihu Root, E. D. Warfield, Benjamin Trueblood, Edwin Mead, James Brown Scott, George W. Kirchwey, Andrew Carnegie, Lyman Abbott, and Albert K. Smiley. Carnegie talked with Root before he made a final decision to create the Endowment. Root to Carnegie, November 1, 3, 1910, and Carnegie to John Morley, November 4, 1910, all in the Carnegie Papers, Vol. 181.

[59] Butler to Carnegie, February 4, March 7, 1910, Butler Papers.

Dutton's resolution, for example, not only called for Butler to appoint a committee but specified that Butler himself would be a member. Moreover, Carnegie first began outlining plans for an endowment only a few days after Dutton and Kirchwey informed him that the Committee of Ten had been definitely established.[60] And Carnegie's resignation from the committee shortly after he announced his gift to the endowment suggests that his primary interest, as well as Butler's, was further discussions on Butler's proposal. Finally, the fact that a National Council for Arbitration and Peace was never created suggests that a major purpose in creating the committee was to impress Carnegie with the coordinated efforts of the peace leaders.[61]

The third, and by far the most important, reason for Carnegie's conversion to the Butler proposal was President Taft's espousal of arbitration treaties. First suggested in vague, almost casual terms on March 22, 1910, and more fully elaborated in later speeches, Taft's treaties proposed that all "judiciable" issues, not excepting questions of "national honor," would be referred to the Hague Court or some other special arbitral agency. Carnegie, who had already attacked the concept of national honor in foreign relations, was elated at Taft's initial proposal and immediately wrote him an enthusiastic letter.[62] The willingness of Great Britain to conclude a treaty along the lines of Taft's proposal, moreover, appealed to Carnegie's long-standing belief that the closest Anglo-American cooperation was a prerequisite to permanent world peace. He optimistically assumed that if the two leading English-speaking nations adopted such a treaty, other nations would join in promoting a general system of arbitration treaties. More important, Taft's action gave the peace movement even greater momentum and convinced Carnegie that it was at last respectable. The psychological moment had arrived, Carnegie believed, for a permanent and influential peace organization that would push the arbitration movement further along the road toward the ultimate abolition of war. After Taft's pronouncement Carnegie approved the Butler plan and on December 14, 1910, formally announced the founding of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.[63]

---

[60] Dutton and Kirchwey to Carnegie, October 21, 1910, Carnegie Papers, Vol. 181. The first draft on the plan for the Carnegie Endowment is dated November 3, 1910. Ibid.

[61] See Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1911, 12. For a discussion of later efforts by this committee, see below, p. 249.

---

[62] National Arbitration and Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1907, 55. Carnegie repeated these remarks in his letter to the board of the trustees of the Endowment at their first meeting. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book for 1911 (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1912), 1, 6.

[63] Hendrick, Carnegie, II, 338-40; Pringle, Taft, II, 742. Carnegie conferred personally with Taft before announcing the Endowment, perhaps in an attempt to make the Endowment contingent upon a promise from the President to negotiate an Anglo-American arbitration treaty. Taft to Carnegie, October 26, 1910, and Carnegie to Taft, October 29, 1910, both in the Carnegie Papers, Vol. 181. But Taft refused any proferred bargain. "The trouble with old Carnegie," the Chief Executive reportedly said after their meeting, "is he might secure what he wants in my [annual] message, and then not give the money. I think I will go a little slow until old Andrew becomes more specific." Archie Butt to Mrs. Lewis Butt, November 11, 1910, in Archibald W. Butt, Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate Letters of Archie Butt, Military Aid (2 vols., Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Doran Co, 1930), II, 559.

The pacifists hailed the Carnegie Endowment as a milestone on the road to the ultimate abolition of war. Ginn's gift of $50,000 a year earlier had impressed them, but the annual appropriation of the Carnegie Endowment totaling ten times that amount overawed them. Think of what could be done with this money! was their common reaction to Carnegie's generosity.[64] From the beginning, however, the activities of the Endowment differed widely from the World Peace Foundation. While the latter attempted to popularize the peace movement through the diffusion of its propaganda to all levels of American society, the Endowment spent its money only on the safest and sanest of peace proposals. The cautious policies of the Endowment reflected the conservative temperament of the board of trustees. The twenty-eight trustees Carnegie appointed were unusually conservative, not only in domestic affairs, which, given Carnegie's fear of radicalism the pacifists might have expected, but in international affairs as well. Of the six pacifists who most actively promoted the proposal, for example, including Mead, Dutton, and Holt, all of whom inclined toward absolute pacifism, only one, the mildly pacifistic Nicholas Murray Butler, was a member of the board of trustees. In fact, with the possible exception of James Slayden, not one idealistic pacifist was a trustee.[65]

---

[64] Jordan, letter in New York Times, December 17, 1910, 4:5; Holt, letter in New York Tribune, December 25, 1910, 7:5; Peacemaker, XXX (February-March, 1911), 36-37, 46.

[65] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book for 1912 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1913), v, 1-4; Hendrick, Carnegie, II, 340-42.

Elihu Root and Nicholas Murray Butler strongly influenced Carnegie in his selection of the trustees. Carnegie valued highly the opinions of these two conservatives who served respectively as first President and Director of the Division of Intercourse and Education of the Endowment. Both helped to restrain Carnegie's temperamental eagerness to plunge headlong into the ranks of the peace-at-any-price men and to analyze international relations more dispassionately. They persuaded him that the pacifists had already denounced the evils of war and had effectively elaborated the desired goals of international organization. What was now needed, the two counseled, was a "scientific" investigation of the various causes of wars and the adoption of educational and judicial methods which would eventually eliminate them. In his preliminary draft to Carnegie on the proposed endowment, for example, Butler elaborated what eventually became the long-range educational aims of the Endowment: "The forces which stand as obstacles to the promotion of the peace of the world," he wrote, "have their roots deep down in human nature and the process of educating mankind and the public opinion of the nation to the acceptance of the doctrines and policies in which we so sincerely believe is going to be a long and arduous one."[66]

The Balkan wars best illustrated the academic approach of the Endowment. Instead of denouncing the reckless policies of the warring powers or promoting mediation efforts to end the wars, the Endowment established an international commission to study the causes, excesses, and many consequences of the wars. Although the belligerents on both sides denounced the published report which documented the reckless and inhumane policies of the warring powers, it in truth closely adhered to the Endowment's standard of scholarly objectivity.[67] In fact, the Endowment deliberately appealed to the intellectual elite of the world by publishing scholarly studies on various aspects of international relations and financing cultural exchange programs for professors with Latin America and Japan. Its other major emphasis was the study and development of international law. Under the able direction of James Brown Scott, head of the Division of International Law, the Endowment gave subventions to the international law societies, promoted the study of international law in American educational institutions, and founded a summer school in international law at The Hague.[68]

---

[66] Butler to Carnegie, January 8, 1909, Carnegie Papers, Vol. 175.

---

[67] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, Publication No. 4, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914), passim. For attacks on the Report, see the New York Times, June 1, 1914, 7:6; June 7, 1914, IV, 3:4; June 8, 1914, 3:5.

[68] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book for 1912, 24-26, 46-54, 99-158; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Report on the Teaching of International Law in Educational Institutions of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 18, 1913), 29, passim; New York Times, August 24, 1913, III, 1:1. In addition to the Divisions of Intercourse and Education and of International Law, the Endowment had a third area, directed by John Bates Clark, called the Division of Economics and History.

## (4)

The Endowment's emphasis on international law reflected the growing influence of international lawyers in the peace movement. President Taft's arbitration treaties pushed the peace movement closer to the realm of international law than any previous arbitration scheme. As a large-navy man, Taft was certainly no pacifist. At the same time, however, he had long been a proponent of international arbitration agreements and had served on the Permanent Executive Committee which promoted the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty in 1897. He was also sincerely interested in the peace movement and occasionally conferred with Hamilton Holt, Nicholas Murray Butler, Andrew Carnegie, Elihu Root, Theodore Marburg, and Theodore Burton on international matters.[69] His background as a lawyer and judge, moreover, had instilled in him a great faith in courts of law, which he believed rendered speedy and impartial justice. He saw no reason why nations, like individuals, would not agree to arbitrate their differences before a tribunal.

His arbitration treaties embodied this faith in the judicial process. Since arbitration was as much judicial as diplomatic in nature to him, he felt confident in excluding the usual reservations which had previously nullified the abstract principle of impartial justice between nations. In fact, in his willingness to include all "judiciable" questions (to be decided by commissions of inquiry of the disputants) in the treaties, Taft was the first important political leader to link the arbitration principle to international law. Had the Senate not rejected his version of the obligatory arbitration treaties with Great Britain and France, the signatory powers would have automatically referred all their "judiciable" differences to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, or, once established, to an International Court of Arbitral Justice which the United States had proposed at the Second Hague Peace Conference and the leading powers had tentatively agreed upon on March 18, 1910, just four days before the President's first pronouncement of his arbitration plan.[70]

---

[69] Pringle, Taft, II, 736-38; The American Conference on Arbitration...1896, 89, 155. Burton and Root, for example, were two senators who supported Taft's treaties. Holt, Butler, and Carnegie were all on familar terms with the President. Taft appointed Marburg Minister to Belgium in late November 1912.

---

[70] Four Powers--the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany--secretly agreed upon a protocol on March 18, 1910, for the establishment of an international court. This protocol, amended on July 22, 1910, at a conference of these powers at The Hague, called for a tribunal of fifteen powers. The larger nations were each to have one permanent judge, while the remaining judges were to be appointed by the smaller powers which were to sit in rotation for shorter periods. The failure of the powers to establish a Prize Court, which was to serve as the model for the International Court of Arbitral Justice, delayed the initiation of this proposal. See James Brown Scott to Philander C. Knox, July 29, 1910, 500.A2/A2b, and "Memorandum Regarding Establishment of an International Prize Court and a Court of Arbitral Justice," September 2, 1910, 500.A2A/701, in United States Department of State Papers, Record Group 43 (National Archives). (Hereafter all Department of State unpublished documents will be referred to only by decimal file numbers.) Finally, on January 12, 1914, James Brown Scott, aware of the international stalemate and the inaction of the Wilson administration on this issue, privately urged the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs to take the initiative by asking nine powers--the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Japan--to establish a temporary tribunal until the Third Hague Peace Conference when a larger and a more general tribunal might be adopted. The Netherlands made this proposal to the other eight governments, but the First World War began shortly before the temporary tribunal was created. For details of these plans, see the summary of James Brown Scott's views on the subject in the New York Evening Post, March 25, 1916, 5:1; also his two books, An International Court of Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1916), passim;

If Taft knew of this preliminary international agreement, it probably had little immediate influence upon his decision to promote arbitration treaties, for a year later he told his aide, Archie Butt, that he initially proposed his arbitration plan "merely to offset the antagonism to the four battleships for which I was then fighting, and I threw that suggestion out merely to draw the sting of old Carnegie and other peace cranks, and now the suggestion threatens to become the main fact of my four years as president." Yet Taft was not insincere in proposing arbitration treaties, for he added that "I have always believed these things, and I suppose if I had not said them then I would have got [sic] them out of my system sometime later on...."[71] While the negotiations for an International Court of Arbitral Justice did not appear as important as his own faith in the principle of international justice and the persistent entreaties of his friends in the peace movement in prompting his first statements for negotiating arbitration treaties, Taft and his Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox, had worked closely with European diplomats in establishing a Court of Arbitral Justice as early as January 1910. In the months following his first announcement of his arbitration plan the encouraging reports of the negotiations in Europe on the creation of a Court of Arbitral Justice further convinced him to press on with the drafting of arbitration

---

and The Status of the International Court of Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1916), 41-51, 91-93; and his summary in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book for 1921 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), 111-12.

[71] Quoted in Archie Butt to Mrs. Lewis Butt, April 30, 1911, in Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, II, 635-36.

treaties with Britain and France. Since the Court of Arbitral Justice was still under debate by the major powers, the President deliberately underplayed its importance and was characteristically vague on its exact relationship to his arbitration treaties. Nevertheless, he believed that his treaties represented a transitional step from the principle of international arbitration to the realm of international law. Taft explained the ultimate purpose of his treaties several months after their failure in the Senate:

> I favored the arbitration treaties as a long step toward an arbitral court whose jurisdiction should be increased ultimately to include all possible disputes of an international character. Such a court is the natural outgrowth of treaties of general arbitration between all nations of the world and it represents the ultimate goal toward which we should be tending.[72]

Many members of the American bar who were dissatisfied with the limited accomplishments of the arbitration movement shared many of Taft's ideas but were much more insistent than the President in espousing the importance of international law as the surest method for transforming the chaos of world politics into a logical, rational system firmly based on legal principles. They especially wanted to purge the arbitration treaties of their "political" or diplomatic qualities. In their view the pacifists placed too much emphasis on arbitration in the international peace movement. While the idealistic pacifists talked in general terms of substituting law for war in international affairs and desired universal arbitration treaties without any reservations, in practice they willingly accepted almost any arbitration agreement as a forward step in the long-range goal of abolishing war. The lawyers agreed that arbitration was a useful way to settle many disputes, but they argued that it was no panacea and even had inherent weaknesses. Like the pacifists, they criticized the temporary character of the judges in arbitral tribunals like the Hague Court, but the lawyers placed greater emphasis on their failure to build a system of international law. As one international lawyer flatly stated: "It is common knowledge that international law is not developed by the awards of temporary tribunals."[73] Furthermore, the lawyers correctly argued that the tribunals were not often composed of well-known jurists but of men trained in politics or diplomacy. Accordingly, the art of negotiation and the spirit of compromise rather than any higher concept of abstract justice were the guiding principles in arbitration. Compromise was also common in arbitration because of the need to harmonize different or fragmentary concepts of law. In the end, arbitration often achieved much less than its proponents cliamed, because a nation which sincerely thought it was in the right in an international dispute was reluctant to submit the case to a tribunal of fallible diplomats and politicians, who, unrestrained by any concrete and determined international law, were likely to render a haphazard decision.[74]

---

[72] Proceedings of Third National Conference, American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, December 20-21, 1912, Washington, D.C. (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Company, 1913), ix-x.

---

[73] James Brown Scott, in ibid., xxi.

The lawyers wanted to create a world court that would not replace but would increasingly take over many of the functions of the existing Permanent Court of Arbitration. Even the proposed Court of Arbitral Justice was at best only a temporary expedient to them since the word "arbitral" in its title implied the continued acceptance of arbitration. While the international lawyers commended the positive advantages of an arbitral court, especially its permanent character which would give the Court considerable stature in the international community and render each decision as a precedent in the development of international law, they really wanted to purge it entirely of its arbitral features and transform it into a purely judicial court--that is, a court of real judges, appointed for life and sitting in continuous session, who ruled on the rights of countries in accordance with the facts and the established law. They believed that the judges on this court, together with future Hague Conferences and other international meetings, would develop a set of definite rules, interpretations, and precedents which would serve as the international law. In their view only the correct application of ac-

---

[74] A good summary of these reservations on the arbitration principle is contained in American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, Proceedings, 1910, especially the addresses by Elihu Root, 9-14, and Charles W. Eliot, 275-80. The pacifists, while welcoming the renewed interest in international law, defended arbitration as an already proven and more flexible method for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Advocate of Peace, LXXIII (January 1911), 4; and LXXVI (March 1914), 61.

cepted international law could bring true international justice, itself a prerequisite to a stable, permanent peace. Only some such approximation of exact justice, in turn, could relieve the international tension which had precluded any hopes for discussions on the vexed question of disarmament. They further reasoned that as soon as a comprehensive code of international law was developed and accepted by the major powers, and as soon as a large segment of the world's population understood the responsibilities of the nations in world politics in terms of this international code, both very optimistic assumptions, then the pressures of an enlightened world public opinion rather than any enforcement machinery would prove enough of a sanction in restraining nations from lawless acts and would eventually strengthen the authority of the world court as the final arbiter in substituting the rule of law for force in international affairs.[75]

To popularize these ideas, a group of lawyers, headed by James Brown Scott, Elihu Root, and Theodore Marburg, founded the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes in February 1910, which complemented the activities of the American Society of International Law. The latter, first organized at Lake Mohonk in 1905 by George Kirchwey, James Brown Scott, Robert Lansing, and other international lawyers, was the first organization in the United States dedicated to the codification and popularization of international law.[76] This society formulated codes of law for the possible adoption of future international conferences, while its more recent "cousin" promoted a world court whose judges would apply and further develop the international law. Although the legal profession dominated the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, the pacifists as well as many politicians, educators, and businessmen also supported its aims.[77] President Taft himself warmly endorsed the Society and accepted the position of Honorary President.[78] In the next few years the Society, in cooperation with the American Society of International Law and the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment, did more than any other organizations in devising the rules and procedures for the World Court which was finally established in 1920.

---

[75] James Brown Scott and Elihu Root, both in ibid., 3-4, 12-14; also Theodore Marburg, "The Peace Movement Practical," Maryland Quarterly, No. 4 (November 1910), 15-16.

(5)

Taft's treaties also brought a flush of enthusiasm from the already growing peace societies. Although the pacifists were pleased by the increased activities of the existing societies in support of Taft's treaties, they were especially heartened after 1910 by the formation and rapid growth of many new peace societies. In the decade before the outbreak of the European war, over forty-five local, regional, and state peace societies were established, and well over one-half of this total were established between 1910 and 1914 when the peace movement gained its greatest momentum.[79] Among the most influential of the new societies were the Connecticut Peace Society, organized in 1906 by Arthur Deerin Call who in 1912 became Executive Secretary of the American Peace Society, the Maryland Peace Society, founded by Theodore Marburg in 1910, and the Massachusetts Peace Society, which Boston pacifists established in 1911.[80] Perhaps the most important new organization, however, was the Chicago Peace Society. An earlier peace society in Chicago had failed, but after the National Peace Congress in that city in 1909, prominent Chicago citizens organized a new peace society. Although Jane Addams, the Reverend Jenkin Lloyd Jones, and Rabbi Emil Hirsch were leading social reformers in the Society, businessmen and bankers comprised most of its officers and gave it added "respectability" and "prestige." The

---

[76] Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1905, 130, 141-42; Straus, Under Four Administrations, 333-36; see also Proceedings of The American Society of International Law, 1907, 23-29.

[77] American Society of International Law, Proceedings, 1911, 18, 19-32; "List of Members," Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, No. 9 Supplement (August 1912), passim.

[78] Taft to Marburg, January 31, 1910, Theodore Marburg Scrapbooks (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), No. 2; Pringle, Taft, II, 738. Taft to Philander C. Knox, October 26, 1910, William Howard Taft Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Series 8, Vol. 19, is a letter of introduction for Theodore Marburg to discuss matters of peace, the arbitral court, and the first meeting of the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes in December, and asks Knox to aid Marburg "in every way."

---

[79] This total includes only those societies which eventually federated with the American Peace Society. See American Peace Society, Annual Report, 1915, 23. Professor Kirchwey indicated that the total number of peace societies in 1911 was sixty, while Arthur Deerin Call said there were eighty in 1913. Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1911, 60; and American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 12.

[80] References to the formation of new peace societies abound in the Advocate of Peace. See, for example, LXXII (March 1910), 55; LXXIII (June 1911), 123; and LXXIV (August 1912), 183-84.

Chicago Peace Society never seriously rivaled its New York counterpart in size, but it immediately became the most widely known and influential peace group in the Middle West. The activities of the Chicago Peace Society were aided, moreover, by the American Peace Society which transferred its field secretary, Charles E. Beals, to Chicago where he also served as secretary of the new peace organization.[81]

As the number of societies increased, the leaders of the peace movement desired to coordinate their activities. Without proper coordination of their propaganda activities, they thought that the peace societies would unnecessarily duplicate their expenditures and dissipate their energies. As already noted, the Lake Mohonk Conference in 1909 took the first step toward the coordination of the peace societies when it created the "Committee of Ten."[82] After considerable discussion and a personal appeal from President Taft, the Committee decided to federate the many peace societies around the American Peace Society, the oldest and best known nationally of the peace societies. While the societies retained their autonomy and independence, they were now tied more closely to the national organization. Twelve members of the Board of Directors of the American Peace Society were henceforth elected at large at the annual meeting of the Society, while representatives from the peace societies were added according to a formula based on their total membership. The reorganized Society also guaranteed representation to the endowments and special congresses that had no organic connection with the American Peace Society.[83]

---

[81] The Chicago Peace Society had over 400 members in 1914. Chicago Peace Society, *Report 1915* (Chicago: n.p.; 1914), 13-14. *Advocate of Peace*, LXXII (February 1910), 30-32; (May 1910), 102-03; LXXIII (A ril 1911), 88; and Thomas, "Jones," 104-08, give the background to the organization of the Chicago Peace Society.

[82] The personnel of the Committee expanded to fifteen members in 1913. Andrew Carnegie, Lyman Abbott, and Albert K. Smiley had resigned by 1911, and seven more were appointed. The new members were William Jennings Bryan, Theodore E. Burton, Hamilton Holt, Theodore Marburg, Daniel Smiley, Jane Addams, and Fannie Fern Andrews. *Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1910*, 196; and *Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1911*, 12.

The American Peace Society was naturally receptive to the plan of reorganization, not only because it coordinated the activities of the peace movement around its own leadership, but also because it brought a handsome subvention from the Carnegie Endowment. The Executive Council of the Endowment voted in June 1911 to make the American Peace Society its main propaganda agency and for this purpose gave an annual appropriation of $31,000 to the American Peace Society conditional to the reorganization of the Society. The directors of the Society immediately revised its Constitution and agreed to federate the peace societies around the parent body. This additional money gave the Society disposal funds from which it made yearly allotments to the affiliated peace societies.[84] The Society which since 1908 had considered moving its offices from Boston to Washington, D.C.

---

[83] Butler to Carnegie, February 4, March 7, 1910, Butler Papers; Advocate of Peace, LXXIII (June 1912), 138-40; for Taft's view and influence, see American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1911, 15; and Holt to Marburg, May 7, 1911, Holt Papers, Box 1.

[84] American Peace Society, Annual Report, 1912, 8-9; Annual Report, 1913, 8, 27.

where it could undertake the national work more easily and effectively finally approved the transfer early in 1911. It also established departments, staffed with field secretaries, in five geographical sections of the nation.[85]

(6)

The Protestant churches completed the growing list of peace organizations before the First World War. One religious organization, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, gave the greatest boost to the peace efforts of Lynch and his co-workers among the Protestant churches. Officially founded in 1908, the Federal Council grew out of the social action programs of the Protestant leaders in the Social Gospel movement. In forming the federation of thirty-odd Protestant denominations, the Federal Council deliberately played down credal differences and instead stressed "the essential oneness of the Christian Churches of America in Jesus Christ as their Divine Lord and Saviour" and "the spirt of fellowship, service and cooperation among them."[86]

One of the reform activities of the Federal Council included international relations. In this area it especially tried to heal the growing estrangement between England and Germany by further stimulating the exchange of English and German ministers, which the church leaders of the two nations meeting at the Second Hague Conference had successfully organized, and by uniting the Protestant churchmen of the United States with them in a threefold alliance of the churches. When representatives of the German and English churches visited the United States in 1910 to enlist the more active support of American clergymen, Albert Smiley invited them to attend the Lake Mohonk Conference. Immediately following the Conference, the Revered Charles S. Macfarland, upon the advice and exhortation of Frederick Lynch, visited England and Germany in behalf of the Federal Council to propose a trinational conference of church leaders. Because of the last minute withdrawal of the German churchmen, the conference was never held, but Macfarland's efforts prompted the Federal Council to establish a Commission on Peace and Arbitration in October 1911. The Commission, headed by Lynch, immediately distributed propaganda in support of a later trinational church conference, endorsed Taft's arbitration treaties, and sent out speakers to address ministerial associations on the role of the churches in the peace movement.[87]

---

[85] Whitney, American Peace Society, 266-67; Advocate of Peace, LXXIII (March 1911), 49-50; LXXIV (June 1912), 138-40; LXXV (January 1913), 10. The five sections comprised New England, New York, South Atlantic, Central West, and Pacific Coast.

[86] Letter Missive, 1905, quoted in Charles S. Macfarland, Christian Unity in the Making: The First Twenty-Five Years of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1905-1930 (New York: The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1948), 31.

The Federal Council barely scratched the surface of the world peace movement before the First World War, but since it was only an advisory group without any central authority to impose its views on the churches, its short range aims were by necessity modest and even apologetic.[88] Considering the chilly diplomatic climate in Europe, moreover, its limited international achievements are understandable. On the domestic scene, however, it passed strongly worded resolutions in behalf of international arbitration and the limitation of armaments and served as an additional pressure group in mobilizing American public opinion behind existing pacifist platforms. It also clearly recognized from its inception the long-range goal of world peace which the federation of the churches would help to attain.[89]

---

[87] [no author], *Der Friede und die Kirchen. Zur Erinnerung an den Besuch in England Abgestattet von Vertretern der Deutschen Christlichen Kirchen vom 26. Mai bis 3. June 1908. Einschliesslich des Besuch in Schottland, vom 3. bis 7. June 1908* (London: Cassell & Co., 1908?), 64, 67-70, *passim*, gives the background of English-German cooperation. Also see Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, *Annual Report of the Executive Committee, 1911*, ed. E. B. Sanford (n.p.: n.p., 1912?), 2-3, 17-19; Charles S. Macfarland, *Pioneers for Peace Through Religion, Based on the Records of The Church Peace Union (Founded by Andrew Carnegie), 1914-1945* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1946), 33-35; New York *Times*, October 18, 1911, 10:8; and Lynch to Mead, March 2, 1912, WPF Papers, Box 3.

Despite its limitations the Federal Council indirectly affected one important development in the peace movement. The culmination of the pacifists' pre-war organizational work occurred only a few months before the outbreak of the World War when Andrew Carnegie founded the Church Peace Union, an interfaith body of American Protestants, Catholics, and Jews dedicated to world peace. Although Carnegie never expressed any great personal interest in organized religion, he was well acquainted with the leading churchmen in New York City, many of whom were prominent in New York Peace Society and the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. He especially relied on the counsel of

---

[88] Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, Annual Report 1914 (New York: n.p., 1915?), 29.

[89] See, for example, the report of the first secretary on the long-range aims of the Federal Council in the area of world peace. Church Federation, Annual Report of the Executive Committee, 1907 (n.p.: n.p., 1908?), 6.

Frederick Lynch who first met Carnegie in 1904 or 1905.[90] Thereafter, Lynch often discussed the international peace movement with Carnegie and after 1908 regularly informed him on the international activities of the Federal Council.[91] In 1912 Lynch told Carnegie about the Federal Council's Commission on Peace and Arbitration and the warm response it had received from the Protestant churches. Carnegie, who believed that the churches could do more than any other group to expose war for what it was--the worst evil in Christian civilization--was very interested in the activities of the Commission and sympathized with Lynch's request for additional funds. Since the Carnegie Endowment refused to help the Commission, Carnegie personally decided to finance the activities of the churches in the peace movement. When, shortly thereafter, European churchmen and statesmen told him of the continuing work of the European churches in creating a healthier international climate by the exchange of ministers, Carnegie decided to establish an endowment for the churches. Although Edwin Mead wanted Carnegie to cooperate with the World Peace Foundation in enlarging its directors to include many more churchmen, Carnegie agreed with Lynch's argument that the churches had already established separate peace groups and needed additional financial support to demonstrate most clearly to the world the glaring contradiction between their commitment to the Christian banner of the Prince of Peace and the ever-present war system. Early in 1914 Carnegie and Lynch drew up a list of twenty-nine trustees which Carnegie announced along with his gift of $2,000,000 to the Church Peace Union on February 19, 1914.[92]

---

[90] Lynch, Personal Recollections, 9, 14, ch. 13.

[91] Carnegie gave Lynch $1000 annually after 1908 so he could devote more of his time to peace work. Lynch to Trueblood, December 16, 1911, Trueblood Correspondence in the American Peace Society Papers, Box 6.

Among the trustees were several churchmen and a few laymen who had already participated in other peace organizations. Francis E. Clark, William H. P. Faunce, Emil Hirsch, Hamilton Holt, William I. Hull, Charles E. Jefferson, Jenkin Lloyd Jones, William Lawrence, Frederick Lynch, Marcus M. Marks, Shailer Mathews, Edwin D. Mead, John R. Mott, George A. Plimpton, and Henry Wade Rogers, for instance, were also prominent figures in peace societies or the World Peace Foundation. Though the Church Peace Union was an interfaith organization, the Protestant clergy dominated the board of trustees. Not surprisingly, therefore, it cooperated most closely with the Federal Council's Commission on Peace and Arbitration. Indeed, one-half of the directors of the Commission were also trustees of the Church Peace Union.[93]

---

[92] Lynch, Personal Recollections, ch. 13; and Macfarland, Pioneers for Peace Through Religion, 33-37, tell this story in detail. The English Liberal, J. Allen Baker, had more influence than any other European on Carnegie's decision. See Elizabeth Balmer Baker and P. J. Noel Baker, J. Allen Baker, Member of Parliament: A Memoir (London: The Swarthmore Press, 1927), 170-218, especially 214-18; and J. Allen Baker to Carnegie, December 13, 1913, Carnegie Papers, Vol. 219. For Mead's views, see Mead to Carnegie, December 13, 1913, ibid., Vol. 219; for Lynch's rebuttal, see Lynch to Carnegie, January 8, 1914, and Lynch to Mead, January 8, 1914, both in ibid., Vol. 220. Carnegie's views are handwritten on Mead's and Lynch's letters to Carnegie.

[93] Macfarland, Pioneers for Peace Through Religion, 17-21, 246; cf. Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, Annual Report, 1914, 30. Only three Catholic and two Jewish clergymen were trustees, but the cooperation of churchmen of different faiths in a permanent organization such as the Church Peace Union was in that day a notable achievement.

In making the gift, Carnegie allowed the trustees to spend the income from the endowment as they pleased, but he hoped that "as the first act they should bring all the churches of Europe and America together in some European city and link up the European churches and religious leaders with the movement."[94] The trustees already had similar ideas and immediately arranged for a peace conference of European and American church leaders at Constance, Germany, in the first week of August 1914. Ironically, the date of the conference coincided with the outbreak of the European war which dashed the clergymen's lingering hopes for a more friendly, stable Europe.

Although the war was to test severely the pacifistic inclinations of the European clergy whose nations seemed bent upon a struggle to the finish, many of them would hope that American clergymen would promote efforts to end the war and to seek a just peace. The large steps the American clergy had taken before the war in organizing religious sentiment in the area of international reform had not been entirely in vain, for their organizations were to enable them to respond more readily to the multifarious problems unleashed by the European war. Now organized, the clergy's response to these international problems would have great potential influence on American and world public opinion during the troubled years of American neutrality. It remained to be seen whether their performance would live up to their promise.

---

[94] Quoted in Macfarland, Pioneers for Peace Through Religion, 36.

# VI. PROFILE, 1910-1914

## (1)

The organization of the peace forces between 1910 and 1914 was a very encouraging development to the peace leaders. Not only had three endowed peace organizations with annual expenditures totaling $650,000, been established in these years, but the American Peace Society had for the first time in its history become a truly national organization. Never, in fact, had the peace movement had such an opportunity for spreading its message to the masses throughout the nation. Although the impact of the propaganda of the peace organizations on public opinion cannot be measured precisely, they influenced public opinion more in these twilight years of world peace than in any previous era of American history. Moreover, on the surface at least, the different societies and endowments seemed to cooperate with each other in their common efforts to reach the American public most directly and effectively. Their activities in support of Taft's arbitration treaties exemplified careful planning to avoid unnecessary duplication of their efforts and the extensive use of the most effective propaganda techniques of that day -- public meetings, church sermons, and distribution of printed literature and press releases.[1]

---

[1] On the pacifists' coordinated activities, see Advocate of Peace, LXXIV (January 1912), 20; (February 1912), 34-35, 46-48; and (March 1912), 59-62; and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book for 1912, 78.

Yet a discussion of the network and actual programs of peace organizations looks only at the externals of the peace movement. What was the peace movement like from within the organizations themselves? How did the pacifists view their organizations? their co-workers in them? the movement as a whole? To the casual observer outside the peace movement, the peace leaders seemed generally united on tactics as well as strategy, on means as well as ends, but the peace advocates themselves, much as they talked about a single "peace movement," did not comprise one harmonious, cheerful family. In one sense, the phenomenal growth of peace activity brought almost as many problems as benefits to the movement. As the peace movement grew in size, it was inevitable that it would become more amorphous and unwieldy in composition and that differences among their leaders on proper tactics, strategy, and ideology would appear. Although these differences did not openly disrupt the peace movement, they helped to limit the effectiveness of the societies in the twilight years of world peace.

(2)

The reservations held by some lawyers toward international arbitration, which has already been noted, was the earliest but not the only sign of any deviation from the apparent consensus of peace leaders. Much more serious was the increasing self-criticism by pacifists of their peace societies. The defeat of Taft's arbitration treaties in the Senate in particular seemed to awaken them to some basic shortcomings of the societies. The pacifists had hoped that their organizational and educational campaign would indoctrinate the masses who would increasingly bring pressures to bear on their political representatives to endorse their programs. Yet some realized that although Taft's treaties evoked the strongest expressions of public support thus far behind the peace movement, there was virtually no evidence that these manifestations of peace sentiment influenced the votes of United States Senators on the arbitration treaties. A few peace workers even indicated that most Senators automatically discounted the propaganda of peace groups on this issue.[2] Indeed, as Taft himself belatedly recognized, the American public expressed no interest in the issue of world peace in the election campaign of 1912, although he had originally proposed his arbitration treaties partly in the hope that they would bolster the sagging political fortunes of his administration.[3] Consequently, while the peace societies could take at least some credit for mobilizing public support behind the treaties, they were faced with the blunt fact that they had failed to make world peace a live, political issue.

A few pacifists went further and concluded that the peace societies generally had little influence and even produced a negative reaction among the American public. Thus, the secretary of the Chicago Peace Society frankly admitted the lack of public support for the activities of his society. "We try to keep out of sight as peace society," he explained. "We don't want to frighten people away. I think the best work of the Chicago society has been by keeping out of sight, and I think in some cases a mistake is made in not getting other people to do certain things, for in the doing they will become interested." So discouraged was he with the puny accomplishments of the Chicago organization, in fact, that he resigned the secretaryship in early 1914.[4] Others also believed the work of the peace societies was ineffective. Perhaps Edwin Ginn exaggerated slightly when he charged that "most of them have been a wet blanket upon the [pacifist] enterprise," but even one of their staunchest defenders conceded in 1913 that the peace societies were "relatively far too inefficient."[5] Still others deflated the extravagant claims by peace leaders of the extraordinary growth in the total number and membership of peace societies. Measured in percentages the increases in the decade were astronomical, but in terms of absolute numbers they were at best modest. Despite the proliferation of pacifist organizations, for instance, the best estimate of their total membership in 1913 was only slightly over 5,000.[6]

---

[2] William H. Short, letter, no date, Samuel S. McClure Papers, (Lilly Library, Indiana University). The first page of this five page letter is missing, but it was probably written to McClure in the fall of 1911. Also Edwin Mead, address, in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 148.

[3] Taft, "The Time to Test Our Faith in Arbitration," International Conciliation, Pamphlet No. 63 (February 1913), 7-8.

From such discouraging statements one might have assumed that the pacifists would have concluded that they should abandon their efforts to make their crusade a mass movement and instead pursue a more limited policy of accepting new members as they came forward but concentrating their efforts on using their personal influence with important congressmen, State Department officials, and the President. As we will see, some of them who had little faith in the pacifist inclinations of the masses accepted this conclusion and urged the peace forces to concentrate their attention on winning governmental leaders to their viewpoint. But others refused to believe that the "people" were not reasonable, good, and peace-loving and would not embrace the pacifist cause if they were only given full exposure to their literature and public utterances. In many cases heirs of the abolitionist tradition it was, after all, comforting to remember that the antislavery crusade had started very modestly but had gradually grown to the point where it had received national attention. And most pleasing of all, that crusade had ultimately resulted in the abolition of slavery, the nation's most heinous evil in the mid-nineteenth century. Similarly, why could not the peace crusade ultimately grow to the point where it would abolish war?[7] The peace workers seemed to forget that the abolitionists had succeeded in the final analysis not because of their appeals to the innate reason and goodness of Southern slaveholders to abandon their peculiar institution but only after the onset of the Civil War and the extinction of slavery by force of arms, the very evil the peace workers were trying to eliminate in the twentiety century. Instead, they continued to assume that the peace movement would follow the pattern of the anti-slavery movement in its progression from a moral crusade to the point when it would become enmeshed in the political process. But with the exception of the most firmly committed and dedicated pacifists -- Benjamin Trueblood, Edwin and Lucia Mead, David Starr Jordan, William I. Hull, Jenkin Lloyd Jones, Frederick Lynch, Charles E. Jefferson, Alfred Love, Belva Lockwood, May Wright Sewall, and perhaps Hamilton Holt, Andrew Carnegie and a few others -- the peace workers, although certainly moral-minded, lacked the moral passion of the abolitionists. The latter eventually championed the immediate abolition of slavery, but most of the peace workers, confident in man's inevitable progress toward the peaceful federation of the world, shunned the militant approach of their forebears. They assumed that they could work patiently toward the milennium of world peace because the laws of history (or, as they often phrased it, the laws of evolution) were on their side.[8] World peace, in short, was almost as much a matter of time as it was of their own effort. In consequence, they viewed their own role as pushing the movement a little faster and farther in the direction it was already moving.

---

[4] Charles E. Beals, address, in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 116; Chicago Peace Society, Report 1914 (Chicago: 1914), 30.

[5] Ginn to Jordan, February 11, 1911, Jordan Papers, Supplementary Correspondence; Arthur Deerin Call, address, in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 124.

[6] American Peace Society, Annual Report, 1913, 18. See Arthur Deerin Call's labored but unconvincing attempt to demonstrate the sizeable growth and achievements of the American Peace Society in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 116-25; and Edwin Mead's criticism of the Society's membership drive in ibid., 146-48.

---

[7] See especially Edwin D. Mead, address, in National Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1919, 39-40; and Mead, "The Literature of the Peace Movement," World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, No. 7, Part IV (October 1912), 9.

---

[8] References to the inexorable growth of world peace (and the opposite side of the coin, the decline of war) abound in the rhetoric of the peace workers. For a few of the clearest expressions of these assumptions, see Frederick Lynch, address, in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1911, 416-17; Advocate of Peace, LXVII (May 1905), 94.

These confident assumptions allowed the peace workers to continue their peace work without analyzing the underlying weaknesses of their movement, which in actuality were much more serious than they realized. Thus, while the more passionate and committed among them occasionally worried about their failure to convert a larger and broader cross-section of the populace, even they did not probe deeply the reasons for the disinterest of the masses. They failed to understand, why, despite the growing number of peace organizations, their membership remained as unrepresentative of the American public as a whole as it had during the abortive agitation for the Olney-Pauncefote treaty more than a decade earlier, since these organizations had failed to convert the lower classes, especially the working class, to their cause. True, the American Peace Society formed a committee in 1906 to work more closely with labor organizations, but it made no noticeable impression on them. And while in the following years the Society made sporadic attempts to distribute its literature to labor organizations, it failed to enroll laborers as members.[9] The other leading Eastern group, the New York Peace Society, undertook a more persistent compaign to incorporate trade unionists and even Socialists into the movement, but its efforts brought nothing but frustration and ultimate failure. Cooperation with the Socialists got nowhere, and although John Mitchell and Samuel Gompers were willing to promote the peace movement in the American Federation of Labor, Gompers was unable to come to New York when the members of the Society proposed conferences to discuss the promotion of the peace movement among the laboring masses. Consequently, while the professions of interest remained on both sides, nothing tangible had resulted by 1914.[10]

---

[9] Advocate of Peace, LXVIII (August 1906), 170-71. Arthur Deerin Call only casually mentions the distribution of peace literature to labor organizations in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1914, 36.

The failure to enlist wage earners in the peace movement stemmed from several sources. In the first place, the peace leaders had to contend with the primary concerns of American workers. The rank and file of organized labor were much more interested in bread and butter issues and various domestic reforms which would advance their collective bargaining rights than in the lofty aims of the peace movement. Neither the idealistic rhetoric of the peace leaders nor their detailed expositions on mediation and arbitration procedures, international law, and world federation struck a responsive chord among laborers. To the average laborer the former was too visionary for his mundane concerns, the latter too technical for his limited education. Even the labor leaders who fully shared the aspirations of the peace leaders subordinated their pacifistic sentiments to the immediate problems of the labor movements. The most striking illustration of the secondary interest of labor leaders in the peace movement occurred during the campaign for Taft's arbitration treaties. The New York Peace Society asked Gompers to speak at a mass meeting in New York City in behalf of the treaties, and though Gompers at first accepted the invitation, he reneged a few days before the proposed meeting when he discovered that the German and Irish laborers in the local trade unions were strongly opposed to the arbitration treaty with Great Britain -- a treaty they erroneously claimed would amount to an "alliance." Although Gompers later wrote that he was "a doctrinaire pacifist" before the outbreak of the World War, his actions in this instance revealed very little commitment to pacifism. Instead of risking a floor fight with the German and Irish laborers by attending the meeting and explaining the merits of the treaties, he begged off the issue. Other labor leaders also declined to speak at the meeting. The fear of disunity in the labor movement was clearly of greater importance to their practical minds.[11]

---

[10] Short to Gompers, May 29, 1912, Gompers to Short, June 1, 1912, Short to Gompers, June 1, 1914, and Mitchell to Marcus M. Marks, May 6, 1912, all in NYPS Papers, Box 4; and "New York Peace Society Minutes," Meetings of April 19, 1911, May 1, 1912, October 8, 1913, in _ibid._, Box 1.

The Socialists seemed even less interested in the peace movement. Although their party conventions and campaign literature occasionally denounced the high cost of armaments, military education in the schools, and the potential threat of a large standing army as strikebreakers, they never endorsed world peace as a cardinal aim.[12] Nor did their journals include more than a few highly sensational articles which attempted to expose the hardships, humiliations, and injustices endured by soldiers and sailors in the armed forces.[13] When they wrote at all about the peace movement, they were usually critical of the peace societies and their bourgeois leadership. One Socialist minced no words in attacking them:

---

[11] Gompers to Short, April 15, 1911, NYPS Papers, Box 4. An unsigned typewritten statement explains the full details of the episode in ibid. Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor (2 vols., New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1925) II, 331. Their fears were not groundless, for several months later German sympathizers actually seized control of a peace meeting in Carnegie Hall, while the organizers of the meeting, Carnegie, Butler, Joseph H. Choate, and Rabbi Stephen Wise, after unsuccessful attempts to quiet the demonstrators, looked on dumbfounded and angry. New York Times, December 13, 1911, 1:8, 2:1.

> Peace societies [he wrote] are nothing more or less than schemes whereby certain parasites of the present [capitalistic] system amuse themselves or gain a livelihood. There is no record that they have ever accomplished anything except create a demand for printer's ink, paper, and furnish an avenue by which some individuals can exploit their ego.[14]

But even such negative statements were few and far between. In fact, compared with their European kinsmen who in many cases had taken an unequivocally anti-war position, the American Socialists expressed almost no interest in the issues of war and peace. The Socialist party platform of 1912, for example, contained thirty-three planks, not one of which mentioned any issue relating to foreign affairs.[15]

---

[12] John Spargo, ed., National Convention of the Socialist Party, Held at Indianapolis, Ind., May 12 to 18, 1912 (Chicago: The Socialist Party, 1912?), 85-86, 101-02, 169; Information Department of the Socialist Party, ed., Socialist Congressional Campaign Book, 1914 (Chicago: The Socialist Party, 1914?), 270-72, 275-79.

[13] Marion Wright, "In the Navy: The Other Side of the Paper," International Socialist Review, XIII (October 1912), 344-47; Ex-Marines in the U.S. Navy, "Untold Tales of the Navy," ibid., XIII (November 1912), 400-07; Marion Wright, "Truths About the Navy," ibid., XIII (December 1912), 481-86; Ex-Sailors and Soldiers, "News About the Army and Navy," ibid., XIII (January 1913), 547-49.

[14] Vincent St. John, "The Working Class and War," ibid., XV (August 1914), 117. This article was written and published before there was any hint of the onset of the European War.

The increasing dominance of the peace societies by businessmen magnified labor's alienation from the peace movement. Much of the superficial prosperity of the societies after 1910 came from the financial support of chambers of commerce and the increased membership of businessmen who bolstered their conservative tone, and in most instances these businessmen naturally had no desire to promote the cause of their economic and political rivals, labor unions and Socialists, in the peace movement. The presence of businessmen in the peace movement had been evident at the Lake Mohonk Conferences since the turn of the century, but in succeeding years they joined the peace societies in increasing numbers.[16] Their support of the movement was partly ideological. Unlike the pacifists, they did not often attack war because it was murderous and therefore immoral, but they enthusiastically agreed with the pacifists when they argued that it was destructive of material comforts, economically unprofitable, and generally wasteful. Essentially conservative on fiscal matters, they also agreed in theory with the pacifists when they attacked the spiraling costs of defense spending, although most of these businessmen showed very little enthusiasm in practice for small-navy resolutions. In addition, they shared the pacifists' hopes that arbitration treaties and the development of international law would improve the chances of international harmony and help to eliminate wars and war scares which caused uncertainty in international trading circles and threatened to disrupt the free and unimpeded exchange of goods in international commerce. Confident in the superior quality of American goods, they assumed that agreements on these matters would improve the marketability of American exports to foreign lands. World peace, in sum, was largely a matter of economic self-interest to these businessmen, although in these prosperous years they described their support of the peace movement as "enlightened" self-interest.[17]

---

[15] National Convention of the Socialist Party,...1912, 197-98. In the prefatory party of the platform, however, it did say: "It is this capitalist system that is responsible for the increasing burden of armaments...." Ibid., 196. Only a few American Socialists ventured into the area of international reform before the First World War. See George R. Kirkpatrick, War -- What For? (West La Fayette, Ohio: The Author, 1910); Reginald Wright Kauffman, The Way of Peace (New York: Moffat, Yard & Co., 1911); and George Allan England, "Fiat Pax," International Conciliation, Pamphlet No. 81 (August 1914). This latter study was also written before the outbreak of the First World War.

[16] The Lake Mohonk Conferences between 1910 and 1914 clearly document the growing interest of businessmen in the peace movement.

The English journalist, Norman Angell, gave these businessmen's assumptions a large boost when he presented a more sophisticated economic argument against war in his pamphlet, Europe's Optical Illusion, published in 1909. Reissued a year later as a full-length study with a new title, The Great Illusion, Angell's book was really an updated version of Richard Cobden's and other nineteenth century economists' arguments againstwar and imperialism. Much the same line of argument had been advanced, moreover, by Jean de Bloch in his six volume work, The Future of War, published in Russia in 1897. Bloch had argued that the great European powers were so interdependent financially and commercially that a general European war would immediately produce a serious drain on all the combatants' economies and that the resulting economic ruin would force the nations to end the war almost as soon as it began.[18] What distinguished The Great Illusion from its predecessors was its numerous examples from the historical experiences of European nations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that war no longer paid in mature capitalistic economies. Angell also found a more receptive audience among people who recognized that the pacifists' moral condemnation of militarism and war had failed to thwart the armament race among the European nations and the growing possibility of a major war and were eager to grasp an alternative theory that might find wider public acceptance as a rational and perhaps workable alternative to these ominous developments. Angell himself played a major role in popularizing the book, for he sent copies to several journalists for review purposes and to more than two hundred important political figures in Europe, including King Edward VII and Arthur J. Balfour of England, King Victor Emmanuel VII of Italy, and Kaiser William II of Germany. Within eighteen months of the appearance of the first edition, The Great Illusion had been translated and published in at least eighteen languages and was widely debated in European intellectual, banking, and business circles.[19]

---

[17] See, for example, the businessmen's bulletins, especially "Obligatory Arbitration and Business," and "The Business Man and International Law," in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1911, 186, 188-89; also "Business Men's Opinion of International Arbitration," in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1912, 151-52.

---

[18] Edwin D. Mead best summarized Bloch's ideas in his article, "Jean de Bloch and 'The Future of War,'" New England Magazine, XXVIII, new series (May 1903), 298-309.

Angell's book also evoked considerable interest in the United States from peace advocates who were eager to take up new arguments against war and thereby broaden the ideological content of their movement. David Starr Jordan found Angell's thesis particularly appealing. He first met Angell in the summer of 1910 during one of his European visits and immediately became deeply interested in Angell's economic theory. Upon his return to the United States, Jordan urged Carnegie to distribute copies of The Great Illusion to every member of the House of Commons in Great Britain and the recent German edition to every member of the German Reichstag. Carnegie apparently did not act upon this suggestion, but he had already corresponded with Angell and was very interested in popularizing his book.[20] Nicholas Murray Butler was also interested in Angell's theory, and he arranged for the Carnegie Endowment to sponsor a lecture tour for Angell in the United States before several universities, trade gatherings, and chambers of commerce. By Angell's own admission his lecture tour was only moderately successful, but he at least managed to spread his economic theory to many individuals who had previously had little or no exposure to the peace movement.[21]

---

[19] Norman Angell, After All: The Autobiography of Norman Angell, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1951), 147-58, describes the impact of The Great Illusion before 1914. Angell to Lucia Mead, March 21, 1910, Mead Papers, Box 1, contains a long explanation of Angell's promotion of the book in Europe, especially among governmental leaders.

[20] Days of a Man, II, 318-19; Jordan to Carnegie, November 7, 1910, Carnegie Papers, Vol. 182; and Jordan to Carnegie, November 28, 1910, ibid., Vol. 183. Angell to Carnegie, June 2, 1910, ibid., Vol. 180, is Angell's own plea to Carnegie.

The growing fear of war, the influence of Norman Angell, and a third factor, the desire to stand behind the conservative Taft in the face of a growing reform movement, helped to encourage individual businessmen to participate much more actively than they had previously in peace societies and various peace gatherings. Their attendance at the biennial peace congresses became particularly noticeable. The 1911 Congress, for instance, was largely dominated by businessmen who offered paeans of praise for Taft and his arbitration treaties.

Not surprisingly, this business dominance gradually dampened whatever enthusiasm the labor leaders had initially shown for the peace movement. The few Socialists as well as moderate labor leaders like Samuel Gompers who had participated in the first two peace congresses, for instance, soon found that their resolutions expounding the economic causes of war and opposing loans by neutral states to warring nations were ignored, and after 1909 they no longer attended the peace congresses. Not a single labor spokesman attended the 1913 congress at St. Louis which was largely promoted and entirely financed by the city's business leaders.[22]

---

[21] Paul David Hines, "Norman Angell: Peace Movement 1911-1915" (Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation: Ball State Teachers College, 1964), 65-74, contains a detailed summary of Angell's lecture tour.

Finally, even without this business influence the peace societies would have made only half-hearted and sporadic attempts to enroll the lower classes in their movement. The social attitudes of most peace leaders hindered the possibility of a firm rapprochement with the rank and file of organized labor. Almost all of the peace advocates were well educated and highly cultured individuals who viewed the peace movement largely in terms of their own civilized standards. Of the thirty-nine most active peace workers, thirty-three had received college degrees, and twenty-six of this latter total had also gained higher degrees in their chosen fields of law, religion, or education. And those without a formal college degree included Andrew Carnegie and Lucia Mead, two of the most literate peace leaders of that day.[23] Much as many peace leaders sincerely wanted to include the workers in their movement, almost all of them assumed that the better educated, more cultured Americans of the middle and upper classes -- that is, individuals like themselves -- could more easily understand and identify with the civilized quality and high moral purpose of their movement than the unenlightened masses. Many of them argued, in fact, that the prerequisite for a successful peace society was the enlistment of "the leading citizens" or "the first men" of the community, state, and nation.[24] The high-priced dinners of the New York Peace Society, Albert Smiley's hand-picked conferences at Lake Mohonk, and the leadership of the peace societies limited to educators, ministers, and philanthropists exemplified this same elitism.[25]

---

[22] Cf. National Arbitration and Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1907, 223-67, 295-326; National Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1909, 158-65, 170-78, 344-58; American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1911, ix-xii, 385-91; and American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 580-636.

[23] These findings come from Allen Johnson, Dumas Malone, and Richard Livingston Schuyler, eds., Dictionary of American Biography (22 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946-1958); Who Was Who in America (3 vols., Chicago: A. N. Marquis Co., 1943-1960); The National Cyclopedia of American Biography (58 vols., New York: James T. White & Co., 1898-1964); and biographies of and autobiographies and reminiscenses by personnel in the peace movement which are cited in the bibliography. See Appendix A for a list of these thirty-nine peace workers.

Theirs was not deliberate snobbery. Rather, reflecting the noblesse oblige assumptions that were common among the reformers of that era, they assumed that the man in the street was an important factor in public opinion only to the extent of his ability to absorb and articulate their own moral values. Until education could provide the moral uplift for the general public, these leaders assumed that they alone were the proper custodians of the peace movement. Specifically, they believed that as soon as they had won over the schools, churches, and press, all essentially middle class institutions, they would have gained the only really important elements of American public opinion. Samuel Dutton, for instance, hoped that universal education would eventually enlighten the general public on the moral aims of the peace movement, but for the present he was convinced that "even in the most intelligent nations there is so much apathy and so much ignorance that the masses can hardly be counted upon in civic affairs at home, much less in world politics."[26] The younger and more idealistic Frederick Lynch also believed that international reform would have to come from above rather than from below:

---

[24] J. J. Hall, address, in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 147-48.

[25] The Unitarian minister, John Haynes Holmes, pointed out the exclusiveness of the peace movement most clearly, though he was encouraged that Short and a few other peace leaders were attempting to overcome this tendency. Holmes to Short, January 27, 1914, NYPS Papers, Box 4.

> It is the prophets and leaders [he insisted] who make the changes of the world. The talk of vox populi is often more of a delusion than a reality. Let us make enough of preachers, teachers, editors, and particularly statesmen to see the reasonableness and inevitableness of the new order, and it can be at once established and the great changes made.[27]

In fairness to the peace leaders, many of them recognized and criticized the elitism of their movement. They repeatedly warned against the "undue striving after mere 'prominence' and 'influence'" by peace societies, and publicly exposed the failure of the peace leaders to direct their appeals to the masses.[28]

---

[26] American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1911, 335. A year later, however, Dutton gave credit to the workers and Socialists, especially those in Europe, as forces for peace. New York Peace Society, Year Book 1912, 25-26.

[27] The Peace Problem, 111.

[28] William I. Hull, address, in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 129; also see Trueblood, address, in ibid., 108; Mead, discussion, in ibid., 146-48; Lucia Ames Mead, address, in ibid., 376-77; Edward Cummings, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1912, 90; Bartholdt, address, in National Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1909, 327; Stephen Wise, in New York Times, May 2, 1907, 6:4.

But in the face of the elitist arguments of their cohorts, their own appeals made little headway. Indeed, since they were also spokesmen of the "solid middle class" of that day, they could not entirely throw off the influence of their own social backgrounds which, to a lesser degree, were tinged with the same elitism of their colleagues. Thus, while they were quick to point out the exclusive nature of their movement, they failed to offer bold proposals which might have helped to bridge the gap between the pacifist leadership and the laboring masses. As already noted, the New York Peace Society frequently discussed the possibility of labor's inclusion in the peace movement, but even labor's proponents in the Society seemed satisfied with the tame proposal for a series of conferences between a committee of the Society and the leaders of the trade unions and the Socialist party. In practice, this meant that the proposals of the peace society would reach the laboring masses only through the latter's own spokesmen. Not once did the New York peace leaders bypass the labor leaders and appeal directly to laborers to join their Society and participate in its meetings. The other peace societies approached the labor movement with even less enthusiasm.

The pacifists' hesitant advances toward the labor movement exemplified a more general weakness in their approach to public opinion. Just as they failed to direct their appeals to the laborers, so did they refrain from direct political agitation in the form of lobbying pressures. Lobbyists, already in disrepute in the progressive era for "buying" state legislatures and congressmen, smacked too much of crass or dirty politics for their own civilized tastes. Even the American Peace Society, which moved to Washington ostensibly to dramatize its national character, had no political agent in Congress. So, too, when the societies sent petitions and memorials to Congress in support of arbitration treaties or against military appropriation bills, they were more interested in acquiring the signatures of a few prominent people than a much larger number of comparative unknowns.[29] Nor did they make any efforts to influence the nominating conventions of the political parties.[30] Whether the American public would have endorsed such direct and massive appeals and whether, in turn, these appeals would have influenced the President, Congress, or the political parties on the issues of war and peace are moot points; the fact is that most of them were too genteel to experiment with the techniques of mass political persuasion.[31] By contrast, the skillful lobbying tactics of the Navy League in Congress and at the national party conventions during Taft's presidential years played no small part in that organization's rising influence. If it had not yet exerted any appreciable influence on politicians, it was at least well-known and a growing force with which the politicians as well as the peace workers would have to contend.[32]

---

[29] "New York Peace Society Minutes," January 29, 1909, NYPS Papers, Box 1.

[30] Doherty, "Love," 90-91, believes that the Universal Peace Union lobbied at the national political conventions in 1912, but I found no documentary evidence for such an assertion nor does Doherty give any.

[31] See the criticism by a few peace advocates of these shortcomings in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 141-58.

[32] Rappaport, Navy League, 18-32.

Similarly, the pacifists' self-image of reasonable, moderate, and genial individuals constrained many of them from vilification or condemnation of political authority. They liked President Taft, for example, almost as much for his affable, warmhearted, and expansive personality as they did for his espousal of international peace. They liked him, in short, because he was a gentleman.[33] Yet in placing their emphasis on that elusive word "character," they overlooked many of the Taft administration's vague, confused, and inconsistent foreign policies. In terms of their own goals, they were of course wise and consistent to support the President's arbitration treaties, but they tended to minimize the extraordinary political implications of these treaties for Democratic as well as Rooseveltian Republican Senators who were reluctant to grant the administration forces an easy victory in an election year. Nor did they realize that the treaties were so carelessly drawn and so obscure in their interpretation that Senators had good reasons quite apart from political spite or Senatorial jealousy for opposing the treaties.[34] Three weeks before the final vote on the treaties, for example,

---

[33] Edwin Mead applied this standard to the Presidential hopefuls in 1912: "I think we ought to be immensely thankful at the nomination of Taft and Wilson, after all the tumult. It is only the grace of God that has saved us from Theodore Roosevelt and Champ Clark. Instead, we have two noble, high-minded,patriotic gentlemen." (emphasis Mead's) Mead to Ginn, July 3, 1912, WPF Papers, Box 3.

[34] John P. Campbell, "Taft, Roosevelt, and the Arbitration Treaties of 1911," Journal of American History, LIII (September 1966), 281-92, details these failings with great force.

Nicholas Murray Butler indulged in self-deception when he complacently remarked that the differences on the treaty existed only on a "small point," while "there was practical unanimity of sentiment" in support of the treaties as a whole.[35]

Moreover, they failed to criticize Taft's other foreign policies which conflicted with his espousal of international peace. Not one peace leader publicly criticized the Taft-Knox policy of Dollar Diplomacy in China, although it tended to annoy all the major foreign powers which had interests there and to undo much of the good will between the United States and these nations which Theodore Roosevelt had attempted with great difficulty to foster. In the same way they showed no awareness of the possible unpleasant repercussions of the administration's policy of Dollar Diplomacy in Latin America. Instead, they either remained silent or approved his promotion of the investment of American capital in all of these lands since they naively assumed that such investment increased world trade and the prosperity and political stability of "backward" nations.[36] That they had not thought deeply about the possible implications of Taft's Dollar Diplomacy was revealed even more clearly when they either tacitly acquiesced in or strongly approved President Wilson's repudiation of that policy in 1913.

---

[35] Butler to Burton, February 16, 1912, Theodore Burton Papers (Western Reserve Historical Society), Box 17.

[36] Advocate of Peace, LXXIV (November 1912), 231, gave a typical endorsement of Dollar Diplomacy: "By influencing American bankers to participate in the Hukuang loan, and subsequently in the reform of Chinese currency, the friendship of China for the United States was promoted, our exports to that country increased 50 per cent in two years, and international good will increased among the concert of great powers in China." The same editorial praised the intervention of American financial interests in Latin American nations. Only Jordan seemed unduly worried about the foreign reaction to American capitalistic elements in foreign lands. Trueblood to Jordan, March 25, 1913, and Jordan to Trueblood, April 5, 1913, both in the Jordan Papers, Supplementary Correspondence. For another endorsement of Dollar Diplomacy, see William H. Short, address, in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 220-21.

Another illustration of their deference to Taft's foreign policies occurred in the summer of 1912 when the President proposed and Congress passed the Panama Canal Tolls Act. This legislation exempted American coastwise shipping from payment of tolls at the Canal when it opened. Although Slayden and Burton (now a Senator) raised objections to the proposed exemption during the debate on the measure in Congress as a violation of the terms of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901, they received almost no support from the other peace workers.[37] One mildly critical editorial in the Advocate of Peace was the only sign of protest by the peace advocates before or immediately following its passage.[38] Either they had not carefully weighed the possible unpleasant repercussions of this act in international circles or were so mesmerized by Taft's support of their movement that they assumed that his peaceful intentions would ultimately resolve any difficulties with Britain or other nations that might arise from this legislation. In the end their deference to the slightest inkling of the administration's good intentions in the international arena made them more prisoners of political authority than molders of it.

---

[37] Congressional Record, 62nd Congress, 2nd session, XLVIII (May 21, 1912), 6916; (July 15, 1912), 9064-66; and (August 17, 1912), 11213. Burton had good reasons for opposing the exemption, for he later said he "was familiar with the treaty negotiations in 1900-1901, at which time I had several conversations with Secretary Hay and feel that I know what his intention was." Burton to Harry E. Bruey, March 16, 1914, Burton Papers, Box 19.

[38] Advocate of Peace, LXXIV (August 1912), 181-82, worried about the possible unpleasant implications of the exemption bill, but after its passage was satisfied that "The chief ground of objection has been removed by the striking out of the provision exempting our ships engaged in foreign trade from paying tolls." (emphasis added). Although the Democratic, Republican and Progressive parties endorsed the exemption and the British government protested the Panama Canal Tolls Act, the journal believed Anglo-American understanding was so firmly based that "There will be further negotiation on the subject, and it is probable that a satisfactory agreement will soon be reached." Ibid., LXXIV (September and October 1912), 206-07.

Their rhetoric illustrates the same restrained, bland, and rather vague thinking on the hard, practical questions of international relations. Their speeches and writings were increasingly filled with the words "peace," "brotherhood," "humanity," "justice," "mutual good will," "international understanding," but shied away from detailed explanations of practical programs. While Richard Bartholdt, Hamilton Holt, and James Brown Scott labored assiduously to develop the institutional apparatus and procedures for arbitration, conciliation, and mediation, almost all of the other peace leaders discussed the machinery of world organization only in the most general terms. Since the development of international organization had made only modest beginnings, their discussions on the subject had to be rather theoretical and flexible, but even their "practical" programs for world federation accepted the same moralistic and historical assumptions of the other peace workers. Almost all American peace workers in the twilight years of world peace, in fact, showed a tendency to soft pedal agitation for a truly authoritative international organization in favor of the more limited aims of international arbitration and the development of international law. In part, the deemphasis on a league of nations stemmed from their realization that the European political climate had worsened after the Second Hague Peace Conference, so that bold proposals on international organization would get nowhere. In part, too, it resulted from their preponderant desire to support Taft's arbitration scheme and a Court of Arbitral Justice, the two most popular and feasible plans for international agreement in the near future. It also resulted, however, from the pacifists' continued acceptance of the religion of progress, so that the longer world peace prevailed the easier it was for them to believe that all the civilized nations were advancing in their moral development to the point where they were beginning to realize that the resort to force to settle international disputes was outmoded and in the not too distant future would be eliminated altogether.

Despite Hamilton Holt's early interest in the creation of a congress of nations and an executive with enforcement powers, even he softened his earlier emphasis on a league of the great powers to enforce the peace in favor of the pacifist preference for arbitration treaties. He diluted his program partly for tactical reasons, for he lectured most often to peace societies and peace congresses whose participants viewed the creation of any militant world organization with alarm. Thus, at the Third American Peace Congress in 1911 he was advised not to advocate a militant world organization and to stress instead a cooperative, federative world order.[39] Yet Holt was entirely willing to alter his speech, for still youthful, open-minded, and anxious to learn from his older and more experienced colleagues in the peace movement, he was highly susceptible to the pacifist rhetoric and was already undergoing a gradual conversion to pacifism. In fact, the more Holt spoke on arbitration, the more he came to believe that it offered the greatest promise for bringing about the federation of the world. Although he had supported American leadership in the arbitration movement as a desirable supplement to his own proposals for a world legislature and executive as early as 1904, by 1909 he was in the forefront of the campaign for new arbitration treaties "without those obnoxious reserves on independence, vital interests and honor,"[40] and by 1911 he was echoing the idealistic pacifists who argued that arbitration was preferable to any league of armed powers. Citing history, Holt noted that Leagues of Peace frequently exceeded their peace-keeping function by using "their common forces to compel outside states to obey their will. Thus they were as frequently Leagues of Oppression as Leagues of Peace." Holt also accepted the pacifist assumption that nations in the more civilized twentieth century had advanced in their moral development to the point where they were less inclined to resort to force and that therefore a league to enforce the peace was not only a contradiction of pacifism but an anachronism:

---

[39] Theodore Marburg, "Apostles of World Unity, VI--Hamilton Holt," World Unity, I (March 1928), 414.

[40] Holt to James Brown Scott, September 23, 1909, Holt Papers, Box 1. For Holt's earlier views against reservations, see The Independent, LVI (January 7, 1904), 101-03; (January 21, 1904), 163-64.

> I think [he said] that at first it would be unwise for a League of Peace to attempt to use force for any purpose whatsoever. Besides, the use of force will probably be found unnecessary. When nations arrive at that state of civilization where they are ready to settle their differences by arbitration rather than by war, they are ready peaceably to abide by the decision of arbitral tribunals. The history of arbitration clearly demonstrates this. With but one or two insignificant exceptions, the nations have lived up to arbitral awards, both in the letter and the spirit of the judgement and there have been hundreds of such awards. We need a policeman to use force on criminals. But happily there is no such thing nowadays as a criminal nation.[41]

No organization more clearly illustrated a lack of focus and clear purpose on international questions than the New York Peace Society. From its inception in 1906, the Society welcomed almost anyone but the confirmed militarist to its fold:

> Its platform is a broad one [the Society's constitution stated], and there is room within its fellowship for men who differ widely as to measures and methods. It includes both those who deny all place to armaments, and those who fear, in the present state of civilization, to abolish large armies and navies. It urges, however, neither non-resistance nor great armaments, but exists to strengthen the forces which are leading toward international good will and the substitution of law for war.[42]

The executive secretary, William Short, attempted to justify this platform as "the only one that can persuade the skeptical that international peace is obtainable."[43] But while this policy enabled the Society to obtain a larger membership and a greater respect from the press and the general public, it sacrificed the moral fervor and direct action tactics which a smaller society composed largely of the most dedicated and idealistic pacifists would have attained. Individual members were of course still free to express themselves on the most controversial question of all, naval preparedness, and some of the active members, including Charles Jefferson, Frederick Lynch, and George Kirchwey, continued to oppose such increases in their capacity as private citizens. But the Society itself, after many long and heated debates on the issue, never officially criticized the large-navy programs before Congress.[44] "For over three years no remonstrance of any kind has gone out from its office," Short declared with no hint of regret in 1911.[45] After further debate the Society's board of directors finally approved Carnegie's innocuous suggestion in January 1913 that "This Society does not oppose such armament as may be necessary for adequate national protection."[46] This resolution managed to provide an uneasy compromise between the anti-preparedness and preparedness advocates in the Society but also underscored the timidity of the Society on a crucial foreign policy issue. With no firm consensus on this issue, its major official activities were limited to promoting arbitration treaties, welcoming foreign visitors to the city, establishing friendship societies, and financing educational exchange programs.

---

[41] American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1911, 9-10; also see Kuehl, Holt, 103-05.

[42] The Peace Society of the City of New York, Annual Reports, Constitution, List of Meetings and List of Members for the Year 1906-1907, 5.

---

[43] American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1911, 219.

[44] "New York Peace Society Minutes," February 12, June 4, 1908, January 22, April 12, February 25, October 5, 1910, NYPS Papers, Box 1.

[45] American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1911, 219.

[46] "New York Peace Society Minutes," January 7, 1913, NYPS Papers, Box 1. The indecision and confusion in the Society were best revealed in late 1912 and early 1913. Someone proposed that the Society hold a dinner to discuss the proposition: "Is it desirable in the interests of peace to increase the strength of the army and navy of the United States?" After some debate, it was

The American Peace Congress in 1913 exhibited a similar preoccupation with harmony over boldness. It is significant that the peace workers in the interest of mutual understanding and fairness allowed delegations from the American Peace and Arbitration League and the Navy League, both large navy groups, to attend and speak to the Congress. In addition, more than one hundred women delegates at the Congress listed the Daughters of the American Revolution as their sponsoring body, hardly an indication of pacifism or internationalism.[47] Recognizing the

---

voted to refer the proposal with the power of decision to a subcommittee of three, but after further discussion, this vote was reconsidered and the action reversed. After still more discussion, the entire proposition was laid on the table. Two months later the executive committee voted: "In the best interest of all work for international peace, the New York Peace Society should neither advocate nor oppose an increase in the American army or navy." Yet Carnegie, who was by far the dominant figure in the Society and who was particularly anxious to keep the support of those in the Society who advocated a larger or "adequate" navy, prevailed upon the directors to adopt his proposal which was even more timid and watered down. "New York Peace Society Minutes," November 6, 1912, January 6, 1913, both in ibid. Box 1. For evidence of Carnegie's early desire to downgrade the armament question so as to enroll additional members in the Society, see "New York Peace Society Minutes," October 8, 1909, ibid., Box 1.

[47] For a listing of D.A.R. delegates, see American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 587, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 600, 604, 606, 626, 627.

growing tolerance of the American public for the peace movement, the representatives of the large navy groups were particularly anxious to inform the delegates that they supported international arbitration and were thus also men of peace but differed only on the preparedness issue. They also realized, however, that many of the delegates, including some of the more cautious peace advocates, were not totally committed to the anti-preparedness position and might be swayed by their own arguments. The field secretary of the Navy League made a reasoned address to the Congress and even had the audacity "to ask recognition of the Navy League as a Peace Society."[48] A few pacifists questioned the ideas of these large-navy spokesmen but most remained silent or were willing to agree with the large-navy advocates that the United States needed an "adequate" navy, although never quite specifying what was meant by "adequate." Arthur Deerin Call put it mildly: "Well, I don't know, but what we all believe in an adequate army and navy."[49] Even Edwin Mead who was one of the most outspoken opponents of a large navy showed a willingness to cooperate with the American Peace and Arbitration League on other questions such as arbitration: "We have got to look at these things fairly. Where we can work together, let's work together."[50] In the end the peace advocates' efforts to appear cooperative and men of good will deprived the word "peace" of much of its pacifist or radical connotations without offering any viable and constructive program of their own beyond the very limited aim of arbitration as an alternative to the large navy boosters. Indeed, the only gains from these mutual expressions of good will went to the Navy League which succeeded in adding to its membership rolls the names of some of those individuals attending the peace congress.[51]

---

[48] Arthur Henry Dadmun, address, in _ibid._, 234.

[49] _Ibid._, 158.

[50] _Ibid._, 148.

The domestic reform impulse which was approaching its zenith in these years further masked the superficiality of the growth and influence of the peace movement. Paradoxically, the progressive movement added luster and promise to the peace movement at the same time that it diverted the energies of many reform-minded individuals from it. On the one hand, these were confident, hopeful, and optimistic years when all kinds of reforms, not the least of which was world peace, seemed possible of consummation. With apparently unlimited opportunities for the moral rejuvenation of individuals, the peace movement gained the support of many people who had previously taken no interest in the cause. It was this same hopeful atmosphere that prompted others who had little or no sympathy for the peace movement to tolerate it. Jonathan Daniels recalled that in 1913 the hope for world peace was so infectious that even the president of the Navy League felt it necessary to proclaim his fervent hopes for peace.[52] On the other hand, the numerous domestic reforms tended to detract from the vitality of the peace movement. Many of the younger individuals--the future life blood of any movement--who joined the peace forces in the decade before the outbreak of the First World War were more conservative than the early crusaders like Benjamin Trueblood, Edwin and Lucia Mead, David Starr Jordan, May Wright Sewall, Jenkin Lloyd Jones, Belva Lockwood, and Alfred Love who had entered the movement before 1900. Samuel Dutton, Theodore Marburg, Nicholas Murray Butler, James Brown Scott, Fannie Fern Andrews, Arthur Deerin Call, Charles E. Beals, and James L. Tryon were much more complacent in their assumptions that international peace was the wave of the future and did not have to be championed aggressively. Only five of the youngest--Louis P. Lochner, George W. Nasmyth, William I. Hull, Hamilton Holt, and Frederick Lynch, twenty-seven, thirty-two, thirty-six, forty-two, and forty-seven years old respectively in 1914--and three others, Jane Addams, William Jennings Bryan, and Charles E. Jefferson, all born in 1860, could easily identify with the idealistic strain of the progressive reformers. These eight viewed world peace as an active, dynamic process promoted by tireless peace workers rather than an inexorable, almost automatic development.

---

[51] Rappaport, Navy League, 36.

[52] Jonathan Daniels, The End of Innocence (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1954), 115.

The growing interest in the various reform movements on the domestic scene also diverted the energies of organizations which had earlier endorsed international reform as one of their major aims. Women's reform groups were the most obvious illustration of this pattern. The Women's Christian Temperance Union and the National Council of Women did not abandon their peace work, but with the accelerating momentum of the temperance and woman's suffrage movements these organizations failed to expand their earlier efforts in support of the peace movement. Indeed, Mrs. Sewall, Mrs. Bailey, Mrs. Mead, Mrs. Andrews, and Miss Addams remained the only women who gave much of their time to the peace movement. Mrs. Bailey continued to promote the peace and arbitration department of the W. C. T. U., but with the growing agitation for temperance legislation the relative importance of her work in the organization declined almost to the point of obscurity. And despite Miss Addams' growing involvement in the peace movement, she still gave a higher priority to industrial justice than to international justice. Much to the chagrin of her fellow pacifists, she supported Roosevelt over Wilson and Taft in the three-cornered Presidential race of 1912 largely because she believed that the social justice planks in the Progressive party platform were the most progressive.[53] Even after Wilson's election she showed more interest in domestic matters than in the peace movement.[54] Other women, notably Carrie Chapman Catt and Anna Garlin Spencer, occasionally spoke at peace congresses and joined peace societies, but they subordinated the issue of world peace to their overriding interest in woman's rights.[55] Lucia Mead clearly noted the dilemma of women's organizations which paid lip service to the peace movement but did almost nothing concretely to involve women in it. "I happen to know," she remarked sadly, "with the exception of what is being done for 450,000 teachers, whom the American School Peace League is trying to reach, there is less than five hundred dollars a year available for peace work among these several millions of women."[56] And May Wright Sewall made a similar complaint when she explained that as chairman of the peace committee of the International Council of Women she was alloted only thirty shillings per annum for peace work![57]

---

[53] Jenkin Lloyd Jones to Jane Addams, October 12, 1912, and David Starr Jordan to Jane Addams, November 25, 1912, both in the Jane Addams Papers (Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College), Series I, Box 4.

[54] New York Times, August 16, 1913, 5:5, notes Miss Addams' interview with President Wilson on the suffrage question.

The competing demands of the domestic reform movement might not have been too serious, but the movement was further hurt by the necrology of some of the most active peace workers. Edward Everett Hale passed away in 1909, Robert Treat Paine a year later, and Alfred H. Love, Samuel Capen, Edwin Ginn, and Albert K. Smiley in 1913 or early 1914. Almost every issue of the Peacemaker between 1909 and 1913 noted the death of one of the leading members of the Universal Peace Union, and when Alfred Love died in the fall of 1913, the Universal Peace Union died with him. In addition, many of the most active pacifists were getting on in years; in 1914, Mrs. Lockwood turned eighty-four, Carnegie seventy-nine, Jenkin Lloyd Jones seventy-two, May Wright Sewall seventy, Benjamin Trueblood sixty-eight, Edwin Mead sixty-five, and David Starr Jordan sixty-three. Their advancing years did not stifle their crusading spirit, but it was obvious that they could no longer participate as actively as they had earlier. They also could no longer identify as closely with the younger generation of Americans who might have shown greater interest in the peace movement if a well-organized nucleus of peace workers their own age had preached the pacifist message to them.

---

[55] Peacemaker, XXI (October 1902), 225, is an extract of one of Mrs. Catt's few pronouncements on world peace. Anna Garlin Spencer served as chairman of the committee of the New York Peace Society which was to plan the celebration of the centenary of Canadian-American peace, but she soon resigned because of the pressing duties of her other reform interests. "New York Peace Society Minutes," Meeting of January 21, 1910, NYPS Papers, Box 1.

[56] Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1911, 52.

[57] American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1911, 426. Six months earlier Mrs. Sewall had tried to obtain additional funds from the World Peace Foundation but without success. Jordan to Sewall, October 7, 1910, Sewall Papers.

(3)

Had the two peace endowments flourished in these twilight years of world peace, the shortcomings of the peace societies might have been less disturbing, but despite their enormous financial resources they made only modest inroads on American public opinion. It was not for want of zeal that the World Peace Foundation failed to stimulate greater pacifist activity in the nation, for Ginn and Mead, the two spearheads of the Foundation respectively as president of the trustees and chief director, were indefatigable workers in promoting its activities. But while the Foundation managed to turn out dozens of pamphlets on the history and recent activities of the peace movement, sponsor lecture tours at home and abroad, and finance educational auxiliaries like the American School Peace League, it encountered many more problems than Ginn had anticipated when he created the endowment. Internal disunity was the source of the Foundation's difficulties. Although the trustees and directors agreed that the Foundation should stress the educational side of the peace movement, they were not of one mind when it came to developing practical policies. Their lack of cohesion on tactics plagued the Foundation from the start and hindered the development of coordinated and imaginative programs.

Ginn's own fiscal and organizational theories were a principal thorn in the side of the Foundation's daily operations. More than any other influence, Ginn's long entrepreneurial career shaped his thinking on the Foundation, which he viewed, in essence, as another business enterprise.[58] Determined to avoid the uncoordinated and disjointed propaganda methods of the peace societies, Ginn attempted to inject business-like practices into the Foundation. In his concern for efficiency he took a special interest in its finances. Although it made sense to watch over the financial affairs of the Foundation, particularly since most pacifists were almost exclusively concerned with the ideology of their movement, to Ginn they became a fetish. Not only did he repeatedly warn the other trustees to maintain a balanced budget, but he spent much of his time in trying to raise additional funds from interested businessmen and philanthropists like Andrew Carnegie.[59] In carrying his business "boosterism" into the Foundation, however, he thought almost exclusively in quantitative rather than qualitative terms. Instead of emphasizing the content and proper distribution of pacifist literature, for example, Ginn measured the relative success of the Foundation (as well as of the entire peace movement) largely in terms of the money it could raise and the sheer amount of literature it could produce. Indeed, as one of his co-workers truthfully pointed out, Ginn tried to promote peace in the same way that he promoted his textbooks.[60]

---

[58] The best public statement of Ginn's business approach to the Foundation is his address in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1913, 24-25.

Ginn's exaggerated emphasis on business methods was further aggravated by his financial conservatism. A self-made man--he once boasted that he was "*blessed* with poverty" in his youth--Ginn firmly believed that his unquestioning acceptance of the puritanical values of self-help and thrift had brought him his business success.[61] In transferring the latter value to the peace movement, he not only wanted the Foundation to allot its funds wisely but was also reluctant to spend the full income. If it had proven a sound practice in the first years of Ginn and Company to pursue cautious financial policies, he reasoned, similar policies were prudent for the newly-established Foundation. Besides, he envisaged conservative fiscal practices only until other millionaires lavished their funds on the Foundation. "We have got to husband our resources," he said in organizing the endowment, "until the big financial men come to our aid with their donations, which I feel sure will come when we are once started."[62] But in order to conserve money while awaiting this financial aid, Ginn continued the practice of the International Library by selling the Foundation's peace books at cost; and since additional outside funds were not immediately forthcoming, he even raised the price of the books when he saw the opportunity for larger revenues.[63]

---

[59] Ginn to Mead, March 7, 8, 1911, WPF Papers, Box 2.

[60] George W. Anderson to Ginn, November 21, 1912, *ibid.*, Box 3.

[61] Edwin Ginn, *Outline of the Life of Edwin Ginn, Including his Preparation for the Publishing Business and the Establishment of Ginn and Company* (Boston: Athenaeum Press, 1908), 3-4.

His bequest of one million dollars was another obvious sign of his fiscal conservatism. Although he advertised his posthumous gift ostensibly to attract contributions from other wealthy individuals who could see that it would guarantee the permanency of the Foundation, to potential donors it seemed to indicate his reluctance to invest a major portion of his fortune in the current operations of the Foundation. For all his efforts to gain contributions from outside sources, therefore, Ginn failed to arouse more than the passing interest of wealthy individuals who could not quite understand why Ginn should solicit their funds while withholding a large portion of his own. Carnegie well expressed their dismay at Ginn's parsimonious approach. After bluntly refusing Ginn's appeals for his financial assistance to the World Peace Foundation, Carnegie chided its founder: "Frankly, my friend, I wish to say that I think you will find great difficulty in obtaining additional funds unless you transfer the $1,000,000 to your organization; that would be a nucleus and mite [sic] induce others to contribute."[64] But Ginn, who was unwilling to abandon his fiscal theories, refused to heed this advice. Instead, he convinced himself that Carnegie refused to contribute money to the Foundation because he was jealous that Ginn had become the first great philanthropist for peace.[65] In 1912 he even persuaded the trustees to hire a business manager to approach potential donors, but the latter's efforts also failed to attract any substantial contributions to the Foundation.[66]

---

[62] Ginn to Jordan, November 23, 1909, Jordan Papers, Supplementary Correspondence.

[63] Ginn to R. L. Bridgman, April 26, 1913, WPF Papers, Box 4.

Ginn's value of self-help, another ingredient in his business philosophy, was reflected in his curiously ambivalent premises on human psychology. Although he had unbounded faith in the essential goodness and reason of the people, he also believed that their lasting interest in reform movements derived not so much from idealistic or humanitarian motives as from economic self-interest. "People are interested in what they pay for," he remarked on more than one occasion, "and they don't care much for anything that is given to them--books, lectures, of [sic] anything else."[67] He assumed, in fact, that the individual's investment in the peace movement was the surest guarantee of his emotional involvement. It was partly for this reason that Ginn condemned the peace societies which largely overlooked his stake-in-society approach in favor of spoken appeals to the hearts and minds of their listeners at public meetings and peace congresses. He also had very little use for the lecture tours of the Foundation's directors which in his view momentarily entertained but did not permanently convert their audiences.[68]

---

[64] Carnegie to Ginn, March 22, 1911, ibid., Box 3.

[65] Ginn to Dutton, July 30, 1913, ibid., Box 4.

[66] Ginn to Mead, November 12, 1912, ibid., Box 3. "The World Peace Foundation: Work in 1913," World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, III, No. 12 (December, 1913), 44-47; Jordan to Editor, Milwaukee Sentinel, September 5, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

Ginn's attitude toward the American School Peace League pointedly illustrates the narrowness of his business approach to the peace movement. Although the League was a leading nonendowed educational agency in the organized peace movement, Ginn strongly opposed appropriating any funds to it. In the first place, he argued that the Foundation's limited resources precluded financial assistance to outside organizations.[69] Just as important, however, an outright annual gift to the League contradicted his own value of self-help. In his view such a donation really amounted to a dole and would "pauperize" the teachers in the nation by discouraging their own financial involvement. Only the personal investment of the teachers themselves in the League would gain their permanent interest in its activities. "There is not one of those teachers," he insisted, "but could give $1 or $5 for carrying on this work if they were sufficiently interested. If the School Peace League were established on such a plan it would be selfsupporting [sic] and a hundred times as much could be done as now."[70] Nor did Mrs. Andrews, the League's secretary, meet his standards of business efficiency. Unfairly overlooking her untiring efforts to organize branches of the League throughout the nation and Europe, he criticized her for adopting the same fruitless propaganda methods as the peace societies: "I feel she is doing too much on the old American Peace Society method of conventional hot air meetings once or twice a year. It is like writing in water--when the stick has passed through the waves, the waves immediately obliterate the letters."[71]

---

[67] Ginn to Jordan, January 29, 1912, Jordan Papers, Supplementary Correspondence; Ginn to Mead, May 16, 1912, WPF Papers, Box 3.

[68] Ginn to Mead, May 16, 1912, and Ginn to Dutton, May 16, 1912, both in ibid., Box 3.

[69] Ginn to Mead, January [?], 1911, ibid, Box 2; Ginn to Jordan, May 15, 1911, Jordan Papers, Supplementary Correspondence.

Ginn's colleagues in the Foundation consistently resisted his attempts to implement his financial and organizational theories. The principal opposition came from Edwin Mead, the other central figure in the Foundation. If Ginn's business background colored his outlook toward the Foundation, Mead's longstanding literary career shaped his. A humanist by temperament, Mead believed that the ideas of individual "great men" rather than economic forces determined the course of history. His own historical writings, for instance, strongly suggested that the moral power of the ideas of a few prophets like Luther or Emerson had significantly influenced and ultimately symbolized the reformist spirit of their eras.[72] In his view the growth of the peace movement was but the most recent of the many moral reforms of modern history. Since a talented elite of peace workers was actively preaching the pacifist message throughout the nation, he was confident that the force of their arguments would eventually convert the masses to pacifist thinking, reform the bases of world politics, and eventually inscribe their own names in the pages of human history.[73]

---

[70] Ginn to Jordan, January 29, 1912, ibid.

[71] Ginn to Jordan, March 18, 1911, ibid.

In terms of his own idealism, Mead found very little merit in Ginn's business-like approach to the Foundation. To begin with, he had much more faith than Ginn in the peace societies. It is significant, for example, that after the death of Edward Everett Hale and except for his own wife Mead's closest associate in the peace movement was Benjamin Trueblood, the secretary of the American Peace Society, the same society which Ginn claimed Trueblood had "made feeble for so many years."[74] Mead's sympathy for the peace societies derived not only from his personal friendhips, however; he also firmly believed in their reliance on the spoken and written word for their propaganda methods. Assuming the basic good will and sincerity of all peoples, he believed that the directors' reasoned appeals in public lectures and short pamphlets would uplift and convert their listeners and readers.[75] Mead himself, who was one of the talented elite in the peace movement, went to incredible lengths in preaching the pacifist message in magazine articles and lecture tours. So ardently did he believe that a few prophets with adequate financial support from the Foundation could most effectively appeal to the reservoir of American idealism that he strongly opposed Ginn's materialistic emphasis. When Ginn criticized the lecture appearances of his co-workers, for example, Mead defended them.[76] And when Ginn first proposed a business manager, Mead obviously annoyed at Ginn's persistent one-dimensional approach, replied sharply: "It is perfectly evident to me, as it has been from the beginning, and as I expect is now evident to you also, that, whatever titles have been carelessly distributed, the real responsibility for the administration of the Foundation must rest with me, just as the preliminary work of these years for bringing the Foundation to its present position has been mine."[77]

---

[72] Martin Luther: A Study of Reformation (Boston: George H. Ellis, 1883), 9-10, 27, 183, 186; The Influence of Emerson (Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1903), 13, 34-35.

[73] See Mead, "The Literature of the Peace Movement," World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, No. 7, Part IV (October 1912), 1-14.

[74] See, for example, Mead, introduction to Trueblood, The Development of the Peace Idea, xviii-xxviii. Ginn to Jordan, March 18, 1911, Jordan Papers, Supplementary Correspondence.

---

[75] Mead to Ginn, June 16, 1913, WPF Papers, Box 4; and Mead to Fannie Fern Andrews, March 15, 1911, *ibid.*, Box 2.

[76] E.g., when Ginn criticized a lecture tour by Hamilton Holt under the Foundation's auspices, Mead defended him as "one of our very best helper's [sic]." Mead, marginal comment on letter from Ginn to Mead, May 29, 1912, *ibid.*, Box 3.

[77] Mead to Ginn, October 14, 1911, *ibid.*, Box 2.

Similarly, Mead opposed Ginn's constrictive policy of thrift. Although he recognized that money was a prerequisite for carrying on the Foundation's propaganda activities and even tried to secure additional funds from Carnegie,[78] he was much more anxious than Ginn to spend the full budget. Thus, when Ginn opposed any expenditure to the American School Peace League, Mead wrote an impassioned latter to the trustees defending the League as an important educational agency in the peace movement. He saw the League issue, insignificant in itself, as a test case in the future direction of the Foundation. To support the League, he argued, would broaden the Foundation's activities, give it some influence over the League's policies, and, most important, arouse the interest of the Carnegie trustees and Carnegie himself, who, seeing its expansive temper, might be encouraged to subsidize the Foundation's future educational programs. On the other hand, if the Foundation refused to appropriate any funds to the League, it would demonstrate a cautious approach to the peace movement, discourage investors, and perhaps stagnate.[79]

Ginn found himself increasingly isolated in the Foundation because the other leading director, David Starr Jordan, almost always supported Mead's position. Like Mead, Jordan believed

---

[78] Mead to Carnegie, May 13, 18, June 15, 1914, all in the Holt Papers, Box 1. Mead's appeals for funds were undoubtedly inspired by Carnegie's recent gift to the Church Peace Union.

[79] Mead to the Finance Committee of the Board of Trustees of the World Peace Foundation, February 9, 1911; Mead to Ginn, February 15, 1911, both in WPF Papers, Box 2.

"the best efforts of a few great men who have shown their power to mould and to guide public opinion" rather than businessmen of Ginn's stripe should formulate the Foundation's policies. Accordingly, he was only lukewarm to Ginn's suggestion for a business manager.[80] Moreover, he supported Mead's position on the American School Peace League by strongly attacking Ginn's alternative suggestion to reorganize the League on a self-supporting basis. It would be impractical and ultimately futile, Jordan said, to ask teachers to contribute $1 or $5 to the League when they already had too many burdens on ther slender purses. Realizing Ginn's aversion to peace societies, Jordan argued even more persuasively when he pointed out the irony of Ginn's proposal: "[T]o collect fees would require a paid agent for every three or four states, and the final result would be that at last we should be doing just what the peace societies are doing now." It would be far easier and more fruitful for the directors to explain the League's program to teacher conventions, as Jordan had already done, and enlist the interested teachers in the League solely on the basis of their support of its idealistic aims.[81] But Ginn, imprisoned by his values of thrift and self-help, acquiesced only reluctantly in the vote of the trustees to allot the paltry sum of $2500 to the League.[82]

---

[80] Jordan to Ginn, February 3, 1912, Jordan Papers, Supplementary Correspondence.

[81] *Ibid.*; also Jordan to Ginn, October 21, 1912, WPF Papers, Box 3.

[82] Ginn to Jordan, January 29, 1912, Jordan Papers, Supplementary Correspondence. For Ginn's cautious public approval of the League, see *Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1913*, 26-27.

Not too much should be made of these temperamental and tactical differences, for all the directors and Ginn himself were idealistic pacifists earnestly laboring for world peace. Moreover, they were reasonable men who confidently believed that they could settle their disagreements amicably. Shortly after Ginn's death, for example, Mead admitted that he had often found many of Ginn's ideas impulsive, inconsistent, and extravagant, but he added even more emphatically that he had always worked closely with Ginn, even regularly criticizing his speeches upon Ginn's request, and had never doubted his profound and persistent devotion to the pacifist cause.[83] There is also no evidence that the other directors and trustees ever allowed their disagreements to develop into personal or factional feuds. On the contrary, they had such high regard for each other and their common endeavor that they freely and frankly expressed what they believed were only honest and healthy differences of opinion.[84]

Nevertheless, it is obvious that the trustees could not formulate coherent programs so long as the dual leadership of Ginn on the one hand, and Mead and Jordan on the other, frequently disagreed on the basic policies of the Foundation. If it is true that the juxtaposition of their temperaments never brought open discord, it is also fair to say that their ideas on practical policies were more conflicting than complementary. Indeed, the same disjunction of idealism and tactics, of means and ends which hindered the efforts of the peace societies was also evident in the Foundation before the World War. Ginn himself admitted that he was very discouraged with the disparity between the Foundation's high intentions and its meagre accomplishments.[85] And although Ginn's sudden death on January 21, 1914, might have led eventually to a more congenial atmosphere in the Foundation, the outbreak of the World War only six months later immediately presented such serious new problems to its personnel, as we shall see, that the disunity of the pre-war years was only further exacerbated.

---

[83] Mead to Albert E. Pillsbury, December 12, 1914, Mead Papers, Box 1; Edwin Mead, "Edwin Ginn, Citizen of the World," Journal of Education, LXXIX (February 12, 1914), 173, is a eulogy.

[84] The correspondence between Ginn, Mead, Jordan and other members of the Foundation in the WPF Papers and Jordan Papers, Supplementary Correspondence, reveals their candid differences which did not seem to affect their cordial relationships or their earnestness in promoting the Foundation's activities.

Meanwhile, the Carnegie Endowment revealed further disunity among the peace forces. While the pacifist reservations on the World Peace Foundation came largely from within the organization itself, the board of trustees of the Carnegie Endowment contained only one professed pacifist, James L. Slayden, who could provide the same kind of self-criticism, and Slayden's duties as Congressman were too time-consuming to permit any attempt to steer the Endowment toward pacifism. As a result, the criticisms of the Endowment had to come from disaffected pacifists outside the organization. Although the pacifists were disappointed with the conservative appointments to the board of trustees, they had at first hoped that the Endowment would champion aggressive pacifist programs. Yet its emphasis on scholarly studies and international law soon confirmed their fears that it was more a research institution interested in promoting the long-range aim of international understanding among a small group of scholars and international lawyers than an active, vital force in the peace movement.

---

[85] Ginn to Jordan, June 8, 1911, January 29, 1912, Jordan Papers, Supplementary Correspondence.

Once convinced of the Carnegie trustees' indifference to the immediate concerns of the peace movement, the pacifists made the Endowment their whipping boy. Edwin Ginn, for example, complained about its failure to conduct a massive propaganda campaign for peace. "So far I have not seen very much evidence of a practical live wire in their work," he noted, "but mostly work among fossils and among the economists, which in the next millenium may be operative, but where are the live wires they are placing and influencing immediately the people? Where are the men and women they are engaging every day to go right out and work and educate the people? Where are their forces?"[86] Holt and Jordan were just as critical. While Holt remarked with evident sarcasm that "some of the trustees prefer peace but are not much averse to war," Jordan lamented their failure to use the Endowment's enormous financial resources to mobilize public opinion both at home and abroad against the growth of armaments.[87]

Since Ginn, Holt, and Jordan were all members of the World Peace Foundation, their resentment at the failure of the Carnegie trustees to give a portion of the Endowment's funds to their own organization may have inspired their remarks. A more plausible explanation, however, is that in terms of their own activist temperaments the programs of the Carnegie Endowment seemed too high-brow and pedantic to have much influence on the so-called masses. Morevoer, other pacifists outside the World Peace Foundation shared their feelings. Frederick Lynch was more cautious in his overall appraisal of the Endowment, but he still criticized its failure to exploit the propaganda potential for the peace movement in current world situations such as the Balkan conflagrations:

---

[86] Ginn to Mead and Jordan, March 29, 1912, WPF Papers, Box 3.

[87] The Independent, LXXVII (February 16, 1914), 219; cf. Holt's earlier and milder criticism in New York Tribune, December 25, 1910; Jordan to Mead, February 12, 1913, Mead Papers, Box 1.

> Just when Europe and America were so outraged over the unspeakable horrors of the Balkan War, perhaps it should have taken every cent of its income--a million dollars would not have been too much--and flooded the nation with pamphlets giving the fullest details of the atrocities.... There are times when one great stroke at the psychological moment counts far more than years of academic investigation.[88]

Even the American Peace Society, which generally approved the Endowment's cultural exchange programs and was of course grateful for its annual subvention to the Society, questioned its lopsided financial support of international law and other non-pacifist international organizations. Compared with the financial support of these groups, members of the Society complained, its subvention to the American Peace Society, less than one-sixteenth of the Endowment's total budget, was a mere pittance.[89]

---

[88] Lynch, "Peace and War in 1913," Yale Review, III, new series (January 1914), 283.

[89] Advocate of Peace, LXXV (August and September, 1913), 172-73; for more favorable comments of the Endowment, see ibid., LXXV (May 1913), 99; and (November, 1913), 229.

Since the Endowment never claimed to promote the immediate concerns of the peace movement, the pacifists' indictment was not entirely justified. Yet Nicholas Murray Butler's attitude toward pacifists and peace societies did not improve their unsatisfactory relations. Butler never fully approved of the formation of new peace societies which he believed duplicated the activities of already existing pacifist agencies and only detracted from international organizations like the American Association of International Conciliation, which he headed. He also disapproved of the word "peace" in their titles because of its possible radical connotation, and had Carnegie accepted his advice, he would have omitted the word from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.[90] Like the other peace workers, Butler was particularly interested in winning "the best minds" to the movement.[91] But whereas the other peace workers also tried to win over the middle classes and, to a lesser extent, the lower classes to their movement, Butler was not so adjustable. In placing value only on an intellectual elite in the peace movement, he did not please and occasionally annoyed pacifists who needed his support to obtain the Endowment's funds for their peace societies but were bewildered by his pontifical attitude.[92]

---

[90] Butler to Dutton, January 21, 1908, NYPS Papers, Box 2, gives these reasons for refusing to join the New York Peace Society; Hendrick, Carnegie II, 338. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book for 1912, 76-77, contains the best public statement of Butler's views on peace societies.

[91] Butler to Dutton, January 21, 1908, NYPS Papers, Box 2.

(4)

In general, however, the pacifists directed their criticisms only at a few specific aspects of their movement--the cause itself was still laudable and worthwhile. The remarks of the pacifists on their failure to organize the laboring men and ordinary citizens, for example, were more suggestions than criticisms, for they too believed that moral education was the panacea for world peace. With the possible exception of Edwin Ginn who disagreed with almost all the peace workers, their differences were more temperamental than ideological, more of mood than of substance, more rhetorical than real, with the activists and idealists more impatient and earnest than the rest of their cohorts in their desire to broaden the educational campaign which the peace societies and the World Peace Foundation had begun. Above all else, the affinity of the peace workers was cultural, for almost all of them represented the professional classes, especially professors and school teachers, and shared the common belief that world peace was primarily a matter of moral uplift and educational reform. The peace workers faced a somewhat paradoxical situation: the same cultural ties which tended to isolate them from the masses of citizenry who had little interest in moral reform and even less in the aura of gentility and respectability of the peace leaders also tended to bind them more closely together. Compared with the gap between the masses and the peace leaders, the latters' differences seemed minor. Even the idealistic Edwin Mead maintained friendly relationships with all the peace advocates, including the conservative leaders of the Carnegie Endowment.[93] Nor did the other pacifists consider the Endowment a lost cause to the peace movement. Despite Hamilton Holt's sharp criticism of the trustees of the Endowment, for example, he still hoped that they would pursue more active programs in the future. He thought that Carnegie's appointment of five members of the World Peace Foundation and none from the Carnegie Endowment to the Church Peace Union in February, 1914, might lead to more aggressive policies from the Carnegie trustees, who would realize that their benefactor was more in sympathy with the activists in the peace movement than the cautious peace advocates of the Carnegie Endowment.[94]

---

[92] Arthur D. Call to William H. Short, February 10, 1914, NYPS Papers, Box 2. This appraisal of Butler is also based on James T. Shotwell's observations of Butler's attitude toward his co-workers in the peace movement in the 1920's, but to a lesser degree they also apply to pacifists before 1914. See his "Impressions of Nicholas Murray Butler," in the Columbia Oral History Project, Columbia University Library.

---

[93] Mead's major complaint against the Endowment was that it lulled people into complacency: "It makes people think this movement has got all the money it needs, and that they need not exert themselves." American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 148. Although Mead maintained friendly relations with the more cautious peace leaders partly in the hope that the Carnegie Endowment would help finance the activities of the World Peace Foundation or its related educational agencies, he was unquestionably sincere in his belief that their differences were not incompatible. See his praise of Elihu Root, for example, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1913, 104-09; Mead to Ginn, March 29, 1911, WPF Papers, Box 2, and Mead to Nasmyth, March 18, 1913, Nasmyth Papers, Box 1.

[94] The Independent, LXXVII (February 16, 1914), 219.

Furthermore, the overlapping membership in the peace societies and endowments increased the personal contacts of the peace leaders and gave them an even clearer understanding of their conflicting viewpoints. The pacifists who participated in more than one peace organization found very little difficulty in cooperating with their associates. Samuel Train Dutton, who served as trustee of the World Peace Foundation, section head of the American Peace Society, secretary of the New York Peace Society, and the American Representative on the Carnegie Endowment's Balkan Commission, worked as closely with Nicholas Murray Butler, his colleague at Columbia University, as he did with more idealistic pacifists like Trueblood, Mead, and Jordan. An able administrator, even-tempered and kindly, Dutton was well-suited as a compromiser and harmonizer among the different peace groups.[95] In 1909, it will be recalled, he had introduced the plan for federating the peace societies around the American Peace Society. In January 1914, he urged Butler to consider an even more ambitious project: "a great international journal, which would, of course, absorb the American Peace Society's Advocate of Peace and be supported by the Carnegie Endowment, the World Peace Foundation, and the American Peace Society, that is, a merging of all interests in one self-respecting organ which will be able to look the army and navy journal [sic] in the face without blushing."[96]

---

[95] See, for example, his emphasis on the cooperation of the peace forces in New York Peace Society, Yearbook 1913, 24-25.

[96] Dutton to Jordan, January 3, 1914, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

Whether Butler buried the proposal or the outbreak of the World War interfered with further efforts in this direction is not clear, but in any case the suggestion never progressed beyond the preliminary stages.[97] In light of the rather cool relationship between the two endowments, Dutton's proposal was probably too optimistic. Nevertheless, it illustrates the extraordinary confidence Dutton had in the good will and cooperative spirit of the leaders of the multifarious peace organizations.

Indeed, the remarkable fact is that the pacifists were so little discouraged by the disunity among the peace forces. Although differences in tactics and temperament between the idealists and more practical peace advocates seriously hindered their effective cooperation, most of the pacifists refused to believe that their movement suffered from any underlying weaknesses. Rather, they naively assumed that their criticisms were not tarnishing their self-image but were purging it of its minor shortcomings, and that their free exchange of ideas would lead to an even more active and vigorous movement in the future.

It is not difficult to explain their self-confidence. Idealistic in outlook, the pacifists automatically minimized the importance of potentially disruptive ideas of peace leaders, which, if admitted, might have undermined their own beliefs in the attainment of world peace. Their pacifism, after all, was a faith, both philosophical and emotional, and like all faiths could not be shaken only by tactical or temperamental differences. As long as world peace prevailed, they felt no need to subject their own or their cohorts' thinking on international affairs to deeper scrutiny. Finally, the sudden attainment of many of their immediate aims in the first year of the Wilson Administration, which had been frustrated during Taft's presidency, further nourished the pacifist faith. At the moment when the shortcomings of the peace movement seemed momentarily to discourage some of them, several actions by the Wilson Administration almost immediately raised their hopes for the ultimate triumph of their cause. However numerous the debits of the peace movement, in short, they paled beside the many new credits which the pacifists could cite as examples of its continued vitality. It is to these credits which we must now turn.

---

[97] I found no references to Dutton's scheme beyond his own casual remark in his letter to Jordan cited above.

# VII. THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION, 1913-1914

## (1)

Always optimistic about the future, the pacifists needed only the hope of success to buoy their spirits and to inspire them once again to the heights of their previous campaign for Taft's arbitration treaties. The events of the first year of the Wilson administration more than satisfied their hopes. In the first months their high expectations derived not so much from the new President, whose relationship to the peace movement was not yet entirely clear, but from the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, who had long been an active participant in the organized peace movement. Not an absolute pacifist, Bryan nonetheless inclined toward radical pacifism. He had abhorred war as a young man; and though he had strongly supported the war with Spain and even enlisted in the American army during the conflict, he emerged from the hostilities considerably sobered in his view of war. He never apologized for his endorsement of the American nation's war with Spain, but the thought that a just war to liberate the Cubans from their Spanish oppressors could turn into a war of conquest of innocent Filipinos and the advancement of imperialism and militarism repelled him. Thereafter he used his influence in the Democratic party in behalf of the independence of the Philippines and against increases in the army and navy.[1]

Bryan's reaction to American imperialism brought to the surface the deeper reasons for his maturing pacifism. The mainsprings of his pacifistic sentiments lay in his early Christian training and his unbounded faith in man's moral progress. The two influences blended easily in his thought, for by progress and morality he meant the advancement of Christian morality. Bryan's Christianity was always social in emphasis. In fact, his ideas on foreign affairs were very similar to the social gospel clergymen who also participated in the pre-war peace movement. If Christianity emphasized that all men were brothers, the Great Commoner consistently argued, they were not just brothers in some future life but here and now in this world. He preached the acceptance of Christ's teachings, moreover, not just for domestic relationships but, once the United States was thrust onto the stage of world politics, for international relationships as well. Beginning around 1900, he reiterated his belief that the United States, the shining example of Christian progress, should provide the antidote to the growth of imperialism and militarism among nations. In accepting the Democratic presidential nomination in 1900, for example, he declared that the United States was "a republic standing erect while empires all around are bowed beneath the weight of their own armaments...a republic gradually but surely becoming the supreme moral factor in the world's progress and the accepted arbiter of the world's disputes."[2] In succeeding years he frequently asserted that the United States should champion the spirit of reason and moral suasion over physical force in international affairs.[3] His foreign travels and the burgeoning reform sentiment within the United States seem to have strengthened his faith in man's progress toward the realization of the brotherhood of man, for he increasingly emphasized that the power of Christian love was growing not just within the nation but throughout the world. Always an optimist--indeed, a compulsive one--he did not waver in his belief that the day was not far distant when mankind would attain the desired goal of world peace.[4]

---

[1] Merle Eugene Curti, Bryan and World Peace, in Smith College Studies in History, XVI (April-July 1931), 117-18, 130-31, 134-35, 140. In this section on Bryan, I have drawn heavily on Curti's study as well as more recent interpretations of Bryan's career by Lawrence W. Levine, Defender of the Faith, William Jennings Bryan: The Last Decade, 1915-1925, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965); and Willard H. Smith, "William Jennings Bryan and the Social Gospel," Journal of American History, LIII (June 1966), 41 ff.

Not content with mere rhetoric, Bryan formulated a concrete plan that would advance the pacifist cause. Writing in his weekly newspaper The Commoner in 1905, he proposed conciliation treaties that would automatically refer all differences between the signatory powers to a permanent commission of inquiry which would investigate and report on the dispute within a year. During the investigation Bryan's plan called for a "cooling off" period during which each nation agreed not to resort to the use of force, though reserving the right to fight after the report had been published if it was dissatisfied with the decision. He believed, however, that the period of delay and the restraining voice of public opinion would cool tempers and make wars unlikely.[5] Bryan later wrote that his conciliation proposal "was the outgrowth of a plan which I had advocated for the settlement of labor disputes. I had for some time been favorable to investigation in all cases, the parties reserving the right of independent action, and it occurred to me that the same plan might be applied with advantage to international disputes,...as a preventative of war."[6] In the eight years following his initial proposal he championed his peace plan in The Commoner and in speeches on the Chautauqua circuit and at various peace congresses. Especially notable was the adoption of a similar plan presented by Richard Bartholdt at the meeting of the Interparliamentary Union in London in 1906. Bryan himself attended the meeting, and though not an official delegate, was invited to address the conference. His speech on the advantages of mediation and conciliation persuaded the delegates to endorse unanimously Bartholdt's proposal.[7] In addition, a few years later Bryan persuaded President Taft to insert an article in his arbitration treaties providing for a "cooling off" period of one year during which the joint high commission of inquiry made the investigation. Taft did not share Bryan's commitment to pacifism, but he credited Bryan with this contribution to his arbitration treaties.[8]

---

[2] William Jennings Bryan, Speeches of William Jennings Bryan (2 vols., New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1909), II, 49. Bryan repeated most of this speech on March 6, 1913, to indicate his enduring faith in these principles. New York Times, March 7, 1913, 2:3.

[3] In 1901, for example, he wrote a friend about the theme of his current lecture tour: "I have been using as a subject A Conquering Nation, and I emphasize the idea that we ought to conquer the world with our ideas rather than with our armies." Bryan to Warren Worth Bailey, December 30, 1901, Warren Worth Bailey Papers (Princeton University Library).

[4] See, for example, his addresses to the National Arbitration and Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1907, 353-60, and 390-95; Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1910, 164-73; Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1911, 44-49; also Smith, "William Jennings Bryan," 57-58; and Levine, Bryan, 7-8, 358-359.

---

[5] The Commoner, V (February 17, 1905), 1:1; (February 24, 1905), 1:1.

[6] Bryan to Holt, August 28, 1914, Holt Papers, Box 1; also see Bryan to Wayne Williams, January 26, 1923, Bryan Papers, Box 36.

Although President Wilson offered Bryan the Secretaryship of State as a political reward for his past leadership of the Democracy, Bryan accepted only after he received the President's full blessing of his treaty plan.[9] From the beginning, Bryan viewed his cabinet post as a supreme opportunity to advance the cause of world peace. "I made up my mind before I accepted the offer of the Secretaryship of State," he said a few months after he undertook his duties, "that I would not take the office if I thought there would be a war during my tenure."[10] Supremely optimistic that his peace treaties would help to prevent such a possibility, he began almost immediately to negotiate "cooling off" treaties with foreign governments. By 1915 he had concluded thirty of them, twenty of which were eventually ratified.[11]

---

[7] Bryan later wrote: "I do not know whether he [Bartholdt] had seen my editorial or whether it just happened that we advocated the plan independent of each other." Bryan to Holt, August 28, 1914, Holt Papers, Box 1. Bartholdt claimed that he arrived at his own plan entirely independently. From Steerage to Congress, 279.

[8] William Jennings Bryan and Mary Baird Bryan, Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan, (Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co., 1925), 385; William Howard Taft, "Why Not Arbitrate Everything?" The Independent, LXXVII (March 16, 1914), 380.

[9] Bryan to Harry Walker, January 20, 1915, Bryan Papers, Box 30; Bryan to Wayne C. Williams, January 26, 1923, ibid., Box 36.

The peace advocates were virtually unanimous in support of Bryan's treaties. David Starr Jordan expressed perhaps most enthusiastically the reaction of the idealistic pacifists to his treaty plan. He met Bryan in late April 1913 in Sacramento, California, where the new secretary was attempting to persuade the California legislature to remove the harsh anti-Japanese provisions from the proposed alien land bill. Jordan, who was also laboring for a more moderate bill at the state capitol, was immediately impressed by Bryan's personal magnetism.[12] When he asked Bryan about the administration's conciliation treaties, moreover, he was convinced both of their worth and Bryan's wholehearted efforts in their behalf. They were "an addition to arbitration," he reported to his wife, "but I think most effective. He is devoting his whole strength for the rest of his days to international peace. He has the chance (and the will and the skill) to do more than anyone yet has done. Success to him!" Even more complimentary, Jordan added: "In Bryan, I acknowledge a master in the job I am trying to be an apprentice in."[13] Almost all friends of peace--moderate as well as radical, Republican as well as Democratic, foreign as well as American--endorsed his treaties. Some of them were less sanguine than Jordan concerning the ultimate benefit of his peace treaties, but they all agreed that they would increase international understanding and, at least in some cases, help to prevent wars.[14]

---

[10] New York Times, May 13, 1913, 1:2. Two days before assuming office he told Josephus Daniels, who was to be the Secretary of the Navy in the new administration: "There will be no war while I am Secretary of State." Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910-1917 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), 428. See also New York Times, December 11, 1913, 1:6.

[11] Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 157-61.

[12] Of Bryan's speech to the legislature, Jordan wrote: "Bryan is great! I think that his message is successful. Nothing drastic will be done. Probably nothing at all will go into the hands of the State Department where it belongs. And he is a wonder for cooling anger. Governor [Hiram] Johnson is as gentle as I am." Jordan to Jessie Jordan, April 29, 1913, Jordan Peace Correspondence. Since the California legislature, ultimately flouting the appeals of the Wilson administration, made only one minor change in the proposed legislation, Jordan's exhilaration reflected a naive optimism. It was precisely this faith in human nature, however, which made him, as it did Bryan, so persistently hopeful for the pacifist cause.

Although the pacifists' admiration for Bryan was spontaneous, they warmed almost as quickly to Woodrow Wilson. They knew the new President was no full-blown pacifist and had, in fact, shown very little interest in foreign affairs during the Presidential campaign. Nevertheless, he was well aware of the activities of the American peace movement and shared its basic aims. He had joined the American Peace Society in 1908, for example, and had addressed the Universal Peace Union in February 1912.[15] Moreover, he had definite ideas about international politics in general and American foreign policy in particular. Although his criticism of American naval weakness in his account of the coming of the War of 1812 in his multivolume A History of the American People (1902) seemed to lend encouragement to the large-navy forces, all his other pronouncements on foreign affairs conveyed an idealistic outlook similar to the pacifists'. He had consistently applauded American efforts in the arbitration movement and believed that morality should be the proper guide in foreign policy, just as it should be in domestic politics. Above all, he believed in the American mission: the United States should assume the leadership in promoting democracy, morality, and justice throughout the world. The application of these American ideals in the international area, he confidently believed, would advance the cause of world peace.[16] Even the most enthusiastic pacifist partisans of Taft could not deny that Wilson's credentials as a friend of peace were as impressive, if yet untested. Consequently, the pacifists had high hopes that Wilson would confirm their most favorable first impressions and perhaps promote their cause even more aggressively than his predecessor in the White House.[17]

---

[13] Jordan to Jessie Jordan, April 29, 30, 1913, ibid.

[14] For some of the many endorsements of his treaties by peace workers, see Advocate for Peace, LXXV (May 1913), 97-98; (July 1913), 146-47; (October 1913), 200; Bartholdt, address, in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 359; Theodore E. Burton, address, in ibid., 528-30; Edwin Mead, address, in Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1913, 106; resolution, in ibid., 10; Taft, The United States and World Peace (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), 130-131; The Independent, LXXIV (May 1, 1913), 949-50; Dutton to Bryan, July 24, 1913, 500.A3/15; New York Times, August 24, 1913, III, 3:3. The few critics were mostly foreign pacifists. Norman Angell, referring to the Secretary's peace efforts in general, thought that "The Bryan type of work, declamatory and unscientific, does, I am afraid, as much harm as good." Angell to Jordan, May 23, 1914, Jordan Peace Correspondence. Also see Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 152-53.

---

[15] Trueblood to Wilson, September 19, 1908, Woodrow Wilson Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Series 2, File 37; Peacemaker, XXXI (March 1912), 56-59.

[16] Wilson, letter, in Second Conference on International Arbitration...1904, 129; Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson (New York: Russell& Russell, 1965 edition), 69-70, 82-84, 105, 116-19, 129-30, 156, 173, 178, 186-87, 228, 240, 277. Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), ch. 1, is a brilliant essay on the origins and development of Wilson's ideas on foreign affairs before 1913.

It should not be assumed, however, that the new President entered the White House with thoughts of catering to the peace leaders and obligingly promoting all their programs. Much as he shared the idealistic internationalism of the peace leaders, he was very conscious of the importance of public and congressional opinion and was to be careful as President not to champion peace measures which might adversely affect his own political fortunes and perhaps those of the Democratic party. Furthermore, a strong streak of egotism and his own political theory of a strong, assertive, and independent chief executive combined to make him temperamentally unsuited to accept advice from or give credit to the proposals of more than a narrow circle of his most trusted advisors. Even before he became President he showed signs of a cautious approach to the peace movement. When he began to entertain presidential ambitions, he did not renew his membership in the American Peace Society, carefully avoided making statements on Taft's arbitration treaties, and perhaps sensing the political overtones of Taft's presence at the Third American Peace Congress in Baltimore in early May 1911, politely but firmly declined to address or attend any of the sessions.[18] Even his speech to the Universal Peace Union shortly before the Senate's final action on Taft's arbitration treaties was circumspect on the subject. In the months between his inauguration and the outbreak of the World War, President Wilson was to remain on fairly friendly terms with all the peace leaders, including even the conservative Republican Senators Theodore Burton and Elihu Root, but his replies to their letters were formal, restrained in tone, and noncommittal, and in at least one instance he demonstrated that he did not want to encourage the peace leaders.[19] Although the World War was to reveal most clearly Wilson's labored struggle to reconcile his own love for peace and his temperamental predisposition to lead public opinion in this direction, on the one hand, with the practical, political requirement of bending to the pressures of public opinion on the issues of neutrality, even if they might mean war, on the other, the same tensions existed in his approach to foreign affairs from the first days of his administration. Before August 1914, however, these tensions were manifest in subdued form. His relationship to the peace workers in these pre-war months was significant not so much because of any measureable influence they had on him but because he shared their outlook on international relations and was sincerely interested in promoting their views in his foreign policies. They did not have to struggle to convert the new President, as they unsuccessfully struggled with Roosevelt, for he was already converted to their viewpoint. His beliefs on foreign affairs, and just as important, what the peace workers thought he believed, were to stimulate them to advance a long list of idealistic proposals for a "new" foreign policy on the incoming administration.

---

[17] Peacemaker, XXXII (January-February 1913), 6-7. Mead to Wilson, January 1, 2, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series 2, Box 72. In the latter letter Mead enclosed a World Peace Foundation pamphlet, written by David Brewer, prophetically entitled, "The Mission of the United States in the Cause of Peace," with Mead's marginal comments on significant passages. Carnegie sent Wilson a printed folder containing his peace message for the New Year. Carnegie wrote at the top: "First Copy sent to President Elect. The Fates cry out aloud 'Thou art the Man.'" Carnegie to Wilson, January 1, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series 2, Box 72.

---

[18] Wilson to Marburg, May 1, 1911, Theodore Marburg Correspondence with Woodrow Wilson, 1904-1918 (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Box 1.

[19] When Hamilton Holt wrote the President asking for an interview on the peace movement in general and Japan in particular, Wilson noted on his letter "Impossible." Apparently the secretary's reply to Holt (which I have not found in the Holt or Wilson Papers but the gist of which is given on the stenographer's note attached to Holt's letter) said that Wilson had a cabinet meeting on the day Holt wanted to see him. Holt wrote another letter asking for a later interview, and this time Wilson wrote "No." Holt to Wilson, October 9, 13, 1913, both in the Wilson Papers, Series 4, File 333.

Wilson had scarcely taken the oath of office when the pacifists began to predict that the President would support their programs. After praising the "fine moral tone" of the President's inaugural address, Edwin Mead confided to Nasmyth his belief that Wilson would actively promote the international peace movement.[20] David Starr Jordan was just as optimistic. He had known Wilson personally during their respective academic careers, had supported his Presidential candidacy, and admired his high-mindedness and sincerity of purpose. Confident that the new President would accept advice on international matters, Jordan wrote several letters to Wilson in the first months of his administration in which he urged a boldly imaginative and genuinely idealistic foreign policy: withdrawal of support from the Six Power Consortium in China, American leadership in recognizing the new Chinese Republic ("Our republic should be the first to acknowledge it," he wrote), non-interference in the ticklish Mexican situation, and the revision of the Monroe Doctrine as a joint American declaration against further colonization or intervention. Furthermore, he questioned the Secretary of the Navy's two battleship program and urged the administration to push the matter of the Third Hague Conference.[21] In short, Jordan asked the President to promote all the immediate aims of the peace movement.

---

[20] Mead to Nasmyth, March 18, 1913, Nasmyth Papers, Box 1.

The new president did not disappoint the peace leaders. They quickly warmed to his many early speeches which emphasized America's moral obligation to encourage and support peace sentiment throughout the world.[22] Moreover, the President's actions spoke louder than his words, for in the months before the outbreak of the World War, his moral-minded administration, wholly dedicated to the implementation of a New Diplomacy in world affairs, not only promoted Bryan's treaties but wrestled with all the international matters Jordan had mentioned and in most instances fulfilled the pacifists' highest hopes.

---

[21] Jordan to Wilson, March 8 (two letters), May 15, December 28, 1913, all in the Wilson Papers, Series 4, File 196. In addition, Jordan wrote Wilson several letters on the questions of fisheries, the Philippines, Japanese immigration, and other matters.

[22] The Advocate of Peace frequently quoted long portions of Wilson's speeches and added appreciative editorial comments. See, for example, LXXV (August-September 1913), 177; (October 1913), 207-208; and LXXVI (January 1914), 4. Wilson also endorsed the Fourth American Peace Congress. Wilson to Manley O. Hudson (chairman of the program committee), May 19, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series 3, Letterbook 3, which is reproduced in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 6.

## (2)

The New Freedom's China policy, its first major action in foreign affairs, expressed the aims of the idealistic pacifists. On March 18, 1913, President Wilson, strongly supported by Bryan, withdrew the government's support from the Six Power Consortium which the Taft administration, in cooperation with a syndicate of New York bankers, had promoted. The repudiation of Dollar Diplomacy in the Far East received the warm praise of the vast majority of Americans who had viewed American participation in the Consortium as a striking example of the dominant influence of the Wall Street interests in the government. Wilson's action was particularly gratifying to the anti-imperialists and idealistic internationalists who had long opposed the economic exploitation of foreign areas.[23] Less than two months later, the Wilson administration continued its moral diplomacy when it became the first major power formally to recognize the so-called Republic of China. The news of this action reached the American Peace Congress in St. Louis on May 2, 1913, which, to the sounds of enthusiastic applause, immediately dispatched a congratulatory message to the President of the Chinese Republic.[24]

---

[23] Jordan to Wilson, March 19, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series 4, File 227; The Independent, LXXIV (March 27, 1913), 671-72. Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 284-86, gives a good summary of the favorable response of American public opinion to Wilson's action.

[24] American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 348-49.

The administration's Far Eastern policy foreshadowed other actions that were equally applauded by the peace leaders. Another of their immediate concerns (the only one Jordan did not mention in his letters to the President) was the repeal of the section of the Panama Canal Tolls Act of 1912 that exempted American coastwise shipping from the payment of tolls at the Canal.[25] All the peace leaders were united in opposition to this exemption clause, pointing out that in their opinion the Congressional action was in clear violation of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901 which had guaranteed that the Canal would be open to the ships of "all nations" on "terms of entire equality." The honor and moral example of the American Republic rather than any fear of war induced their propaganda campaign on this issue. True to their beliefs in the sanctity of international law, they argued that the United States could never promote international understanding if it so shamelessly violated its treaty obligations. They also pointed out the intimate relationship between the tolls question, which especially displeased Great Britain, and the renewal of Root's limited Anglo-American arbitration treaty which expired in June 1913.[26] Hopeful for its renewal and possibly for a more inclusive one along the lines of Taft's earlier treaties,[27] the peace leaders emphasized that the exemption clause was doubly damaging to Anglo-American relations. Even the normally cautious Carnegie Endowment was so convinced that the United States should uphold its treaty obligations that it joined the pacifist campaign by printing and distributing 1,210,000 copies of its statement advocating repeal to newspapers, legislators, diplomats, and private associations.[28] Two officers of the Endowment, President Elihu Root, who had opposed the exemption clause during the Taft administration, and Vice-President Joseph Choate, who as Ambassador to Great Britain had played a part in the negotiations of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, undoubtedly prompted the Endowment's activity on this issue. Woodrow Wilson, who had earlier accepted unquestioningly the Democratic platform of 1912 endorsing the Congressional action, first indicated that he had changed his mind in January 1913 after listening to Choate and Root explain in detail that the

---

[25] Jordan's failure to mention the tolls issue was an oversight, for elsewhere he attacked the exemption clause as a violation of American treaty obligations and a direct benefit to what he called the "Coastwise Shipping Trust . . . the most heavily protected interest in the country." War and Waste: A Series of Discussions of War and War Accessories (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1913), 180-81, 183-87.

---

[26] Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1913, 140-77, contains the fullest discussion of these arguments; also resolution, in ibid., 10; Advocate of Peace, LXXV (January 1913), 1; and LXXVI (January 1914), 1; Peacemaker, XXXII (Mid-summer 1913), 57-61; The Independent, LXXIV (January 30, 1913), 224-26; and LXXVI (November 6, 1913), 238; "New York Peace Society Minutes," Meetings of January 30, 1913, and January 19, 1914, NYPS Papers, Box 1.

[27] Andrew Carnegie especially urged the President to propose an unlimited Anglo-American arbitration treaty. New York Times, October 18, 1913, 7:5, June 20, 1914, 5:3.

[28] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book for 1913-1914, 37-38, 79-82; New York Times, April 19, 1914, III, 3:1.

British interpretation of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was the correct one.[29]

Although Wilson deferred action on the matter until after he had completed his domestic program, he publicly repudiated that plank in the platform in January 1914.[30] The peace leaders were delighted but at first made no attempt to influence the outcome of the repeal bill in Congress. After a hard fought victory in the House, however, William H. Short of the New York Peace Society decided that outside pressure might bolster the repeal forces in the Senate. He immediately sounded out peace leaders to testify in favor of repeal before the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals. Although Choate told him that he opposed outside influence and was entirely willing to trust the judgment of the anti-exemption Republican Senators Lodge, Root, and Burton to aid the President on this matter, Short wrote Burton for his opinion.[31] Like Choate, Burton was worried that the peace advocates' testimony might be interpreted as interference by the Senate committee, but he asked Short to persuade one of the members of the New York Peace Society, Oscar Straus, to travel to Washington to interview the so-called Progressive Senators on the matter.[32] Short managed to convince Straus of Burton's plan, while Burton persuaded the Senate Committee members to extend an invitation to Straus to appear before them. Short also found that another member of the New York Peace Society, Professor Ernst Richard, was willing to testify. At the same time, however, Short revealed the same reluctance to associate the name of a peace society with lobbying activities that had characterized the peace forces during the Taft administration. He carefully pointed out to these prospective witnesses that they should not appear as representatives of the New York Peace Society, which might arouse the antagonism of committee members who had little or no sympathy with the peace movement, but as interested private citizens or as representatives of non-pacifist groups.[33] Thus, Straus' appearance before the Committee seemed nothing more than that of an experienced diplomat pointing out the possible unpleasant consequences of the coastwise exemption to American foreign policy, while Richard, a German-American claiming to represent 40,000 members of the North American Gymnastic Union, told the committee that this German-American group was not anti-British but on the contrary strongly favored repeal as a step toward better American understanding with all nations in the international community.[34] Although their testimony was far less important than Wilson's personal influence on anti-exemption Democratic committee members who were much more interested in party harmony than in obstinate obstruction, Straus' and Richard's views were received in a friendly spirit and may have helped to soften the opposition.[35] Whatever their importance, the committee reported the bill favorably, and in June 1914 the bill finally passed Congress and was signed by the President.

---

[29] Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 306.

[30] President Wilson was very conscious of the relationship between the Tolls Act and the renewal of the Root Treaty and discussed it in Cabinet session in the first days of his administration. Fearing the tolls issue might divide the Democratic party in Congress, he did not publicly advocate repeal of the Tolls Act until after the enactment of the tariff and currency laws. In the interim, Wilson's desire to gain Britain's cooperation for his Mexican policy gave him an additional compelling reason for repeal. See E. David Cronon, ed. The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 35-37, 44-45 (entries for April 15, 18, 1913); and Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 306-07.

[31] Short to Burton, April 3, 1914, Burton Papers, Box 19.

---

[32] Short to Burton, April 6, 1914, ibid., Box 19, reviews Burton's plan.

[33] Short to Burton, April 15, 20, 1914, ibid., Box 19, discusses Short's strategy, while Straus, Under Four Administrations, 338-39, confirms that the committee formally invited Straus to appear.

The President's decision to champion the repeal of the exemption clause had the desired effect in improving Anglo-American relations, for a few months after he first recommended repeal, England agreed to renew the Root Treaty as well as sign Bryan's conciliation treaty. Together, these developments indicated that the peace leaders' campaign, though certainly not as decisive as the common desire of both American and English statesmen for more friendly relations, had not been in vain. Indeed, Anglo-American understanding reached its zenith in 1914.[36]

(3)

The pacifists expressed cautious hopes for Wilsonian leadership on two other issues. First, they wanted the Wilson administration to assume leadership in the movement for a Third Hague Peace Conference.[37] The Second Conference had endorsed a proposal for a third meeting after a time interval corresponding to the one between the first two conferences, or about 1915. Yet neither President Wilson nor Secretary Bryan expressed any interest in a third conference during the first nine months of their tenure. In fact, for all of his interest in the peace movement, Bryan did not fully share the pacifists' optimism on the value of such conferences in promoting international understanding and world organization. He had expressed disappointment at the meagre accomplishments of the Second Hague Peace Conference and believed it revealed how difficult it was "to secure peace by agreement when so many nations are to be consulted and so many conflicting interests are to be harmonized." Partly for this reason, he had placed even greater emphasis after the Second Conference on the moral example of America's independent leadership in promoting world peace as exemplified by his own treaty plan.[38] It was not so much the President's or Secretary's disapproval or disinterest, however, that prompted their inaction in the first months of the new administration; more probably, it resulted from the many pressing domestic and diplomatic problems that needed their immediate attention. Nor did the peace leaders at first seem particularly anxious to impress the administration on the importance of initiating steps for the calling of the conference.[39] Yet in the last months of 1913, new developments began to arouse the administration's interest in the matter. In the first place, the American Preparatory Committee appointed under Taft's administration submitted its final recommendations for the American program for the third conference in September 1913.[40] While this report was not well publicized in the press, it was at least known in State Department circles and laid the groundwork for later action. More important, when newspapers reported that the State Department seemed willing to cater to the European powers, especially Great Britain, which advocated delaying the conference to 1916 or 1917 at the earliest and hinted at postponing the conference altogether,[41] numerous Americans--members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, delegates to previous Hague Conferences, international lawyers, and the pacifists--were aroused and immediately appealed directly to Secretary Bryan and

---

[34] New York Times, April 16, 1914, 8:8; and April 17, 1914, 6:2.

[35] Straus, letter, in ibid., April 17, 1914, 10:5, explains his cordial reception before the committee. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 311-14.

[36] Ibid., 314.

---

[37] I am grateful to Professor Calvin DeArmond Davis, of Duke University, for supplying me with a copy of his unpublished paper, "The United States and the Movement for a Third Hague Peace Conference," delivered at a session of the meeting of the American Historical Association, Washington, D C., December 1964. His short study helped to orient my thoughts on this hitherto unexplored subject.

[38] The Commoner, VII (October 11, 1907), 2:2.

---

[39] The one exception was Nicholas Murray Butler of the Carnegie Endowment who feared from the first days of the Wilson administration that the arrangements for the Third Hague Peace Conference were not proceeding as rapidly as they should. Finally, he asked Dutton to make an inquiry of the State Department on its position. Dutton was told that the preparatory work had not progressed very far. Butler to Trueblood, November 8, 1912, Trueblood Correspondence in the American Peace Society Papers; Dutton to Bryan, July 24, 1913, 500.A3/15; and J. Reuben Clark to Dutton, August 1, 1913, 500.A3/16.

[40] J. Reuben Clark (chairman of the Committee) to John Bassett Moore, September 18, 1913, 500.A3/28. The entire report was 137 pages with long addenda. A convenient summary appears in Advocate of Peace, LXXVI (January 1914), 10-11.

[41] New York Times, November 27, 1913, 3:3.

President Wilson urging them to seize the initiative in promoting the conference.[42] The Carnegie Endowment and New York Peace Society even cooperated in developing plans for organizing a National Citizens Committee on the issue if the Wilson administration continued its policy of inactivity.[43] All of these friends of peace believed that unless the United States assumed the world's leadership in promoting the third conference, it would be delayed past the 1915 date. The prospect of delay was especially discouraging because the Second Hague Conference had stipulated that a preparatory international commission consisting of a representative from each nation which attended the Second Conference would meet "some two years" before the third conference to collect the governments' proposals for discussion, decide which of them were ripe for fruitful discussion and possible agreement, and prepare the program for the upcoming conference. Since no nation had as yet appointed its international commissioner, it was probable by late 1913 that the conference could not meet before 1916. To delay their appointment any longer would mean an even later meeting date and perhaps contribute to a general feeling among the powers of postponing it indefinitely.

---

[42] Ibid., December 5, 1913, 13:1; R. L. Bridgman (Boston author of books on world organization and a member of the American Peace Society) to Wilson, November 27, 1913, 500.A3/27, and Jordan to Wilson, December 30, 1913, 500.A3/27. (Many of the documents in this record group are clipped together and have the same decimal number.)

[43] "New York Peace Society Minutes," Meeting of December 23, 1913, NYPS Papers, Box 1. William H. Short to David Starr Jordan, January 26, 1914, Jordan Peace Correspondence, is one of the letters sent to many peace leaders asking for their active support of the National Citizens Committee which was to hold its first meeting on February 11 in New York City.

Though many peace advocates requested the administration to promote the third conference as soon as possible, two individuals, Elihu Root, and the American Minister to the Netherlands, Henry Van Dyke, saw most clearly the obstacles standing in the way of the third conference and had the greatest immediate influence in convincing the administration to promote a conference. On December 10, 1913, Elihu Root, acting on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment's trustees, especially those like himself, James Brown Scott, and Joseph Choate, who had played a part in the previous Hague Conferences, wrote a long letter to Secretary Bryan which reviewed the final recommendations of the Second Conference for initiating a third one and concluded with a suggestion that might arouse the interest of foreign governments in a third conference:

> It may be that the selection by the United States of its member of the international committee provided for by the Final Act of 1907, and the notification to the other powers of such appointment, with a request for information as to when it will meet their view to have the committee completed and begin its labors, would call attention to the subject sufficiently to lead to immediate action. At all events, if that were done the United States would be free from any imputation of lack of interest in this subject, which so great a proportion of the people of our country regard as of highest importance.[44]

---

[44] Root to Bryan, December 10, 1913, 500.A3/36. Root's letter is reproduced in Carnegie Endowment, Year Book for 1913-14, 122-23.

Bryan forwarded the letter to Wilson who acknowledged that Root's suggestion was "a most timely one and that we ought to act on it." Before appointing a commissioner, however, Wilson wanted to investigate the question of his authority to appoint a commissioner and to see if funds were already available to pay his expenses.[45] In the meantime, the State Department had been studying a more elaborate and bolder proposal advanced by Van Dyke. Root's letter had first opened the eyes of the President on the subject of a third conference, but Van Dyke's suggestions were ultimately to prove more important. After outlining the difficulties facing the United States in promoting the third conference, Van Dyke advanced two ways to overcome them. First, the United States should suggest to the other powers that the Permanent Administrative Council of the Court of Arbitration at The Hague, which consisted of the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic representatives of the contracting parties accredited to The Hague, should serve as the preparatory committee and thus eliminate the inevitable delay which would result from each government appointing a commissioner. Second, the United States should urge the Queen of the Netherlands to invite the nations to The Hague in 1915 or 1916, though Van Dyke personally believed it was already too late to hope for a 1915 meeting.[46] John Bassett Moore, Counselor of the State Department, prepared a memorandum endorsing Van Dyke's proposal, but added that if the United States decided to promote Van Dyke's suggestion for the international commission, then he saw no reason why the United States could not request the Queen to call the conference in 1915. Bryan forwarded Moore's memorandum to the President and added a political argument of his own: he favored the 1915 rather than the 1916 date "because we would have larger freedom of action in the selection of delegates, owing to the fact that there is no [political] campaign on that year." Wilson immediately agreed with all these arguments and asked Bryan to propose the 1915 date.[47] Two days later, on January 31, 1914, the State Department cabled Van Dyke at The Hague asking him to sound out the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs to see whether the Queen would be willing to take the initiative in issuing the invitation. The Department was willing to endorse a 1916 meeting but believed that the work of preparation was not so considerable as to rule out the possibility of a meeting in 1915. By interpreting the phrase "some two years" as not to mean necessarily two full years, it hoped to answer critics of the 1915 date. At the same time, the State Department also sent out a circular note which proposed that the powers allow their representatives at The Hague to serve as the international preparatory commission for the third Hague conference.[48] When the State Department released the circular to the press a week later, the peace leaders were delighted. Whatever their earlier fears concerning the passive attitude of the Wilson administration immediately disappeared after the State Department not only seized the initiative but promoted the earliest possible meeting date.[49] The peace leaders went ahead with their plans for a National Citizens Committee but made it a lobbying group to publicize the American proposition. What had originally been planned as a protest group overnight became a cheerful chorus behind the Wilson administration.[50] Although Great Britain objected to the American plan to save a year's time in the preparation for the conference and the Dutch government ultimately ignored it in calling for the nations to appoint delegates to the international preparatory committee, the American action had at least stirred up interest in the third conference. Prospects for holding the third conference at The Hague in 1916 seemed bright until the World War abruptly intervened.[51]

---

[45] Wilson to Bryan, March 19, 1914, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence in the United States Department of State Papers, Record Group 59 (National Archives).

[46] Van Dyke to Bryan, November 4, 1913, 500.A3/19.

---

[47] Moore to Bryan, January 19, 1914, 500.A3/29, is Moore's memorandum. Bryan to Wilson, January 28, 1914, and Wilson to Bryan, January 29, 1914, both in the Wilson Papers, Series 4, File 231.

[48] Moore to Van Dyke, January 31, 1914, 500.A3/19. The circular note is 500.A3/29a (F.R., 1914, 4-5).

Related to the question of a third Hague conference was a second question: limitation of armaments. While most friends of peace realized that the recent popular enthusiasm for militarism in Europe precluded any real progress on this difficult subject at The Hague, they hoped that the American delegation would at least broach the issue. So serious was the problem of militarism and so infrequent were the Hague Conferences, they argued, that the delegates should explore every proposal that might lead to some agreement on the limitation of armaments. Leaving no stone unturned, they also wanted the President to act independently by sounding out the great powers on the chances for an arms agreement.[52]

---

[49] Cf. Advocate of Peace, LXXV (November 1913), 224; LXXVI (February 1914), 25-26; and (March 1914), 49-50. Also cf. Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1913, 8-9, 82-114, 184; and Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, 1914, 8-9; and The Independent, LXXVI (December 4, 1913), 429-31; and LXXVII (February 16, 1914), 224.

[50] New York Times, February 12, 1914, 8:7.

[51] Ibid., February 19, 1914, 4:1; February 24, 1914, 4:2; and July 3, 1914, 4:1. For the postponement of the conference because of the war, see ibid., October 4, 1914, VIII, 4:3; and F.R., 1914, 10-11.

While awaiting some auspicious international development on this question, the pacifists continued their opposition to military preparedness at home. Since they believed that only the United States, the one great power geographically removed from the European power struggle, could assume effective leadership on the limitation of armaments, especially on the problem of a large-navy which most directly affected both the United States and European nations, they wanted America first to practice at home what it ultimately hoped to preach abroad. If the American nation could uphold its anti-military tradition, they reasoned, then its example might induce other nations to seek some kind of detente on armaments.[53]

---

[52] Lake Mohonk Conference Report, 1914, 102, 116-117, 174; Advocate of Peace, LXXVI (April 1914), 73-74.

[53] This is not to say that the pacifists failed to oppose increases in the army, but the army was clearly secondary to the naval question. James Slayden and Edwin Mead were the pacifists most concerned about the growing incursions of the army into American civilian life. Slayden and Oswald Garrison Villard saw President-elect Wilson on December 30, 1912, and expressed their concern about the pending Militia Pay Bill. Slayden sent Wilson

The pacifists found good reason to believe that their long campaign against the large-navy forces was at last on the verge of success, for in the last years of the Taft administration the congressional opponents of preparedness became increasingly more numerous and vocal. Domestic developments as much as any clear awareness of the international situation contributed to the surge of anti-preparedness sentiment in Congress. In part, congressmen who had grown tired of Roosevelt's persistent prodding on the naval question could now argue that the navy had been doubled in strength during his Presidential tenure and that further increases in peacetime were not only unnecessary but might also lead to a drastic departure from America's trational isolationism. Theodore Burton hinted at the impending reaction when he reported after the approval of two battleships in 1910 that "a sufficient number of Senators really wished to vote with those who favored only one battleship;" and though they were held back by party loyalty to the Taft administration, Roosevelt's arguments, or a desire to stand with the majority of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, Burton believed that this was "the last time

---

a letter reaffirming his position and included a copy of the minority report of the Committee of Military Affairs, of which Slayden was a member, on the bill. Slayden to Wilson, December 31, 1912, Wilson Papers, Series 2, Box 71. Slayden's minority report is reprinted as The Militia Pay Bill (Boston: World Peace Foundation, n.d.). Mead attacked General Leonard Wood's military camps for college students, the newly formed Army League, and the reports of a military pageant at Wilson's upcoming inauguration. New York Times, July 20, 1913, V, 14:1; and Mead to Wilson, January 1, 2, 1913, both in the Wilson Papers, Series 2, Box 72.

they will vote for the extensive naval measure."[54] More directly a contributing factor to the growing anti-preparedness sentiment were the Democratic victories at the polls in 1910 and 1912. The Democracy, partly because of Bryan's leadership, had traditionally taken a more moderate position than the Republicans on military preparedness, but the split in the Republican party beginning in 1910 enabled many more Middle Western Democrats to win election to Congress, particularly to the House of Representatives. More isolated from the dangers of immediate attack than the coastal states, these congressmen, along with the handful of Republicans and Southern Democrats, were reluctant to approve any increases in the armed forces when the world was at peace and the dangers to American possessions seemed largely imaginary.[55]

The anti-preparedness position was strengthened, moreover, during the height of the progressive insurgency when the big business interests were under attack. Even moderately conservative congressmen could most easily prove their "progressiveness" by assailing the "trusts," which they claimed had selfishly exploited their monopolistic position in order to fatten their already bulging pocketbooks. Although all "trusts" were on the defensive in these years, those engaged in manufacturing military preparations were especially vulnerable to attacks by congressmen, for their profits were largely dependent on the military appropriations of Congress. Assuming that big businessmen were motivated almost entirely by economic self-interest, the congressional opposition argued that to enlarge military expenditures, which including pensions already comprised about two-thirds of the federal budget, would only satisfy the greed of the powder, steel, and nickel "trusts." Moreover, if fiscal conservatives said that "economy" required a small army and navy, their more reform-minded anti-preparedness colleagues emphasized that a larger proportion of the available funds should be spent on the immediate and pressing domestic problems; but both could unite against increases in military spending.[56] Some also argued that the growth of armaments

---

[54] Burton to Butler, May 26, 1910, Butler Papers. Advocate of Peace, LXXII (July and August, 1910), 154, applied Burton's analysis to both Houses of Congress.

[55] Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), 286-90, 308-09. The leading Democratic anti-preparedness congressmen were Walter P. Hensley (Mo.), Frank Buchanan (Ill.), Finly H. Gray (Ind.), James L. Slayden (Tex.), Oscar Callaway (Tex.), Samuel A. Witherspoon (Miss.), Edward W. Saunders (Va.), Clyde Tavenner (Ind.), and Warren Worth Bailey (Pa.). With the exception of Slayden and Saunders, who were first elected to Congress in 1896

---

and 1906, these anti-preparedness congressmen were first elected in 1910 or 1912. Bailey was the only Eastern congressman in this group, but a single-tax convert and a friend of Bryan, he seemed almost mid-Western. All of them, except Witherspoon who died in office in November 1915, served in Congress throughout the preparedness debate from 1913 to 1916. Two other Middle Westerners, Silas Barton (Nebr.) and the ever present Richard Bartholdt (Mo.), were the most active Republicans in the anti-preparedness group. Bartholdt did not run for Congress in 1914, amd Barton was not reelected in 1914. Of course there were several other anti-preparedness congressmen, but the above group comprised the most vocal as well as the most consistent opponents of large-navy bills in Congress. In the following footnotes I have cited their arguments only against the 1914 naval bill though in the debates over the naval bills of 1912 and 1913 they used the same arguments.

[56] Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 2nd session, LI (April 17, 1914), 6854-56; (April 21, 1914) 7027, 7047, (May 5, 1914), 8113; (May 7, 1914), 8245. A good statement of the conservative position is James L. Slayden, "Millions Wasted for War," Farm and Ranch, XXXI (March 9, 1912), 1.

automatically increased the spirit of militarism which not only stifled man's moral and material progress but psychologically prepared the nation for wars and, if unchecked, actually precipitated them.[57]

Had the munition makers appeared but passive spectators to the preparedness debate, they might have escaped more serious criticism, but the anti-preparedness congressmen charged that these "interests," together with the growing influence of the Navy League and the military establishment, formed a well-organized clique to promote militarism in the nation. This clique appeared even more Machiavellian because its organized activities were secret and therefore invisible to the public eye.[58] Several anti-preparedness congressmen claimed, for instance, that these selfish groups attempted to frighten Congress into expensive military programs by cleverly fabricating war scares which the "irresponsible," "corrupt," and "jingoistic" metropolitan press obligingly sensationalized only a few days before Congress voted on military appropriation bills.[59] Such collusion has never been proven and probably never existed, but the idea of a "conspiracy" was planted in the public mind.[60]

---

[57] Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 2nd session, LI (April 21, 1914), 7043-44; (April 28, 1914), 7378.

[58] Ibid., LI (April 21, 1914), 7019, 7041-42; (April 24, 1914), 7218-20. Also James L. Slayden, "The Traffickers in War," Farm and Ranch, XXXII (November 22, 1913), 4-5.

[59] Ibid; and James L. Slayden, "Selfishness is the Cause of War," ibid., XXXII (November 29, 1913), 3-4; Congressional Record, LI (April 17, 1914), 6854-55; (April 21, 1914), 7041-42; (April 24, 1914), 7220.

[60] Rappaport, Navy League, 43, 205-06, passim, for example, absolves the Navy League of any collusion with the shipbuilders or armament makers.

Although many Middle Western and a few Southern Congressmen most frequently advanced these reasons for their opposition to military preparedness, they used most of the same arguments as the leading Eastern pacifists--a curious but significant pattern that was to be repeated in the more heated preparedness debate of 1915 and 1916. They differed mainly in emphasis: the Eastern pacifists, considering themselves true internationalists, stressed America's moral responsibilities in promoting good will and international understanding among nations as the sure path to world peace, while the inland politicians were concerned with the possible betrayal of America's traditional isolation by a coterie of warmongers. Actually, only a few congressmen--Walter Hensley, James Slayden, Theodore Burton, and Richard Bartholdt--took any interest in the organized peace movement before 1914, so the anti-war sentiments of anti-preparedness congressmen derived less from any direct pacifist influence on them than from the deeply ingrained isolationism in the Middle West.[61] Yet if the Middle Western populist-progressive tradition was more isolationist than pacifist, it was certainly steeped in antimilitarism. Consequently, mid-Westerners could agree with pacifists in their opposition to the military tendencies in the nation and to any war which might advance the power of the military establishment and the pecuniary interests of Eastern bankers, businessmen, and munitions makers. Only a war fought for the most idealistic and humanitarian reasons, in short, could win their support. Moreover, since William Jennings Bryan, more than any other political figure, had for some years most clearly represented the Middle Western mentality, his Christian pacifist sentiments were far from alien to that region.[62] Some of the antipreparedness congressmen were even called "Bryan Democrats," not simply from blind party loyalty to their leader for they followed him even after Wilson became President, but because Bryan expressed most eloquently and embodied most perfectly their own sectional prejudices on both domestic and foreign affairs. They followed the Peerless Leader, in part, not in spite of his antimilitarism and pacifism but because of them.

---

[61] Hensley first publicly expressed interest in the organized peace movement at the semi-annual meeting of the American Peace Society on May 8, 1914. See his address printed in Advocate of Peace, LXXVI (June 1914), 131-33.

The antipreparedness forces displayed their real strength in the House where in 1912 and again in early 1913 the small-navy men, successfully resisting Taft's large-navy programs, forced the Senate to accept passage of their naval bills, each of which provided for only one battleship. Believing that these two congressional actions signified the stemming of the militarists' tide, the pacifists were of course jubilant.[63] Their faith in Congress increased during the first months of the Wilson administration, for on December 8, 1913, the House adopted by an impressive 317 to 11 vote a resolution, proposed by Walter L. Hensley, endorsing the appeal of Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty in Great Britain, for a one year "naval holiday" in the construction of battleships.[64] Although the Senate never considered a similar resolution, the Advocate of Peace hailed the decisive vote in the House as the best expression of the public reaction to the armament craze.[65] Nor did administration officials ignore the idea of a naval holiday. President Wilson immediately communicated the resolution to Secretary Bryan with the suggestion that "it might be well to consult with the representatives of the leading naval powers as to the feasibility of agreeing upon such a policy as Mr. Churchill suggested."[66] Although the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, was widely known as a large-navy man when he assumed his cabinet post, he also supported the idea of a "naval holiday." Four days before the House passed the Hensley resolution, he gave Churchill's suggestion sympathetic treatment in the Department's annual report, even favoring as a more practical alternative an international congress in Washington within the coming year to discuss limitations on the building of battleships. It is probable, in fact, that Daniels' proposal facilitated the passage of the Hensley resolution.[67] Bryan, who had earlier declared that it was "the imperative duty of the United States...to set a shining example in disarmament," also gave his qualified endorsement to the Hensley resolution. Other Cabinet members were just as sympathetic to some kind of international naval agreement.[68]

---

[62] Cf. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), 271-72.

[63] Advocate of Peace, LXXIV (September and October 1912), 207; LXXV (March 1913), 51; Peacemaker, XXXII (Midsummer 1913), 47; resolution in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 440.

---

[64] Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 1st session, L (October 18, 1913), 5830-35; (November 13, 1913), 5913-18; 63rd Congress, 2nd session, LI (December 8, 1913), 479-80.

[65] Advocate of Peace, LXXVI (January 1914), 3-4; and (April 1914), 83.

[66] Wilson to Bryan, December 9, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series 3, Letterbook 8.

Despite this flurry of interest in naval disarmament, neither Hensley's nor Daniels' proposal was officially promoted by the administration, for the Cabinet, believing that the administration's endorsement of the naval holiday proposal might detract the attention of the major naval powers from the already pending Bryan treaties, finally advised the President temporarily to shelve the Hensley resolution. Bryan also added an argument of his own: "It would be difficult," he said, "to agree on a year for a naval holiday because of the [building] contracts different nations have already made. The idea is good, but it would not seem to me practicable."[69] Wilson deferred to the Cabinet and took no action on the matter, although he implied that he might propose some kind of arms agreement in the future. As he reminded Bryan, "I like Secretary Daniels' suggestion very much indeed." He even asked Bryan to see Hensley and use flattery and half-truths to appease the congressman's disappointment at the administration's inaction on his resolution: "You are quite at liberty to say [to him] , if you think best, that I suggested the conference [first proposed in Daniels' annual report], in order that some form of resolution might be devised which would propose a practical course of action and reserve for him the credit he deserves for having taken the initiative in the House."[70] Whether Bryan ever spoke to Hensley does not appear in the record. In any event, Hensley remained hostile to the administration's two battleship program when it came up for debate a month later.[71]

---

[67] Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1913 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914), 9-10; New York Times, December 5, 1913,3:2.

[68] Daniels, End of Innocence, 49, quotes Bryan. The Cabinet discussed the possibility of President Wilson summoning an international disarmament conference as early as April 1913. See Cronon, ed., Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 27, 35 (entries for April 8, 15, 1913); also Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 411-14.

[69] Ibid.; Bryan to Wilson, March 13, 1914, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence.

It was not difficult for the President to postpone action on the Hensley-Daniels proposals, for almost simultaneously he began to express interest in another scheme which would not require an immediate invitation to a disarmament conference but which might better lay the groundwork for one at some point in the future. While he was considering the possibility of making a formal proposal to the major European powers, he also realized the advantages of informal, preliminary discussions with various European leaders to sound out their interest in and receptivity to some later American initiative for an international disarmament conference. He began these discussions even before the passage of the Hensley resolution when he discussed during an interview with Sir Edward Grey's secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, the necessity for curbing European armaments if peace was to be maintained.[72] Nothing immediately resulted from this interview, but Tyrrell also had a lengthy discussion with Wilson's confidant, Colonel Edward M. House, who had carefully nourished plans for a "great adventure" in European diplomacy on the question of disarmament from the first days of the Wilson administration. House's plan envisioned his visiting Europe in a semi-official capacity to discuss with the British, German, and French leaders the possibility of negotiating a four-power understanding relating to armaments, both military and naval.[73] When Tyrrell cordially endorsed his scheme, ten days later, or four days after the passage of the Hensley resolution, House repeated the details of his disarmament scheme to the President. House noted in his diary that Wilson gave "his warm approval and cooperation" to his plan. Remembering the recent passage of Hensley's resolution, Wilson also told House that he would favor the incorporation of a Congressional resolution for a naval holiday in the administration's two-battleship program when it came up for consideration if by that time House had persuaded the three European powers to accept a naval holiday for the following year.[74]

---

[70] Wilson to Bryan, March 16, 1914, ibid.

[71] Hensley was the acknowledged leader of the small-navy forces in the House during the debate on the naval bill. Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 2nd session, LI (April 21, 1914), 7041-47, 7050.

---

[72] Daniels, End of Innocence, 121-22, contains the full flavor of this interview.

[73] The Diary of Edward M. House, December 2, 1913, Edward M. House Papers (Yale University Library). As a second part of his plan for breaking the diplomatic stalemate, House proposed a kind of international dollar diplomacy whereby the four governments would cooperate in encouraging private investors to loan money at reasonable rates and to develop the economies of the "backward" or "waste" places of the earth, especially those of South and Central America.

It is doubtful whether Wilson thought very deeply about the possible far-reaching implications of House's grandiose ideas for America's active participation in European affairs as an honest broker between the power blocs. Nevertheless, his receptivity to House's scheme indicated his willingness to use unofficial diplomacy as a first, tentative step toward larger American involvement in European problems. Whatever Wilson's long-range aims, House actually proceeded with his mission which had barely passed the preliminary stages when the European war erupted.

Had the pacifists known the real purpose of House's European visit, they would have deluged the President with resolutions and letters of praise. Since the purpose of House's mission was a carefully guarded secret, and since they knew nothing of Wilson's private support for international disarmament, however, they might have concluded that Wilson was wedded to the large-navy forces. The administration's two battleship program which Congress passed and Wilson signed on June 30, 1914, seemed to confirm this pessimistic view. The passage of this law was all the more discouraging to the pacifists, for it signified that

---

[74] House Diary, December 12, 1913, House Papers. The entire story of House's disarmament scheme is most fully told in Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (4 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926-1928), I, 235-75. But since Seymour's main interest was Colonel House, he did not relate House's disarmament proposal to other disarmament suggestions which influenced Wilson in his growing enthusiasm for the subject. Nor have other historians of the Wilson period described the relationship between House's proposal and Daniels' and Hensley's.

Congress was no longer receptive to their campaign for only one battleship. The Advocate of Peace admitted that pacifists had suffered a sharp setback as a result of Congress' action.[75] They must have also realized, however, that the large-navy men had fallen far short of their goal of four battleships which the General Board had endorsed but Daniels had ignored when he first presented the administration's program. The bill was moderate enough and Daniels' influence on Southern Democrats strong enough to win the support of several congressmen who had previously opposed increases in naval expenditures. And although the Navy League ultimately supported the two battleship program, it had no appreciable influence on the outcome of the bill. Indeed, the small-navy congressmen so severely ridiculed the League in the House debate that it seemed more a liability than an effective pressure group to the large-navy forces. It is small wonder, therefore, that its members were more discouraged than the pacifists on the attitude of Congress and the administration toward naval preparedness.[76] The pacifists must also have realized that Wilson never strongly supported the preparedness movement, for he spoke about the naval program only in general terms and without any apparent enthusiasm. He shared, in fact, the complacent attitude of other members of his administration, including Secretary Daniels himself, that preparedness was not a serious issue in the United States since the nation was already adequately armed and in any case secure from attack.[77] From what the pacifists knew on the eve of the World War, therefore, they could still derive some comfort from the President's moderate position. If militarism was rampant on the European continent and at least temporarily no longer on the wane in the United States, they could still believe it was only a matter of time--unfortunately, as the outbreak of European hostilities was soon to demonstrate, too short a time--before Wilson would take some specific action on this issue.

---

[75] Advocate of Peace, LXXVI (August and September 1914), 173.

[76] Rappaport, Navy League, 41-44. For some insinuations of small-navy congressmen on the "subtle influence" of the Navy League on congressmen, see Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 2nd session, LI (April 21, 1914), 7020; (May 7, 1914), 8241-45. Joseph L. Morrison, Josephus Daniels: The Small-d Democrat (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 58-59, makes a persuasive case for Daniels' personal influence on several congressmen, though he does not document this influence.

(4)

Finally, many peace leaders hoped that the Wilson administration would adopt a new hemispheric policy. Although most of them were primarily European-oriented, a few also expressed increasing interest in Latin America. Partly as a reaction to Taft's Dollar Diplomacy and even more to Roosevelt's "Big Stick" policies toward America's southern neighbors, Lucia and Edwin Mead, David Starr Jordan, William I. Hull, and particularly the Texas congressman, James L. Slayden, added their voices to the rising chorus of protests from members of the American academic community who after 1912 advocated a revision of Unites States' policy toward Latin America. Their common aim was to revise the Monroe Doctrine which previous American presidents had used and expanded to justify frequent armed interventions of Latin American territory. They believed that if the Wilson administration would transform the Monroe Doctrine from a unilateral American defense policy into a joint American doctrine against future foreign exploitation or colonization, it would help to mollify much of the Latin American distrust of the "Colossus of the North" and eventually promote greater good will throughout the Americas.[78] Slayden even proposed a treaty by which the United States would guarantee not only the "territorial integrity" but the "sovereignty" of all nations south of the border. He introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives to this effect in 1913 which was buried in the Foreign Affairs Committee, but Bryan sympathized with Slayden's plan and brought it to the attention of the President who called it "striking."[79]

---

[77] Sprout, American Naval Power, 303; Notter, Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 276-77.

---

[78] Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 324, note 20, lists many books and articles by scholars on this theme; also Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1955 edition), 320-22. For pacifists' criticisms, see William I. Hull, address, American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, Proceedings, 1913, 75-96; David Starr Jordan, America's Conquest of Europe (Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1913), 35-37; New York Peace Society, Yearbook 1913, 16.

[79] Slayden first made his proposal in 1910, but receiving no encouragement from the Taft administration, renewed his efforts with the Wilson administration. Slayden to Carnegie, November 17, 1910, Carnegie Papers, Vol. 182, and Slayden, address, in Official Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Session of the Trans-Mississippi Commercial Congress, Held at San Antonio, Texas, November 22, 23, 24, and 25, 1910 (n.p.: n.p., n.d.), 114-16, describe his proposal in detail. Also Congressional Record, 61st Congress 3rd session, XLVI (January 25, 1911), 1461. (Since this was Slayden's most original contribution to the peace movement, it is strange that his wife did not mention it in her diary.) Bryan to Wilson, November 5, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series 4, File 2400, enclosing letter from Slayden; Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943), 194-96.

The Wilson administration did not formulate a new Pan-American policy until after the World War began, however, mainly because it was deeply concerned with the revolutionary situation in Mexico, which came within a hairbreadth of full-scale American intervention and a long drawn-out war. Confident in the President's professions of friendship toward his Latin American neighbors, almost all the pacifists at first refrained from any direct criticism of Wilson's refusal to extend recognition to the Mexican government of Victoriano Huerta who had ruthlessly seized power early in 1913. When they commented at all, it was generally in praise of the President's restrained policy of "watchful waiting" toward the revolutionary turmoil. Sharing Wilson's aversion to Huerta's unconstitutional takeover and to his undemocratic government, they did not even protest when Wilson undertook a diplomatic offensive in order to isolate and eventually topple the "illegal" Huerta regime.[80] During these months of heightened tension in American-Mexican relations, Andrew Carnegie and Richard Bartholdt were the only pacifists who publicly opposed all American interference in Mexican affairs, but for the moment even Carnegie was willing to give the President's policy the benefit of the doubt. The revolution, he said, was "a family affair of the Mexicans and I don't see that we have any right to interfere," but he added that the President was "acting for the best in the way he is handling this very delicate question. We must remember that President Wilson knows a great many things about the situation that the public does not know."[81]

---

[80] The Independent, LXXV (July 31, 1913), 235-36, LXXVI (November 13, 1913), 281-82, and LXXVII (January 12, 1914), 49-50, consistently praised Wilson's policy, while the Advocate of Peace, LXXV (April 1913), 78-79, and (October 1913), 207-08, cited Wilson's speeches with approval. An article a few months later frankly admitted it did not know how far the United States could interfer with justice in Mexican affairs but added that "the motives of the Administration are of the highest. Only time can reveal the wisdom of its course." Ibid., LXXV (December 1913), 246.

The pacifists were aroused only after the failure of the Mexican authorities to apologize satisfactorily for their alleged insult to the American navy at Tampico in April 1914. Wilson used this trivial incident (in which some American sailors were arrested by Huerta's men and momentarily detained in Tampico before being released with an apology) as a handy pretext for military intervention by which he hoped to overthrow the obnoxious Huerta. Appealing personally to Congress, Wilson received that body's approval of military action "to enforce demands made on Victoriano Huerta," though not without some opposition in the House.[82] Meanwhile, the peace forces were not inactive. Indeed, the crisis in Mexican-American relations, which culminated in the landing of American troops at Vera Cruz on April 21, galvanized them into open opposition. As much as they admired Wilson and disliked Huerta, they did not want war, especially over such a minor grievance. Peace societies, individual pacifists, even Socialists and the I.W.W., immediately called special meetings at which they drew up petitions strongly opposing any action that might lead to hostilities with Mexico.[83] The Commission on Peace and Arbitration of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, for example, sent a resolution to the President, his Cabinet, and every member of Congress, claiming that the "citizens of our Republic want no war with our southern neighbor, nor do they desire to dominate it, or to interfere with its internal affairs, but on the other hand they desire cordial relations and friendly intercourse." It specifically warned congressmen that "the voices clamoring for war do not represent the sentiment of the sane and substantial people of our Republic, ... but of mischief-makers and of certain vested interests whose aggrandizement is furthered by war."[84] Carnegie also expressed the pacifists' abhorrence of hostilities. "Such a war as seems pending," he chided the President, "will in after days be held akin to the fabled war of the two kings to decide which end of the egg should first be broken."[85]

---

[81] New York Times, November 26, 1913, 10:8; for Bartholdt's views, see ibid., November 8, 1913, 2:3.

[82] The vote in the House was 337 to 37. Hensley supported the resolution, but Bartholdt voted against it. A few hours before the vote Slayden telephoned his wife that he was going to oppose the resolution, though he believed it would mean the end of his political career. Apparently he reconsidered, for he finally voted "present," one of three Representatives to do so. Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 2nd session, LI (April 20, 1914), 6958; and Ellen Slayden, Washington Wife, 233.

---

[83] Advocate of Peace, LXXVI (May 1914), 112, gives a good summary of many of these meetings. Also, "New York Peace Society Minutes," Meeting of April 24, 1914, NYPS Papers, Box 1; Edwin Mead and Norman Angell to Wilson (telegram), April 18, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series 4, File 95M; Jenkin Lloyd Jones to Wilson (telegram), April 26, 1914, ibid., Series 4, File 95L; and Robert C. Root (secretary of the California Peace Society) to Wilson (telegram), April 18, 1914, ibid., Series 4, File 95B. For once the Socialists were sufficiently aroused to join the pacifists in oppostion to intervention. See resolution, dated April 25, 1914, in Socialist Congressional Campaign Book, 1914, 279-80; also with additional comments in the official bulletin of the Socialist party, The Party Builder, No. 77 (April 25, 1914), extra edition, 1-4. The entire issue was published in red ink.

[84] The resolution, dated April 21, 1914, is reprinted in Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, Annual Report 1914 (New York: n.p., 1915?), 31-32. William H. Short, who often attended the meetings of the Federal Council of Churches in New York City, wrote of this resolution: "While the language is not mine, the ideas are, for the most part, those which I suggested," Short to Burton, April 21, 1914, Burton Papers, Box 19.

Partly in response to these pacifist appeals and even more to the general aversion of the American public to military intervention, Wilson, who also began to dread the prospect of an extended war, refused to press hostilities further and quickly accepted the timely mediation offer of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile as a way out of the impasse.[86] The peace leaders were relieved and, more important, reassured in their beliefs that Wilson was a man of peace at heart.[87] A few of them were ecstatic in their praise of the administration. Hamilton Holt hailed the ABC mediation offer as "one of the most dramatic and glorious strokes in the history of international relations.... President Wilson and Secretary Bryan, in accepting it, have shown a political genius equalled only by their humanity."[88] Carnegie's reaction to Wilson's change of heart was even more laudatory than Holt's. He was attending a concert in Carnegie Hall when he received a telegram from Washington informing him of President Wilson's acceptance of mediation. Flushed with excitement, Carnegie left his box and hurried to the stage where he announced the good news. "This is the happiest moment of my life!" he exclaimed. "War has been averted at the last moment....There will be no more hostilities! Our whole attitude with regard to the Mexican situation has been wrong. The United States should expect Mexico and all other Latin American republics to take care of their own affairs, and should not meddle in them."[89]

---

[85] Carnegie to Wilson, April 21, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series 4, File 95C.

[86] Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 403-05, gives a good summary of the impact of public opinion on Wilson. The best contemporary account I have found of public opinion is the diary entry of Representative Slayden's wife for April 20, 1914: "What a difference there is in the public mind today and what it was sixteen years ago when we went to war with Spain. Then we were on edge with excitement and enthusiasm. We marched instead of walking and crowds cheered every trifling item on the bulletin board. We hummed 'The Star Spangled Banner;' we saluted one another with 'Viva Cuba Libre,' and called our red hats and dresses by Cuban names.... [Now] No one seems to want any war. I have not heard a shout nor a word of praise of the President and Bryan whose blundering and delays--and ignorance of Mexico--have brought on this crisis, but there are jokes about the market price of records of Bryan's oration on 'The Prince of Peace.'" Ellen Slayden, Washington Wife, 235. Another pacifist made a similar comment: "Thank God there is no war spirit in the land. The peace movement has achieved something. It keeps us unready for war." Stephen S. Wise to William H. Short, April 21, 1914, NYPS Papers, Box 7.

[87] Advocate of Peace, LXXVI (June 1914), 123, 127.

(5)

By the summer of 1914, then, the Wilson-Bryan "New Diplomacy" had strengthened the pacifists' confidence in the future of their movement. When the administration's high-minded foreign policies are added to three other strong influences, the century of free security, the continued growth of the peace movement, and the idealistic overtones of the domestic reform impulse, especially the reformers' faith in moral progress, it is small wonder that the pacifists increasingly believed that they had arrived at the threshold of a new era. In fact, the closer the date of Armageddon, the more these factors converged to bolster the pacifists' conviction that the day of permanent world peace was within their grasp. The major question in their minds was no longer whether but when the millenium of world peace would arrive. The Secretary of the Nebraska Peace Society had one answer. "There will not be any more great wars," he said. "We know it. It is absolutely settled. That is percolating through the great masses of the people. It is not a question or matter of argument."[90] William Jennings Bryan seemed to share this viewpoint when he said in 1912 that "The era of the brotherhood of man is not coming. It is here now." Nearly two years later, however, perhaps sobered by the failure of Taft's treaties, the outbreak of warfare in Mexico and the Balkans, and his responsibilities as Secretary of State, he was more restrained in his optimism. World peace, he now believed, would come "not in our time perhaps," but he implied that it would arrive within a generation.[91]

---

[88] Letter in New York Times, April 27, 1914, 10:6.

[89] Ibid., April 26, 1914, III, 2:6; also see Carnegie's letter in ibid., April 27, 1914, 10:6.

Bryan's latter statement expressed the thoughts of almost all peace workers: the millenium, if not immediately at hand, would arrive in the near future. Even the conservative Taft, echoing the optimistic rhetoric of his former rival for the presidency, stated that "the whole world is aroused to a more brotherly spirit, the whole world is aroused to the advantage of peace as it never has been before;" and he prophesied that once the

---

[90] Arthur L. Weatherly, discussion, in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 150.

[91] Quoted in The Commoner, March 8, 1912, 3:1, from a speech printed in Boise Capital, n.d.; New York Times, December 11, 1913, 1:6.

International Court of Arbitral Justice (which he believed the Third Hague Conference would establish) became a reality, then all international disputes would be solved without war within "a few decades or half a century."[92] Others set no time limit for the Utopia but agreed that sooner or later it was inevitable. One peace advocate spoke for the overwhelming majority when he stated that "the world is nearer the millenium of peace than ever before, and the dreams and hopes which yesterday were so dimly seen are today certain of consummation." Even those who refrained from prophecy and admitted the likelihood of future wars believed they would occur only in the uncivilized areas of the world. It was "highly improbable," however, that the United States or "the more advanced countries of Europe" would ever experience another war.[93]

That these peace advocates could predict the millenium during or immediately following the two Balkan wars, both of which threatened to plunge Europe into a general war, pointedly illustrates their unreasoned optimism. Although they were disturbed by the horrors of these wars, they did not attach much importance to them as barometers of a general European insecurity. Instead, they reasoned that these conflicts were only temporary setbacks to the inevitable progress toward world peace. After all, war scares and military clashes in the Balkans had been the warp and woof of the European experience, yet no major war had occurred in Europe in more than forty years. Was not this proof enough of the progress of Europe away from war? Similarly, they showed little awareness of the relationship of these two wars to the major European powers, especially their potential and actual effects on the two rival alliance systems. If they did relate these wars to the broader European scene, they assumed that they were a blessing in disguise since the major European powers had cooperated in ending them. True, the fear of a major European war might have partly motivated the European government's peace efforts, but even more significant were their genuine and tangible efforts to relieve the diplomatic stalemate. The realities of power alliances and the portent of a major war entirely escaped them.[94]

---

[92] New York Times, March 27, 1914, 6:1.

[93] John Wesley Hill, address, in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 380; also see Charles E. Beals, address, in ibid., 179.

When all this is said, it must be pointed out that the more experienced peace workers were not blind to the real dangers of these wars to the peace of Europe. Edwin and Lucia Mead, Nasmyth, Trueblood, Lynch, Bartholdt, Carnegie, Holt, Dutton, and Jordan had traveled widely throughout Europe and regularly corresponded with European peace leaders on the European situation. Most of them also attended the annual international peace congresses in various European cities. Aware of the existence and workings of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, they realized that the Balkan wars had increased the already existing tension between Austria and Russia to the point where a future clash between them might quickly involve all the major European powers. Dutton and Jordan had even visited the Balkans during the first war and accurately reported the incredible nationalistic, religious, and racial rivalries in the area.[95] This group of pacifists also realized that these wars had led to a resurgence of the military spirit and war propaganda throughout Europe. The growth of war expenditures in Europe confirmed their beliefs in the folly and burden of militarism which increased the chances for a general European war. Trueblood summarized the viewpoint in 1913:

---

[94] Ibid., also John Lewis, address, in ibid., 429.

> The recent fresh outburst of militarism in Europe has been the most distressing and discouraging event of the year. The proposed increase of the armies and navies of Germany, France, Great Britain, and Russia leads one to feel that militarism, with its fears, its scares, its panics, its increasing burdens, and exactions, has finally driven Europe insane, and one cannot help wondering how much longer this irrational and exhausting system can go on without resulting in a catastrophe such as civilization has not experienced in modern days.[96]

He even predicted that a full-scale European war was virtually inevitable. "If ... the long talked of general war does not occur," he declared ominously, "it will be next to a miracle."[97]

But if these pacifists understood the immediate dangers to the peace of Europe, they shrank from Trueblood's pessimistic conclusion that a general European war was probable, if not inevitable. Trueblood, in fact, was the only pacifist who took a truly alarmist position on the European situation. The others remained much more hopeful for the future peace of Europe. Although their rhetoric was usually more restrained and sophisticated than their less experienced pacifist colleagues, they came to the same general conclusion that a European war was unlikely.

---

[95] Lynch, "Peace and War in 1913," 272-74; Jordan to Mead, February 12, 1913, Mead Papers, Box 1. "The World Peace Foundation: Work in 1914," World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, IV, No. 7 (December 1914), 23-24, is Jordan's own report of his itinerary in the Balkans.

[96] American Peace Society, Annual Report, 1913, 15-16.

[97] Advocate of Peace, LXXIV (December 1912), 254. This editorial, though unsigned, was undoubtedly written by Trueblood.

The most involved and fascinating rationalization of the European situation came from David Starr Jordan. Obvously influenced by Bloch's and Angell's economic theories, Jordan mixed together untested and superficial assumptions on human nature, economic theory, and the influence of interest groups on governmental policies to "prove" the impossibility of a European war. The basis of his argument was that the "financial exploiters"--a coterie of businessmen, bankers, and the armament makers--held the real political power in Europe and pulled the strings of their governments behind the scenes. Since these capitalists had invested large sums of money in the Turkish area of the Balkans, he believed they had a direct interest in resisting the nationalistic uprisings against Turkey's control of the area. He even charged that French capitalists had armed the Turkish troops to prevent Turkey's expulsion from the area. But after painting an unattractive picture of the greed and chicanery of these parasitic "interests," he recoiled from the conclusion that they increased the war potential in Europe. Indeed, he concluded just the opposite--that the ever impending, ever threatening European war would never come. True, he admitted prophetically, the tinder was so well dried and laid in such a way that some half-crazed man, by the touch of a match, could start a conflagration which would quickly engulf all of Europe. He insisted, however, that barring and perhaps even after such an "accident," the businessmen and bankers (he was not clear about the armament makers) would never allow their governments to fight a major war. Although they might tolerate small wars such as had already occurred in the Balkans, in the interest of local exploitation, he believed that they were the strongest guardians of the general European peace. Considerations of their economic self-interest alone, he thought, would restrain them from the abyss of war. Businessmen and bankers, who were already worried about the staggering debt and overburdened system of credit in Europe, realized that a major war, no matter which nations emerged victorious, would prove so expensive that the entire financial system would topple and plunge Europe into miserable economic chaos. Consequently, the masters of capital, who naturally desired to maintain their wealth and dominant influence in the present European economic and political system, would never give their governments the signal for a general European war. Realizing that his economic interpretation was one-dimensional and not infallible, he concluded his argument by adding a human factor: the peoples of Europe, who were increasingly demanding a voice in their governments, also wanted peace and would help to restrain their political leaders from war.[98]

More typical of the pacifist arguments, however, was the simpler assertion that none of the major European powers wanted war, and that therefore there would be no war. After giving a long description of the atrocities and horrors of the Balkan wars and their dangers to the future peace of Europe, Frederick Lynch concluded, for example, that the European powers were closer to the peaceful solution of their differences than ever before. The outstanding fact of the Balkan wars, he asserted, was not their dangers to world peace, but the cooperation of five major European powers during the wars "in a concert hitherto unknown."[99]

---

[98] "The Impossible War," The Independent, LXXIV (February 27, 1913), 467-68; also see Jordan's earlier article, "Bankers as Peace Guardians," World Today, XXI (February 1912), 1786-89.

There was, to be sure, some truth in all these pacifist arguments, for there were outward signs of a lessening of tensions among the European powers by 1914. The dangers of a French-German conflict over Alsace-Lorraine and colonial rivalries had declined, the continued Anglo-German naval and commercial rivalry was somewhat blunted by growing cooperation among their businessmen in the Balkans and elsewhere, the Austro-Italian friction had somewhat abated, and the major powers had cooperated in ending the Balkan wars.[100] That the pacifists could remain optimistic, therefore, in the face of the existing European tensions, especially the apparently insolvable question of nationalism which continued to inflame the peoples in eastern Europe, is not too surprising; almost all Americans and many Europeans shared the belief that a general European war was improbable. What is significant about the pacifists, however, as we have already seen, is that in most cases their vision of the millenium went not only undimmed but shined at its brightest in these twilight years of world peace. It was as though the closer the date of Armageddon, the greater their tendency to absolve an uneasy conscience by reaffirming the certainty of their vision of a peaceful Utopia. Yet if forebodings of a European war might have partly inspired their glowing prophecies, a much more important motivation was their genuine and sincere belief in the imminent attainment of their goal. All the pacifists except Trueblood expressed in varying degrees this enthusiasm for the future, but the student leader George Nasmyth, now thirty-one years old, expounded it most emphatically. He had watched with dismay the military spirit in Europe, which he said was "in the throes of an international reign of terror," but after talking with students at several universities in almost every nation of Europe, he became much more hopeful.[101] However gloomy the present situation, he was sure the sun's rays would soon break through the darkness. Writing Edwin Mead from Germany toward the end of the first Balkan War, Nasmyth rapturously described his impressions of the world's future:

---

[99] Lynch, "War and Peace in 1913," 272-76; also see Bartholdt, address, in American Peace Congress, Proceedings, 1913, 104; and Edwin Mead, address, in ibid., 347-48.

[100] See Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Coming of the War, 1914 (2 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), I, 59-76, for illuminating discussion of these points.

> It is a wonderful period in the world's history and the change which has taken place in China is a prelude of still greater changes for which the stage is being prepared in Russia and all the other countries of Europe. A new era in human history is dawning--the era of the unity of the world of which you have been one of the prophets--and the men and women who are now students will play the chief part in this great drama of history. When I see the eagerness with which those Russian students, revolting against the narrow-

---

[101] Nasmyth to Mead, March 29/April 11, 1913, Mead Papers, Box 1.

> ness and the superstitution of the Russian Church and forbidden to take part in political reform, respond with a passionate longing to my appeal in the name of humanity, asking only for some task which they can take up in the great work, when I think of the quick response which I have found among the students in all the lands through which I have travelled, or of the sensitive eager faces of the students of all nations gathered to study international problems of our Cornell Cosmopolitan Club, I know that the hour for the organiyation [sic] of the world in peace and justice is at hand. I feel that I must travel the length and breadth of America preaching this great doctrine of humanity and pleading for the organization of a great missionary movement which will send peace workers out to all countries, and that I must go through all the world, rousing the students to the significance of the coming dawn, revealing to them a vision of the great task of international reconstruction of our century in which each of them can have a share.[102]

In one sense, Nasmyth's prophecy was correct. The stage was being prepared for great changes in Russia as well as in the rest of Europe; a new era in human history was indeed dawning. But, alas, the Golden Age of international peace and justice, of the unity of the world, which Nasmyth and the other pacifists envisaged in the near future, did not come. Sarajevo lay in the immediate future, and with it the onrush of events that were to plunge the world into four years of unparalleled war and revolutionary turmoil.

---

[102] Nasmyth to Mead, April 24, 1913, ibid.

## VIII. AFTERMATH

### (1)

When the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, the American peace workers were already preparing for their annual pilgrimmage to Europe where they expected to participate in various peace meetings. A few of them had already made the journey. Carnegie was vacationing in his native Scotland, while Butler, Nasmyth, Mr. and Mrs. Mead, and Jordan were combining short vacations with their European colleagues in preparation for the upcoming peace congresses. The summer months were supposed to be a particularly active time for the American and European advocates of peace. Norman Angell had arranged for a conference outside London from July 17 to 27 for young people, which was to be addressed by several notable public figures in English public life, as well as three American peace workers, Edwin Mead, David Starr Jordan, and George Nasmyth. Three more conferences were scheduled for August and September. The Church Peace Union, in cooperation with the British and German Church Peace Councils, had sponsored a church conference in Constance, Germany, near the Swiss and French frontiers from August 2 to 5, the Interparliamentary Union was scheduled to open in Stockholm, Sweden, on August 19, and the twenty-first Universal Peace Congress had planned to meet in Vienna, Austria, from September 15 to 19.

As the Austrian-Serbian crisis unfolded in the days following the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the peace workers showed no real alarm, and even those who did not leave the shores of the United States until July 24, only four days before the Habsburg monarchy declared war on Serbia, saw no reason to cancel their steamship reservations. By July 31, even as all the continental powers were mobilizing for the ensuing war, more than thirty-five American friends of peace, almost all of whom were bound for the Church Peace Conference, had arrived in Europe and were beginning the last leg of their journey to Constance. Only a few of the American peace workers who had planned to attend the Interparliamentary and Universal Peace Congresses failed to reach the Old World. Richard Bartholdt was in mid-ocean on a German liner when the news of the European war erupted, and the captain of the ship, fearing an enemy attack, immediately reversed the course of the vessel and high-tailed back to the United States.[1] Arthur Deerin Call, James L. Tryon, James L. Slayden, Fannie Fern Andrews, Samuel Dutton, William I. Hull, and several other American peace workers who had not planned to leave the United States until late August or early September never left the American shores, for the Austro-Serbian war forced the cancellation of the Congress on July 29, and the onset of the European war soon dashed any hopes for holding it elsewhere.[2]

---

[1] Bartholdt, From Steerage to Congress, 357-59.

The reactions of the American peace workers to the mounting diplomatic tension in last critical days of July make for intensely interesting reading. Those on their way to Constance experienced firsthand the growing international anxiety, the frantic mobilization efforts, the popular fears which gave way to excitement and finally to wild hysteria, and the personal tragedies of grief as families were separated and the civilian populations shoved aside by the autocratic imposition of military rule.

The first reaction among the American peace workers in these hectic days was disbelief that a major war was at hand. Following Norman Angell's conference, Edwin and Lucia Mead left London in the last week of July on what they thought would be a leisurely journey through the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany on their way to Constance. After spending a day at The Hague where they admired the Peace Palace completed a year earlier, they arrived in Brussels on July 28, just as the Austrian government declared war on Serbia. It was only then that the Meads began to realize the imminent possibility of a general European war.[3] Louis Lochner's first thoughts were even more innocent. His ship did not arrive in Cherbourg, France, until July 31. As soon as he debarked, he found awaiting him a letter from a German friend, an officer in the German army with important political connections in Berlin. His friend had written in no uncertain terms that Germany was determined to go to war and fight pro gloria et patria, yet Lochner believed that the very thought of a European war "seemed too stupendous for earnest consideration."

---

[2] Advocate of Peace, LXXVI (August and September 1914), 177, 180-81. On July 31, several peace workers meeting in Brussels decided to maintain in principle the calling of the Congress in Berne, Switzerland, but that was the last heard of the matter. Ibid., LXXVI (November 1914), 238.

[3] Edwin Mead, "The World Peace Foundation: Work in 1914," World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, IV, No. 7 (December 1914), 8.

> I remembered [Lochner continued] that the author of the letter had spoken of this same 'Generalabrechung' in 1911, during the Morocco crisis. But the fact that at that time Germany had seen the folly of launching a European war gave me hopes that it was nothing more than the enthusiastic talk of one who has repeatedly assured me that no death would be more welcome to him than that on the field of battle in the service of his country.
>
> Aside from this letter, there were no indications at Cherbourg of the cataclysm that was soon to engulf Europe. We read of the financial panic at Paris, Berlin, and London as a result of the Austro-Servian war, but saw in it merely another illustration of the internationality of the world today, and felt confident that this panic would induce the great powers to bring Austria and Servia to terms. Everybody in our ship's company, therefore, cheerfully boarded the special train for Paris. Even the scarcity of gold in Paris worried but few.[4]

James L. Tryon, a representative of the American Peace Society at the Church Peace Conference, expressed the same feeling. As late as August 1, he said, "Most of us Americans were light-hearted, and laughed at the idea of leaving Constance at all; we discounted the war scare, while one or two, including an

---

[4] Advocate of Peace, LXXVI (October 1914), 211. Lochner's recollections were compiled from a diary he kept at the time.

English clergyman, thought it would be cowardly to 'skedaddle' before the congress had begun."[5]

Needless to say, the eyes of the American peace workers were quickly opened. A few peace workers did their best to prevent the war that was about to descend upon Europe. When the Meads arrived in Brussels, they were met by Senator Henri La Fontaine, a leading Belgian peace worker and president of the Berne Peace Bureau, who was greatly alarmed at the prospect of a general European war. Edwin Mead, who was also a member of the Berne Peace Bureau, for the moment abandoned his plans to visit Constance and conferred with La Fontaine and a few other Belgian peace workers on the critical situation. They immediately agreed to telegraph the European members of the Berne Peace Bureau and other European peace workers throughout Europe asking them to come at once to Brussels. Despite the lateness of the appeal, more than fifty peace workers managed to assemble in Brussels on the morning of July 31, even as the preparations for war were hurtling out of control. Most of these delegates were Belgians, but four came from Britain, seven from France, two from Italy, three from Germany, and a large contingent from Holland. Determined to do whatever they could to preserve the last thread of peace, the peace leaders drew up carefully worded appeals and cabled them to the ruling sovereigns and foreign ministers of Russia, Germany, and Austria. Upon the urging of Edwin Mead, they even dispatched a cable to President

---

[5] Ibid., LXXVI (October 1914), 207.

Woodrow Wilson requesting him to mediate the critical situation. Although these appeals failed to prevent the outbreak of the World War, these peace workers could at least take heart that they acted responsibly in the final crisis and had done what they could to prevent the war.[6]

With mobilization already begun among all the major continental powers, the peace workers left Brussels on the evening of July 31 and, despite considerable difficulties, returned to their homelands. In what must have been an almost insuperable task, the Meads somehow managed to arrive in Constance on the evening of August 1.[7] Many of the other Americans who were bound for the Church Peace Conference did not arrive in Constance until that same day and experienced the same difficulties. Louis Lochner who did not arrive in Paris until August 1 gave up the attempt entirely, but the rest of the American participants reached Constance safely. Frederick Lynch described vividly the problems which he and many of his American friends experienced on the last leg of their journey from Paris to Constance. Only a little luck, a lot of pluck, and the cooperation of a few French and German border officials enabled his party to arrive in Constance after a detour which carried them through Switzerland. Lynch might have abandoned the effort entirely if he had not believed that he, as one of the leaders of the Conference, should make every effort to meet with those delegates who were awaiting his arrival.[8]

---

[6] This account is compiled mainly from the detailed report of a French pacifist, Theodore Ruyssen, which was reprinted in Ibid., LXXVI (November 1914), 236-38; also see Mead, "World Peace Foundation: Work in 1914," World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, IV, no. 7 (December 1914), 8.

[7] Mead gave the impression that he never arrived in Constance: "As we left Brussels that evening for Cologne and Constance, it was to find the Belgian railways everywhere blocked by the already mobilizing troops." Ibid., 8. But Theodore Ruyssen stated that the German delegates at the Brussels meeting were able to catch the last train from Brussels to Germany before the violation of Belgian neutrality. The Meads probably caught this train and traveled southward through Germany to Constance, for both James L. Tryon and Frederick Lynch, writing independently, listed the Meads as American representatives at Constance, Tryon stating that they arrived in Constance on midnight of August 1. See Advocate of Peace, LXXVI (November 1914), 238; (October 1914), 217; and Lynch, Through Europe on the Eve of War: A Record of Personal Experiences; Including an Account of the First World Conference of The Churches for International Peace (New York: The Church Peace Union, 1914), 19, 111, 112.

By the time the church leaders gathered for religious services on Sunday morning, August 2, the actual declarations of war were occurring at an almost breathless pace. Whatever hopes they had previously had for a peaceful solution to the crisis quickly gave way to dismay and extreme anguish. Nevertheless, British, French, and German delegates at the conference prayed side by side hoping for some miracle which would spare Europe from the war that was already descending upon it. Frederick Lynch left this personal testament of his agony on this occasion:

> I have prayed for public gatherings perhaps five thousand times in my life, but never before this morning did I realize what it was to voice the cry of the people before me, and of the world. I had no conception of what I should say when I arose -- I have no idea now of what I said. I only know that my heart was bleeding for the sins of the world and I saw a vision of millions of little children who were soon to roam the devastated cities hungry, cold,

---

[8] Ibid., 13-16, is Lynch's account of his journey.

> fatherless, all because of the sin of a few men. I saw the mad orgy of lust, vice, drunkenness, hatred, cruelty that was to be loosed, and I felt for once something of what Christ felt at Gethsemane. I could only beseech God over and over again to spare us this thing, and to teach men that Christ's test of discipleship was that they should love one another.[9]

When it became clear that the German government was commandeering all trains for the mobilization and war effort, the church delegates began debating whether they should depart immediately for the Netherlands or Great Britain where they could continue the conference or stay in Constance where they would have to assume the risks of remaining in a belligerent nation. This dilemma was quickly resolved with the announcement that the local bank had closed and that their hotel had gone bankrupt and was going to close down. The delegates then decided to adjourn the Conference, the French returning to their homelands through Switzerland and the remaining eighty delegates taking the last train northward to Cologne where the German authorities finally permitted the non-German delegates to enter Holland. Once again on neutral soil, the American and British church representatives boarded a boat for England and finally arrived in London on August 5, only hours after Great Britain declared war on Germany.[10]

(2)

As the war expanded in intensity and scope, the American peace workers, like most thoughtful Americans, offered their explanations of its underlying and immediate causes. Their task required more than careful and dispassionate analysis, however, for they realized that their movement seemed discredited in the eyes of world opinion. Unwilling to admit that they had failed, they usually coupled their analysis of war causation with a vigorous defense of the peace movement. In answering their critics, the pacifists argued that the World War vindicated their predictions that the escalating armament race would inevitably lead to a major war. Samuel Dutton expressed this opinion only a few days after the outbreak of hostilities. "We saw this war coming. Every advocate of peace who has studied the grounds for his faith has known that this clash was coming. Dr. Jordan saw it, and expressed that one nation would 'load itself up' on the border of another nation when this condition made it practically certain that sooner or later the loading nation would 'go off.'"[11] Representative James Slayden echoed the same refrain. The war, he declared, was "clearly the result of excessive armament, and it forever disposes of the argument that great preparedness for war is the way to insure peace. The war of all Europe shows that it has precisely the reverse influence, as some of us have contended all along." He continued: "the peace movement has not been in vain. It has made people think. Millions now see and understand the danger of being overarmed where only thousands saw it before."[12] Of all the peace workers, Charles E. Jefferson stated these views most unequivocably:

---

[9] Ibid., 25-26.

[10] Ibid., 37-56.

---

[11] New York Times, August 5, 1914, 7:1.

> Armaments are provocative of war. You may increase them for a season, but at last you receive the retribution which you invited.
> The least surprized [sic] men in the world today are the men who for many years have been protesting against armaments. They may be dreamers, but the silly dream that armaments are the guarantees of peace never entered their mind.[13]

Such statements represented ths instinctive reactions of individuals who were emotionally committed to the cause of world peace, but they were not very convincing. Indeed, they sounded rather hollow and even hypocritical when compared with their utterances before the war, for however much they had feared the outbreak of a general European war -- and inwardly many of them had certainly dreaded the possibility -- they had not stated their fears publicly and even their private correspondence had rarely reflected upon the imminent danger of war. Dutton's remarks about Jordan's fears of a general European war were undoubtedly sincere, but they were the most obvious distortion of Jordan's own elaborate theory of an "impossible war." Their claims that they had consistently attacked the armament makers and military cliques were more to the point, but, as we have already seen, they were not unanimous on the armament question and some of them had shown signs of weakening on the issue in the few years preceding the war. Even the strongest opponents of the military had issued no warnings concerning the awesome developments in military science and technology, such as the submarine, airplane, and gigantic artillery pieces, and the massive material and human destruction they would inflict in a major war. It is perhaps unfair to blame them for their failure to foretell the mass-produced slaughter of a European war, but as the most concerned Americans about the armament question one might have expected at least a few ominous predictions of the impending horrors and carnage of modern warfare. Nor had they shown much interest in the armament firms and their potential and actual influence in government circles. If anything, certain congressmen had shown a stronger disposition to level verbal blasts at the armament makers than the peace workers themselves.

---

[12] Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 2nd session, LI (August 18, 1914), 13920.

[13] Charles E. Jefferson, "The Nemesis of Armaments," The Independent, LXXIX (August 17, 1914), 247.

But an even deeper flaw in their reasoning was their repeated assertion that the World War was the inevitable result of the accelerating armament race. The American peace workers surely overemphasized armaments as the most important underlying cause of the war. Although large armaments did contribute to the growing importance of the military in political decision-making, especially in periods of diplomatic crisis, they were more an obvious and tangible symptom, just as were the formation and tightening of the rival alliance systems, of a growing feeling of insecurity among the European powers. Fundamental economic and imperial rivalries directly contributed to this insecurity and in turn to the escalating armament race. More specifically, the growing insecurity among the European nations was an outgrowth of Germany's rising ambitions as a major naval and a colonial power, which the other Western nations generally recognized as legitimate aims, and the blustering and erratic foreign policies of German diplomats in the post-Bismarck era, which they feared and on occasion condemned. On an even more specific and immediate level, a fundamental cause of the World War was the failure of the European statesmen to solve the problem of nationalism, especially as it related to the Balkans, for it was these national passions which finally provided the spark which set the alliance systems in motion.

If the peace workers oversimplified the underlying causes of the First World War, their oversimplications conformed to their general assumptions on human nature. Unwilling to accept man's irrationality as an integral part of his existence, they labeled an impersonal factor, the armaments themselves, as the major cause of the war. Thus, David Starr Jordan sprinkled his talks on the war with statements that 350,000,000 people in Europe did not want war but that it had come anyway. "The war was not brought on by anybody.... When nations are armed, war is bound to come." He even believed that the armament race had come to its "predestined end."[14] Trueblood saw the same causal connection when he wrote that "The mere increase of armament arouses suspicion that it is intended not for defense (as is always claimed), but for offense, and this stimulates like increases elsewhere and dread and dislike which soon grow into hate, and then -- a war."[15] Frederick Lynch provided the clearest evidence of this reasoning. Upon his return to the United States, he wrote Carnegie: "I am trying to convey to everybody in the United States two pictures: one of the boundary line between the United States and Canada, the other of the boundary line between France and Germany -- their differences are the results of each. One, no weapons -- no war. The other, weapons everywhere, -- war everywhere."[16]

---

[14] See Jordan's statements in New York Times, October 11, 1914, II, 9:1-3, November 26, 1914, 4:6, and September 23, 1914, 8:6.

When the peace advocates argued that large armaments predetermined Europe's cruel fate, they came dangerously close to saying that the individual was a prisoner of society, especially of its productive processes. But they did not intend to eliminate free will entirely from their ideology. Recognizing that armaments alone could not produce war but required their actual use by individuals, most of them censured the small minority of war profiteers and military leaders as the the most obvious culprits. Jordan never seemed to understand the deeper reasons for the European armament race, but he at least realized that the vast quantity of arms subtlely affected the quality of a few military men whose interests were most

---

[15] Advocate of Peace, LXXVI (October 1914), 199.

[16] Lynch to Carnegie, September 3, 1914, Carnegie Papers, Vol. 230. Lynch expressed much the same view in his Through Europe on the Eve of War, 102.

directly involved. As Jordan remarked: "To prepare for war is to breed a host of men who have no other business and another host who find their profits in blood." Or again: "The springs of war come from a few men impelled by greed or glory."[17] Yet these few men had triumphed over the majority because they were better organized, had learned how to influence their governments, and through their clever appeals to "patriotism" and "duty" had successfully duped the masses into fighting their wars. To put it in slightly different terms, an autocratic elite had triumphed over the democratic instincts of the masses. Despite its gains in the previous hundred years, democracy had failed to limit the influence of these segments of autocracy which benefited most directly from military preparedness.[18] "In the great struggle against privilege," Jordan wrote, "which is at the bottom of the present war, we have deprived the aristocrats of one thing after another in the interests of the people, but we have left the control of instruments of destruction in their hands for them to play with as boys play with fireworks, and they have turned them against us."[19]

### (3)

The longer the war continued and increased in intensity the more difficult was it for the peace workers to believe that a quick peace could occur and a new international reconstruction begun. A few of them became so grief-stricken that they fell physically ill. Carnegie, Trueblood, and Edwin Mead all suffered serious illnesses in the first months of 1915 and never fully recovered their full strength during the war, and the former two died respectively in 1916 and 1919. The illnesses of these three could be ascribed to the infirmities of old age, for they were all over sixty-five years and obviously were no longer as robust as they had been earlier. Trueblood had even fallen ill in 1913, and his illness of 1915 which lead to his death in the following year was a recurrence of his previous malady. Yet there is also some evidence that their illnesses were psychosomatic and not purely physical in origin. Trueblood's colleagues described his first illness of June 1913 either as a nervous breakdown or as a worsening of a case of arteriosclerosis which brought on a cerebral hemorrhage. While it is almost certain that Trueblood suffered from the latter, it is worth noting that his first attack occurred shortly after he had made his ominous predictions of a European war. Whatever the medical reasons for his initial illness, Trueblood managed to recover much of his strength by January 1914 and was able to resume his duties as secretary of the American Peace Society and editor of the Advocate of Peace until he suffered a relapse in late 1914 after which he reluctantly decided to give up his post. He found the World War a deeply disturbing and emotional experience, and it may have hastened his fatal illness.[20]

---

[17] New York Times, September 23, 1914, 8:6.

[18] Ibid.; also Mead, "The World Peace Foundation: Work in 1914," World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, IV, No. 7 (December 1914), 13; and typed copy of William Short's statement in New York Press, August 30, 1914, provided by Frederick W. Short.

[19] Jordan to Upton Sinclair, October 15, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

If the psychosomatic origins of Trueblood's demise are not entirely clear, Edwin Mead's and Carnegie's were. Mead suffered a serious nervous breakdown in early 1915, and his wife admitted later in that year that her husband, now confined to a sanitarium in New Hampshire, was in "a very depressed and nervous condition" and suffered "from insomnia and bowel trouble."[21] He never recovered during the course of the war and was forced to retire from all pacifist activity for nine years.[22] He eventually managed to recover sufficient strength to write articles attacking the Navy League and did not die until 1935, just long enough to suffer the double martyrdom of witnessing the rising war clouds in Europe which threatened a second political collapse of Europe.[23] Andrew Carnegie's illness was also psychosomatic. The World War dashed Carnegie's efforts of the previous decades for a federative Europe and painfully affected his optimistic outlook. At first he could not believe that the worst was at hand and he went through the motions of reiterating his optimistic credo. "The world grows better," he could say with amazing disrespect of the facts of international life in November 1915, "and we are soon to see blessed peace restored and a world court established."[24] But deep in his heart he could no longer believe what he so desperately wanted to believe. His own wife who stood by him to the end of his life later described the psychological effects of the war on him. After the outbreak of the war, she explained, her husband broke off the writing of his autobiography:

---

[20] For slightly different descriptions of Trueblood's illness, see Advocate of Peace, LXXVII (May 1915), 105; LXXVIII (December 1916), 328; and Beals, Benjamin Franklin Trueblood -- Prophet of Peace, 14-15.

[21] "Annual Report, 1915," World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, V, No. 6 (December 1915), 8; Lucia Mead to Miss Trueblood, August 2, 1915, Mead Papers, Box 1.

[22] Toward the end of the World War, Mrs. Mead described her husband's prolonged sickness and concluded sadly: "He is lonely and wretched beyond all words and cannot be reconciled to his cruel fate." Lucia Mead to Jordan, August 24, 1918, Jordan Peace Correspondence. Albert E. Pillsbury to Mead, April 29, 1924, and Lynch to Mead, June 5, 1924, both in Mead Papers, Box 1, congratulated Mead on his recent recovery.

[23] Edwin Mead, "The President and the Big Navy," Unity, CLXXI (December 14, 1931), 208-10; and "The Moral of the Navy League Flurry," ibid., CLXXI (December 21, 1931), 223-25, are two examples of Mead's continuing condemnation of large armaments and the Navy League.

> Henceforth he was never able to interest himself in private affairs. Many times he made the attempt to continue writing but found it useless. Until then he had lived the life of a man in middle life -- and a young one at that -- golfing, fishing, swimming each day, sometimes doing all three in one day. Optimist as he always was and tried to be, even in the face of the failure of his hopes, the world disaster was too much. His heart was broken. A severe attack of influenza followed by two serious attacks of pneumonia precipitated old age upon him.[25]

Not all the American peace workers had such traumatic experiences, although they all felt aggrieved in varying degrees. In general, they suffered in proportion to their commitment to the cause of world peace. Trueblood, Mead and Carnegie had all made the peace movement their ruling passion by 1914 and were thus most susceptible to the emotional strain of the European conflagration, but others who were either young enough to withstand the emotional strain of the horrors of the war, or who were not so emotionally committed to pacifism, or who had other interests besides the peace movement were able to weather the deepening World War without visible anguish. David Starr Jordan was probably most susceptible to the physical strain of war, for he had increasingly channeled his energies into the peace movement and had attempted to convince himself that a major war could not occur. Yet Jordan's interests were wide-ranging, and his scientific training as well as his receptivity to new ideas had made him more resilient and flexible than Trueblood, Mead and Carnegie, all of whom had based their pacifist faith on a single ideology. It is interesting, and perhaps significant, that Jordan used Darwinian evolution (wars destroyed the fit and promoted the survival of the unfit), Bloch's and Angell's economic theories, educational reform, and even William James' famous essay, "The Moral Equivalent of War," as intellectual tools to attack war, while Edwin Mead derived his almost entirely from idealists like Kant or Emerson, Carnegie from Spencerian optimism, and Trueblood from Christian pacifism. Others like William Jennings Bryan had so many other interests that outwardly the war did not visibly affect them.

---

[24] New York _Times_, November 25, 1915, 4:4.

[25] _Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie_, v.

(4)

The shock of war which so deeply disturbed the individual peace workers also affected the peace organizations. With Trueblood seriously ill by 1915, the American Peace Society lost its leading crusader for peace, and thereafter the more cautious officers of the Society, executive secretary Arthur Deerin Call and president Theodore Burton, and the trustees of the Carnegie Endowment, which provided the Society with an annual subvention, soon guided the Society toward a more conservative course. The American Peace Society failed to take strong positions on any of the thorny political and diplomatic questions which faced the American policy makers during the period of neutrality. While it opposed the most vehement preparedness advocates, it did not make anti-preparedness a crusade. Nor did it give any support to the growing American sentiment for mediation of the war. It upheld neutral rights and international law but did not attempt to educate the American public on what exactly were a neutral's rights in wartime. Indeed, it said nothing at all about the legality of shipping munitions, of allowing private and governmental loans to belligerent nations, and of American citizens traveling on belligerent passenger liners. For the most part it seemed content to make bland remarks about its devotion to "rational" and "sane" pacifism, "true" patriotism, "duty," "right thinking," and "constructive" action.[26] Such statements were certainly reasonable and obviously sincere, but for all practical purposes they underscored the fact that the American Peace Society had no answers to the immediate problems of the war in Europe and their actual and potential effects on the United States in particular and the neutral nations in general.

---

[26] See, for example, the editorial in Advocate of Peace, LXXVII (August 1915), 186-87; and Call's essay, in ibid., LXXVIII (January 1916), 10-13.

This is not to say that the Society had no program at all, for it did advocate an international legislature and judiciary as prerequisites for a stable and peaceful post-war world. Yet even these institutional proposals had a vague and old-fashioned sound to them. While the Society's journal consistently opposed any international organization which envisioned a system of collective security, it did not elaborate the details of these programs which might have served as a guide for diplomats at the peace settlement.[27] It said nothing, for example, about procedures for conciliation, arbitration, and the size and powers of an international legislature and judiciary. Instead, it freely admitted that it supported a vague ideal:

> Whether we believe in a "league of Peace," a "United States of Europe," a "federation of the world," or what not, is relatively unimportant. But some form of cooperative, collective, international solution of the problem of armaments, is, certainly, soon to be imperative.... Now is the time to think, confer, and think again.... When men and women think, really think, upon these matters, then the problem of war will be solved.[28]

But when the leaders of the American Peace Society began to think, they could only look backward to the ancient principles of the Society's early leaders, notably William Ladd, as their guide for post-war reconstruction. As Arthur Deering Call noted in his annual report of May 1915: "The aims of the American Peace

---

[27] Ibid., LXXVII (May 1915), 105-06, asks several questions concerning the establishment of a League of Peace after the war but gives no answers. Ibid., LXXVII (August 1915), 188-89, is more outspoken against any enforcement machinery in a post-war international organization.

[28] Ibid., LXXVII (August 1915), 188.

Society, as presented by its various branches and sections, have not been materially changed because of the European war. The two main principles of this Society are as pertinent as in the days of William Ladd. The substitute for all of the problems incident to the crime of war must take the direction of an International Congress and a High Court of Nations."[29]

Although these were Call's own views, it so happened that they were almost identical to those expressed by James Brown Scott, the Secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Director of its Division of International Law. In June 1915, in the midst of the difficulties between the United States and Germany over the sinking of the *Lusitania*, Scott wrote Call urging him to guide the policy of the American Peace Society away from the question of preparedness, mediation, and avoidance of war, and instead "withdraw within itself, as it were, during the present war, to consider carefully what can best be done in the future, to limit its program consciously, and, having so limited it, endeavor to carry it into effect when the conclusion of peace will give the Society a hearing." Indeed, Scott urged the Society to "return to its traditions. Let other societies without these traditions follow their best judgment. Encourage and aid them to do so. But the American Peace Society should, in my opinion, go back to the Fathers [Ladd, Burritt, and Jay], as it were, and consciously preach and carry out their doctrines to their logical conclusions. By so doing, the American Peace

---

[29] *Ibid*., LXXVII (June 1915), 143-44.

Society will occupy a very different position in the peace movement from that which it now occupies, and its influence will, I feel quite sure, be appreciably increased."[30]

Given Call's similar outlook, it was not difficult for him to steer the Society along this more cautious course. But since the American Peace Society was still dependent upon the Endowment for its annual subvention of $31,000, or about three-fourths of its total annual income,[31] one wonders whether the leaders of the American Peace Society had much choice in the matter. If Mead, Bartholdt, and especially Trueblood had still been leaders in the Society, it is possible that the Society would have taken more positive stands on neutral rights, mediation, and preparedness and still received a subvention from the Carnegie Endowment; but Call was so anxious to please Scott that the Society's program became almost a carbon copy of the Endowment's.

Some members of the American Peace Society had already begun to grumble about the inertia and laissez-faire policies of the national Society, but after Scott's views were published in the Advocate of Peace with Call's approving comments, they became more outspoken in their criticism. They now fully realized, as they had only suspected earlier, that the officers of the American Peace Society and Carnegie Endowment were working together against any active peace work for the duration of the World War. Louis Lochner, secretary of the Chicago Peace Society, and head of the American Peace Society's Central-West Department, immediately assailed this position. From the outbreak of the World War the youthful Lochner was determined to promote a more active pacifism. Although at first discouraged by the conservative leadership of the Chicago Society, he had a few allies in that organization, especially Jane Addams and Jenkin Lloyd Jones, and together these activists had managed by January 1915 to reorganize the Society according to their wishes. They immediately began to promote mediation and anti-preparedness movements in the Middle West.[32] Lochner hoped that their pacifist activity might sustain President Wilson's and Secretary Bryan's initial interest in mediation and perhaps eventually encourage them to undertake a more active diplomatic campaign for ending the war under terms which would be acceptable to both sets of belligerents. He also wanted to nourish peace sentiment among the remaining neutral nations in Europe, which might also promote mediation moves, and to support the efforts of foreign groups, such as the Union of Democratic Control in Great Britain, which had been organized shortly after the beginning of the war, to establish a minimum program for a more liberal and peaceful post-war order. But the efforts of these Chicago activists to receive financial support from the Carnegie Endowment got nowhere, and Scott even refused to appoint delegates to their meetings which were supposed to discuss such activities.[33] Increasingly frsutrated by the Endowment's hands-off policy, Lochner finally could not restrain his impatience and in an interview published in the Detroit News in November 1915 charged that the Endowment was "one of the pitiable and deplorable facts of the peace movement in America." Obsessed by the "governmental mind," it had become bogged down in red tape and inaction. Citing Scott's recent statement of policy in the Advocate of Peace, he leveled a personal attack on Scott, claiming that he had become "inoculated with the virus of inertia for which the Endowment will someday be world-famous."[34]

---

[30] Scott to Call, June 16, 1915, reproduced in ibid., LXXVII (November 1915), 239-41.

[31] See the treasurer's report for the year May 1, 1914 to April 30, 1915, in ibid., LXXVII (June 1915), 144-45.

---

[32] Lochner to Lucia Mead, October 9, 1914, Mead Papers, Box 1; and Jenkin Lloyd Jones to Jordan, January 22, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence. Advocate of Peace, LXXVII (March 1915), 68-69, describes the reorganization of the Chicago Peace Society.

The news of Lochner's public attack quickly reached the officers of the Carnegie Endowment and the American Peace Society. The assistant to Nicholas Murray Butler, Director of the Endowment's Division of Intercourse and Education, attempted to refute Lochner's contentions but admitted that the Endowment had curtailed all its work in Europe and was concentrating on the relations of the Republics in the Western Hemisphere and certain educational projects in the United States, such as study clubs on international relations in American universities.[35] Arthur Deerin Call interpreted Lochner's attack on the Carnegie Endowment as an attack upon the American Peace Society as well:

---

[33] Lochner to Butler, January 4, 1915, Butler Papers; Scott to Jane Addams, December 31, 1914, Woman's Peace Party Papers (Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College).

[34] Detroit News, November 20, 1915, 1:1, 2:4, 5, contains the entire interview. Several other metropolitan newspapers reproduced parts of this interview in the next few days.

> Your condemnation of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace seems to me most unjustifiable, surprising, and destructive. My personal feeling is that whatever views you may hold relative to the work of other men interested in our cause it is most unfortunate publicly to lambast them as you have done. It would be perfectly proper for you to express these views to the Carnegie Endowment or even to me, or to any other member of our society, but to do it publicly is subversive to all that makes for international cooperation, much less international peace.[36]

Lochner accepted this criticism as an open invitation to resign from the American Peace Society, and in a temperate reply to Call resigned from both the national body and its affiliate, the Chicago Peace Society, so as not to hinder the American Peace Society in the policy it wished to pursue. Lochner had little regret, for he was already helping to make the final arrangements for Henry Ford's Peace Ship, which was to become the most sensational of mediation efforts during the period of American neutrality.[37]

Other pacifists shared Lochner's feelings but discreetly expressed their opinions privately to their pacifist friends and to the leaders of the Carnegie Endowment and American Peace

---

[35] Henry S. Haskell to Lochner, [no date, but included in papers of November 1915], Ford Peace Plan Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Box 3.

[36] Call to Lochner, November 22, 1915, Lochner Papers.

[37] Lochner to Call, November 28, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

Society. Jordan, who had already praised Lochner as "one of the best of all our bunch" for promoting a more active pacifism,[38] supported Lochner's position. In a long letter to one of the trustees of the Carnegie Endowment, he complained that the inertia of the Endowment and American Peace Society was a disgrace to the peace movement. "It is this sort of cowardice and incompetance, by no means new in pacifism, which weakens and makes absurd the peace movement and which is bringing the Carnegie Endowment and the American Peace Society into sharp and deserved criticism in England and America." He even believed that the Endowment was "an obstruction rather than a help in the cause, partly because its existence creates the impression that the cause has all the money it needs, when so far as present efforts are concerned it has no money at all."[39]

Bartholdt was just as critical of the Carnegie Endowment. After retiring from Congress in early 1915, Bartholdt had returned to his home in St. Louis and thus had no direct influence in shaping the policies of the American Peace Society. When he read Lochner's attack on the Endowment, he expressed his entire agreement. "I do honestly believe that the cause of peace has been retarded rather than helped by Mr. Carnegie's millions. The leaders [of the peace societies] now wear a rope around their necks, while formerly they were free.... The East is under the domination, more or less, of the N.Y. press, but what do you think is the feeling of the honest peace advocates out West when not a word of protest is uttered by the Carnegie people either against the unholy traffic in arms or against the preparedness craze?"[40] Despite Trueblood's illness, even he managed to criticize Call for causing Lochner's resignation and for giving such an incomplete program of the American Peace Society.[41]

---

[38] Jordan to John Mez, February 18, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

[39] Jordan to Henry S. Pritchett, November 23, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence. To his own wife Jordan was even more blunt: "It is such cowardice and incompetence [by James Brown Scott and the Endowment] that makes [sic] peace societies ridiculous. The trustees have no sympathy with men in earnest. I don't understand 'em." Jordan to Jessie Jordan, November 23, 1915, _ibid_.

These criticisms failed to alter the cautious course of the American Peace Society which, if anything, became more conservative in the following months. Its president, Theodore Burton, had spent the spring and summer months of 1915 touring Latin America and upon his return to the United States showed very little interest in the Society. Claiming other pressing duties (among which was his ambition to become the Republican presidential nominee in 1916), Burton finally resigned in December 1915 and thereafter showed almost no interest in the peace movement.[42] In the meantime, Butler of the Carnegie Endowment and Dutton of the Society's executive committee, who were already searching for Burton's successor, urged their recently retired Columbia colleague, George W. Kirchwey, to consider the position.[43] Kirchwey finally accepted with the understanding that he could review the Society's policies and perhaps institute changes. He soon discovered, however, that the Scott-Call forces dominated the Society; and since Kirchwey himself was not entirely sure what policies the Society should pursue, he quietly acquiesced in the Society's previous position.[44] When no change in policy occurred, William I. Hull, the Quaker pacifist, also criticized the Society's inaction and even refused to attend the executive committee meetings which he thought never amounted to anything. Although Hull still hoped that Kirchwey would revitalize the Society, Kirchwey had already lost interest in the Society and finally resigned in May 1917.[45]

---

[40] Bartholdt to Lochner, November 24, 1915, Lochner Papers.

[41] John Mez to Jordan, December 9, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence, describes Trueblood's feelings. Mez was a young German pacifist and professor of economics who had played a leading role in the Corda Fratres, the European counterpart of the Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs. He had met Jordan at a peace congress in Germany in 1913 and thereafter the two became good friends. In the last days of peace, Mez was in Brussels and escaped to Holland when the war began. Angered at Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality, he refused to return to his native land and came to the United States in late 1914, where he worked for the American Peace Society.

---

[42] New York Times, December 13, 1915, 8:3.

[43] Kirchwey to Butler, July 20, 1915, Butler Papers, reviews Butler's efforts to persuade Kirchwey to accept the presidency of the American Peace Society. Dutton to Butler, October 6, 1916, Butler Papers, reviews Dutton's successful efforts in the American Peace Society to elect Kirchwey to the presidency.

[44] Kirchwey expressed his indecision when he first accepted the presidency: "So far the society has taken no definite steps to bring about peace in Europe, having confined its activities simply to spreading peace propaganda, as it did before the outbreak of the war. Whether we shall change this is a question to be decided." New York Times, December 13, 1915, 8:3.

[45] Call to Hull, December 9, 1916, Hull to Call, December 18, 1916, and Call to Hull, December 19, 1916, all in the American Peace Society Papers (Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College). Only a few months

Their complaints were not unjustified, and during the fateful crisis of February and March after the German government had initiated a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, the Society carefully debated the alternatives open to the American government but proposed nothing beyond hoping that President Wilson would leave no stone unturned in seeking a peaceful settlement of the submarine issue. It offered no answer to the question of arming American merchant vessels. At first it weakly hoped that "neutral ships might well remain unarmed" and pleaded for any policy which was based on its "memorial faiths in reason rather than passion, in justice rather than might, in ordered processes rather than mobbed lawlessness;"[46] but once Wilson had decided to arm the merchantmen on his own authority, the executive committee on March 9 voted to support the President in whatever action he felt necessary. Arthur Deerin Call summarized this policy. On the immediate question, should the United States arm its merchant vessels, he answered: "We do not know. That is not the business of the American Peace Society; it is for the Government to decide." And on the larger question of a declaration of war against Germany, he replied: "the American Peace Society leaves the question whether we shall or shall not enter this war to the Government of the United States."[47] What

---

after Kirchwey assumed the presidency, John Mez noted: "Dr. Kirchwey does not seem to care much about the [American] Peace Society." Mez to Jordan, March 1, 1916, Jordan Peace Correspondence. Advocate of Peace, LXXIX (June 1917), 265.

[46] Advocate of Peace, LXXIX (March 1917), 69, 70.

[47] Ibid., LXXIX (April 1917), 100, 99.

Lochner had said of the "governmental mind" of the Carnegie Endowment more than a year earlier applied equally well to the American Peace Society. It wanted peace at the same time that it wanted to uphold international law and neutral rights, but in the final crisis could offer no clear answer, either one way or the other, to what were admittedly difficult questions and ended up sacrificing whatever influence it might have had in shaping the opinions of the President, Congress, and the public at large.

The World War also brought confusion and disunity to the World Peace Foundation. Although Samuel Dutton, chairman of the Foundation's Committee of Organization, emphasized in his report to the trustees a few months after the onset of the war that "this is the beginning of a new epoch in the history of the Foundation" and urged the Foundation to work out a well defined policy,[48] the trustees had a difficult time in deciding what changes in the Foundation's programs were necessary. The old sureness and confidence in the future were no longer evident. With Edwin Ginn dead and Edwin Mead seriously ill, the Foundation had lost two of its leaders, who, in spite of their differences, had at least agreed that the World Peace Foundation should actively serve the cause of peace. Without their presence the Foundation drifted aimlessly for a time, and when it finally began to formulate a specific policy it only served to divide its members.

---

[48] Report of the Committee on Organization, November 23, 1914, presented at the Annual Meeting of the Board of Trustees, November 24, 1914, 57, 60, WPF Files.

Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the trustees initiated policies which reflected their indecision and caution. They appointed Charles Levermore,ex-president of Adelphi College, as Acting Chief Director during Mead's illness but could agree on no active program. Instead, they decided to curtail all the Foundation's activities "not involving legal and moral obligation, so as to have an emergency fund for possible new activity."[49] In pursuit of this policy, or non-policy, they voted to discontinue the Foundation's meagre support of women's clubs, to leave vacant the position of business manager who had died in February 1915, and to cut off the salary allowance of many of its directors. It also voted to terminate the Foundation's subvention to the American School Peace League, although later the trustees reconsidered this action and reinstated the appropriation. Since the trustees also voted to prohibit publication of books and pamphlets without the consent of a majority of the five man Committee of Organization, in practice this meant that the printed matter of the Foundation was also curtailed, for as Dutton remarked, "in many cases there have not been even three members of the Committee ready to approve of a publication proposed by the Acting Chief Director."[50]

---

[49] Annual Meeting of the Board of Trustees, November 24, 1914, 59a, 62, ibid.

[50] Special Meeting of the Board of Trustees, October 11, 1915, 93-96, Special Meeting of the Board of Trusttes, June 3, 1916, 118, 120, and Report of the Committee on Organization, presented at Special Meeting of the Board of Trustees, January 8, 1916, 99, all in ibid.

These restrictive actions did not mean that the World Peace Foundation abandoned all its peace work during the war, for Levermore wanted to promote educational programs in the schools and colleges. Before his appointment as Acting Director, he had served as head of the college department of the Foundation, and he continued the educational work of the Foundation during the war. But whereas Edwin Mead had looked upon the Foundation's work among students as a process of moral exhortation and conversion of American youth to active service in the movement, Levermore wanted only to promote study clubs on international relations for students and to encourage college administrators to add courses on international relations to their curricula. With the cooperation of his assistant, George Nasmyth, Levermore helped to stimulate discussion on international topics in several colleges and universities in the East and Middle West. Since the Carnegie Endowment also expressed interest in promoting the study of international relations in higher education, it cooperated with Levermore and Nasmyth in the undertaking. By the end of 1916 the combined efforts of these two foundations had succeeded in organizing foreign policy groups, usually called International Polity Clubs, in more than forty American universities and colleges.[51]

---

[51] Special Meeting of the Board of Trustees, October 11, 1915, 93, 94-95, and Report of the Committee on Organization, presented at Special Meeting of the Board of Trustees, January 8, 1916, 99, both in *ibid.*; and "Annual Report, 1915," *World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series*, V, No.6 Part II (December 1915), 11-15. For the Endowment's side in the student club movement, see Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Year*

Despite this modest undertaking the World Peace Foundation was very reluctant to embark on more ambitious programs. Given its obsession with saving money for future peace work -- one estimate called for saving $20,000 per year for the duration of the war -- the trustees' caution was understandable, yet because of financial difficulties over Ginn's will and other unforeseen expenditures (such as major repairs to the Foundation's buildings) the Foundation was unable to save any money. As the Finance Committee sadly reported: "In spite of the fact that the Foundation has had for more than a year no very well defined policy or apparent activity, we have spent most of our income."[52]

Finally, after long debate the trustees, awakening from their lethargy, decided to endorse a new organization, the League to Enforce Peace. The idea of a league of the great powers to enforce the peace was the brainchild of Hamilton Holt and Theodore Marburg who believed that the World War necessitated the creation of an authoritative world organization if future wars were to be prevented. Officially founded in June 1915, the League to Enforce Peace gained the loyal support of William Howard Taft and other prominent Americans. Sobered by the incredible national hatreds unleashed by the World War, these

---

Book for 1915 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1915), 70-72; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book for 1916 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1916), 61-62; and New York Evening Post, January 25, 1915, 3:5.

[52] Annual Report of the Finance Committee for the Financial Year Ending September 30, 1915, presented at Special Meeting of the Board of Trustees, January 8, 1916, 103, WPF Files.

individuals adopted a more realistic view of international morality and politics than they had espoused before 1914, for they now believed that the collective action of nation states against recalcitrant nations was a prerequisite for a stable world order.

Among the early promoters of the League was one of the Foundation's trustees, the notorious conservative, A. Lawrence Lowell. Shortly after the founding of the new organization, Lowell, president of Harvard University, introduced the League's program to the trustees and persuaded them to endorse its "general principles and policy." Not all the trustees were happy with the potential dangers of using force to counteract force in international affairs, but Lowell had immense prestige and influence in the Foundation and in January 1916 managed to convince the trustees to appropriate a maximum of $10,000 of the Foundation's annual income to the new organization. The trustees actually increased this appropriation in 1916 and 1917 and virtually abandoned any interest it had previously shown toward the immediate questions of American neutrality.[53]

David Starr Jordan, one of the directors of the World Peace Foundation, became increasingly dismayed with all these developments. Before the Foundation began to appropriate funds to the League to Enforce Peace, he criticized the growing conservatism of the trustees and their refusal to embark on active peace work. As he reported to his wife in October 1915, the Foundation was "stuck in the mud" and in a "very unsatisfactory state." He suspected that Lowell, whom he privately called "the tory president at Harvard," was responsible for the trustees' initial caution; but after the trustees had endorsed the League to Enforce Peace, he was convinced that Lowell dominated the board of trustees.[54] Jordan conceded that the League might provide one answer to the problem of international anarchy after the war, but its recognition of the principle of force to maintain the peace troubled him. He was more disturbed, however, that the Foundation's financial support of the League meant the virtual abandonment of all other peace work for the duration of the war. Jordan had many friends on the board of trustees, especially Pillsbury, Swain, Faunce, and Dutton, and he told them that if they would promote him as chief director, he might agree to serve in this position for a year or more until he could reactivate the fund. Jordan was not very optimistic about his proposal, for he realized that the majority of the trustees were reluctant to embark on a more active policy. He expressed these thoughts to his wife: "The trouble is," he complained, "they are afraid to endow anybody as Mr. Ginn wished to endow me, and any live man might jar the London Clubs, or the Republican Standpat Organization."[55] Jordan's friends on the board had already urged a more active working head, but the trustees had ignored the proposal.[56] Indeed, since the trustees had already endorsed the League to Enforce Peace, they failed to consult any of the directors except Levermore and Nasmyth who continued their modest efforts among institutions of higher learning. Once committed to the League, the trustees rejected all other proposals for peace work, and by late 1916 the Foundation became little more than an administrative agency which distributed the largest single portion of its annual income to the League to Enforce Peace.[57]

---

[53] Special Meeting of the Board of Trustees, July 12, 1915, 86-88, Special Meeting of the Board of Trustees, January 8, 1916, 115, Special Meeting of the Board of Trustees, June 3, 1916, 121, and Annual Meeting of the Board of Trustees, December 1, 1917, 141, all in *ibid*.

---

[54] Jordan to Jessie Jordan, November 30, 1914, October 26, 28, 1915, all in Jordan Peace Correspondence.

[55] Jordan to Jessie Jordan, November 6, 1916, *ibid.*

Some of the trustees and and directors who had previously expressed deep reservations about the possible unpleasant consequences of such an organization also lost interest in the Foundation and directed their attention to other peace organizations more congenial to their own outlook. Thus, Samuel Dutton, who placed greater faith in the judicial settlement of international controversies than in a militant world organization, increasingly devoted much more of his time to another new organization, the World's Court League, whose main purpose was to mobilize American public sentiment behind a world court following the World War. By October 1916 Dutton was so committed to the new group that he agreed to serve as its secretary. Charles Levermore followed much the same course. Realizing that his services as a director of the World Peace Foundation were virtually worthless, he soon joined Dutton in promoting the judicial court, and by the end of 1916 Levermore's participation in the Foundation had dwindled to the point where his name was no longer mentioned in the trustees' meetings.[58]

---

[56] Special Committee on "Improvements in the form of the World Peace Foundation," presented at Special Meeting of the Board of Trustees, January 8, 1916, 109-14, WPF Files..

[57] At one meeting, for example, the trustees failed to take any positive action on the following proposals: to endorse the Union of Democratic Control, to establish a newspaper, and to create a Press Plate Bureau for newspaper campaigns. Special Meeting of the Board of Trustees, January 8, 1916, 117, ibid.

The New York Peace Society drifted along a similar course. At first some of its members were interested in spreading pacifist propaganda to educate the citizenry against American participation in the conflict and in promoting American mediation of the war. But as long as its president, Andrew Carnegie, was healthy, he vehemently opposed such activity and argued "that of all things, silence, upon the part of our country, is the best policy."[59] What Carnegie desired of the country, he demanded of the Society, and the majority of its members agreed with him. Even after Carnegie fell ill and began to lose all interest in the peace movement, the Society's directors failed to pursue an active policy. Although they still favored mediation moves on the part of the American government, they exerted no pressure on the Wilson administration and admitted by the autumn of 1916 that "we have not learned, during the year, of any further project which seemed to us to have in it promise of accomplishing this desired end." Unwilling to divide the Society on the question of military preparedness, they avoided the issue entirely, claiming that the entire question was not "of essence to the peace movement."[60]

---

[58] Levermore, Dutton, 166-70; Dutton to Butler, October 6, 1916, Butler Papers; Revised Minutes of the Adjourned Annual Meeting, December 2, 1916, 129-30, WPF Files; and Dutton to Jordan, December 3, 1916, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

[59] Carnegie to Short, November 2, 1914, NYPS Papers, Box 3.

When the New York Peace Society did take a position, it decided to uphold international law as defined before 1914. In standing on neutral rights, it came dangerously close to advocating war whenever a German submarine sank a neutral or belligerent ship which resulted in the loss of American lives. Ultimately Hamilton Holt, with the cooperation of his friend William H. Short, managed to gain a forum in the Society for his ideas on a league of nations to enforce the peace, and a special committee was organized to debate the entire problem. But in early 1915 even these members, realizing that the Society was inert and at any rate had only a local influence, decided to form an independent group out of which eventually emerged the League to Enforce Peace.[61] As the League grew in size and stature, the New York Peace Society endorsed the new organization. Since William Short was already secretary of both organizations, the cooperation between the two groups became especially close.[62]

---

[60] New York Peace Society, Year Book, 1915-1916 (n.p.: n.p., 1916?), 10.

[61] New York Evening Post, January 7, 1915, 3:3; Ruhl J. Bartlett, The League to Enforce Peace (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1944), 30-32.

[62] New York Times, November 7, 1915, II, 15:1, and December 27, 1915, 5:3.

Not all agreed with this policy. Those who were more concerned with keeping the United States out of the war at all costs and in promoting policies to end the carnage and destruction in Europe at first became discouraged with the Society's inaction and later dismayed at the Society's endorsement of collective security, and by late 1915 several of the less prominent members, including John Haynes Holmes, Oswald Garrison Villard, and his mother, Fanny Garrison Villard, had resigned in disgust. Oswald Villard well expressed their displeasure with the Society's indifference to pacifism. Quoting a friend, he called the New York Society a "somnolent and inactive reform association," which despite its "aroma of original benevolence," was really an organization that "attracts respectable, rich, lazy, and conservative people."[63] John Haynes Holmes was more temperate but just as discouraged. The New York Peace Society, he wrote in his letter of resignation, had "lamentably failed, from my point of view, to meet emergencies presented by the war and the new overwhelming crisis of disaster which seems to impend in our own country."[64]

(5)

From the foregoing it would seem that the outbreak of the World War shattered the superficial unity among the peace workers. Yet the American peace movement from 1914 to 1917 was not entirely shattered; rather it was reorganized. Those dissatisfied with the timidity of the peace organization in the months following the outbreak of the war not only dissociated themselves from existing peace groups but formed new ones. These new peace organizations combined some of their earlier approaches to peace with the realization that because of the total nature of the World War new approaches were necessary. Thus, just as the internationalist-minded peace advocates founded new groups like the League to Enforce Peace and the World's Court League, both of which attempted to lay the groundwork for post-war international organization, so did various idealistic pacifists start and recruit new blood for pacifist organizations of their own. The American Union Against Militarism, the Woman's Peace Party, the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation, the American Neutral Conference Committee, the Fellowship of Reconciliations, and the Emergency Peace Federation were the most important of the new pacifist organizations. Nor did these pacifist organizations attract only those peace workers who were dissatisfied with the static character and underlying conservatism of the American Peace Society, for the World War impelled many Americans who had shown no interest in the peace movement before 1914 into active cooperation with these new groups. Indeed, many individuals who first joined the peace movement after 1914 helped to organize these groups and gave their vigorous support to them. Julia Grace Wales, Lella Faye Secor, Rebecca Shelly, Emily Greene Balch, Lilian D. Wald, Crystal Eastman, Max Eastman, Amos Pinchot,

---

[63] Quoted in Michael Wreszin, Oswald Garrison Villard: Pacifist at War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), 46.

[64] Holmes to Short, November 4, 1915, NYPS Papers, Box 4.

Henry Ford, and Paul U. Kellogg were among the newcomers who swelled the pacifist ranks during the neutrality years.

The story of the formation and actual programs of these new peace societies during the two-and-a-half years of American neutrality goes far beyond this study. Indeed, their activities were so extensive and wide-ranging and had such a potentially important influence on large segments of American public opinion and even on President Wilson that a separate study would be required to document their historical importance. What is clear, however, is that the American peace workers who had steadily added to their leadership and extended their field of operations in the decade before the World War, after 1914 could no longer accept uncritically the complacent assumptions which had previously permeated the peace movement. The World War threatened the very foundations of America's geographical isolation and the relaxed atmosphere in which Americans had previously debated questions of foreign policy. With the limits of America's freedom of action narrowed, it became apparent that Americans could not so easily afford the luxury of vague programs and imprecise thinking on world problems. Henceforth, they would have to rethink their own programs more carefully, define more precisely what they meant by "peace," "justice," and "internationalism" and the priorities they gave to these words, and then work long and hard for whatever policies they came to espouse.

Most important, however hopeful they were for a peaceful world, they could no longer be so confident in their grand vision of an enlightened world order. The longer the human slaughter continued in Europe, the more difficult it became for the peace workers to uphold the lofty idealism which had permeated the prewar American peace movement. It was perhaps fortunate for them that Woodrow Wilson who shared their ideological and historical assumptions on America's place in world affairs lived in the White House in this trying period, for he fervently hoped to keep the United States out of the war; and when he finally decided that American intervention was necessary, his war message which attempted to justify American involvement invoked the highest principles of democracy, freedom, and justice. His message won over not only the internationalists who shared Wilson's belief that as a great world power the United States had no alternative but to enter the war after Germany's renewal of submarine warfare but most, though by no means all, of the strongest antiwar leaders who grudgingly conceded that the President's motives were sincere and his purposes lofty.

Yet the year 1917 represented the high tide of American idealism, for when Wilson helped to negotiate a peace settlement which satisfied neither the European Allies nor large segments of the American public, disillusionment followed. Several American peace workers noted this changing mood, but the Reverend Charles E. Jefferson, one of the most active pacifists who acquiesced in American involvement in the war only after Wilson's idealistic war message, described it most strikingly. In 1924 he visited Lake Mohonk where the Smileys had held the annual conferences on international arbitration. Now an old man of sixty-four, Jefferson half realized that Lake Mohonk had represented in microcosm the beauty, simplicity, and innocence which the peace workers of his high-minded generation had wanted to extend to all peoples. As he wrote to Edwin Mead:

> My wife and I were there sixteen days -- etc[ch]ing and walking and driving and loafing, and of course I had to think of you and recall the olden days when we were young. The foliage was more than usually beautiful and the place is still charming but it did not come up to the Mohonk of the olden days when Edward Everett Hale was there and Robert Treat Payne [sic] and Edwin D. Mead was [sic] there and ever so many of the annoited lovers of peace. I felt I was in another world. Albert Smiley was gone and Daniel Smiley was gone and I was lonesome in the midst of all that floral magnificance. And so I called up in my mind a great host of the people whom I have seen at Mohonk.[65]

Jefferson was right. The Lake Mohonk he saw was still beautiful, but the idealistic souls who had convened there each spring were no longer in evidence. His co-workers in the pre-war peace movement had either passed away or were too old to attempt to grapple with the cataclysmic forces which were transforming world politics. Lake Mohonk served as a nostalgic memory, a kind of unchanging symbol in an increasingly complicated, fast-paced, and discordant world. Much as American peace workers in the post-war world still wanted to extend the serenity and simplicity of Lake Mohonk to the entire world, they realized that it had become a difficult, almost insuperable task. Compared with the years before 1914, advocates of peace had become either more radical or "realistic," but whatever idealism they retained was more subdued, based more on hope than on blind faith.

---

[65] Jefferson to Mead, October 20, [no year given but included in correspondence for the year 1924], Mead Papers, Box 1.

# APPENDIX A


1870
1800
1890
1900
1910
1920
Edward Everett Hale (1822-1909)
Albert K. Smiley (1827-1912)
Alfred H. Love (1830-1913)
Belva Ann Lockwood (1830-1917)
Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919)
Robert Treat Paine (1835-1910)
Edwin Ginn (1838-1914)
Hannah J. Bailey (1839-1923)
Samuel B. Capen (1842-1914)
Jenkin Lloyd Jones (1843-1918)
May Wright Sewall (1844-1920)
Benjamin F. Trueblood (1847-1916)
Edwin Doak Mead (1849-1937)
Samuel Train Dutton (1849-1919)
Oscar S. Straus (1850-1926)
David Starr Jordan (1851-1931)
Theodore E. Burton (1851-1929)
James L. Slayden (1853-1922)
Richard Bartholdt (1855-1932)
George W. Kirchwey (1855-1942)
Lucia Ames Mead (1856-1936)
William Howard Taft (1857-1930)
Jane Addams (1860-1935)

William Jennings Bryan (1860-1925)
Charles E. Jefferson (1860-1937)
Nicholas Murray Butler (1862-1947)
Theodore Marburg (1863-1942)
James L. Tryon (1864-19??)
James Brown Scott (1866-1943)
Charles S. Macfarland (1866-1956)
Fannie Fern Andrews (1867-1950)
Frederick Lynch (1867-1934)
William H. Short (1868-1935)
William I. Hull (1868-1939)
Charles E. Beals (1869-1931)
Arthur Deerin Call (1869-1941)
Hamilton Holt (1872-1951)
George W. Nasmyth (1882-1919)
Louis P. Lochner (1887-    )



------------------ some participation in American peace movement

—————————— active participation in American peace movement

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

(The following list includes only those items actually cited in footnotes with the exception of the bibliographical aids and a few articles and books, especially biographies, which might give the interested reader additional reference on certain aspects of the peace movement.)

### Bibliographical Aids

Brinton, Elen Starr, and Doty, Hiram, eds. Guide to the Swarthmore College Peace Collection, A Memorial to Jane Addams. Swarthmore College Bulletin, XLV (Peace Collection Publication No. 1) (1947).

Hays, Alice Newman, David Starr Jordan; A Bibliography of His Writings, 1871-1931. With a Personal Appreciation by Robert E. Swain. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952.

Holloway, Jean. "A Checklist of the Writings of Edward Everett Hale," Bulletin of Bibliography, XXI (May-August, 1954), 89-92; (September-December, 1954), 114-20; (January-April, 1955), 140-43.

Kuehl, Warren F., ed. A Bibliography of the Writings of Hamilton Holt. n.p.: n.p., n.d.

Robinson, Peter E., ed., Register, Hamilton Holt Papers. Winter Park, Fla.: Mills Memorial Library, Rollins College, 1964.

## Manuscript and Scrapbook Collections

Jane Addams Papers. Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. Very little on the pre-1914 years, but much of value during the period of American neutrality. The entire collection is uneven in quality since many of her papers were destroyed (she burned many of them in her fireplace) and she rarely kept copies of her own letters. But what still exists has been card indexed chronologically and by correspondent for easy reference. The entire collection has also been microfilmed for use by scholars on interlibrary loan.

American Peace Society Papers. Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. Very little correspondence or other manuscript material, but the correspondence between William I. Hull and the Society during the period of American Neutrality was useful. Benjamin Trueblood's correspondence is in this collection, but since it is organized as a separate unit, I have listed it below under Trueblood's name.

Edward A. Atkinson Papers. Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts. One letter from Edwin Mead describes his reaction to imperialism and the Boer War.

Hannah J. Bailey Papers and Diary. Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. Contains several boxes of printed matter on the WCTU peace department, including its annual reports which are difficult to find in one place elsewhere. Correspondence is meagre in the collection. Her diary clearly delineates her daily activities and her deeply religious nature but says little concerning her relationship with other peace workers.

Warren Worth Bailey Papers, Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey. Contains several letters to his constituents in which he clearly espouses his strong small-navy prejudices. Also some letters from William Jennings Bryan relative to his interest in the peace movement.

Richard Bartholdt Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Missouri. Bartholdt apparently left no personal papers. This collection houses only printed material, such as his speeches, most of which were reproduced in peace journals or in the proceedings of peace congresses.

William Jennings Bryan Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. A rather disappointing collection since Bryan apparently did not save all his incoming correspondence and rarely kept copies of his own letters. Some letters of value showing his growing interest in peace after 1898 and the development of his plan for conciliation treaties.

Theodore E. Burton Papers. Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio. Reveals Burton's growing interest in the peace movement in the decade before the First World War, but only a few letters to and from peace workers on Taft's and Wilson's foreign policies were of more than ordinary interest.

Nicholas Murray Butler Papers. Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, New York. An extensive collection arranged by correspondent. Butler corresponded with almost all peace advocates before the war, but his letters to and from his New York co-workers and fellow educators were most extensive, if not always most valuable.

Andrew Carnegie Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Extraordinarily rich on the peace movement, especially after about 1908. It is almost possible after that date to plot Carnegie's daily activities from his correspondence with peace workers. Also of occasional value before then.

Ford Peace Plan Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. A prerequisite for anyone interested in the Ford Peace Ship of December 1915 and its aftermath, but of minor value for the pacifists' attitudes before its sailing.

Edward Everett Hale Papers. The New York State Library, Albany, New York. Mostly letters to members of his own family, and only occasionally concerning the peace movement. A few letters for the period 1895 to 1900 were of interest as were some typewritten statements outlining Hale's views on the obligations of the clergy and his general outlook on life.

Hamilton Holt Papers. Mills Memorial Library, Rollins College, Winter Park, Florida. Only one box of letters for the pre-1917 period, but some were helpful. Other boxes of printed material, including some of Holt's speeches and book reviews on peace, were consulted, but I did not peruse his mammoth newspaper clipping file.

Edward M. House Papers and Diary. Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut. Letters for the pre-war years were of little value, but the diary helped to establish the timetable of President Wilson's interest in disarmament and his endorsement of House's mission to Europe in early 1914.

David Starr Jordan Peace Correspondence. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California. One of several collections of Jordan material at Stanford open to scholars. (A few are still closed.) This one contains all of Jordan's peace correspondence after 1913 which is neatly arranged chronologically. Since Jordan apparently saved everything and made carbons of almost all his own letters, the collection is a chronicle of Jordan's peace activities. His long and frequent letters to his wife when he was away from Stanford were especially interesting.

David Starr Jordan Papers, Supplementary Correspondence. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California. Contains Jordan's correspondence from about 1908 to 1913. Arranged by correspondent, the letters between Jordan and various members of the World Peace Foundation were very valuable for revealing the different approaches to peace work in the Foundation.

Louis P. Lochner Papers. The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin. Very little on his activities in the peace movement before 1914, but indispensible for anyone interested in the 1914 to 1917 period.

Samuel S. McClure Papers. Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. McClure was a member of the New York Peace Society who went on the Ford Peace Ship more as a reporter than a pacifist. Only one letter of interest for the pre-war years.

Theodore Marburg Correspondence with Woodrow Wilson, 1904-1918. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. One box revealing the growth of Marburg's and Wilson's interest in international organization after 1914. Very little of interest before that date, but one letter was helpful.

Theodore Marburg Scrapbook. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Helps to illuminate Marburg's legal and poetical nature and the development of his ideas on international organization, but of little value for this study.

Edwin and Lucia Mead Papers. Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. Very little on the years before 1900, but much fuller after that. Supplements other collections on Edwin Mead's association with trustees and directors of the World Peace Foundation after 1910. Lucia Mead's correspondence was also of some value.

George W. Nasmyth Papers. Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. Several long letters to Edwin Mead on his European experiences highlight this small collection. Also some material on his association with the League to Enforce Peace during the First World War.

New York Peace Society Papers. Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. Perhaps the most complete collection of papers of a peace society for the pre-1914 years. Minutes of meetings alone are generally full and tell much about the internal workings and problems of a peace group. I found, however, that the correspondence in the collection was equally important.

Robert Treat Paine Papers. Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts. Unfortunately, I learned of this collection too late to peruse first hand for this study, but the librarians kindly sent me Xerox copies of his few letters to Edwin Mead.

May Wright Sewall Papers. Indianapolis Public Library, Indianapolis, Indiana. A small collection which was of little value for my study, though contains some letters from women pacifists on the Second Hague Peace Conference and her pacifist inclinations after 1914.

James T. Shotwell "Impressions of Nicholas Murray Butler." The Oral History Collection of Columbia University, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, New York. A perceptive, yet fair-minded appraisal of Butler whose cool, reserved nature make him easily misunderstood, if not actively disliked.

Oscar S. Straus Papers and Diary. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., A large collection but perused only for selected periods, especially 1898, 1906, and 1914.

William Howard Taft Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Rather disappointing considering Taft's interest in the peace movement and the immense size of the collection.

Benjamin F. Trueblood Correspondence in the American Peace Society Papers. Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. Little on the 1890's, but the collection increases in size and value after about 1900. For the years 1908 to 1914 it was often helpful. Swarthmore has recently acquired additional Trueblood papers, but these were not available in time for this study.

Woodrow Wilson Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Mammoth collection which fortunately is fairly well arranged and indexed. I used extensively Series 2 (pre-Presidential personal correspondence), Series 3 (Presidential letterbooks), and Series 4 (Presidential personal correspondence).

Woman's Peace Party Papers. Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. Contains much correspondence on the founding of this new peace society in December 1914 but of little value before then.

World Peace Foundation Papers. Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. A very valuable collection showing the internal problems of the Foundation. Most of the correspondence for the years from 1909 to 1914 is to and from Edwin Ginn and for that interim is as much his personal collection of papers as the Foundation's.

World Peace Foundation Files. World Peace Foundation, Boston, Massachusetts. Contains only the minutes of the meetings of the trustees of the Foundation, but these were a great help in documenting the shifts in the official position of the Foundation from 1910 to 1917.

## Unpublished Official Records

Bryan-Wilson Correspondence in United States Department of State Papers. Record Group 59. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

United States Department of State Papers. Record Group 43, Decimal file 500.A2 and 500.A3. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

## Public Documents

*A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents.* James D. Richardson, ed. 20 vols., New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897-1917.

*Congressional Record*, 1874, 1887-1914.

*International American Conference, Reports of Committees and Discussions Thereon.* 4 vols., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1890.

*Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1893-1914.

*Parliamentary Debates*, 1893.

U.S. Congress. Senate. *Senate Document No. 63*, 55th Congress, 1st session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1897.

## Correspondence and Collected Works

Allen, Gardner Weld, ed. *Papers of John Davis Long, 1897-1904.* Norwood: The Massachusetts Historical Society, 1939.

Blaine, James G. *Political Discussions: Legislative, Diplomatic and Popular, 1856-1886.* Norwich, Conn.: The Henry Bill Publishing Co., 1887.

Bryan, William Jennings. *Speeches of William Jennings Bryan.* 2 vols., New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1909.

Butt, Archibald W. *Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate Letters of Archie Butt, Military Aide.* 2 vols., Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Doran Co., 1930.

Hale, Edward Everett. *The Works of Edward Everett Hale.* Library Edition, 10 vols., Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1898-1901.

Hale, Edward Everett, Jr. *The Life and Letters of Edward Everett Hale*. 2 vols., Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1917.

Morison, Elting E., ed. *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt.* 8 vols., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951-1954.

Seymour, Charles, ed. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Arranged as a Narrative*. 4 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926-1928.

## Published Diaries, Memoirs, and Autobiographies

Addams, Jane. *The Second Twenty Years at Hull House*. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1930.

Angell, Norman. *After All: The Autobiography of Norman Angell*. London: H. Hamilton, 1952.

Baker, Elizabeth Balmer, and Baker, P.J. Noel. *J. Allen Baker, Member of Parliament: A Memoir*. London: The Swarthmore Press, 1927.

Bartholdt, Richard. *From Steerage to Congress: Reminiscences and Reflections*. Philadelphia: Dorrance & Co., 1930.

Bryan, William Jennings, and Bryan, Mary Baird. *Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan*. Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co., 1925.

Butler, Nicholas Murray. *Across the Busy Years: Recollections and Reflections*. 2 vols., New York: Charles S. Scribner's Sons, 1939 edition.

Carnegie, Andrew. *Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1920.

Cronon, E. David, ed. *The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963.

Daniels, Josephus. *The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910-1917*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944.

Gompers, Samuel. *Seventy Years of Life and Labor*. 2 vols., New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1925.

Hale, Edward Everett. *Memories of a Hundred Years*. Two vols. in one, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1904.

Jordan, David Starr. *The Days of a Man: Being Memories of a Naturalist, Teacher and a Minor Prophet of Democracy*. 2 vols., Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book Company, 1922.

Lochner, Louis. *Always the Unexpected: A Book of Reminiscences*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956.

Lynch, Frederick. *Personal Recollections of Andrew Carnegie*. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1920.

Mead, Edwin D. "Boston Memories of Fifty Years," in *Fifty Years of Boston: A Memorial Volume*. ed. Elisabeth M. Herlihy. Boston: Goodspeed's Bookstore, 1932.

Ogden, Robert Morris, ed. *The Diaries of Andrew D. White*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1959.

Pettigrew, R.F. *Imperial Washington: The Story of American Public Life from 1870 to 1920*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1922.

Reid, Wemyss. *Memoirs and Correspondence of Lyon Playfair, First Lord Playfair of St. Andrews*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1899.

Roosevelt, Theodore. *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913.

Slayden, Ellen M. *Washington Wife: Journal of Ellen Maury Slayden from 1897-1919*. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.

Straus, Oscar. *Under Four Administrations: From Cleveland to Taft*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1922.

Suttner, Bertha von. *Memoirs of Bertha von Suttner: The Records of an Eventful Life*. 2 vols., Boston: Ginn and Co., 1910.

White, Andrew D. *Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White*. 2 vols., New York: The Century Co., 1905.

## Contemporary Books and Pamphlets

Addams, Jane. *The Newer Ideals of Peace*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907.

Ames, Lucia True. *Memoirs of a Millionaire*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1889.

Angell, Norman. *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage.* London: William Heinemann, 1911.

Angell, Norman. *Peace Theories and the Balkan War*. London: Horace Marshall & Son, 1912.

Angell, Norman. *War and the Essential Realities*. London: Watts & Co., 1913.

Beals, Charles E. *Benjamin Franklin Trueblood -- Prophet of Peace,* New York: Religious Society of Friends, 1916.

Butler, Nicholas Murray. *The International Mind: An Argument for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912.

Carnegie, Andrew. *An American Four-in-Hand in Britain*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883.

Carnegie, Andrew. *A League of Peace: A Rectorial Address Delivered to the Students in the University of St. Andrews, 17th October, 1905*. Boston: Ginn & Company, 1906.

Carnegie, Andrew. *Triumphant Democracy, or Fifty Years' March of the Republic*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886.

Darby, W. Evans. *International Arbitration. International Tribunals. A Collection of the Various Schemes Which Have Been Propounded; and of Instances Since 1815*. 3rd ed., London. J.M. Dent and Co., 1900.

Davis, Hayne, ed. *Among the World's Peacemakers: An Epitome of the Interparliamentary Union*. New York: The Progressive Publishing Co., 1907.

Field, David Dudley, Carnegie, Andrew, Eaton, Dorman B., Jessup, Morris K., and Hewitt, Abram S. *Memorial to Congress, 1888,* n.p.: n.p., n.d.

Foster, John W. *Arbitration and the Hague Court*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1904.

Ginn, Edwin. *Are Our Schools in Danger?* n.p.: n.p., 1895.

Ginn, Edwin. *Outline of the Life of Edwin Ginn, Including his Preparation for the Publishing Business and the Establishment of Ginn and Company*. Boston: Athenaeum Press, 1908.

Hull, William I. *The New Peace Movement*. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1912.

Jordan, David Starr. *America's Conquest of Europe*. Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1913.

Jordan, David Starr. *The Blood of the Nation: A Study of the Decay of Races Through the Survival of the Unfit*. Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1902.

Jordan, David Starr. *The Human Harvest: A Study of the Decay of Races Through the Survival of the Unfit*. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1907.

Jordan, David Starr. *Imperial Democracy: A Study of the Relation of Government by the People, Equality before the Law, and Other Tenets of Democracy, to the Demands of a Vigorous Foreign Policy and Other Demands of Imperial Democracy*. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1899.

Jordan, David Starr, and Krehbiel, Edward Benjamin. *Syllabus of Lectures on International Conciliation, Given at Leland Stanford Junior University.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1912.

Jordan, David Starr. *War and the Breed: The Relation of War to the Downfall of Nations*. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1915.

Jordan, David Starr. *War and Waste: A Series of Discussions of War and War Accessories*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1913.

Lockwood, Belva A. *The Central American Peace Congress and an International Arbitration Court for the Five Central American Republics*. Washington, D.C.: n.p., 1908.

Lockwood, Belva A. *Peace and the Outlook*. Washington, D.C.: Thos. W. Cadick, 1899.

Love, Alfred H. *A Brief Synopsis of Work Proposed, Aided and Accomplished by the Universal Peace Union During the Last Forty-five Years (From 1866 to 1911)*. n.p.: n.p., n.d.

Lynch, Frederick. *The Peace Problem: The Task of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1911.

Lynch, Frederick. *Through Europe on the Eve of War: A Record of Personal Experiences; Including an Account of the First World Conference of The Churches for International Peace*. New York: The Church Peace Union, 1914.

Marburg, Theodore. *Political Papers*. 2 vols., Baltimore: John Murphy Company, 1898-1900.

Mead, Edwin D. *The Case of Mr. Blaine: An Open Letter to the Boston Advertiser. By an Independent*. Boston: J.S. Cushing & Co., 1884.

Mead, Edwin D. *Gov. Roosevelt's "Exact Parallels."* n.p.: n.p., 1899?

Mead, Edwin D. *The Influence of Emerson*. Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1903.

Mead, Edwin D. *Martin Luther: A Study of Reformation*. Boston: George H. Ellis, 1883.

Mead, Edwin D. *The Old South Work.* Boston: Old South Meeting House, 1899.

Mead, Edwin D. *The Philosophy of Carlyle*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1881.

Mead, Edwin D. *The Roman Catholic Church and the School Question*. Boston: C.H. Ellis, 1888.

Mead, Edwin D. *The Two Sides of the School Question*. Boston: Arnold Publishing Co., 1890.

Mead, Lucia Ames. *A Primer of the Peace Movement*. Boston: American Peace Society, 1905.

Mead, Lucia Ames. *Swords and Ploughshares, or the Supplanting of the System of War by the System of Law*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1912.

Moritzen, Julius. *The Peace Movement of America*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1912.

Sewall, May Wright, ed. *Genesis of the International Council of Women and the Story of its Growth, 1888-1893.* Indianapolis: n.p., 1914.

Stead, W.T. The United States of Europe on the Eve of the Parliament of Peace. New York: Doubleday & McClure Co., 1899.

Taft, William Howard. The United States and World Peace. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914.

Trueblood, Benjamin F. The Development of the Peace Idea, and Other Essays. Boston: Plimpton Press, 1932.

Trueblood, Benjamin F. The Federation of the World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1899.

Weston, Stephen F., ed. Prize Orations of the Intercollegiate Peace Association. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1912.

## Newspapers (Consulted for the years indicated)

Detroit News, November 1915.

New York Evening Post, 1914-1917.

New York Times, 1887-1917.

Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 1898.

New York World, 1897-1898.

Washington Post, 1896-1898, 1904, 1914.

## Contemporary Periodicals (Consulted for the years indicated)

Advocate of Peace, 1893-1917.

American Journal of International Law, 1907-1914.

American Journal of Politics, 1892-1894.

American Magazine of Civics, 1895-1897.

Arbitrator, 1885-1914.

*The Arena*, 1908.
*Atlantic Monthly*, 1908-1909.
*Century Magazine*, 1912.
*Chautauquan*, 1909.
*Christian Arbitrator and Messenger of Peace*, 1890-1893.
*The Commoner*, 1905-1914.
*The Critic*, 1898.
*Educational Review*, 1898-1914.
*Everybody's Magazine*, 1914.
*Farm and Ranch*, 1912-1913.
*Harper's Weekly*, 1904.
*Homelitic Review*, 1907, 1911.
*The Independent*, 1899-1917.
*International Conciliation*, 1907-1915.
*International Socialist Review*, 1910-1915.
*Journal of American History*, 1909.
*Journal of Education*, 1898-1917.
*Judicial Settlement of International Disputes*, 1911-1915.
*Lend a Hand: A Record of Progress*, 1889-1897.
*Maryland Quarterly*, 1910.
*The Nation*, 1896, 1909.
*New England Magazine*, 1889-1903.
*Nineteenth Century*, 1898, 1906.
*North American Review*, 1896-1902, 1910.
*Old and New*, 1871.
*The Outlook* (New York), 1905-1909.
*The Party Builder*, 1914.

*The Peace Crusade*, 1899.

*Peacemaker*, 1882-1913.

*Religious Education*, 1911-1912.

*Review of Reviews* (London), 1898-1900.

*Review of Reviews* (New York), 1908.

*Saturday Evening Post*, 1913.

*Unity*, 1931.

*Voice of Peace*, 1874.

*World Today*, 1907-1912.

*World Unity*, 1928.

*Yale Review*, 1914.

Contemporary Articles (Does not include unsigned editorials or articles nor any references cited in the text from the English and American peace journals.)

Addams, Jane, "Peace on Earth," *Ladies Home Journal*, XXX (December 1913), 27.

Ames, Lucia True, "City Homes for the Poor," *Lend a Hand: A Record of Progress*, XII (March 1894), 163-70.

Ames, Lucia True, "The Home in the Tenement-House," *New England Magazine*, VII, new series (January 1893), 394-99.

Ames, Lucia True, "Saints and Sinners," *Lend a Hand: A Record of Progress*, XI (September 1893), 213-16.

Andrews, Fannie Fern, "A Course of Study in Good Will," *Religious Education*, VI (January 1912), 570-73.

Bartholdt, Richard, "The American Proposition for Peace," *The Independent*, LXI (July 5, 1906), 9-12.

Burton, Theodore E., "The Day of International Peace," *Saturday Evening Post*, (December 6, 1913), 3-4, 68-70.

Butler, Nicholas Murray, "America Responsible to the World," *Journal of American History*, III (October-December 1909), 481-88.

Carnegie, Andrew,"Americanism Versus Imperialism," *North American Review*, CLXVIII (January 1899), 1-13.

Carnegie, Andrew, "Americanism Versus Imperialism -- II," *North American Review*, CLXVIII (March 1899), 362-72.

Carnegie, Andrew, "An Appeal to American People, "*Journal of American History*, III (October-December 1909), 473-78.

Carnegie, Andrew, "Distant Possessions -- The Parting of the Ways," *North American Review*, CLXVII (August 1898), 239-48.

Carnegie, Andrew, "The Latest Panacea," *Journal of Education*, LXXVIII (July 10, 1913), 32-33.

Carnegie, Andrew, "The Manchester School and To-day," *Nineteenth Century*, XLIII (February 1898), 277-83.

Carnegie, Andrew. "The Opportunity of the United States," *North American Review*, CLXXIV (May 1902), 606-12.

Carnegie, Andrew, "The Presidential Election -- Our Duty," *North American Review*, CLXXI (October 1900), 495-507.

Carnegie, Andrew, "The Venezuelan Question," *North American Review*, CLXII (February 1896), 129-44.

Davis, Hayne, "The American Victory at Waterloo," *The Independent*, LIX (October 5, 1905), 777-79.

Davis, Hayne, "The Development of the Union," *The Independent*, LVI (May 12, 1904), 1072-76.

Davis, Hayne, "The Final Outcome of the Declaration of Independence," *The Independent*, LV (July 2, 1903), 1543-47.

Davis, Hayne, "The Man and the Movement," *The Independent*, LVIII (March 16, 1905), 589-93.

Davis, Hayne, "A Parliament of Nations," *The Outlook*, LXXIX (January 7, 1905),

Davis, Hayne, "President and the Interparliamentary Union," *Harper's Weekly*, XLVIII (October 22, 1904), 1611-12, 1627-28.

Davis, Hayne, "A World's Congress," *The Independent*, LVII (July 7, 1904), 11-19.

Dutton, Samuel T., "The Cultivation of the Sentiments," *Religious Education*, V (February 1911), 715-18.

Dutton, Samuel T., "Educational Efforts for International Peace," *Journal of Education*, LXVI (July 18, 1907), 87-89.

Dutton, Samuel T., "Missing Factor in the Peace Movement," *The Independent*, LXIV (April 9, 1908), 786-88.

Fulk, George, "The Intercollegiate Peace Association," *The Independent*, LXIV (June 19, 1908), 1396-97.

Ginn, Edwin, "All Honor to Japan," *Journal of Education*, LXVIII (November 19, 1908), 538-39.

Hale, Edward Everett, "The Hague Peace Conference," *The Forum*, XXXI (April 1901), 197-208.

Hale, Edward Everett, "The High Court of America," *Lend a Hand: A Record of Progress*, IV (December 1889), 845-85.

Hale, Edward Everett, "Out of the Mouth of Czars," *New England Magazine*, XIX, new series (January 1899), 580-85.

Hale, Edward Everett, "A Peace Perspective," *Chautauquan*, LIV (May 1909), 351-57.

Hale, Edward Everett, "The United States of Europe," *Old and New*, III (March 1871), 26-67.

Hale, Edward Everett, "The United States of Europe," *The Cosmopolitan*, XXVII (June 1899), 221-23.

Harper, Ida Husted, "The Work of the International Council of Women," *World To-Day*, XIII (July 1907), 696-701.

Holt, Hamilton, "The United States Peace Commission," *North American Review*, CLCIII (September 1910), 301-16.

Jefferson, Charles Edward, "The Delusion of Militarism," *Atlantic Monthly*, CIII (March 1909), 379-88.

Jefferson, Charles Edward, "The Nemesis of Armaments," *The Independent*, LXXIX (August 17, 1914), 247-48.

Jefferson, Charles, E., "The New Navy," *The Independent*, LVII (October 27, 1904), 972-74.

Jefferson, Charles E.,"'Peace at Any Price' Men," *The Independent*, LXVI (February 4, 1909), 224-27.

Jefferson, Charles E., "Some Fallacies of Militarism," *The Independent*, LXIV (February 27, 1908), 457-60.

Jordan, David Starr, "Bankers as Peace Guardians," *World To-Day*, XXI (February 1912), 1786-89.

Jordan, David Starr, "The Higher Politics," *The Independent*, LXXV (July 3, 1913), 12-14.

Jordan, David Starr, "The Impossible War," *The Independent*, LXXIV (February 27, 1913), 467-68.

Jordan, David Starr, "The Suddenness of War," *The Independent*, LXXV (September 18, 1913), 681-82.

Lochner, Louis P., "Cosmopolitan Clubs in American University Life," *Review of Reviews,* XXXVII (March 1908), 317-21.

Lockwood, Belva A., "The Growth of Peace Principles, and the Methods of Propagating Them," *American Magazine of Civics*, VI (May 1895), 504-15.

Lockwood, Belva A., "How Shall the Columbian Exposition Be Opened?" *American Journal of Politics*, I (July 1892), 44-47.

Lockwood, Belva A., "International Arbitration, Venezuela, Cuba, and the National Conference at Washington," *American Magazine of Civics*, IX (July 1896), 12-30.

Love, Alfred H., "Military Instruction in Schools, Colleges, and Churches," *American Journal of Politics*, V (August 1894), 205-211.

Love, Alfred H., "The Modern Peace Movement," *American Journal of Politics*, I (December 1892), 607-21.

Lynch, Frederick, "The Leaders of the New Peace Movement in America," *The Independent*, LXIX (September 22, 1910), 629-38.

Lynch, Frederick, "Peace and War in 1913," *Yale Review*, III, new series (January 1914), 272-84.

Marburg, Theodore, "Apostles of World Unity, VI--Hamilton Holt," *World Unity*, I (March 1928), 411-15.

Marburg, Theodore, "The Peace Movement Practical," *Maryland Quarterly,* No. 4 (November 1910), 15-16.

Mead, Edwin D., "Adjustment of Education to Contemporary Needs," *Educational Review*, XIX (May 1900), 472-80.

Mead, Edwin D., "Conquest and Justice," *Journal of Education*, LXXXI (January 28, 1915), 93.

Mead, Edwin D., "Edward Everett Hale," New England Magazine, XL, new series (July 1909), 521-29.

Mead, Edwin D., "Edwin Ginn, Citizen of the World," Journal of Education~~, LXXIX (Fe~~bruary 12, 1914), 173.

Mead, Edwin D., "England and Germany," Atlantic Monthly, CI (March 1908), 399-407.

Mead, Edwin D., "The German Point of View," Everybody's Magazine, XXXI (October 1914), 525-26.

Mead, Edwin D., "Harvard's International Services," Journal of Education, LXXIX (June 4, 1914), 625-26.

Mead, Edwin D., "Jean de Bloch and 'The Future of War,'" New England Magazine, XXVIII,new series (May 1903), 298-309.

Mead, Edwin D., "The Message of Puritanism for This Time," New England Magazine, IV new series (June 1891), 462-69.

Mead, Edwin D., "The Moral of the Navy League Flurry," Unity CLXXI (December 21, 1931), 223-25.

Mead, Edwin D., "Our Silver Experiment," American Journal of Politics, V (October 1894), 399-407.

Mead, Edwin D., "Peace Teaching in American Schools and Colleges," The Outlook, LXXXIII (June 16, 1906), 376-82.

Mead, Edwin D., "The President and the Big Navy," Unity CLXXI (December 14, 1931), 208-10.

Mead, Lucia Ames, "Apostles of World Unity, X--Edwin D. Mead," World Unity, II (August 1928), 337-43.

Mead, Lucia Ames, "Better Understanding of the Navy," The Outlook, XCI (April 17, 1909), 868.

Mead, Lucia Ames, "The Demand for More Battleships," The Independent, LXIV (February 13, 1908), 350-51.

Mead, Lucia Ames, "How Schools Should Instill Patriotism," Journal of Education, LXXX (July 9, 1914), 47-48.

Mead, Lucia Ames, "How to Further National Defense," The Outlook, LXXXVIII (January 4, 1908), 49-50.

Mead, Lucia Ames, "Practical Suggestions for Peace Day," Journal of Education, LXXIX (May 7, 1914), 522.

Mead, Lucia Ames, "Some Fallacies of Captain Mahan," The Arena, XL (August-September 1908), 163-70.

Mead, Lucia Ames, "Teaching Patriotism," Journal of Education, LXVI (July 18, 1907), 93.

Mead, Lucia Ames, "What Our Navy Costs Us," World To-Day, XVI (April 1909), 49-50.

Nasmyth, George W., "The Peace Movement in the Colleges," The Independent, LXVIII (February 17, 1910), 362-65.

Nasmyth, George W., "What I Saw in Germany," The Independent, LXXX (October 19, 1914), 91-92.

Nathan, Maud, "Women and Internationalism in Europe," The Independent, LXXVI (October 23, 1913), 169-70.

Slayden, James L., "The Alien Land Laws," Farm and Ranch, XXXII (May 24, 1913), 6.

Slayden, James L., "Enlightened Opinion Will End War," Farm and Ranch, XXXII (December 13, 1913), 2.

Slayden, James L., "Millions Wasted for War," Farm and Ranch, XXXI (March 9, 1912), 1.

Slayden, James L., "Selfishness is the Cause of War," Farm and Ranch, XXXII (November 29, 1913), 3-4.

Slayden, James L., "The Traffickers in War," Farm and Ranch, XXXII (November 22, 1913), 4-5.

Slayden, James L., "What Armed Peace Costs the Nations," Farm and Ranch, XXXII (December 6, 1913), 5-6.

Taft, William Howard, "Arbitration Treaties That Mean Something," The Independent, LXXVII (March 9, 1914), 338-41.

Taft, William Howard, "The Pending Arbitration Treaties: An Appeal for Their Ratification," The Century Magazine, LXXXIII (January 1912), 459-66.

Taft, William Howard, "Why Not Arbitrate Everything ?" The Independent, LXXVII (March 16, 1914), 379-80.

Trueblood, Benjamin F., "The Case for Limitation of Armaments," American Journal of International Law, II (October 1908), 758-71.

Trueblood, Benjamin F., "The International Peace Conference at The Hague," *New England Magazine*, XX, new series (August 1899), 651-68.

Trueblood, Benjamin F., "The Peace Movement -- What Ministers May Do," *Homelitic Review*, LIII (April 1907), 249-53.

Trueblood, Benjamin F., "The Progress and Outlook of the Peace Movement," *Homelitic Review*, LXI (January 1911), 17-21.

Trueblood, Benjamin F., "The United States, Great Britain and International Arbitration," *New England Magazine*, XIV, new series (March 1896), 21-27.

## Pamphlets, Reports, and Miscellaneous Publications

The American Arbitration League. *Annual Report*, 1885/1886. ed. Robert McMurdy. n.p.: n.p., 1886?

*The American Conference on International Arbitration, Held in Washington D.C., April 22 and 23, 1896*. New York: The Baker & Taylor Co., 1896.

*The American Friends' Peace Conference Held at Philadelphia, Twelfth Month 12th, 13th and 14th, 1901.* Philadelphia: Ferris & Leach, 1902.

American Peace Congress. *Proceedings of the Third American Peace Congress Held in Baltimore, Maryland, May 3 to 6, 1911.* ed. Eugene A. Noble. Baltimore: The Waverly Press, 1911.

American Peace Congress. *Book of the Fourth American Peace Congress, St. Louis, May 1, 2, 3, 1913.* ed. Walter B. Stevens. St. Louis: n.p., 1913.

American Peace Society. *Annual Report*, 1907-1917.

American School Peace League. *Annual Report of the American School Peace League*, 1909-1911.

American School Peace League. *Yearbook of the American School Peace League*, 1911/1912-1914/1915.

American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes. *Judicial Settlement of International Disputes.* Pamphlets Nos. 1-29, 1910-1917.

American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes. *Proceedings of the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes*, 1910-1916.

American Society of International Law. *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, 1906-1915.

Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs. *The Cornell Cosmopolitan Annual*. Vol. 1, 1906-1907. Ithaca, N.Y.: Andrus & Church, 1907.

Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs. *The Cosmopolitan Annual*. Vol. 2, Ithaca, N.Y.: Andrus & Church, 1908.

Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs. *The Cosmopolitan Annual*. Madison, Wisconsin: The Post, 1909.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. *Year Book*, 1911-1917, 1921.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education. *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*. Publication No. 4, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law. *The Final Acts of the First and Second Hague Peace Conference, Together with the Draft Convention on a Judicial Arbitration Court*. Pamphlet No. 10, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1915.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. *Report on the Teaching of International Law in Educational Institutions of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 18, 1913.

Chicago Peace Society. *Report*, 1910-1915.

Church Federation. *Annual Report of the Executive Committee*, 1909-1914.

Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. *Annual Report of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America*., 1908-1914.

*Der Friede und die Kirchen. Zur Erinnerung an den Besuch in England Abgestattet von Vertretern der Deutschen Christlichen Kirchen vom 26. Mai bis 3. Juni 1908. Einschliesslich des Besuchs in Schottland, vom 3. bis 7. Juni 1908*. London: Cassell & Co., 1908?

Interparliamentary Union. *Union Interparliamentaire pour L'Arbitrage International, Session de 1905, Compte Rendu de la XII^e Conference Tenue a Saint Louis, Missouri du 12 au 14 Septembre 1904.* Washington D.C.,: Government Printing Office, 1905.

Lake Mohonk Conference. *Report of the Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration,* 1895-1916.

National Arbitration and Peace Congress. *Proceedings of the National Arbitration and Peace Congress, New York, April 14th to 17th, 1907.* ed. Robert Erskine Ely. New York: n.p., 1907.

National Arbitration League. *The National Arbitration League*. ed. Robert McMurdy. Washington, D.C.: n.p., 1884?

National Peace Congress. *Proceedings of the Second National Peace Congress, Chicago, May 2 to 5, 1909.* ed. Charles E. Beals. Chicago: Peterson Linotype Company, 1909.

New England Arbitration and Peace Congress. *Report of the Proceedings of the New England Arbitration and Peace Congress, Hartford and New Britain, May 8 to 11, 1910*. ed. James L. Tryon. Boston: American Peace Society, 1910.

New York Peace Society, *Yearbook*, 1910-1917.

The Peace Society of the City of New York. *Annual Reports, Constitution, List of Meetings and List of Members for the Year 1906-1907*. New York: The Irving Press, 1907.

*Second American Conference on International Arbitration, Held in Washington, D.C., January 12, 1904.* Washington, D.C.: January 12, 1904. Washington, D.C.: Gibson Bros., 1904.

The Socialist Party of the United States of America. *National Convention of the Socialist Party, Held at Indianapolis, Ind., May 12 to 18, 1912.* ed. John Spargo. Chicago: The Socialist Party, 1912?

The Socialist Party of the United States of America. *Socialist Congressional Campaign Book, 1914*. ed. Information Department of the Socialist Party. Chicago: The Socialist Party, 1914?

Trans-Mississippi Commercial Congress. *Official Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Session of the Trans-Mississippi Commercial Congress Held at San Antonio, Texas, November 22, 23, 24, and 25, 1910*. n.p.: n.p., n.d.

The Twentieth Century Club of Boston, 1894-1904. Boston: The Davis Press, 1904.

Universal Peace Congress. Official Report of the Fifth Universal Peace Congress Held at Chicago, United States of America, August 14 to 20, 1893. Boston: American Peace Society, 1894?

Universal Peace Congress. Official Report of the Thirteenth Universal Peace Congress Held at Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A., October Third to Eighth, 1904. ed. Benjamin F. Trueblood. Boston: The Peace Congress Committee, 1904.

World Peace Foundation. World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1910-1915.

## Secondary Works and Articles

Abrams, Irwin. "The Emergence of the International Law Societies," Review of Politics, XIX (July 1957), 361-80.

Atkinson, Henry A. Theodore Marburg: The Man and His Work. New York: Morton Littman Printing Co., 1951.

Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American People. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 4th edition, 1955.

Barrows, Isabel, A Sunny Life: The Biography of Samuel June Barrows. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1913.

Bartlett, Ruhl, J. The League to Enforce Peace. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944.

Beales, A.C.F. The History of Peace: A Short Account of the Organized Movements for International Peace. New York: The Dial Press, 1931.

Beisner, Robert L. "Gloom, Gloom, and Scarce One Ray of Light: Ruminations of E.L. Godkin and Charles Eliot Norton," American Heritage, XVIII (August 1967), 65-71.

Berman, Milton. John Fiske: The Evolution of a Popularizer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961.

Blake, Nelson M. "The Olney-Pauncefote Treaty of 1897," American Historical Review, L (January 1945), 228-43.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943.

Burns, Edward McNall. *David Starr Jordan: Prophet of Freedom.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953.

Blodgett, Geoffrey. *The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.

Campbell, A.E. *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1960.

Campbell, Charles S. *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957.

Campbell, John P. "Taft, Roosevelt, and the Arbitration Treaties of 1911," *Journal of American History*, LIII (September 1966), 279-98.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. *The International Conferences of American States, 1889-1928*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1931.

Crissey, Forrest. *Theodore E. Burton: American Statesman*. Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1956.

Curti, Merle, *The American Peace Crusade, 1815-1860*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1929.

Curti, Merle Eugene. "Bryan and World Peace," *Smith College Studies in History*, XVI (April-July 1931). Northampton, Mass.

Curti, Merle. "Jane Addams on Human Nature," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXII (April-June 1961), 240-53.

Curti, Merle. *Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636-1936*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1946.

Daniels, Jonathan. *The End of Innocence*. Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott Company, 1954.

Davis, Calvin DeArmond. *The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962.

Earhart, Mary. *Frances Willard: From Prayers to Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944.

Ekirch, Arthur A., Jr. *The Civilian and the Military*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.

Evans, Howard. Sir Randal Cremer: His Life and Work. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1910.

Filene, Peter, "The World Peace Foundation and Progressivism, 1910-1918," New England Quarterly, XXXVI (December 1963), 478-501.

Flourney, F.R. "British Liberal Theories of International Relations (1848-1898)," Journal of the History of Ideas, VII (April 1946), 195-217.

Fredrickson, George M. The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

Grenville, John A.S., and Young, George Berkeley. Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, 1873-1917. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

Gresham, Matilda. The Life of Walter Quintin Gresham, 1832-1895. 2 vols., Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1919.

Harrington, Fred H. "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII (September 1935), 211-30.

Hawkins, Chauncy J. Samuel Billings Capen: His Life and Work. Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1914.

Hemleben, Sylvester John. Plans for World Peace Through Six Centuries. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1943.

Hendrick, Burton J. The Life of Andrew Carnegie. 2 vols., Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1932.

Hirschfeld, Charles. "Brooks Adams and American Nationalism," American Historical Review, LXIX (January 1964), 371-92.

Hofstadter, Richard. The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955.

Hofstadter, Richard. Social Darwinism in American Thought. New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1959 revised edition.

Holloway, Jean. Edward Everett Hale. A Biography. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1956.

Holt, W. Stull. Treaties Defeated by the Senate: A Study of the Struggle Between President and Senate over the Conduct of Foreign Relations. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933.

[no editors] *The Interparliamentary Union from 1889-1939.* Lausanne, Switzerland: Payot & Cie., 1939.

Kuehl, Warren F. *Hamilton Holt: Journalist, Internationalist, Educator*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960.

LaFeber, Walter. *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963.

Lasch, Christopher. "The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," *Journal of Southern History*, XXIV (August 1958), 319-31.

Leech, Margaret. *In the Days of McKinley*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959.

Levermore, Charles Herbert. *Samuel Train Dutton: A Biography*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

Levine, Lawrence W. *Defender of the Faith, William Jennings Bryan: The Last Decade, 1915-1925.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Link, Arthur S. *Wilson the Diplomatist*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957.

Link, Arthur S. *Wilson: The New Freedom*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956.

Link, Arthur S. *Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Macfarland, Charles S. *Christian Unity in the Making: The First Twenty-Five Years of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1905-1930.* New York: The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1948.

Macfarland, Charles S. *Pioneers for Peace Through Religion, Based on the Records of The Church Peace Union (Founded by Andrew Carnegie), 1914-1945*. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1946.

McCormick, Thomas J. "Commentary," *Studies on the Left*, III, No. 1 (1962), 28-33.

McGann, Thomas F. *Argentina, The United States and the Inter-American System, 1880-1914*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.

Mann, Arthur. *Yankee Reformers in the Urban Age*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1954.

Mathews, Joseph J. "Informal Diplomacy in the Venezuelan Crisis of 1896," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, L (September 1963), 195-212.

May, Ernest R. "American Imperialism: A Reinterpretation," *Perspectives in American History*, I (1967), 123-286.

May, Ernest R. *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961.

May, Henry F. *The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Own Time, 1912-1917*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959.

Morrison, Joseph L. *Josephus Daniels: The Small-d Democrat*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966.

Muller, Dorothea R. "Josiah Strong and American Nationalism: A Reevaluation," *Journal of American History*, LIII (December 1966), 487-503.

Neale, R.G. *Great Britain and United States Expansion, 1898-1900*. Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1966.

Nevins, Allan. *Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1932.

Notter, Harley. *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson*. New York: Russell & Russell, 1965 edition.

Osgood, Robert Endicott. *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.

Partington, Frederick E. *The Story of Mohonk*. Fulton, N.Y.: The Morrill Press, 1911.

Perkins, Dexter, *A History of the Monroe Doctrine*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1955 edition.

Pletcher, David M. *The Awkward Years: American Foreign Policy under Garfield and Arthur*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1963.

Porter, Kirk H., and Johnson, Donald Bruce, eds. *National Party Platforms, 1840-1964*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966.

Pringle, Henry F. *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft: A Biography*. 2 vols., New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1939.

Rappaport, Armin, The Navy League of the United States. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962.

Reinsch, Paul S. Public International Unions: Their Work and Organization. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1911.

Schmitt, Bernadotte E. The Coming of the War, 1914. 2 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930.

Smith, Willard H. "William Jennings Bryan and the Social Gospel," Journal of American History, LIII (June 1966), 41-60.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret. The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939.

Tate, Merze. The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942.

Tompkins, E. Berkeley. "Scylla and Charybdis: The Anti-Imperialist Dilemma in the Election of 1900," Pacific Historical Review, XXXVI (May 1967), 143-61.

Weber, Francis J. "The Pious Fund of the Californias," Hispannic American Historical Review, XLIII (February 1963), 78-94.

Whitney, Edson L. The American Peace Society: A Centennial History, Washington, D.C.: The American Peace Society, 1928.

Whyte, Frederic. The Life of W.T. Stead. 2 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925.

Wilgus, A. Curtis. "James G. Blaine and the Pan American Movement," Hispanic American Historical Review, V (November 1922), 662-708.

Wreszin, Michael. Oswald Garrison Villard: Pacifist at War. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965.

## Unpublished Studies

Chatfield, Charles E. "Pacifism and American Life, 1914-1941." Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1965.

Davis, Calvin DeArmond. "The United States and the Movement for a Third Hague Peace Conference." Paper delivered at a session of the meeting of the American Historical Association, Washington, D.C., December, 1964. (In the author's possession, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.)

Doherty, Robert Welsey. "Alfred H. Love and the Universal Peace Union." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1962.

Dubin, Martin David. "The Development of the Concept of Collective Security in the American Peace Movement, 1899-1917." Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1960.

Hines, Paul David. "Norman Angell: Peace Movement, 1911-1915." Ed. D. dissertation, Ball State Teachers College, 1964.

Hovey, Amos Arnold. "A History of the Religious Phase of the American Movement for International Peace to the Year 1914." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1930.

Khan, Rais Ahmad. "The United States and International Arbitration, 1895-1912." Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1962.

Marchand, Charles Roland. "The Ultimate Reform: American Attitudes toward Peace and Arbitration during the Progressive Era." Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1964.

Thomas, Richard Harlan. "Jenkin Lloyd Jones: Lincoln's Soldier of Civic Righteousness." Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers--The State University, 1967.

Tinsley, William W. "The American Preparedness Movement, 1913-1916." Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1954.

Tompkins, Edwin Berkley. "The Great Debate: Anti-Imperialism in the United States, 1890-1920." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1963.